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A Shaky Foundation?  John Owen and Thomas F. Torrance on Christ’s Mediation 
 The goal of this dissertation is to explore how the theology proper of both John Owen and 
Thomas F. Torrance informs their respective accounts of Christ’s mediation.  To this end, the primary 
question behind the entire investigation is how Owen and Torrance conceptualize God and all things 
in relation to God. I have chosen Owen and Torrance as dialogue partners because they offer us two 
different approaches to ‘God and all things in relation to God’ from within the same broadly 
Reformed tradition.  Furthermore, both are also catholic theologians, engaging with, and 
appropriating sources throughout the ancient, medieval, Reformation, and modern Christian 
traditions, and in the case of Torrance, the traditions of both East and West.  In addition, both give 
significant attention to Christ’s priesthood.  This emphasis on Christ, combined with their 
preoccupation with God, allows us to see how both Owen and Torrance move from God in himself to 
God for us.  Furthermore, Owen’s scholastic and broadly Thomistic theology is what Torrance seeks 
to avoid at every turn.  Therefore, by placing Owen and Torrance in dialogue, I test the ‘Calvin versus 
the Calvinists’ thesis that is by and large disproven today by historians showing both the continuity 
and discontinuity of Calvin with his heirs.  The Reformed shift to a soteriological reading of theology 
proper – as I will develop in this study – means, I argue, that the relationship of one Reformed 
generation to another is more complex than both sides suggest.   
 After investigating both thinkers’ understanding of theology proper, God as one and God as 
tripersonal, I then show how the doctrine of God informs Christ’s hypostatic union and Christ as 
mediator.  The main body of the work consists of understanding each thinker on his own terms, 
though critiques, mainly related to conflations of God in se and God for us, are offered along the 
way.  Throughout the study, I argue that in both Owen and Torrance various conflations arise that 
are all, in some way, related to their soteriological reading of God in se.  By conflation, I simply mean 
that something outside of God in himself – anything other than God’s eternally perfect being – 
becomes the foundation for our understanding of God.  I show that in both Owen and Torrance, 
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soteriology, at least at points, becomes the foundation for theology proper as God’s saving works in 
Christ become determinative for our understanding of God.  All of this builds toward a constructive 
conclusion that calls for a retrieval of God’s goodness as the solution to avoiding conflation in our 
theological systems.  While less intentional and radical in Owen, and more purposely revisionary in 
Torrance, the turn toward a soteriological foundation is one that places theology proper on an 
insecure foundation.    
 In chapter 1, I investigate Owen’s understanding of God’s being and attributes.  In chapter 2, 
I turn to Owen’s Trinitarian theology with particular attention to the divine processions and missions 
showing that Owen’s use of the covenant of redemption leads him to inadequately distinguish God 
ad intra and God ad extra. In chapter 3, I show that Owen’s understanding of the hypostatic union 
and Christ’s two natures follows Chalcedon and Aquinas and a Thomistic understanding of God in se 
and God for us, though his understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit upon Christ’s human nature 
reveals his continual struggle to relate God in se and God for us.  Finally, in chapter 4, I show that 
Owen’s theology of Christ as mediator seeks to hold together Aquinas’s metaphysically motivated 
Christology and Calvin’s office Christology.  In chapter 5, I show how Torrance’s understanding of 
God’s being is determined by the Son’s incarnation.  The economic is the immanent because Jesus 
Christ is homoousios.  In chapter 6, I investigate Torrance’s theology of the three divine persons, 
arguing that Torrance’s understanding of hypostasis and being pushes his Trinitarian theology in a 
somewhat modalist direction. In chapter 7, I show that Torrance understands the Son’s mission, not 
as a communication of God’s goodness, but as a self-communication – that is revelation – that 
demands a soteriological starting point.  Lastly, in chapter 8, I turn to Torrance’s theology of election 
and Christ’s mediation as the vicarious human being.  I argue that Torrance’s construction aligns 
Christ’s divinity too closely with Christ’s humanity.  By concluding with a retrieval of God’s goodness, 
I advance our understanding of how Christ is predestined for his redemptive mission without letting 
soteriology slip into our foundation, theology proper.
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‘A small error in the beginning is a great one in the end.’1 
 
The Foundation of Theology Proper 
 
 Theology is best understood, says Aquinas, as the study of ‘God and all things in relation to 
God.’  This relation, how we understand God ad intra and God ad extra, is the foundation of all 
theology.  Yet articulating a theology that takes God’s creative and redemptive work seriously while 
maintaining that God in se, and nothing outside of God, is the foundation of all these works toward 
the outside, is a hard task.  John Owen and Thomas F. Torrance are two theologians who are 
preoccupied with God in se and God for us – albeit in different ways.  In this study, I will explore the 
doctrine of God in both Owen and Torrance, specifically how they understand God and all things in 
relation to God.  Theology proper influences, and in some ways determines, every other loci of one’s 
theological system.  Theology proper is the study of God’s inner life – his being, attributes, and the 
processions of the divine persons along with God’s works.  The major claim of this study is that 
theology proper is the foundation of the entire theological system.  I will then show how theology 
informs both Owen’s and Torrance’s accounts of Christ’s hypostatic union and Christ as mediator.  
The main body of the work consists of understanding each thinker on their own terms, though 
critiques, mainly related to the transposition of God in se and God for us, are offered along the way.  
Throughout the work of both Owen and Torrance various conflations arise that are all, in some way, 
related to their soteriological reading of God in se.  By conflation, I simply mean that something 
outside of God in himself – anything other than God’s eternally perfect being – becomes the 
foundation for our understanding of God and God’s purposes.  Following Aquinas, my approach to 
God ad intra and God ad extra is one that seeks to give primacy to God’s being.  God is the ground, 
or foundation of the existence of all things, therefore God (principium essendi) is primary.  It is true 
 
 1 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Prologus.  ‘Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine.’  
11 
 
that our human knowing (principium cognoscendi) first understands God through contingent effects, 
as these effects are created by God.  Effects have their being in relation to God, God’s existence 
being inferred through the epistemological process.  The principium cognoscendi, though, is always 
determined by its foundation – the principium essendi – God in se.  Another way to think of 
conflation, as I intend, is that at points both Owen and Torrance unintentionally do not sufficiently 
safeguard against allowing humanity’s need for salvation to become determinative of God’s being.2  
In both Owen and Torrance, soteriology becomes the foundation for theology proper as God’s saving 
works in Christ become determinative for our understanding of God’s being.  This happens in both 
thinkers’, as I will attempt to show, due to a narrowing of revelation that removes the similitude that 
exists in a Thomistic understanding of the analogia entis as developed by Eric Pryzwara.  As a result, 
the epistemological impact of the effects, to differing degrees in both Owen and Torrance, are 
somewhat muted.  Yet, an analogical understanding that affirms both God’s similitude with 
creatures and his ever-greater dissimilarity allows for proper distinguishing, but never conflation, of 
God ad intra (order of being) and God ad extra (order of knowing).3  While all human knowledge 
begins in the economy, the analogia entis reasons from created effects back to their foundation, 
which is God the Creator.  Torrance and Owen both move away from this understanding of analogy 
precisely because the similitude that exists between God and creatures is not operative in their 
theology.  ‘Causal likeness is the ground of analogical predication.’4   
 All this builds toward a constructive conclusion that calls for a retrieval of God’s goodness as 
the solution to avoiding conflation in our theological systems.  While less intentional and radical in 
Owen, and more purposely revisionary in Torrance, the turn toward a soteriological foundation is 
one that places theology proper on a somewhat unstable ground because this turn toward 
 
2  See, Muller, DLGTT:290 and C. Stephen Evans, Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of 
Religion (Downers Grove, IL:  InterVarsity Press, 2002), 86. 
3  Therefore, to speak of conflation and analogy is to have the order of being and knowing in view as 
will be the case throughout this study.    
4 Sebastian Rehnman, ‘The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy,’ in A Companion to Reformed 
Orthodoxy, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 40, ed. Christopher M. 
Bellitto (Leiden, The Netherland:  Brill, 2013), 360.  
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soteriology marginalizes God’s communicative nature that results from his ontological goodness.  
Such a foundation is insecure because Owen, at points, risks properly maintaining the priority of God 
ad intra for understanding God and God’s economy.  Unintentionally, at a few key points, Owen lets 
soteriological concerns inform his understanding of God ad intra.  As we shall see, this occurs largely 
due to Owen’s understanding of God’s justice and his use of the pactum salutis.  Torrance more 
intentionally aligns God in se and God for us because for him there is no difference between the two.  
Even Rahner’s maxim is a bit too dualistic and abstract for Torrance.  Rather than understanding that 
the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, Rahner ‘grounded the former in the latter…and so a 
moment of abstraction appears to be introduced between what God is in himself and the mode of 
his self-revelation and self-communication to us.’5  Yet the result is that Torrance equates, in such a 
way as to conflate, God ad intra and God ad extra throughout his theology.      
 
Why John Owen and Thomas F. Torrance? 
 
 I have chosen Owen and Torrance as dialogue partners, because they offer us two different 
approaches to ‘God and all things in relation to God’ from within the same broadly Reformed 
tradition.  Furthermore, both are also catholic theologians engaging with and appropriating sources 
throughout the Eastern, ancient, medieval, Reformation, and modern Latin (i.e. Western) Christian 
tradition.6  In addition, both give much attention to Christ’s priesthood.  This emphasis on Christ, 
combined with their preoccupation with God, allows us to see how both Owen and Torrance move 
from God in se to God for us and where they may not properly distinguish between the two.  
Furthermore, Torrance seeks to avoid Owen’s scholastic and broadly Thomistic theology.  Therefore, 
by placing Owen and Torrance in dialogue, I test the ‘Calvin versus the Calvinists’ thesis that is by 
 
 5  Thomas F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh, UK:  T&T 
Clark, 1994), 79.  
 6  The modern must be understood as the modern of their day respectively, of course.  Torrance is 
greatly influenced by the Greek patristic fathers.  Owen is less influenced by the East but certainly read and 
knows the dimensions of the tradition.      
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and large disproven today.7  I am sympathetic with Muller’s thesis that notes both the continuity, 
development, and discontinuity among the Magisterial Reformers and the Reformed Orthodox.  
However, the Reformed shift to a soteriological reading of theology proper – as I will develop in this 
study – suggests that the relationship of one reformed generation to another is more complex than 
either ‘side’ admits.8   
  Throughout the last several decades, studies on Owen’s life and thought – a subject long 
neglected by theologians and historians alike – have grown.  While often more descriptive than 
constructive in nature, this is a welcome development as Owen certainly ranks among the best and 
most influential of the seventeenth-century Puritan divines.9  Owen’s theological and political career 
 
 7  The Calvin versus the Calvinists thesis makes the claim that Calvin avoids the traps of scholastic and 
legalistic theology, but the reformed tradition after Calvin, especially following Beza, turned back to 
scholasticism and Greek metaphysics.  The most extreme version of this thesis might be Torrance’s own.  See, 
Thomas F. Torrance, Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell (Edinburgh, UK: T&T Clark, 
1996); passim.  See also, Basil Hall, ‘Calvin against the Calvinists,’ in John Calvin, ed. G.E. Duffield (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1966), 19-37; M. Charles Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology: The Doctrine of Assurance 
(Edinburgh, UK: The Handsel Press, 1985); James B. Torrance, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of the Westminster 
Theology,’ in The Westminster Confession in the Church Today, ed. Alasdair I.C. Heron (Edinburgh, UK: St 
Andrew Press, 1982), 40-54; R.T. Kendal, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1997).  
Richard Muller argues that this approach misses the continuity of the reformed tradition (though Muller is 
clear the reformed tradition is not monolithic) and that the return to the scholastic method does not turn the 
content into a rigid and legalistic system.  See, Richard Muller, PRRD 1: 27-32 and Richard A. Muller, After 
Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2003).  I am sympathetic to Muller’s thesis, though often times the breadth of the 
reformed tradition and the points of discontinuity are not given the attention they deserve.  See, Richard A. 
Muller, ‘Calvin and the “Calvinists”:  Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between Reformation and 
Orthodoxy.  Part One,’  Calvin Theological Journal 30 (1995):  345-375; Richard A. Muller, ‘Calvin and the 
“Calvinists”:  Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between Reformation and Orthodoxy.  Part Two.’  
Calvin Theological Journal 31 (1996):  125-160. 
 8   Stephen Holmes’ thoughtful and careful discussion is worth mentioning.  Holmes finds more 
continuity than discontinuity between Calvin and his followers, but helpfully shows that one must not pick 
between the ‘orthodox’ and ‘neo-orthodox.’ Holmes rightly reminds us that there is not, and never has been, 
one reformed tradition.  Holmes helpfully calls us to begin with what the different reformed approaches agree 
upon and remain generous to those with whom we disagree.  Stephen R. Holmes, ‘Calvin against the 
Calvinists?,’ in Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2002), 68-85. 
 9  For biographies of Owen see:  Tim Cooper, John Owen, Richard Baxter and the Formation of 
Nonconformity (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011); Crawford Gribben, John Owen and English 
Puritanism: Experiences of Defeat, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology, ed. Richard A. Muller (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2016); Andrew Thomson, ‘Life of Dr. Owen,’ in The Works of John Owen, ed. William 
H. Gould, 24 vols. (Edinburgh & London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850-1855); Peter Toon, God’s Statesman: The 
Life and Work of John Owen (Exeter: Paternoster, 1971).  For studies that treat doctrinal topics in Owen’s 
works see, Sinclair B. Ferguson, John Owen on the Christian Life (Edinburgh, UK:  Banner of Truth, 1987); Joel R. 
Beeke, Assurance of Faith:  Calvin, English Puritanism and the Dutch Second Reformation, in American 
University Studies 7 (New York, NY:  Lang, 1994); R.C. Gleason, John Calvin and John Owen on  Mortification:  A 
Comparative Study in Reformed Spirituality, in Studies in Church History 3 (New York, NY:  Lang, 1995); Carl 
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ranges from the parish pulpit, to the personal chaplain to Oliver Cromwell during the years of the 
Interregnum, to vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford.  As a student at Oxford, Owen learned 
metaphysics from his Thomistic- minded tutor, Thomas Barlow.  Owen’s indebtedness to Thomistic 
patterns of thought is clearly seen throughout his works, though perhaps more prominently in his 
early works.  This is shown in the work of both Trueman and Cleveland.10  The polemical nature of 
Owen’s work as seen in his dialogue with the Arminians and the Socinians is important for the claims 
 
Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1998); Sebastian 
Rehnman, ‘Is the Narrative of Redemptive History Trichotomous or Dichotomous? A Problem for Federal 
Theology, Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis, 80, no. 3 (2000): 296-308; Rehnman, Divine Discourse: 
The Theological Methodology of John Owen (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002); Trueman, John Owen: 
Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007); Kelly Kapic, 
Communion with God: The Divine and the Human in the Theology of John Owen (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2007); Brian Kay, Trinitarian Spirituality: John Owen and the Doctrine of God in Western Devotion 
(Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2007); Alan Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration: John Owen and the Coherence of 
Christology (London, UK: T&T Clark, 2007); Christopher Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011); Trumean, ‘The Necessity of the Atonement,’ in Drawn into Controversie:  
reformed theological diversity and debates within seventeenth-century British puritanism, ed. Michael A. G. 
Haykin and Mark Jones (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011):  204-222; Kelly M. Kapic and 
Mark Jones, ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to John Owen’s Theology (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2012); Trueman, ‘Atonement and the Covenant of Redemption: John Owen on the 
Nature of Christ’s Satisfaction,’ in From Heaven He Came and Sought Her: Definite Atonement in Historical, 
Biblical, Theological, and Pastoral Perspective, ed. David Gibson and Jonathan Gibson (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 
2013), 201-223; Ryan McGraw, A Heavenly Directory: Trinitarian Piety, Public Worship and a Reassessment of 
John Owen’s Theology, Reformed Historical Theology, vol. 29, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Göttingen, Germany: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014); Edwin E.M. Tay, The Priesthood of Christ: Atonement in the Theology of John 
Owen, Studies In Christian History and Thought, ed. Alan P.F. Sell, D.W. Bebbington, Clyde Binfield, Gerald 
Bray, Grayson Carter, and Dennis Ngien (Milton Keyknes, UK: Paternoster, 2014); Andrew Leslie, The Light of 
Grace: On the Authority of Scripture and Christian Faith, Reformed Historical Theology, vol. 34, ed. Herman J. 
Selderhuis (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015); B. Hoon Woo, ‘The Pactum Salutis and the 
Trinity: John Owen,’ in The Promise of the Trinity: The Covenant of Redemption in the Theologies of Witsius, 
Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius, Reformed Historical Theology 48, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Göttingen, 
Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018), 85-137; T. Robert Baylor, ‘“He Humbled Himself”:  Trinity, 
Covenant, and the Gracious Condescension of the Son in John Owen,’ in Trinity Without Hierarchy:  Reclaiming 
Nicene Orthodoxy in Evangelical Theology, ed. Michael F. Bird and Scott Harrower (Grand Rapids, MI:  Kregel 
Academic, 2019):  165-194;  John W. Tweeddale, John Owen and Hebrews: The Foundation of Biblical 
Interpretation, in T&T Clark Studies in English Theology, ed. Karen Kilby, Michael Higton, and Stephen R. 
Holmes (London, UK:  T&T Clark, 2019).    
 10  Trueman, Claims of Truth, 39, 42-43; Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen, passim.  In pointing out 
this Thomstic influence, which Owen would have first learned from his tutor Thomas Barlow at Oxford, it must 
be remembered that Owen is an eclectic theologian.  See, Richard A. Muller, ‘Thomas Barlow on the Liabilities 
of the “New Philosophy”: Reflections of a Rebellious Ancilla in the Era of Protestant Orthodoxy, in 
Scholasticism Reformed: Essays in Honour of Willem van Asselt, ed. Maarten Wisse, Marcel Sarot, Willemien 
Otten (Leiden, The Netherlands:  Brill, 2010) 179-195; ‘Reformation, Orthodoxy, "Christian Aristotelianism", 
and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,’ Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis/Dutch Review of 
Church History 81, no.3 (January 2001), 306-325;  ‘Not Scotist: understandings of being, univocity, and analogy 
in early-modern Reformed thought,’  Reformation & Renaissance Review 14, no.2 (2012), 127-150; ‘Reformed 
Theology between 1600 and 1800,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology, 1600-1800, ed. Ulrich L. 
Lehner, Richard A. Muller, and A. G. Roeber (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 167-168. 
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of this study.  Owen’s engagement with the Arminians focuses on the doctrine of God and the 
passible god Owen believes such a system constructs.  While Owen’s engagement with the Socinians 
is also about theology proper as the Socinians reject the divinity of the Son and the Trinity, Owen is 
greatly concerned about the overly rationalistic approach to Scripture employed by the Socinians, 
especially Owen’s English interlocutor, John Biddle.  This engagement is very important as it is one of 
the main reasons that Owen begins to constrain his understanding of revelation in a Christ-exclusive 
direction that greatly limits the role of natural theology in his theological constructions.11   
 Placing T.F. Torrance within the Christian tradition is a fascinating yet difficult endeavour.  In 
many ways, Torrance is a wonderful example of a reformed catholic.  As a Church of Scotland 
minister and professor at the University of Edinburgh, Torrance works within the reformed tradition, 
but his corpus of work reflects a deep understanding and appreciation for the catholic theological 
tradition, especially the Greek Patristics.  In fact, Torrance uniquely engages in a theology of retrieval 
that serves as a model for how to work constructively within the wider tradition.  This is especially 
true of the way Torrance understands Athanasius and Karl Barth.12  In addition, Torrance initiated 
 
 11  On Owen’s engagement with both the Arminians and Socinians see, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 22-
24.  
 12  Though it would be helpful if Torrance reflected more upon his development of Athanasius and 
Barth.  Torrance wrote two books on Karl Barth:  Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early 
Theology 1910-1931 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1962); Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1990).  Torrance appeals to Athanasius throughout his writings but see especially, The Trinitarian 
Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Church (London, UK: T&T Clark, 1991) and Theology in 
Reconciliation: Essays Toward Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock 
Publishers, 1996), 215-266.  For biographies of Torrance, see:  Alister McGrath, TF Torrance: An Intellectual 
Biography (London, UK: T&T Clark, 1999); Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity, Great 
Theologians Series, ed. John Webster, Trevor Hart, and Douglas B. Farrow (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2009).  For treatments of Torrance’s theology see, Elmer M. Colyer, The Nature of Doctrine in T.F. 
Torrance’s Theology (Eugen, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2001) and How to Read T.F. Torrance: Understanding 
His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2001); Gerrit Scott Dawosn, ed., An Introduction 
to Torrance Theology: Discovering the Incarnate Saviour (New York, NY: T&T Clark, 2007); Myk Habets, 
Theology in Transposition: A Constructive Appraisal of T.F. Torrance Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013); 
Paul D. Molnar, Faith, Freedom, and the Spirit: The Economic Trinity in Barth, Torrance and Contemporary 
Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015); Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the 
Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology, 2nd ed. (London, UK:  Bloomsbury, 
2017); Alexander S. Radcliff, The Claim of Humanity in Christ:  Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of 
T.F. and J.B. Torrance (Cambridge, UK:  James Clarke & Co., 2017);  Paul D. Molnar, "Thomas F. Torrance," in 
David A. S. Fergusson and Mark W. Elliott, eds., The History of Scottish Theology, Volume III: The Long 
Twentieth Century (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), 227-241; Paul D. Molnar and Myk Habets, ed., 
T&T Clark Handbook of Thomas F. Torrance (London, UK:  T&T Clark, 2020).  
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ecumenical dialogue with the Greek Orthodox churches producing a statement on the Holy Trinity.13 
And yet, Torrance’s idiosyncratic appropriation of the tradition makes placing him within that 
tradition difficult.  
 Like Owen, most studies of Torrance come from sympathetic theologians who generally 
follow Torrance’s theological methodology.  Such a methodology follows the Hellenization thesis of 
western Christianity first put forth by the likes of Adolph van Harnack, Théodore de Régnon, and Karl 
Rahner.  This claims that Greek metaphysics invaded theology and led to a static, rather than 
dynamic, understanding of God.  Thomistic theology falls into this very trap for Torrance. Therefore, 
theology must begin with salvation history and God’s acts in Christ, not with abstract metaphysics.14  
Torrance’s call for a revision of Chalcedon and his favourable use of Moltmann and Jϋngel leads 
Torrance beyond Owen (and Barth) to a more radical revision of classical theology than most 
recognize or admit.15   
 
Overview of the Thesis  
 
 Both Owen and Torrance are theological giants whose work demands careful study. 
Therefore, while the main chapters of this work seek to uncover and unfold the points of conflation 
that arise in each thinker’s work, I will also pay attention to how a shared Reformed catholic 
 
 13  “Agreed Statement on the Holy Trinity,” in Theological Dialogue between Orthodox and Reformed 
Churches, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1993):  219-226; see also, Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Finding 
Common Ground on the Doctrine of the Trinity,’ Touchstone: A Journal of Ecumenical Orthodoxy 5 (1992): 20-
27; Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Commentary: Agreed Statement on the Holy Trinity,’ in Trinitarian Perspectives: 
Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 127-143.    
 14  Torrance calls the Thomistic and metaphysical approach to theology ‘The Latin Heresy.’  See, 
Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy,’ in Divine Interpretation: Studies in Medieval and Modern 
Hermeneutics, ed. Adam Nigh and Todd Speidell (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2017), 44-67.    
 15  Torrance believes that Moltmann is on the right track with his understanding of God’s suffering and 
largely follows Jungel’s theology of the cross.  See, Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One 
Being Three Persons (London, UK: T&T Clark, 2016), 54 no.81; Thomas F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 83-
84.  Moltmann contributed to the collection of essays published in honour of Torrance.  See, Jϋrgen Moltmann 
‘Creation and Redemption,’ in Creation, Christ, and Culture:  Studies in Honour of T.F. Torrance, Richard W.A. 
McKinney, ed. (Edinburgh, UK:  T&T Clark, 1976):  119-134. 
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tradition is appropriated in both thinkers’ theology.  I will pay particular attention to the influence of 
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, and, in the case of Torrance, Karl Barth, though other important 
influences appear along the way.  Notably, I use Stephen Charnock to critique Torrance’s 
understanding of immutability.  In my conclusion, I appeal to Charnock once again as a Reformed 
thinker working with a Thomistic account of divine goodness.  To this end, I begin first with Owen, 
simply because he precedes Torrance historically.  In chapter 1, I investigate Owen’s understanding 
of God’s being and attributes.  Aquinas’ influence is immediately evident, though Owen does not 
properly relate God in se and God for us when he makes God’s vindictive justice necessary instead of 
contingent.  In chapter 2, I turn to Owen’s Trinitarian theology, giving particular attention to the 
divine processions and missions.  In this chapter, I show that Owen’s construction of the pactum 
salutis follows Aquinas’ theology of the divine missions, but the covenant of redemption is not quite 
a decree and not quite economic.  Once more, Owen risks too closely aligning God ad intra and God 
ad extra when he introduces a new relation between the Father and the Son in his construction.  
Many supporters of the pactum salutis say this new relation is in view of the incarnation.  However, 
this is less than clear in Owen’s Works.  In Aquinas, the new relation comes at Christ’s incarnation as 
God now relates to the Son’s created and assumed human nature.  Has Owen pulled this new 
relation into God’s inner life?  If so, Owen’s foundation is questionable as he unintentionally risks 
letting humanity’s need for salvation determine God in se.  I argue that Owen’s construction of the 
covenant of redemption is the main reason that conflations arise in Owen’s theology as the pactum 
salutis is the bridge between God in se and God for us.   
 In chapter 3, I show that Owen’s understanding of the hypostatic union and Christ’s two 
natures largely avoids conflation due to his careful attention to Chalcedon and Aquinas.  However, 
Owen’s understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit on Christ’s human nature after the initial act of 
assumption departs from Thomas and again reveals Owen’s struggle.  Finally, in chapter 4, I show 
that Owen’s understanding of Christ as mediator is indebted to both Aquinas’ metaphysical 
approach and Calvin’s office Christology.  This chapter uncovers possible confusions, showing that 
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the turn to covenant and history must not lose sight of metaphysics.  In this way, Owen’s foundation 
for redemption shifts, even if slightly, from God in se to the protoevangelium of Gen 3:15 – to God 
for us.  Throughout Owen’s theology, a truncating of revelation is at work that causes God’s 
communicative goodness to remain undeveloped and, at points, drop out of Owen’s constructions.   
 Torrance consciously turns away from metaphysics toward epistemology.  Torrance’s 
constant concern for ‘knowledge’ predominates throughout.  Torrance repeatedly writes, ‘Things 
must be known as they really are.’  However, this turn to epistemology means, I argue, that Torrance 
plays by the Enlightenment’s rules.  Historically, the Enlightenment’s shift to ‘how we know’ is done 
in order to remove authority, especially God’s authority.  To be clear, this is not Torrance’s 
motivation.  However, whether knowingly or not, Torrance seems to try to solve the problem raised 
by the Enlightenment on the Enlightenment’s terms. True, Torrance works in the aftermath of Kant.  
In many ways, he cannot escape this question of knowledge.  Yet Torrance’s epistemology is one 
that acknowledges God in se but very clearly says that we know God in se only because Jesus Christ 
is God for us.  The incarnation alone, therefore, makes known God’s inner life.16  Torrance’s central 
dogma of homoousion means that what Christ reveals as God for us is God in se.  Thus, throughout 
his works, Torrance repeatedly fuses together God in se and God for us.  The order of being and 
knowing are understood in a way that does not properly safeguard a Thomistic understanding of the 
relation of God and all things in relation to God.   
 In chapter 5, I show how Torrance’s understanding of God’s being is determined by the Son’s 
incarnation.  The economic is the immanent because Jesus Christ is homoousios.  Following Barth, 
God’s being is being-in-act.  From a Thomistic perspective, I argue, such an understanding is a 
conflation of God’s being with God’s act, which is the foundation, of God’s acts.  In chapter 6, I 
 
 16  Scripture, of course, does speak directly of God in se.  This is precisely why most theological 
construction before the turn to epistemology and history begins with Ex 3:14 and a discussion of God’s being 
and existence.  Ex 3:14 features in chapters 1 and 5, and my conclusion.  For the turn away from metaphysics 
to history see:  Michael Allen, ‘Exodus 3 After the Hellenization Thesis,’ Journal of Theological Interpretation 
vol. 3, no. 2 (2009): 179-196. 
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investigate Torrance’s theology of the three divine persons.  Torrance’s understanding of hypostasis 
and being pushes his Trinitarian theology in a subtly modalist direction as he departs from a classical 
understanding of the order of the Trinitarian persons and develops an understanding of God’s 
monarchia as applying to God’s being instead of to God the Father.  Thus, Torrance does not 
construct his theology with an understanding of the divine processions and missions but with what 
he calls ‘onto-relations.’  As a result, Torrance does not develop the relations of origin between the 
divine persons, and the divine processions are not part of Torrance’s theological work.  In chapter 7, 
in contrast to a communication of God’s goodness, I show that Torrance understands the Son’s 
mission as a self-communication – as revelation – that demands a soteriological starting point.  This 
profoundly influences Torrance’s theology of the person of Christ or what he calls the union of God 
and man.  Lastly, in chapter 8, I turn to Torrance’s theology of election and Christ’s mediation as the 
vicarious human being.  Once more, conflation arises with Torrance’s theology of Christ’s divine-
humanity.   
 What we see throughout is the importance of theology proper for moving through the 
different theological loci.  Understanding God’s one nature and the three divine persons as intrinsic 
to that nature is the foundation for moving into Christology.  There is a relation between the Son’s 
eternal generation and a Chalcedonian two-nature Christology.  Chalcedon allows us to understand 
Christ’s historical and salvific acts without defining him and in turn the divine life by something 
contingent and outside of his very being.  It also allows us to understand the created human nature 
that Christ assumes and how to speak properly of the Son as divine and as human.  Lastly, our 
understanding of the divine processions and missions, and Christ’s two natures, influence, I aver, our 





Contribution to Scholarship  
 
 This thesis advances our understanding of theology proper by highlighting how Owen 
confuses and Torrance merges together God ad intra and God ad extra due to their prioritizing of 
soteriology.  Such a prioritization leads to a constraining of God’s revelation and an eventual loss of 
God’s goodness – at least in terms of theological construction.  The loss of God’s goodness, however, 
shifts Owen’s and Torrance’s understanding of God’s nature.  With the foundation of God’s 
goodness removed, the pactum salutis (in Owen) and Christ’s election (in Torrance) take its place, 
but these are less than robust foundations for theology proper.  Both theological manoeuvres are 
attempts to explain how God in se is truly God for us and our salvation.  However, rather than 
understanding the redemptive character of goodness as anchored in God’s ontological goodness, 
God must self-communicate, i.e., disruptively reveal himself.  While the noetic effects of sin are part 
of the reason Owen and Torrance move in this direction, Owen’s shift is due in part to his debate 
with the Socinians who prize autonomous reason.  Torrance too perhaps overreacts in his effort to 
avoid natural theology.  Their soteriological readings of God’s inner life lead them astray at points.  
By concluding with a retrieval of God’s goodness, I advance our understanding of how Christ is 
predestined for his redemptive mission without letting soteriology, God ad extra, determine 
theology’s foundation, God ad intra.   
 Throughout this study, I will show that God’s inner life – his complete and eternal plenitude 
– must be the foundation of all things outside of God and at all points of theological reflection and 
construction.  Avoiding a soteriological reading that fuses, or even confuses, God ad intra and God 
ad extra begins with a proper understanding of God’s being and essence as well as the three divine 
persons and their relations of origin.  The divine processions, God in se, are the foundation for the 
divine missions, God for us.  By developing Christ’s predestination along the lines of God’s goodness 
and God’s will, the foundation of our theology remains firm as we move from God in se to God for 
us.  God hears the cry of his people (Ex 3) and comes to us in his great love (John 3:16).  However, 
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our cries uttered from God’s contingent and fallen creation do not change God.  Though God does 
rescue us from our sinful fall, the motive for the Son’s incarnate mission is not the plight of fallen 
humanity.  Rather, the motive of human salvation is God’s eternal goodness.  The theology proper 












Part I: John Owen’s Foundation of Christ’s Mediation
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Chapter 1:  John Owen on God’s Nature and Attributes 
 
 The question, ‘what is God’ sounds odd to the modern ear, but beginning with God’s 
quidditas, God’s ‘whatness’, is to reflect upon God’s nature, and what is true of that nature, in 
distinction from God’s works.1  God’s plenitude and the perfection of his divine being is at the 
forefront of Owen’s thought.  John Owen is a God-centred theologian.2  Therefore, rightly 
understanding God ad intra and God ad extra is paramount in Owen’s thinking.  For instance, 
chapter 2 of John Owen’s ‘Great Catechism’ begins by asking, ‘What do the Scriptures teach 
concerning God?’  Owen’s answer is ‘First, what he is, or his nature; secondly, what he doth, or his 
works.’3  This order of being and knowing is important and safeguards a proper understanding of 
theology and economy in Owen’s catechism.  The foundation of God’s works ad extra is always God 
ad intra.4  Unsurprisingly, Owen’s next question asks, ‘What is God in himself?’5  Building upon the 
epistemological foundation of Holy Scripture, theological reflection must first speak of God’s nature 
before speaking of God’s works.6  The foundation of economic knowledge of God is God’s very being.  
Analogical predication allows us to maintain the primacy of being as we move from epistemology to 
ontology. 
 
 1  God’s nature is the principle of his works but is not to be confused with his essence.  See, Aquinas, 
ST I, q. 39, a. 2, ad. 3.     
2  Owen’s works were published as:  John Owen, The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold, 24 
vols. (Edinburgh & London, UK:  Johnstone & Hunter, 1850-1855.  Volumes 1-16 were reprinted by Banner of 
Truth (Edinburgh) in 1965 but omit Owen’s Latin works (volume 17).  This makes the volume numbers different 
between the two editions (after the first sixteen volumes, the Banner edition is one number behind Goold’s).  
For the sake of clarity, in this study, I follow the Banner of Truth edition unless otherwise noted.  This means 
that citations from Owen’s Hebrews commentary are cited as Hebrews and volume number (1-4).   Due to the 
uncertainty of their originality, I have removed the many italics found in Owen’s published works. 
3  Owen, Works 1:471.   Owen wrote two catechisms, one for children and one for families in 1645—
before the Westminster Assembly published their shorter and larger catechisms.  Typical of theological 
systems in the Reformed Orthodox era, Owen’s opening chapter deals with Scripture. Thus, this question that 
begins question two builds upon question 1. Owen, Works 1:470. 
 4  Aquinas, ST I, q. 39.          
5  Owen, Works 1:471.  
 6  Beginning with Scripture rather than God reveals Owen’s narrowing of revelation to special 
revelation.  This narrowing is not seen in all of Owen’s works, but his debates with the Socinians push him in 
this direction and this, as we shall see, is a major contributor to Owen’s soteriological reading of God in se that 
creeps into his thought at certain points.       
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 In this chapter, I will explore John Owen’s doctrine of God.  By examining Owen’s theology of 
God’s nature and attributes, we see how he answers the question ‘what is God’, and the 
methodological importance of starting all theological construction with God himself.  Throughout, 
Owen’s desire is to construct an understanding of God and all things in relation to God in a way that 
rightly distinguishes between God in se and God for us.  In many ways, Owen succeeds.  Yet, in spite 
of Owen’s catechetical starting point, at times soteriology determines his understanding of God in 
se.7  When this happens, God ad intra becomes informed by something ad extra.   Therefore, I will 
seek to trace the contours of Owen’s broadly Thomistic account of God’s nature and attributes, 
while giving particular attention to several areas where Owen inverts God in se and God for us.  In 
this chapter, this shift occurs in Owen’s understanding of God’s name and his understanding of 
God’s justice.   It is important to keep in mind throughout the first half of this study that Owen never 
intentionally confuses God and all things contingent to God.  Yet, at times he does not clearly 
distinguish God in se from God for us.  At least in part, Owen’s lack of clarity arises due to the 
polemical context in which most of his work occurs.  Owen’s debates with both the Arminians and 
the Socinians are important to Owen precisely because the doctrine of God is at stake.  Owen’s 
answers to these challenges influence his construction at points.  Thus, in Owen’s works, conflation 
is often unintentional and carefully nuanced.  Nevertheless, at points in Owen’s theological 
foundation, God ad intra, shifts to God ad extra, introducing instability into his theological 
foundation, even if ever so slight.    
 
 
 7  Rehnman makes the point that Owen’s epistemology is motivated by soteriology due to its 
‘distinctly Reformed flavour.’ Sebastian Rehnman, Divine Discourse: The Theological Methodology of John 
Owen, in Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought, ed. Richard A. Muller (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002), 143.  While I agree with Rehnman’s assessment of Owen’s thought, to 
claim that a soteriologically motivated epistemology is reformed too narrowly defines the Reformed tradition 
and is historically inaccurate.  It is true that the rise of Arminianism and Socinianism leads many of the 
Reformed thinkers to downplay the role of natural theology and fallen human reason.  As a result, disruptive 
grace takes more of a central place.  We see this somewhat in Owen, but to conclude that all Reformed 





 The goal of theology, says Owen, is the right worship of God.8  Theology should lead to 
doxology.9  Therefore, the foundation of all worship is the being of God.10  God for us, his great 
works of creation and redemption, deserve our worship, but the primary reason we are to worship 
God ‘is what God is in himself.’11  Owen writes:  
Because he is,—that is, an infinitely glorious, good, wise, holy, powerful, righteous, 
self-subsisting, self-sufficient, all-sufficient Being, the fountain, cause, and author of 
life and being to all things, and of all that is good in every kind, the first cause, last end, 
and absolutely sovereign Lord of all, the rest and all-satisfactory reward of all other 
beings,—therefore he is by us to be adored and worshipped with divine and religious 
worship.  Hence are we in our hearts, minds, and souls, to admire, adore, and love 
him; his praises are we to celebrate; him [are we] to trust and fear, and so to resign 
ourselves and all our concernments unto his will and disposal; to regard him with all 
the acts of our minds and persons, answerably to the holy properties and excellencies 
of his nature.12 
Here, Owen’s broadly Thomistic doctrine of God is clearly seen.  God is self-subsistent and all-
sufficient.  God alone is a se and independent, and he is the fountain, cause, and telos of all created 
beings.  Knowing what God is, therefore, is all important for Owen.  Unlike many modern treatments 
of theology proper, Owen works within a reformed catholic tradition that often, though not 
exclusively, begins with God’s one nature before speaking of God’s three persons.13  The Reformed 
 
8  Owen, Works 3:64.     
 9  Owen’s understanding of theology is a Protestant understanding of the definition attributed to 
Aquinas – theologia Deum docet, a Deo docetur et ad Deum ducit. [Theology teaches God, is taught by God, 
and leads to God.]  
 10   Owen, Works 3:64-65.  
 11  Owen, Works 3:65.  
 12  Owen, Works 3:65.    
13  I think ‘reformed catholic’ is a useful turn of phrase to explain the trajectory and influences of 
Owen’s thought as well as how Owen viewed himself, hence my locution.   While many still think of the terms 
‘reformed’ and ‘catholic’ as antithetical, Owen is clearly indebted to, and appropriates reformation, medieval, 
and ancient sources throughout his works.  In fact, Owen sees himself in this light.  In response to criticisms of 
his Communion with God, Owen writes, ‘I will not renounce or depart from that which I know to be the true, 
ancient, and catholic doctrine of the church.’ Owen, Works 2:279.  The understanding of reformed catholicity 
precedes Owen.  See, William Perkins, Catholicus Reformatus: Hoc est, Expositio Et Declaratio, Praecipuarum 
Aliquot Religionis controversiarum : quae ostendit, quatenus Ecclesiae ex Dei verbo reformatae in iis cum 
Ecclesia Rom. qualis ea hodie est, consentiunt, & quatenus ab eadem dissentiunt, adeoq[ue] in quibus 
numquam ei consentire debent (Hanoviae: Guilielmum Antonius, 1601).  In recent years, the call for a reformed 
catholic approach to theology has grown.  See, Michael Allen and Scott R. Swain, Reformed Catholicity: The 
Promise of Retrieval for Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015).  See 
also, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 28-29; Reformed Catholic, 12-17. 
26 
 
Orthodox follow Aquinas and begin first with God’s existence and essence, giving logical priority to 
God’s existence.  Before anything else can be said about God, it must first be said that God exists.14  
In the order of knowing and of predication, historically, it is first established that God exists before 
speaking of either the divine essence and attributes or the three divine persons.  Owen largely 
follows Thomas’ method, but with one important difference.  .  Rather than beginning with God’s 
existence which is known through natural theology, ‘what God is’ is known through special 
revelation.15  Therefore Owen begins with what God is before turning to God as Trinity, or who God 
is, but the absence of God’s existence in his methodology shows that his understanding of God’s 
nature is slightly different than Aquinas’.  This is important to keep in mind throughout this study.16  
It is important to note at this point that Owen’s analogical understanding departs from a Thomistic 
analogia entis due to his narrowing of revelation – a point that I will return to throughout this study.  
That Owen begins with God as one must not be understood as introducing division within God.  
Rather, God as one and God as three speak of the same God whose three persons are his one 
essence.  Strictly speaking, no human being can say what God is, but only that God is.  Therefore, 
 
 14  Logically then, God as one takes priority, but this is not to say that the three divine persons are 
derived from God as one.  See, Rehnman, ‘The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy,’ 354-357; Muller, 
PRRD 3:167-194. 
15  ‘That God is’, for Thomas, concerns God’s existence.  ‘What God is’ speaks of God’s attributes.  God 
is simple so ‘that’ and ‘what’ describe different dimensions of the one and same divine reality.  Owen starting 
with ‘what God is’ anticipates his complex understanding of natural theology and his narrower understanding 
of revelation more generally. 
16  This is not to be understood as mking what God is the basis or foundation for who God is.  God 
always exists as One and three perss.  Interestingly, Owen’s narrowing of revelation throughout his career 
raises the question of whether or not he stays consistent with this method that gives logical priority to God’s 
existence.  Owen and his contemporaries’ emphasis on Scripture as the starting point for theological reflection 
and the lack of any discussion of proofs oGod’s existence in Owen reveals a shift away from the natural 
knowledge of God’s existence.  This is not to suggest that Scripture is unimportant, but that the discussion of 
prolegomena and the placement of Scripture at the beginning of catechetical and theological works is likely 
related to this narrowing of revelation we find at work in Owen. For modern theological work taking a similar 
approach, see Katherine Sonderegger, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2015), xv.  Though Sonderegger thinks God as one determines God as three.  For a helpful 
corrective to Sonderegger, see Christopher R.J. Holmes, ‘Architectonic Matters: Some Advantages of Treating 
the Unicity of God in Advance of the Trinity of Persons, in Dialogue with Thomas Aquinas,’ International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 19 no. 2 (2017): 130-143.      
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Owen’s description of God’s essence is undertaken by analogy, reasoning from created effects – 
God’s works ad extra – to their Cause – God ad intra.18   
 God ad intra is, Owen writes, ‘One only, in respect of his essence and being.’19  What is 
more, God is a spirit and is not composed of parts.  God’s attributes must not be understood as 
things that make up God.  Rather, God’s essence is coterminous with each of his attributes, because 
God is simple. God is one because God is simple, not composite.  Speaking of God as simple is, in 
part, to say what God is not – he is not a composite being.20   Owen’s understanding of God’s simple 
essence aligns him with Aquinas, at this point, and the wider western tradition.21  Answering 
question two of his ‘Greater Catechism,’ Owen begins to tell us what the one and simple God is: ‘An 
eternal, infinite, incomprehensible Spirit, giving being to all things, and doing with them whatsoever 
he pleaseth.’22  Importantly, when Owen says we can know what God is, Owen speaks of ectypal 
knowledge of God and not archetypal knowledge of God.23  This means that knowing God’s quiddity, 
for Owen, is always known analogically by finite creatures.24  Only God knows himself archetypically.  
Owen’s explanation of divine simplicity makes this clear.  Owen writes:  
Though simplicity seems to be a positive term, or to denote something positively, yet 
indeed it is pure negation, and, formally, immediately, and properly, denies 
multiplication, composition, and the like.  And though this only it immediately 
denotes, yet there is a most eminent perfection of the nature of God thereby signified 
 
18  Although Owen did not write a systematic textbook of theology, this order of reflection is found in 
both his ‘Lesser’ and ‘Greater’ catechisms, which were written during Owen’s first pastorate in Fordham in 
Essex in the year 1645.  Owen, Works 1:467, 471.  While these are early works of Owen, understanding God ad 
intra and God ad extra remains important throughout Owen’s corpus of work.    
19  Owen, Works 1:467.  
 20  Owen, Works 12:71.  Owen builds upon Aquinas with the help of both Suarez and Cajetan’s 
commentary on Aquinas’ On Being and Essence, see, Works 12:71no.2 and Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 38. 
21  Aquinas, ST I, q. 3, a. 7.  See also, Muller, PRRD 3:273-275. 
22  Owen, Works, 1:471.  Owen’s answer in the ‘Lesser Catechism’ is nearly identical:  ‘An eternal, 
infinite, most holy Spirit, giving being to all things, and doing with them whatsoever he pleaseth.’  Owen, 
Works 1:467.  It is worth noting, and keeping in mind throughout this study, that the Reformed insistence on 
God doing ‘whatsoever he pleases’ follows modern notions of freedom not found in Aquinas.  Thomas, rather, 
speaks of God’s freedom as freedom from constraint not so much the idea of doing whatever one wants.  
Theologically, as I will argue in the conclusion of this work, the difference here between Aquinas and Owen is 
God’s goodness.  The ‘whatsoever he pleaseth’ needs to be constructed along the lines of God’s will, which is 
free, but always wills that which is good.  Aquinas uses the term beneplacitum but in a way that understands 
God’s free willing as a communication of God’s goodness.  See, Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 12, ad. 2.     
 23  See, Rehnman, Divine Discourse, 63-71; Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 35-36.  
 24  Though Owen’s understanding of analogy differs at points from Aquinas as this chapter, and this 
study, will show.    
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to us; which is negatively proposed, because it is in the use of things that are proper to 
us, in which case we can only conceive what is not to be ascribed to God.25 
Finite creatures cannot fully comprehend the infinite and incomprehensible God, yet God is 
knowable because he reveals himself through his names and his attributes or properties.26  Owen’s 
theological reflection is driven by exegesis of texts that name God and reveal something of God’s 
being or nature.27   
 
God’s Name  
 
 References to God’s names are found scattered throughout Owen’s works.28  In Vindicae 
Evangelicae, Owen connects Ex 3:14 with God’s simple nature.  God as ‘I Am’ reveals that God’s 
nature is one, because there is only one principle in God – God himself is the principium essendi.29  
God is ‘a simple being, existing in and of itself; and this is that which is intended by the simplicity of 
the nature of God, and his being a simple act.’30  Furthermore, simplicity also implies that any 
distinctions predicated of God in se – whether they be his attributes or the relations of origin – are 
not real distinctions.31  In a footnote to his ‘Greater Catechism,’ Owen makes it clear that the many 
names of God do not compromise God’s simplicity:  ‘The divers names of God signify one and the 
same thing, but under diverse notions in respect of our conception.’32  To name God with a plurality 
of names is not to divide God into parts, but each name is a way to describe the one divine essence.  
In A Practical Exposition Upon Psalm CXXX, Owen writes: 
 
 25  Owen, Works 12:71. 
26  Owen, Works 1:471. While ‘properties’ for Aquinas are ways to speak of the three divine persons, 
in the Reformed Orthodox era, properties is used interchangeably with attributes.  Muller, PRRD 3:199. 
27  Muller, PRRD 3:254.  Muller writes, ‘The orthodox writers evidence considerable diversity both of 
extent and of detail in their discussions of the divine names, but they virtually all indicate the importance of 
the topic to the theological system, because of the manner in which the discussion was capable of moving 
from exegesis to doctrinal formulation.’  Muller, PRRD 3:254.  For an overview of how the divine names shaped 
the theological systems of the Reformed Orthodox, see, Muller, PRRD 3:216-218, 254-270.   
 28  I have found no secondary sources that consider Owen’s understanding of God’s name.  This quite 
surprising given the importance of Ex 3:14 and God’s name in Reformed Orthodox theology.    
 29  Owen, Works 12:71.  
 30  Owen, Works 12:71.  Owen’s understanding of God as pure act is addressed later in this chapter.    
 31  Owen, Works 12:71.    
 32  Owen, Works 1:471.   
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The name of God is that whereby he reveals himself unto us, whereby he would have 
us know him and own him.  It is something expressive of his nature or properties 
which he hath appropriated unto himself.  Whatever, therefore, any name of God 
expresseth him to be, that he is, that we may expect to find him; for he will not 
deceive us by giving himself a wrong or a false name.33 
In naming himself, God reveals something ectypal of his nature.   
 The name that most properly and clearly reveals what God is, is the name God gives himself 
in Exodus 3:14—‘I Am’.34  God’s name, I Am, implies God’s aseity and simplicity which are key for 
understanding God’s one essence.  Within a long-standing tradition that understands Ex 3:14-15 to 
speak of God’s being and existence,35 Owen writes, ‘God alone hath all being in him.  Hence he gives 
himself that name, “I AM,” Exod. iii. 14.  He was eternally All; when all things else that ever were, or 
now are, or shall be, were nothing.  And when they are, they are no otherwise but as “they are of 
him, and through him, and to him,” Rom. xi. 36.’36  God is the cause of all being, and all things that 
God creates are ordered to God.37   God’s name reveals what God is, independent of any and 
everything that is not God.  Owen encapsulates God’s name as ‘infinite, eternal being and goodness, 
antecedent unto any act of wisdom or power without himself to give existence unto other things, 
God was, and is, eternally in himself all that he will be, all that he can be, unto eternity…whereunto 
nothing can be added.’38  God names himself ‘I Am’ as a way to reveal himself as he is, was, and will 
be, without respect to any created thing.  At this point, Owen’s construction of God’s name is very 
traditional.  However, in several works, God’s name moves in a Christ-exclusive direction.    
 God’s name points to God’s nature, but the two are not synonymous.  However, as we are 
about to see, when Owen discusses God’s nature and God’s name he sometimes allows the 
 
33  Owen, Works 6:478.  This section is perhaps the closest we get in Owen’s Works to true treatment 
of God’s name.  See, Owen, Works 6:478-482. 
34 This understanding of ‘I Am’ as the name that most clearly reveals what God is, is not unique to 
Owen.  See, ST I, q. 13, a. 11; Muller, PRRD 3:254-266.  
35  Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q.2, a.3, where Thomas writes of God’s existence by referring to Exodus 
3:14.   
36  Owen, Works 1:368.  
 37  Owen follows Aquinas here in finding Rom 11:36 giving exegetical support for understanding God 
as the first and final cause of all things.  See, Aquinas, ST 1, q. 44, a. 1, s.c.   
38  Owen, Works 1:368.  
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economic being of God to determine what God is in se.  Several times Owen references Ex 3:14, or 
the ‘I Am’ texts of the Gospel of John, when speaking of God’s nature.  In Hebrews, commenting on 
Heb 1:10-12, which speaks of Christ’s ‘eternal and immutable existence,’39 Owen gives one of his 
most detailed discussions of God’s name, I Am.  Owen writes: 
There is an allusion in these words unto, if not an expression of, that name of God, “I 
am;” that is, who is of himself, in himself, always absolutely and unchangeably the 
same. And this ַאָּתה הּוא, “tu ipse,” the Hebrews reckon as a distinct name of God. 
Indeed, ַאָּתה הּוא ,ְיֹהָוה, ὁ ὤν, αὐτὸς εἶ, are all the same name of God, expressing his 
eternal and immutable self-subsistence.40 
The God who names himself as ‘I Am’ eternally exists.  God is eternally what he is now, always has 
been, and always will be.41  The immutability of God’s ‘being and existence’ gives God’s people great 
confidence as they face life’s challenges.42  As God’s people know God as faithful, they can reason 
back to his immutable being.  Owen builds his understanding of God’s faithfulness on God’s 
immutability.43  Thus, his pastoral application follows the order of being and knowing.   It is worth 
mentioning that, whether rightly or wrongly, Owen’s pastoral concerns reveal that he is more  
soteriologically motivated than Aquinas’ speculative approach.44  Furthermore, and more important, 
Owen’s polemical engagement with the Socinians serves Owen’s narrowing of revelation.  God’s self-
revelation in history takes priority over speculative contemplation.  This is an important initial point 
to make, because in this section of Hebrews, Owen attempts to refute the arguments of the 
Socinians who deny Christ’s divinity but accept the authority of the Scriptures.45  Engagement with 
the Socinians leads him to a cautious use of natural theology.46  Owen never completely dismisses 
natural theology, but he increasingly focuses on special revelation in order to counter the Socinians’ 
 
39  Owen, Hebrews 3:211. 
40  Owen, Hebrews 3:211.  
41  Also notice that because God is simple, Owen cannot really speak of God’s name without also 
speaking of God’s immutability.   
 42  Owen, Hebrews 3:211.     
43 As we shall see, Torrance does not hold to a ‘static’ immutability.  Rather, God’s eternally faithful 
acts show that God is faithful because God is being-in-act.  
44  See, Aquinas, Hebraeos, cap. 1, lec. 5.   
 45  On Owen and the Socinians see, Cooper, Formation of Nonconformity, 59-74; Trueman, Reformed 
Catholic, 26-31; Trueman, Calims of Truth, 22-25.   
 46  See, Rehnman, Divine Discourse, 76-82.   
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claim that human reason alone can rightly understand God.47  This truncating is seen as Owen writes, 
‘God hath no name but what he gives unto himself; nor is it lawful to know him or call him 
otherwise.  As he calls himself, so is he; what his name imports, so is his nature.  Every name also of 
God is engaged in Jesus Christ in the covenant, and is proposed unto us to place our trust and 
confidence in.’48  God’s name is known only in Christ.  Here, likely to counter the Socinians, Owen’s 
Christ-exclusive constraining of revelation appears.  
 In The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance, Owen similarly explains that God’s self-naming 
teaches us that God’s faithfulness is tied to God’s nature and not to the faithfulness of his 
creatures.49  Like the Hebrews example just mentioned, Owen’s foundation of God’s work ad extra, 
his faithfulness, is God ad intra, God’s immutable nature.  Owen’s account follows Aquinas and the 
tradition in many ways, yet even here Owen begins to identify God ad intra by God ad extra.  Owen 
clearly roots God’s faithfulness in God in se.  However, Owen also says that God’s name is ‘the 
principle from whence he worketh’ and is known only as God reveals himself in Jesus Christ. 50  To 
shift the principle, which from a Thomistic understanding is God’s nature, to God’s name is to invert 
God for us and God in se.  Owen is clearly inspired by the tradition, but his understanding of God’s 
name is more Christological than it is for Thomas.51  Owen’s more soteriological reading of God’s 
name leads him to conflate God’s name – something outside of God’s inner life – with God’s nature.  
 
 47  The Reformed Orthodox divide theology into natural and supernatural.  Owen’s narrowing focus 
downplays natural theology.  My focus on Owen’s polemics against Socinians that lead to this downplaying of 
natural revelation is not at the expense of Owen’s and the Reformed Orthodox’s understanding of sin.  For 
Owen, natural theology is most properly at work in the state of integrity before humanity falls into sin.  In this 
Owen differs with Aquinas, though Rehnman shows that Owen’s precise understanding of the relationship 
between natural and supernatural theology is not easy to discover.  My point is simply that the polemical 
context leads Owen to focus on supernatural revelation in ways that he does not always do in other, mainly 
earlier, works. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, 76-82.  
 48  Owen, Works 6:481-482.  
49  Owen, Works 11:256.  
 50  Owen, Works 11:257. Also, Owen begins to move away from natural theology due to his 
interactions with the Socinians.  Owen still affirms general revelation, but the ability for human beings to 
reason that God is, is greatly reduced in Owen.  Thus, in Owen and much reformed thinking, general revelation 
and natural theology are related but not synonymous.          
 51  This is not to say Thomas does not understand Jesus as ‘I Am’, but to show that Owen reads God’s 
name in a narrower manner.  See, Aquinas, ST I, q. I, a. 1.  
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God’s nature, not God’s name, is the principle of God’s works ad extra.  To be clear, Owen’s 
soteriological reading of God in se is inconsistent, in distinction from Torrance’s intentional and 
radical soteriological reading.  Nevertheless, God in se and God for us are not properly distinguished 
at certain key points.    
Owen’s shift away from a more Thomistic understanding of God’s nature and name is not 
purely a chronological shift.  Owen is most Thomistic in his early writings, but in his final treatise 
Meditations and Discourses on the Glory of Christ, Owen’s formulation of God’s nature and name is 
very Thomistic.52  Owen there says that God’s name in Ex 3:14 declares that ‘God alone hath all 
being in him.’53  As Owen explains Ephesians 1:8-10, he grounds his reflections in God’s quidditas.  
Owen goes on to say, ‘Moreover, his being and goodness are the same.  The goodness of God is the 
meetness of the Divine Being to be communicative of itself and its effects.  Hence this is the first 
notion of the divine nature—infinite being and goodness, in a nature intelligent and self-subsistent.  
So the apostle declares it, “He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a 
rewarder,” Heb. xi. 6.’54  Of course, this text raises pastoral issues, which, of course, concern God’s 
economy.  The point to notice here is not that Owen is wrong, but that in Meditations, while citing 
the same biblical text, Owen’s focus is more on the God who simply exists.  In Aquinas’s Hebrews, he 
does not develop God’s name as in his Summa, but he understands Heb 11:6 (the one who seeks 
God must believe that he is) to refer to God’s being and existence similarly to Owen.55  Thus, Owen’s 
Meditation and Thomas’ Hebrews are very similar.   
Interestingly, Owen’s explanation of Heb 11:6 in Meditations leaves out the soteriological 
reading found in Hebrews.  In Meditations, Owen writes of the recapitulation of Christ in all things 
showing that metaphysical concerns and redemptive historical concerns, rightly understood, belong 
 
 52  Owen, Works 1:273-415.   This work was first published in 1684.  Owen died in 1683, and this 
treatise serves as his last word to his congregation.     
 53  Owen, Works 1:368.  
 54  Owen, Works 1:368.  
 55  Aquinas, Hebrews, Cap. 11, lect. 2, 575.  Aquinas here cites Ex 3:14.    
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together.  The theologian does not have to choose between the metaphysical foundation of God’s 
inner life and covenant history.  Yet, commenting on Heb 11:6 in Hebrews, Owen’s soteriological 
reading of Ex 3:14 and God’s name returns.  Now, the text that calls human beings to believe that 
God is, speaks not of ‘the divine being absolutely’ but of God as ‘his God.’  To believe that God exists 
as ‘I Am’ is to believe that God is the covenant God of his people.56  In the Ex 3 text, God does reveal 
his covenant name YHWH.57  However, ‘I Am’ and ‘YHWH’ speak of God ad intra and God ad extra 
respectively.  When they are equated, economy creeps into theology once more.58  Owen’s Hebrews 
speaks, not of God’s communicative nature, but of the reward God’s people receive by coming in 
faith to God.  Certainly, God rewards his people with the blessing of himself.  The point, though, is 
that Owen’s differing understanding of God’s nature is beginning to emerge. 
 
God’s Attributes  
 
 The answer to what is God, in part, is answered by God’s names.  Yet God’s name already 
begins to say something about God’s attributes—those perfections and properties through which 
God makes himself known.  Finite intellect ‘cannot conceive of a single designation suitable to the 
infinite and simple essence of God.’  Therefore, human reasoning ‘designates the divine essence in 
terms of a series of perfectiones or proprietates, which it attributes to or predicates of God.’59  
Remember that Owen’s question in the catechism speaks of both God’s names and God’s attributes 
or properties and separates them only in order to explain them to his reader.60  Therefore, as we 
 
 56  Owen, Hebrews 7:43.  The first volume of Owen’s Hebrews was published in 1668 and completed 
the last volume just before his death in 1683.  This makes his inconsistency all the more puzzling as he likely 
worked on Hebrews 7 and Meditations and Discourses around the same time.  On Hebrews see, Tweeddale, 
Owen and Hebrews.      
 57  See, Augustine, for instance:  Augustine, EP 6, 135.6.  I will return to Augustine on God’s name in 
my conclusion.   
 58  Owen, Hebrews 7:42.  
59  Muller, DLGTT:43.  
60  Owen, Works 1:471. Owen uses ‘attributes or properties’ in a synonymous, though inconsistent 
way, as our exposition will show.  
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consider Owen’s understanding of the divine attributes, we do not leave behind God’s one essence 
or God’s good name.  God’s attributes are the one divine essence because God is simple.  God does 
not contain a quantity of immutability, for instance.  Immutable is what God is.  Thus, Owen defines 
God’s attributes as ‘His infinite perfections in being and working.’61  In question seven of the ‘Greater 
Catechism,’ Owen asks: ‘What are the chief attributes of his being?’62  Owen’s answer reads: 
‘Eternity, infiniteness, simplicity or purity, all-sufficiency, perfectness, immutability, life, will, and 
understanding.’63   
 At this point, Owen’s terminology needs clarification.  Once more, Owen is deeply indebted 
to Thomas Aquinas, but he also departs from the Dominican in a significant way.  When Aquinas 
speaks of God’s properties, he has in mind the unique characteristics of one of the three divine 
persons of the Trinity.64  Attributes, as distinguished from personal properties, for Thomas, are those 
characteristics common to the one essence of God.  Attributes are convertible with God’s essence, 
but personal properties are not.  This distinction between the concepts property and attributes is 
known to Owen, as the next chapter of his ‘Greater Catechism’ makes clear.65  However, with Owen, 
and the Reformed Orthodox era more generally, the terminology gets jumbled and used in different 
ways.  Muller explains that the Reformed Orthodox use property ‘to either speak of God’s 
incommunicable attributes or the personal properties of the three persons of the Trinity.66  Owen, 
does not use the term attribute very often, and when he does it tends to be in his practical works, 
 
61  Owen, Works 1:471.  Owen cites Rev 5:8-11.   
62  Owen, Works 1:471. ‘Chief attributes of being’ refer to God’s absolute properties (discussed 
below), which some call God’s incommunicable attributes.   
63  Owen, Works 1:471.  This is the closest Owen comes to providing a comprehensive list of 
attributes, though it should be taken as exhaustive of Owen’s thought, it is noteworthy that goodness and love 
are not included.   
64  Aquinas, ST I, q. 3, 4, 39.   
65  Owen, Works 1:472.  Owen, here, closely follows Thomas as he speaks of the distinguishing 
property of each of the divine persons.  The Father’s distinguishing property is that he is the ‘fountain of the 
Godhead.’  The Son’s distinguishing property is his being begotten from the Father from eternity, and the Holy 
Spirit’s distinguishing property is proceeding from the Father and the Son.  Owen, Works 1:472.  Owen’s 
understanding of these personal properties, or relations of origin, is the subject of chapter 2.    
66  Muller, DLGTT:296; see also, Muller, PRRD 3:216-219. 
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such as the catechisms.67  However, Owen inconsistently uses the term ‘properties’.  At times, Owen 
uses ‘properties’ to speak of the personal properties of the three divine persons, just as Thomas 
does.68   When Owen reflects upon God’s one essence, he uses both ‘attribute’ and ‘property’ 
interchangeably.69  Owen is not confusing personal properties and attributes, but using the terms to 
speak of different concepts in different places within his works. To clarify, when speaking of God’s 
one essence, Owen will use both attributes and properties, and even at times perfections, to speak 
of what Thomas, more consistently, calls attributes—to speak of those characteristics that God’s one 
essence is.70   
 However, our work of clarifying is not yet finished.  Owen’s most common way to speak of 
God’s attributes is to use the distinction of absolute and relative properties – a formulation that 
follows the order of being and knowing.71   An absolute property is a way to talk about God ad intra.  
A relative property is one that reveals something of God’s nature but presupposes God’s creation 
and God’s creatures, and so speaks of God ad extra.72  Owen explains his use of these terms like this:   
The properties of God are either absolute or relative.  The absolute properties of God 
are such as may be considered without the supposition of any thing else whatever, 
towards which their energy and efficacy should be exerted.  His relative are such as, in 
their egress and exercise, respect some things in the creatures, though they naturally 
and eternally reside in God.73 
 
Understanding how and why Owen prefers this distinction is important.  ‘God,’ writes Owen, ‘in his 
own essence, being, and existence, is absolutely incomprehensible.  His nature being immense, and 
 
67  Owen, Works 1:467, 471.   
68  Again, see chapter 3 of Owen’s ‘Greater Catechism.’  Owen, Works 1:472.    
69  For example, in chapter 2, question 4, of Owen’s ‘Greater Catechism’, we find both attributes and 
properties used in a way that suggests Owen equates the two concepts. Owen, Works 1:471.    
 70  Owen, Works 12:71.  Owen uses personal property to speak of the three divine persons.     
71  Owen, Works 12:93.  See, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 103.  This understanding is common among  
the Reformed Orthodox of the seventeenth century.  See, Richard A. Muller, ‘God as Absolute and Relative, 
Necessary, Free, and Contingent: The Ad Intra-Ad Extra Movement of Seventeenth-Century Reformed 
Language about God,’ Always Reformed: Essays in Honor of W. Robert Godfrey, ed. R. Scott Clark and Joel E. 
Kim (Escondido, CA: Westminster Seminary California, 2010), 37-55. 
 72  Muller writes, ‘[T]he purpose of the classification is to manifest, even in the order of discussion, the 
identity of God in se and in relation to the world order.’  Muller, PRRD 3:218.  
73  Owen, Works 12:93.    
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all his holy properties essentially infinite, no creature can directly or perfectly comprehend them, or 
any of them.’74  Yet, God does reveal himself relatively: 
God hath not only revealed his being unto us in general, but he hath done it by many 
distinct properties…God in his nature exists in one simple essence or being; nor are 
there any things really different or distinct therein. His nature is all his properties, and 
every one of his properties is his whole nature; but in the revelation of himself unto us 
he proposeth his nature under the notion of these distinct properties, that we may the 
better know the nature of the duty which we owe unto him.75   
 
The reason Owen seems to prefer this distinction is twofold.  First, Owen very carefully attempts 
throughout his works to distinguish God’s immanent life and God’s economic work, although Owen’s 
emphasis here on moral duty perhaps shifts his understanding toward the soteriological and 
economic.  The revealed attributes are moral.  Second, Owen is deeply concerned to show that 
though God is infinite and incomprehensible, relatively speaking he can be known. God is not a 
detached or uninterested deity.   
 An example of how Owen uses the absolute/relative distinction of God’s attributes will help 
us understand his thinking. In Vindicae Evangelicae, Owen shows how this distinction works as he 
discusses God’s immensity and ubiquity.76  Owen chooses the attribute of immensity as an example 
to refute the anti-metaphysical theology of the Socinian John Biddle.  God’s immensity ‘is an 
absolute property of his nature and being.  For God to be immense, infinite, unbounded, unlimited, 
is as necessary to him as to be God; that is, it is of his essential perfection so to be.’77  God’s 
immensity is an absolute property, or attribute, of God.  Notice the distinction Owen makes when he 
explains God’s ubiquity:  ‘The ubiquity of God, or his presence to all things and all persons, is a 
 
74  Owen, Works 1:65.  
75  Owen, Hebrews 4:365.   
 76  Trueman writes, ‘Biddle raises critical philosophical questions with which earlier generations of 
Protestant theologians had not had to wrestle, and in this context we find Owen articulating a doctrine of God 
which positively connects to earlier medieval paradigms in its utilization of philosophical notions as a means of 
reinforcing the results of biblical exegesis.’  Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 39-40.  While Trueman’s point is 
historically helpful and true, it must be kept in mind that the Reformed Orthodox treatment of divine 
attributes introduces a level of complexity not found in the medieval treatments as well as a lack of 
terminological clarity with the use of ‘property’ for attribute as mentioned above.   
77  Owen, Works 12:93.  
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relative property of God; for to say that God is present in and to all things supposes things to be.  
Indeed, the ubiquity of God is the habitude of his immensity to the creation.’78  If God is not 
immense, he cannot be ubiquitous to his creation, yet immensity and ubiquity are not synonymous.  
Ubiquity is expressed only in relation to creation, while God’s immensity is undistinguishable from 
God’s eternal essence.  Owen explains, ‘Of that which we affirm in this matter this is the sum:  God, 
who in his own being and essence is infinite and immense, is, by reason thereof, present in and to 
the whole creation equally.’79  What God is absolutely, is immense.  The habitude, or relative form 
that this absolute property of God takes in relation to creation and creatures is ubiquity.  God is 
immense and, therefore, ubiquitous in relation to creation.  Importantly, the absolute and relative 
properties cannot be reversed.  God is not immense because he is ubiquitous; he is ubiquitous 
because he is immense.80   
 God’s absolute properties, God in se, are the foundation of his relative properties.   What is 
more, in our finite creaturely state, human beings never come to an absolute knowledge of God.  We 
know something of God’s immensity through God’s ubiquity but we never know God as absolutely 
immense.  Owen writes, ‘The properties of God are those whereby God makes known himself to us, 
and declares both what he is and what we shall find him to be in all that we have to deal with him:  
he is infinitely holy, just, wise, good, powerful, etc.  And by our apprehension of these things are we 
led to that acquaintance with the nature of God which in this life we may attain, Exod. xxxiv. 5-7.’81 
Only something infinite and perfect can know an infinite and perfect God—only God has absolute 
and perfect knowledge of himself.82   
 
78  Owen, Works 12:93.  
79  Owen, Works 12:93.    
 80  Torrance risks such a reversal when he equates immutability with faithfulness.   
81  Owen, Hebrews 3:211-212.  
 82  Understanding God’s attributes as absolute and relative follows our understanding of God ad intra 
and God ad extra.  The absolute and relative attributes form ‘pairs’ like we see here with immensity and 
ubiquity in Owen.  Another example would be that God is absolutely infinite and relatively eternal.  See, 
Muller, ‘God as Absolute and Relative,’ 59.  
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 However, God can be known through revelation.83  Perhaps this is why Owen prefers the 
absolute/relative distinction more than the typical reformed distinction of incommunicable and 
communicable attributes.84  In the context of theology proper, the only place Owen speaks of 
incommunicable attributes is in A Practical Exposition Upon Psalm CXXX.85  It is noteworthy that such 
terminology is not found in Owen’s more technical and academic treatments of God’s attributes.  
Perhaps Owen finds the absolute and relative distinction a better way to express that in God’s self-
revelation something of God’s nature is made known, albeit in a way that is appropriate to the 
creation without making God dependent upon creation.  The distinction of absolute and relative 
allows Owen to focus on the effects of each attribute without going so far as to introduce any 
difference realiter in God’s essence or between the attributes themselves—God is simple.86   Muller 
is correct that Owen’s ‘primary concern is to argue that, given the infinite distance between God and 
human beings, God in himself must remain utterly incomprehensible to us and known only in his 
external representations.’87 Without, and before, his creation, God remains absolutely the perfection 
he has always been.  Echoing themes from his catechism, Owen writes, ‘God is absolutely perfect; 
whatever is of perfection is to be ascribed to him:  otherwise he could neither be absolutely self-
sufficient, all-sufficient, nor eternally blessed in himself.  He is absolutely perfect, inasmuch as no 
perfection is wanting to him, and comparatively above all that we can conceive or apprehend of 
perfection.’88  However, the absolutely perfect God is made known through his relative properties. 
 At least at times, Owen’s absolute/relative distinction serves his narrowing view of 
revelation. The infinite distance between Creator and creatures is overcome in the incarnation when 
 
83  Owen, Works 1:65.  
 84  See, Muller, PRRD 3:223-226.  
85  Owen, Works 6:620-622.  
 86  While Owen works with a fairly Thomistic understanding of simplicity, surprisingly, he defines 
divine simplicity as a property or attribute ‘of God’s being or essence’ in Vindicae Evangelicae.  Owen, Works 
12:71.  Simplicity tells us what God is not, but is not one of God’s attributes in the same way that power is an 
attribute for example.    
87  Richard A. Muller, PRRD 3:290.  
88  Owen, Works 12:95.  
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the infinite divine person of the Son takes to himself a finite human nature.89    While this is certainly 
true, what Owen misses in his construction of divine attributes and understanding of revelation is 
the similitude that exists between God and his creatures – a point that is important to keep in mind 
throughout this study.  While Owen is greatly concerned to maintain the Creator-creature 
distinction, perhaps Muller, by focusing on Owen’s commonality with other theologians, misses his 
important theological motivation for this approach to the divine attributes.90  Owen reasons that the 
infinite distance between God and creatures makes knowledge of God impossible unless there is 
something capable of standing in the infinite gap between the Creator and his creatures.  This, for 
Owen, is Christ who is the mediator between God and human beings.91  The creation reflects God’s 
nature and glory, but the creation itself is finite and limited ‘and so cannot properly represent that 
which is infinite and immense.’92  A real representation of the divine nature is needed.  This, says 
Owen, ‘is done in the person of Christ.  He is the complete image and perfect representation of the 
Divine Being and excellencies.’93  Creaturely knowledge is still relative, but Christ reveals God to 
creatures in a way that anything creaturely is incapable of doing.  Owen writes, ‘Hence it is God, as 
the Father, who is peculiarly represented in him and by him; as he says: “He that hath seen me hath 
seen the Father:” John xiv.9.’94  Creaturely knowledge always remains ectypal knowledge, but Owen 
is concerned that in the advent of Christ, the archetype himself, God is truly made known.  However, 
such a construction risks undermining the relative revelation of God through his attributes that is 
known in creation.95 
 
89  This is seen throughout Owen’s ΧΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ. In Owen, Works 1: passim.   
 90  Trueman also understands Owen’s Creator/creature distinction as one of ‘infinite distance’ without 
mention of the similitude.  Trueman, Claims of Truth, 62.  
91  Torrance shares this concern with Owen.   
92  Owen, Works 1:67.  
93  Owen, Works 1:69.  
94  Owen, Works 1:69.  Owen explains further, ‘Unto such a representation two things are required:—
1. That all the properties of the divine nature—the knowledge whereof is necessary unto our present 
obedience and future blessedness—be expressed in it, and manifested unto us.  2. That there be, therein, the 
nearest approach of the divine nature made unto us, whereof it is capable, and which we can receive.  And 
both of these are found in the person of Christ, and therein alone.’  Owen, Works 1:69.  
 95  This is not to minimize God’s climatic final self-revelation in Christ (Heb 1:1).  Duby helpfully writes, 
‘Since Scripture is the divinely appointed source of our knowledge of the incarnate Son, we have to recognize 
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A Dissertation on Divine Justice  
 
 At the heart of Owen’s use of the absolute/relative properties distinction is how we are to 
understand God’s interaction with the world he has made.  Owen’s most sophisticated discussion of 
the relationship between God’s absolute and relative properties is his treatment of God’s justice in A 
Dissertation on Divine Justice.96  Divine justice is an essential attribute of God’s divine being.  
Therefore, God’s justice takes on a vindictive form once sin enters the world.  God’s punitive justice 
is not essential, but it is an ‘egress’ or ‘exercise’ of God’s justice in response to sin.  Owen’s 
understanding of the divine will is perhaps in question throughout this work, and we will need to 
return to this in later chapters.97  However, for our purposes in this chapter, it is enough to see how 
Owen employs this distinction of attributes in one of his most nuanced and complex pieces of 
theology.    
 Owen begins A Dissertation on Divine Justice:  ‘In this treatise we are to discourse of God 
and of his justice, the most illustrious of all divine perfections, but especially of his vindicatory 
justice.’98  While Thomas understands goodness to be God’s primary attribute, for Owen, justice is 
God’s chief attribute.99  As a result, Owen distances himself from the ‘Schoolmen’ and some of the 
‘later divines’ who follow Aristotle’s distinction of justice as universal and particular as well as 
 
that within Scripture Jesus is presented as the culminating moment in God’s revelation, but not the first or 
only moment.’  Stephen J. Duby, God in Himself:  Scripture, Metaphysics, and the Task of Christian Theology 
(Downers Grove, IL:  IVP Academic, 2019), 142.   
96  Owen, Works 10:482-624.  
97  In a rare autobiographical moment, Owen admits that he has not always held the position he 
affirms in A Dissertation on Divine Justice.  See, Owen, Works 10:508.  Owen does not tell us what led him to 
change his position, but this change raises questions about Owen’s understanding of the divine will.  For 
instance, if God’s justice is essential, and the ‘egress’ of God’s justice is necessary in response to sin, has Owen 
changed his understanding of God’s will as the basis for God’s relation to those things outside of himself?  This 
question will be taken up with great detail in later chapters, especially in relation to Owen’s understanding of 
the covenant of redemption.    
98  Owen, Works 10:495.  Notice that Owen here uses yet another term for God’s attributes, 
‘perfections.’  On the context of Owen’s treatise, and the theological issues at stake, see, Trueman, Reformed 
Catholic, 42; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 105-111; Trueman, ‘John Owen’s Dissertation on Divine Justice: An 
Exercise in Christocentric Scholasticism,’ Calvin Theological Journal 33 (1998): 87-103.    
 99  This is a clear shift away from Aquinas and the early Reformers who all hold that goodness is God’s 
chief attribute.   
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Aristotle’s distinction bewteen communicative and distributive justice.100  Owen takes a different 
approach to God’s justice, preferring instead to speak of God’s absolute justice and its ‘egress’ and 
‘exercise.’101  Though the term relative is not here used by Owen, his common distinction of God’s 
attributes is clearly in view.  God’s absolute justice is ‘the universal rectitude and perfection of the 
divine nature.’102  This absolute justice moves outward relatively as vindicatory justice.  These 
outward movements, or ‘egresses’, are twofold.  They are ‘absolute and perfectly free.’  God, in his 
‘egresses’ is not constrained, nor compelled by anything outside of himself.  But they are also 
‘necessary’ in that they could not be otherwise.103  In formulating God’s justice in this way, Owen 
shifts the foundation of God’s work ad extra from God’s will to God’s essential justice.104  Owen’s 
main concern is to show that God’s revelation of his justice reveals what God is, albeit in a relative 
way.  God’s justice is essential to God’s being.  Therefore, Owen argues that God must punish any 
and every sin.  The atonement is necessary for Owen.  Without Christ’s incarnate mission, there 
would be no forgiveness of sins.  God overlooking sin would contradict his own nature.105  
Atonement, then, for Owen, is the not the fitting response of God’s good will, but the necessary 
response of God’s essential nature.106  
 While Owen does not tell us why he came to hold God’s justice as essential to God’s nature, 
it is plausible that his use of the absolute/relative distinction within his polemical context is key.  
Owen’s debate with the Socinian John Biddle likely influences the way he understands the 
 
100   Owen, Works 10:497-498.  See, Aristotle, Ethics ad Nicom., lib. V. cap. 1 and 2. 
101   Owen, Works 10:498.   
102  Owen, Works 10:498.  
103  Owen, Works 10:499.       
 104  Trueman shows that Owen shifts the foundation of God’s justice from God’s will and decree to 
God’s essence.  Trueman, ‘Dissertation on Divine Justice,’ 89.  This shift is also a shift in Owen’s understanding 
of revelation.  Trueman, ‘Dissertation on Divine Justice,’ 99.  See, Owen Works 10:205 for Owen’s early view.   
105  Owen, Works 10:499-500. Whether or not Owen is correct at this point, it is vital to see that 
theology proper and exegesis go hand in hand.  At every point, Owen seeks to let what God is guide his 
theological formulations.   
 106  See, Aquinas, ST III q. 46, a. 1, co., for a nuanced understanding of the fittingness of Christ’s 
atoning work that guards Christ’s ‘voluntary suffering’ but also understands Christ’s death as ‘necessary from 
necessity of the end proposed.’  ‘Voluntarie passus…Fuit autem necessarium necessitate finis.’  Aquinas uses 
‘voluntary’ and ‘freedom’ to speak of things as contingent in relation to God.  Owen and Torrance, both in their 
own way, understand God’s freedom more in terms of individual choice.   
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absolute/relative understanding of the divine attributes.  Most likely to counter Baxter’s claim that 
Owen’s earlier position is susceptible to the Socinian position.107  Owen is critical of the tradition that 
comes before him, because if God’s justice is not an essential attribute, then God’s ‘egress’ of justice 
is dependent on some object outside of God himself.108  To place God’s exercise of justice within 
God’s will, as many notable theologians before Owen do, is a critical mistake.  Such a move risks 
making God reactionary and creates the possibility that God can forgive sin apart from the life, 
death, and resurrection of Christ.  Placing the punitive aspect of God’s judgment in God’s will leaves 
room for God to forgive without sin receiving the punishment God’s justice demands.  This, thinks 
Owen, compromises God’s immutability and impassibility.109 
 As Owen continues this discourse, we gain insight into how he believes this distinction of 
absolute and relative works.  God is absolutely justice.  That is, God is perfect justice before sin 
enters the world.  Relatively, God’s justice takes a punitive form in response to sin.  An objection 
raised at this point by Owen’s fellow reformed theologians is that Owen seems to compromise God’s 
freedom.  It is plausible that Owen’s engagement with Biddle leads to an overreaction in his 
understanding of God’s justice.110  William Twisse, for instance, writes, ‘I cannot agree that God by 
nature equally punishes and hates sin, unless you mean that hatred in the Deity to respect his will as 
 
107  See, Hans Boersma, A Hot Pepper Corn: Richard Baxter’s Doctrine of Justification in Its 
Seventeenth-Century Context of Controversy (1993; repr., Vancouver, B.C.: Regent College Publishing, 2004), 
130-132; Cooper, Formation of Nonconformity, 63-66.  
108  Owen, Works 10:500-501.  Trueman claims that Owen’s change of mind on God’s justice is a shift 
away from the influence of Scotist thought and that Owen is more Thomistic after his change of mind.  
However, Owen shifts away from Aquinas’ understanding that the incarnation is God’s fitting response to 
human sin and the result of God’s good will.  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 1, a. 1, co., where Christ’s redemptive 
mission is a fitting response flowing out of God’s communicative goodness.  Furthermore, Trueman goes on to 
say that Owen’s ‘natural theology’ at this point is not metaphysical but rhetorical.  The introduction of 
Renaissance rhetoric and arguments like ‘the consent of all nations’ is a move toward the historical (and 
soteriological in theology) and away from rooting God’s justice in God in se.  While Owen’s treatment of justice 
is complex and polemical, he lets God ad extra impact God ad intra.  This move is anything but Thomistic.  See, 
Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 43.  
109  Owen is well aware of the reformed catholic tradition on this topic.  The schoolmen, and even 
Aquinas, are too dependent on philosophy.  Closer to home, Owen is also unsatisfied with his own 
‘countrymen’ who divide God’s justice of government (providence) into communicative and distributive.  See, 
Owen, Works 10:500-508.  
110  This overreaction is similar to Owen’s narrowing of revelation.   
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appointing a punishment for sin.’111  Twisse understands God’s vindictory justice not as something in 
God’s nature, but as a free decision of his will and argues that ‘it is not equally natural to God to 
punish sin and to hate it.’112  However, Owen does not see it quite this way as such an understanding 
of God’s nature suggests that God could let some sin go unpunished.113  God, says Owen, is ‘both a 
necessary and free agent.’114  God is necessary in his ‘internal’ actions, by which Owen means the 
subsistent relations between the divine persons.115  Yet, as regards the acts of God’s will ‘which have 
their operations and effects upon external objects, he is an agent absolutely free.’116  However, the 
basis for Owen’s understanding of God’s justice is his distinction between God’s free acts that have 
no ‘antecedent condition,’ such as the creation of the world, and ‘the acts of the divine will which 
could have no possible existence but upon a condition supposed.’117  To clarify—some attributes 
require no object in regards to their exercise.  Yet others require a predetermined object.  God’s 
punitive justice is such an attribute because there would be no ground for God to exercise his justice 
if there was nothing to judge. God would not judge sin if there was no sinner who had sinned.  But a 
rational creature who has sinned against God’s penal law is the ground on which God’s absolute 
justice ‘egresses’ and is ‘exercised’ relatively against sin.  This exercise of judgment is not an act of 
God’s will alone.  Justice must be honoured, because it is an essential attribute. This, however, does 
not mean that God is not free, according to Owen.  If God does not honour his justice, then because 
it is an absolute attribute relatively revealed in the judgment of sin, God denies his own essence and 
 
 111  William Twisse, Vindiciae Gratiae Potestatis ac Providentiae Divinae (Amsterdam, 1632) 1.25, 
digr.8.  Owen also critiques Samuel Rutherford at this point.  See, Samuel Rutherford, Disputatio Scholastica de 
Divina Providentia (Edinburgh, 1649); The Covenant of Life opened; or, a treatise on the Covenant of Grace 
(Edinburgh, 1654). 
 112  Twisse, Vindiciae Gratiae, 1.25.  
 113  Owen, Works 10:551.  
114  Owen, Works 10:510.  
 115  Owen, Works 10:510.    
116  Owen, Works 10: 510.  
117  Owen, Works 10:510-511.  
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ceases to be God.118  As careful as Owen is, it is hard not to see necessity determined by something 
ad extra – in this case human sin – being introduced into God ad intra.    
   Importantly, for Owen, justice as an essential attribute means that Scripture teaches that a 
vicarious punishment for sin is necessary because of what God is.119  If God merely wills the 
punishment of sin, but the ‘egress’ does not flow out of God’s nature, then there is hardly a 
‘sufficient and necessary cause’ for the death of Christ.120  If there is no offense against what God is, 
why then subject his own Son to such awful suffering?  Owen asks: 
Hath God not set him forth to be a propitiation for the demonstration or declaration of 
his sin-punishing justice?  But how could that justice be demonstrated by an action 
which it did not require, or if the action might be omitted without any diminution of 
it,—If God would have been infinitely just to eternity, nor would have done any thing 
contrary and offensive to justice, though he had never inflicted punishment upon any 
sin?121    
 
Owen’s concern is clearly to avoid an arbitrary God who either is reactionary or uninvolved with his 
creation.  What God is absolutely is what God is relatively in the world.  If God is just, then in the 
fallen creation, this justice must be vindicatory. 
  This is why Owen prefers to distinguish God’s attributes as absolute and relative properties.  
Owen makes use of the absolute/relative distinction in order to maintain that God in se is the 
 
 118  Owen, Works 10:510-511.  Owen continues his investigation by turning more specifically to 
Scripture.  His goal is to show exegetically that justice is natural to God and necessary in regards to its exercise 
against sin.   In Scripture, Owen believes there are three main categories of texts that show God’s justice is 
vindicatory.  The first are those passages that speak about how the purity and holiness of God oppose sin.   The 
second category of texts are those that speak of God as judge and show that he judges and will judge with 
righteousness.   The third type of texts are those that show God does punish sin and that it is just for him to do 
so.   Owen draws out several implications from Romans 1:32 that are important for understanding why he 
holds to the position that he does.  Romans 1:32, says, ‘Even though they know God’s righteous requirement, 
they do those things that are worthy of death, and not only do they do those things, but also they approve of 
those who practice such things.”  In this verse, Owen believes that God’s justice is known universally; that it is 
the ‘cause, source, and rule’ of all punishments, for this is God’s right, because those who sin are ‘worthy of 
death.’  And this verse also proves that God’s justice, or righteousness, is essential to God.  True, its exercise 
and effect are outside of God, but as God is its ‘source and root, it respects himself as its subject, if God be 
absolutely perfect.’  Owen, Works 10:512-516.     
 119  Owen, Works 10:516.  Owen also references 2 Thessalonians 1:6; Hebrews 2:2; Jude 7 as further 
proof.  
120  Owen, Works 10:556.  
 121  Owen, Works 10:557.    
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foundation of God’s works ad extra.  However, Owen’s use raises several questions.  One relates to 
God’s will as previously noted.  Another question is whether or not Owen is consistent at this point.  
Owen is clearly attempting to think consistently in line with his understanding of what God is.  This is 
the very reason Owen departs from reformed divines he greatly respects.  For instance, Owen is 
frustrated with Twisse who agrees with Owen on the need for God to satisfy sin, yet will not go as far 
as Owen goes by saying God’s justice is an absolute property.  Placing God’s judgment within God’s 
will leaves the door open for God to forgive sin without the satisfaction of Christ.122  Owen objects to 
this way of thinking, because this would compromise the simplicity of God.  Whatever ‘God cannot 
do in respect of one attribute, he can do in respect of none; or, in other words, that which cannot be 
done because of any one essential property, cannot be done because of them all.’123  If satisfaction 
for sin is the egress of an essential attribute, then there is no possibility for God, in his freedom, to 
forgive sin in any other way.  It is hard to see how human sin does not introduce necessity into God 
in se even with Owen’s careful nuances.  Owen’s understanding of justice influences his 
understanding of simplicity in a way that makes the atonement necessary for God instead of a free 
and contingent act of his will.124     
 The result of Owen’s shift on divine justice is that he conflates God’s absolute and relative 
justice.  At the end of Dissertation on Divine Justice, Owen writes:  
Is it to be wondered at, that God should be disposed severely to punish that which 
earnestly wishes him not to be God, and strives to accomplish this with all its might? 
Sin opposes the divine nature and existence; it is enmity against God, and is not an idle 
enemy; it has even engaged in a mortal war with all the attributes of God. He would 
not be God if he did not avenge, by the punishment of the guilty, his own injury. He 
hath often and heavily complained, in his word, that by sin he is robbed of his glory 
and honour, affronted, exposed to calumny and blasphemy; that neither his holiness, 
nor his justice, nor name, nor right, nor dominion, is preserved pure and untainted: for 
he hath created all things for his own glory, and it belongs to the natural right of God 
 
122  Owen, Works 10:585-587.  
123  Owen, Works 10:586-587.    
 124  Stephen Long argues that Owen’s polemical context influences his understanding of simplicity.  
Long argues that for Aquinas and Zanchi, simplicity is a way to speak of relations of origin within God ad intra.  
In Owen, ‘divine simplicity ensures God’s eternal decree to save some and damn others.’  D. Stephen Long, The 
Perfectly Simple Triune God: Aquinas and His Legacy (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2016), 155.  
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to preserve that glory entire by the subjection of all his creatures, in their proper 
stations, to himself.125  
Here Owen seems to suggest that sin is a threat to God’s existence and nature.  If God is absolutely 
perfect, simple, and immutable, then sin, something external to God’s nature, introduces, I would 
argue, no real change to what God is.  Relatively God’s glory is diminished by sin, but absolutely God 
cannot be anymore glorious than he has been, is, and will be for eternity.  If we posit God’s justice as 
a fitting response to sin that is connected to God’s love, then the problem of Owen’s necessity is 
avoided and God ad intra remains the foundation for God ad extra.126   
 
 God as Pure Act 
 
 Owen’s distinction of properties is built upon the concept of God as pure, or simple, act.  
Owen makes this connection in The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance when he writes, ‘God 
himself being an infinite pure act, those acts of his will and wisdom which are eternal and immanent 
are not distinguished from his nature and being but only in respect of the reference and habitude 
which they bear unto some things to be produced outwardly from him.’127  Once more, God’s 
attributes are distinguished absolutely and relatively.  While it is true that Greek philosophy uses 
similar language, Cleveland’s work shows that the actus purus concept, as employed by the Christian 
tradition, is not simply co-opted from Greek philosophy or from Aristotle, despite many contrary 
claims.128  Torrance follows this understanding of the use of Aristotle in western theology and refers 
to this ‘problem’ as the ‘Latin heresy.’129  While it is true that the concept of actus purus gives rise to 
 
125  Owen, Works 10:619.  
 126  See, Aquinas, ST I, q. 21 where God’s love takes the form of justice toward sin and mercy toward 
God’s elect.    
127  Owen, Works 11:141-142.  Owen uses the concept of God as actus purus throughout his works, 
but it is found most clearly in Display of Arminianism, The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance, and Vindicae 
Evangelicae.  See Christopher Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen (Surrey, England:  Ashgate, 2013), 27.  Notice, 
here, Owen properly employs the order of being and knowing.   
128  Cleveland, Thomism, 27.      
 129  Torrance, ‘Latin Heresy,’ 463.  
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Thomas’ appropriation of Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover’, neither Aquinas, nor Owen, believe God is 
static and uninvolved with his creation as Torrance fears.130  In fact, Owen’s concern is precisely the 
opposite.  God is dynamic because he is ‘pure act.’  By pure act, Owen, following Aquinas, means 
that there is no potentiality in God.131  Therefore, because God is fully actualized, he alone can move 
something he created from potentiality to action as the first cause of all his ad extra effects.132   
 In answering the question what is God, Owen’s catechism teaches that God is an ‘eternal, 
infinite, incomprehensible Spirit.’133  Understanding God as ‘Spirit’ deepens the notion of God as 
actus purus because it means that God is not limited by a finite human body, nor limitations that 
arise from a creature’s finiteness.  Therefore, purus actus is a way to speak of God’s simplicity.134  
God’s essence is one and free from any and all composition.  God’s simplicity allows Owen to 
understand that the acts of God’s will and wisdom ‘are not distinguished from his nature.’135  God is 
not made up of his attributes, or properties, for God is his attributes.  Nor does God receive his 
existence from outside of himself.  Rather, everything outside of God has its existence from God.  
God is the uncaused Cause of all contingent creation.  Creatures, not God, are in a state of 
potentiality and their ability to act comes from God precisely because nothing outside of God makes 
God, God.  This Thomistic account of God’s simplicity, which Owen intentionally follows, shows that 
God as acuts purus is not simply a reproduction of Aristotelian philosophy.  Owen, through Thomas, 
 
130  Cleveland, Thomism, 27.  This is one of Torrance’s consistent differences with Thomism.  See 
chapter 5 and Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1996), lxx-lxxix; Thomas F. 
Torrance, ‘The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition,’ Reformed Review 54 (2000), passim.   
131  Aquinas, ST I, q. 3, a. 2.    
 132  God as first and last cause of all things is the result of God’s perfect, simple, and pure act.  God 
only is fully actualized, and, therefore, God alone can move something from potentiality to actuality.  Owen’s 
understanding of causality need not be developed here, but God as first and last cause will be important in the 
conclusion of this study.  In Owen, see, Works 6:482 and Works 10:24-28. 
133  Owen, Works 1:471.  
134  Muller defines simplicity as: ‘having an uncompounded or noncomposite nature…according to 
which God is understood as being absolutely free of any and all composition, includes not merely physical but 
also rational or logical composition.’  Muller, DLGTT:336.  See also, Aquinas, ST I, q. 2.  
135  Owen, Works 11:141.  
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makes use of Aristotelian categories, but modifies the concept to fit with his understanding of 
Christian truth. 
 If God is fully actual, then he is also immutable and impassible.  There is no potential in God.  
God does interact with the world he makes, but it does not change God.136   God’s essence is not 
mutable, nor is God driven by emotion and passion.  Muller defines immutability in saying, ‘God is 
understood as free from all mutation of being, attributes, place, or will and from all physical and 
ethical change; in other words, the immutabilitas Dei indicates the eternal and perpetual identity of 
the divine essence with all its perfections.’137  Owen’s Socinian interlocutor, John Biddle, holds that 
God has a body and that God is full of passions.  Thus Biddle makes God reactionary to the 
circumstances of the world, claiming that God has ‘turbulent affections and passions.’138  Owen sees 
in both the Socinians and the Arminians, while very different, a theological logic that leads one to a 
reactionary, passible god.  Therefore, immutability and impassibility are major themes in Owen’s 
own articulation of God’s manner of being God.  
 In Vidicae Evangelicae, Owen engages Biddle by first agreeing that some biblical texts speak 
of God having human passions or reacting as a human being might react.  Yet Owen’s doctrine of 
God understands that God is involved with his creation but is not changed or moved by anything ad 
extra.  God as pure act is able to work within creation as his perfection is the cause that moves 
things from potentiality to actuality.  Therefore, certain biblical texts must be interpreted as using 
metaphors ‘in reference to his [God’s] outward works and dispensation.’139  Owen defines affections 
as things that ‘have always an incomplete, imperfect act of the will or volition joined with them.’140  
In God, there is no imperfection, and therefore no affections.  In finite creatures, there are no pure 
 
 136  Owen, Works 6:482.    
137  Muller, DLGTT:162.  By ‘impassibility’ Owen means that God does not suffer and that God is not 
reactionary like a human being might be.  See, Muller, DLGTT:161-162. 
 138  Owen, Works 12:108.    
 139  Owen, Works 12:108.    
 140  Owen, Works 12:109.     
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affections, because affections always reveal a lack in the one who exercises them.141  Thus Owen 
writes, “Affections are necessarily accompanied with change and mutability; yea he who is affected 
properly is really changed; yea, there is no more unworthy change or alteration than that which is 
accompanied with passion, as is the change that is wrought by the affections ascribed to God.”142  
Notice that Owen equates affections and passions. Since God is perfect and lacks nothing, he has no 
passions or affections.143  Owen cites one of his favourite verses—Malachi 3:6—to affirm God’s 
immutability.  Affections necessarily mean one is mutable, and they change the one who exercises 
them—therefore, God has no, and can have no, passions or affections.144  Owen concludes, ‘To 
ascribe affections properly to God is to make him weak, imperfect, dependent, changeable, and 
impotent.’145 Perhaps the example of God’s love clarifies the heart of Owen’s argument, which is 
that nothing outside of God is the cause of what God is or how God acts in the world.146  On God’s 
love, Owen writes: 
Certainly, then, in God his love is but a pure act of his will.  That love which was the 
cause of sending his Son is, I say, an act of his will, his good pleasure,—not a natural 
affection to the creature.  No such affection is there in God, as I have abundantly 
proved in the treatise.  Now, this love, this act of God’s will, was not purchased, not 
procured by Christ.  Very true; who ever was so mad as to affirm it?  Can a temporal 
thing be the cause of that which is eternal?147   
God as actus purus is the foundation of theology proper for Owen, because he is greatly concerned 
to show that God ad intra is not moved by anything contingent.  Neither creatures nor creation add 
anything to God’s nature.  God alone is without potential.  That God is (actus) purus means that God 
is perfect and complete in and of himself.148  That God is actus (purus) means there is no becoming, 
 
141  The ‘lack’ here being the finite existence of the creature and not sin.   
 142  Owen, Works 12:110.    
 143  Owen, Works 12:109.  
 144  Owen, Works 12:110.     
 145  Owen, Works 12:110.    
146  This point will be important throughout this work, especially in regards to Owen’s understanding 
of the covenant of redemption.   
147  Owen, Works 10:427.  
148  See ST 1, q. 2. a. 3 and Muller, DLGTT:11-12.    
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or potential, within God because God is eternally existent, perfect, and fully realized.149  The broad 
contours of Owen’s understanding of actus purus clearly build upon Aquinas. 
 However, Owen also differs from Aquinas and the reformed catholic tradition in a significant 
way at this point.  Affections are positive desires or ‘dispositions toward something.’150  Passions are 
‘dispositions derived from something, such as suffering caused by something or someone other than 
one’s self.’151  Owen’s desire to defend God’s impassibility against Biddle leads him to equate God’s 
affections and passions.  This is theologically significant.  In the quote above, notice that Owen says 
that God has no ‘natural affection to the creature’ and, thus, no affection for the creature.  What is 
missing in Owen – and this is a significant difference with Aquinas – is the similitude of God’s 
goodness.  God creates human beings in his own image and says they are good (Gen 1:26-31).  In this 
way, there is a ‘natural connection’ between God and creatures.  There is a similitude that does not 
transgress the ever-greater dissimilarity – the Creator/creature distinction – that also exists between 
God who is actus purus and his creatures.  It is plausible that one reason Owen ends up blurring the 
distinction between absolute and relative is because of an underdeveloped account of the creature’s 
similitude with God.  The pure act of God’s will always desires that which is good.  God has affections 
for the creatures he makes. Yet, as goodness and similitude drop out of Owen, goodness is replaced 
with God’s good pleasure as pointed out above.  God is impassible, though Owen’s understanding of 
God’s unchanging nature is a slight modification of the tradition he inherits.  Furthermore, Owen’s 
denial of God’s affections makes him liable to Torrance’s claim that the Reformed Orthodox have a 
static and uninvolved God.  Owen, of course, does not understand God’s nature in this way, but it is 
his narrowing of revelation that begins to understand goodness differently than Thomas who clearly 
understands God’s communicative goodness as an attribute of God’s nature.        
 
 149  Torrance’s (following Barth) understanding of God’s being-in-act misunderstands this basic 
Thomistic point.   
 150  Muller, DLGTT:19.  





 Lastly, Owen’s understanding of God as pure act allows us to investigate the role of God’s 
decrees within Owen’s theology proper.  Turning back to Owen’s ‘Greater Catechism,’ he asks the 
reader in chapter 4 question 2, ‘What are the decrees of God?’  Owen’s answer is: ‘Eternal, 
unchangeable purposes of his [God’s] will, concerning the being and well-being of his creatures.’152  
Owen, writing here in 1645, understands God’s goodness and will in a much more explicitly 
Thomistic way than in his later work from 1648 quoted above.  God’s will is expressive of God’s 
decree that seeks and orders all things to the goodness that God is.  Here, goodness has not dropped 
out from Owen’s understanding of God’s will and decree.153  It appears that Owen’s polemical work 
against the Socinians and their appeal to autonomous reason is one reason that this constricted 
understanding of revelation appears at times in Owen’s thought.  This complicates understanding 
Owen on God’s decrees as his most sustained work on the topic, A Display of Arminianism is quite 
early in Owen’s corpus of work.  Owen was only twenty-six years old when he wrote A Display of 
Arminianism in 1642.  Owen’s catechisms were written in 1645. The block quote near the end of the 
last section is from an appendix attached to The Death of Death and was written in 1648.  As Owen 
seeks to avoid the Socinian errors, the role of natural theology greatly lessens.  Therefore, his 
understanding of revelation narrows throughout his lifetime.  As this happens, God’s ontological 
goodness is not as foundational in his theology.    
 Nevertheless, Owen’s articulation of God’s decrees in A Display of Arminianism reveals to us 
Owen’s Thomistic influence before modifications enter into this later works and reveals Owen’s 
polemics against his other, and first, theological interlocutor – the Arminians.154  The Arminians’ 
 
152  Owen, Works 1:473.   
 153  To be fair, we should not over-read a catechism compared to a major treatise, but it clearly seems 
like a change takes place in Owen.    
 154  While it is true that Owen believes both the Arminians and the Socinians deviate from a proper 
doctrine of God, they do so for different reasons.  My point here is not that Owen avoids polemical concerns 
with the Arminians, but that the concerns are different and come quite early in Owen’s career.  For Owen’s 
debate with the Arminians, see, Cooper, Formation of Nonconformity, 59-74; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 22-24, 
116; Reformed Catholic, 26-31.  
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position that human beings can freely choose or not choose to believe in God runs counter to 
Owen’s theology of limited atonement – that Christ died only for the elect.  The major issue in this 
discussion – unlike modern debates that focus on humanity’s freedom – for Owen is the doctrine of 
God.  If a human being can freely choose God for salvation, then God is passible and changes in 
relation to the movement of something outside himself.  On the opening page of A Display of 
Arminianism, Owen encapsulates this concern, asking, ‘Whether the first and chiefest part, in 
disposing of things in this world, ought to be ascribed to God or man?’155  If human beings have a 
free will in the way that the Arminians understand, than God reacts and changes in response to 
something outside of himself.  Therefore, Owen’s understanding of God’s decrees is governed by his 
understanding of God’s simplicity and immutability, the basis of which is God as pure act.  Since 
God’s decrees are unchangeable and eternal, then to introduce any change into God’s decrees is to 
also say that God’s essence changes.  God’s will is God’s essence, and God’s decrees express God’s 
eternal, free, divine purpose and will.   Therefore, Owen, showing his constant attention to God’s 
immutability, writes, ‘Neither can any thing that is absolutely eternal, as is this decree and counsel of 
God, be the effect of, or be procured by, any thing that is external and temporal.’156 As Owen thinks 
through God’s decrees, he once more uses the categories of absolute and relative.157   God’s decrees 
have in view those things that will take place in history.  Yet, these decrees are first ‘internal and 
immanent.’158  As the only one who exists necessarily, all other things depend on God for their 
existence, including future events.159   
 
 155  Owen, Works 10:11.  For the context of A Display of Arminianism, see, Cooper, Formation of 
Nonconformity, 59-64.  
 156  Owen, Hebrews 5:505.   
 157  Owen does not typically use the terms absolute and relative to speak of God’s decrees, but the 
concept is clearly similar to Owen’s articulation of God’s attributes.  Muller writes, ‘There are, moreover, 
various ways in which this relativity and conditionality were expressed by the early modern Reformed…The 
varieties of Reformed argumentation, moreover, point toward reaction against Arminian understandings of 
conditionality.’  Muller, ‘God as Absolute and Relative,’ 66.    
158  Owen, Works 1:473.  
159  Owen, Hebrews 5:87.  
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 These are Owen’s concerns as he begins his Display of Arminianism.160  There, Owen explains 
that God’s decrees are internal and eternal acts of God’s will.161  As a result, God’s decrees are 
immutable.  Perhaps the modern reader finds Owen writing one hundred and thirty-seven pages 
against the view of Arminius as pedantic.  However, for Owen what is at stake is nothing less than 
the doctrine of God.162  The Arminian view of God’s decrees—namely, that God will save, if human 
beings respond in faith—makes God’s decrees mutable and, therefore, makes God’s peremptory 
decrees temporal.  To follow down this path, is to find a mutable god, but not the God of the 
Scriptures, claims Owen.163  If God is mutable, then he is not simple.  Just as God is simple and not 
composed of parts, so our theological construction must not divide God’s essence.  Owen, revealing 
Thomas’s influence on his thinking, writes, ‘Mutable decrees and occasional resolutions are most 
contrary to the pure nature of Almighty God…To ascribe the least mutability to the divine essence, 
with which all the attributes and internal free acts of God are one and the same, was ever accounted 
ὑπερζολὴ ἀθεότητος, “transcendent atheism,” in the highest degree.’164   
 Quoting from James 1:17, Owen argues that God knows all of his works from eternity past.  
Therefore, what God brings to pass he has decreed from eternity.165  Further, because Owen sees 
God’s decrees as ‘being conformable to his nature and essence’, they must be eternal and 
immutable.166  Owen clearly shows how God as actus purus, God’s simplicity, and God’s absolute 
decrees are all ways that seek to conceptualize God ad intra.  Owen explains: 
The decrees of God, being conformable to his nature and essence, do require eternity 
and immutability as their inseparable properties.  God, and he only, never was, nor 
ever can be, what now he is not.  Passive possibility to any thing, which is the fountain 
of all change, can have no place in him who is “actus simplex,” and purely free from all 
 
160  Owen, Works 10:14.    
161  Owen, Works 10:14.    
 162  Of course, there are implications for anthropology as well, namely, how one understands original 
sin and its effects.   
 163  Owen, Works 10:18.  Owen believes that this logic makes God’s warnings about judgment 
temporal or temporary.  The reason someone will face God’s eternal judgment then lies in the human beings 
lack of faith.  Owen believes that the cause of any and all types of judgment is, first and foremost, the justice of 
God.  For Owen, the consequences for one’s theology proper are, I think, significant.    
 164  Owen, Works 10:14.   
 165  Owen, Works 10:19.    
 166  Owen, Works 10:19.  See ST I, 2. q. 4 and q. 9.  
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composition; whence St James affirmeth that “with him is no variableness, neither 
shadow of turning,” James i.17; with him,—that is, in his will and purposes:  and 
himself by his prophet, “I am the LORD, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are 
not consumed,” Mal. iii.6; where he proveth the not changing of his gracious purposes, 
because he is the LORD.  The eternal acts of his will not really differing from his 
unchangeable essence, must needs be immutable.167 
 
If God’s decrees are eternal, then God knows from eternity past all things that will happen in time.  
God’s foreknowledge, contra the Arminians, includes free and contingent events.  ‘Divines,’ writes 
Owen, speak of God’s ‘intuitive or intellective’ foreknowledge—whereby he knows and sees all 
things that he can possibly do and whether or not they will happen.168  All things that are possible, 
because of God’s almighty power, God knows ‘by his essential knowledge.’169  Out of his essential 
knowledge, God, by his decrees, freely determines what will obtain in the world.  This essential 
knowledge is called God’s prescience or visionis, ‘whereby he infallibly seeth all things in their proper 
causes, and how and when they shall come to pass.’170 God is omnipotent, but in Owen’s thought, 
God’s visionis is a way to speak of God’s purpose whereby an event that was once only possible will 
obtain at a certain point in the future.171  God’s essential knowledge is his knowledge of all that 
‘may’ occur, while God’s foreknowledge is God’s knowledge of what is impossible not to occur.172  
Owen clarifies the relationship between these two types of knowledge, writing, ‘With this 
prescience, then, God foreseeth all, and nothing but what he hath decreed shall come to pass.’173   
 
167  Owen, Works 10:19. 
168  Owen, Works 10:19.    
169  Owen, Works 10:23.  Owen, still speaking of the ‘divines’ tells us this knowledge is also called 
scientia or simplicis intelligentiae.    
170  Owen, Works 10:23.   
171  Owen, Works 10:23.   Visionis is genitive feminine singular, meaning ‘of vision.’  Owen references 
this and then says, ‘whereby he infallibly seeth all things in their proper causes, and how and when they shall 
come to pass.’ Owen, Works 10:23. 
172  Owen, Works 10:23-24.  Owen further clarifies this by saying God’s scientia is his omnipotence and 
his visionis is his purpose.  Owen, Works 10:24.  Aquinas in ST I, q. 14, a. 9 addresses whether or not God 
knows things that are not.  Aquinas even uses the distinction of scientia visionis.   Owen’s precise wording is:  
‘Now, these two sorts of knowledge differ, in as much as by the one God knoweth what it is possible may 
come to pass; by the other, only what it is impossible should not come to pass.’  Owen, Works 1:23-24.  
173   Owen, Works 10:24.  
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 In making this distinction, Owen cites Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae.174  Aquinas makes this 
same distinction between God’s knowledge as visionis and God’s knowledge as simplicis 
intelligentiae, when also speaking of God’s knowledge of things that do not exist.175  In both Aquinas 
and Owen, visionis is God’s knowledge of those things that will be actual in the future, but in the 
present are still potential.  Owen’s use of simplicis intelligentiae is harder to understand.  However, 
in Hebrews Owen offers some insight into his thinking.  While expositing Hebrews 6:4-6, Owen raises 
the question of God’s decrees when discussing what it means for some who were part of the 
Hebrew congregation to now have fallen away from grace.  As regards God’s decrees, Owen explains 
that not all future events are equally possible given what God is.  Some future things are ‘impossible 
with respect to the nature of God, either absolutely, as being inconsistent with his being and 
essential properties...or, on some supposition’ such as forgiving sin without satisfaction.176  Further, 
God’s decrees and purposes make some possible future events impossible though they are not 
contradictory to God’s will.  Owen gives the example of Saul and explains that Saul’s repentance is 
not contrary to the nature of God, but it will never happen because God has not decreed it to 
occur.177  In using simplicis intelligentiae, Owen is trying to articulate this concept—some things are 
theoretically possible, but will never happen simply because God wills they not happen.  
Theologically, the motivation behind such a distinction is to concurrently preserve God’s absolute 




 Moving from God ad intra to God ad extra, Owen naturally takes up God’s providence as his 
next topic of concern.  Providence is a way to talk about all of God’s actions ad extra as Owen 
 
174   Owen, Works 10:23no.1 and 4.   
175   Aquinas, ST I, q. 14, a. 9. 
 176   Owen, Hebrews 5:87.  
177  Owen, Hebrews 5:88.  Notice that Owen says nature of God and not will of God.  This follows his 
understanding of divine justice.   
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himself tells us in his ‘Greater Catechism.’  God’s providence concerns God’s decree or purpose, 
God’s prescience, and God’s temporal operations.178  Furthermore, God’s providence is his act 
whereby he loves, sustains, and governs the world and all things he created, bringing them, in 
accordance with their natures, to God’s appointed end.179  Owen explains these different aspects of 
God’s providence at length.180  Then, with this foundation in place, Owen defends his understanding 
of God’s providence against that of the Arminians.181  Owen believes that the Arminians ‘maketh all 
the decrees of God, whose execution dependeth on human actions, to be altogether uncertain, and 
his foreknowledge of such things to be fallible and easily to be deceived.’182  God’s decrees are 
eternal and effectual.  To explain God’s action in the world in another way is to speak of another 
god, for Owen.  This point is important, because it raises the question of how Owen’s articulation of 
God’s decrees gives insight into his theology of the processions and missions of the Son and Holy 
Spirit—a point that we will return to in chapter 2.  God’s work in the world is effectual.  It does not 
merely make certain events possible.  Rather, God accomplishes what he decrees and foreknows for 
his own glory.   
 Owen’s understanding of God’s will and decree in relation to his knowledge leads Owen to 
conclude that the theory of God’s knowing called ‘middle knowledge’ also contradicts God’s 
perfection.183  God knows all that is to be known, and his effectual knowing brings about future 
potentials into actuals.  Yet Owen is aware of the problem of contingency.  Events that happen in the 
world are contingent with respect to their effects or with respect to both cause and effect.184  God’s 
 
178  Owen, Works 10:31.   
179  Owen, Works 10:31.  In Aquinas, all creatures are ordered to their natural end and God’s elect are 
ordered to a supernatural end – to God himself.  This is what the language of ‘according to their natures’ 
means.  However, Owen’s causality and the implied understanding of God’s goodness is not here fully 
developed and, as I have already said, drops out in Owen’s more polemical works.  See, Aquinas, ST 1, q. 22, a. 
2, ad. 4.     
180  Owen, Works 10:34-36.  
181  Owen provides helpful insights on God’s governing and sustaining of creation and creatures, of 
God sovereignty, and of how God uses secondary causes while remaining providentially in control of all things.  
182  Owen, Works 10:42.  
 183  Owen, Works 12:128.  Of course, this was a major point of debate with the Arminians.    
 184  Owen, Works 12:128.  Owen calls them, “if only” and “free.”    
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omniscience does not make contingency meaningless.  Owen explains, ‘God can work with 
contingent causes for the accomplishment of his own will and purposes, without the least prejudice 
to them, either as causes or as free and contingent.  God moves not, works not, in or with any 
second causes, to the producing of any effect contrary or not agreeable to their own natures.’185  
Owen concludes his discourse on providence by coming back to his chief concern—theology proper.  
Owen writes that:  
all perfections are to be ascribed to God, they are all in him.  To know is excellency; he 
that knows any thing is therein better than he that knows it not.  The more any one 
knows, the more excellent is he.  To know all things is an absolute perfection in the 
good of knowledge; to know them in and by himself who so knows them, and not from 
any discourses made to him from without, is an absolute perfection in itself, and is 
required where there is infinite wisdom and understanding.  This we ascribe to God, as 
worthy of him, and as by himself ascribed to himself.186 
Owen is very concerned to show that his theological reflection is derived from exegesis.  Scripture 
reveals something of what God is—the simple, perfect, eternal, pure act who always has, does, and 
will exist for his own glory.  Owen’s understanding of God’s decrees – at least his full and early 




 In this chapter, I have shown how Owen’s theology proper is both Thomistic and also very 
much his own.  This investigation shows us how Owen understands God in se as the foundation of 
God for us.  I have argued that Owen is a complex and at times inconsistent thinker who seeks to 
answer this perennial question of God and all things in relation to God.  As he does, Owen’s 
polemical concerns, especially his interaction with the Socinian John Biddle, lead to his narrowing 
understanding of revelation whereby natural theology is greatly downplayed.  When this happens, 
God’s similitude with his creatures, God’s goodness, drops out of Owen’s theology.  With goodness 
 
 185  Owen, Works 12:131.    
 186  Owen, Works 12:138.    
 187  Owen’s catechisms also teach this account of God’s decrees.    
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underdeveloped, Owen reads God in se in a soteriological way that leads to his understanding of 
God’s justice, which too closely aligns God absolutely and relatively, to use Owen’s terminology.  This 
is not Owen’s intention to be sure.  However, when the similitude is removed the absolute God is 
only known relatively through an act of disruptive grace.188  There is no affective goodness in the 
creature, which is the result of divine goodness communicated to creatures.  This understanding of 
Owen’s doctrine of God’s essence and attributes prepares us to next investigate Owen’s 
understanding of the three divine persons.  
 
 188  I do not mean to suggest that some of God’s acts are not disruptive like the incarnation for 
instance, though even this ‘disruption’ is God’s chief act of goodness.  Nor do I mean to suggest that an 
operative theology of goodness means that we know God absolutely.  Ectypal, or relative, knowledge of God is 
creaturely knowledge of God.  The point here is to highlight what happens when divine goodness is 
marginalized in Owen’s thought.     
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Chapter 2: The Procession and Mission of the Son 
 
One reason Owen understands that God must disruptively break into the world he has made 
is because he departs from the Thomistic tradition on his understanding of the divine missions.  A 
theology of the Son’s mission arises from reflection on biblical texts such as John 5:36 and John 8:42 
where Jesus says that he did not come on his own accord, but that the Father sent him.  These two 
passages are favourites of Thomas Aquinas.1  Just as Owen’s understanding of God as one is 
indebted to Thomas, Aquinas’ influence upon Owen’s account of the Trinitarian persons looms large.  
However, Owen departs from Aquinas’ construction of the divine processions as the foundation for 
the missions with his introduction of the covenant of redemption.  Aquinas’ construction anchors 
the temporal missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit in their respective processions.  Owen anchors 
the temporal mission of the Son in the pactum salutis.   
Like many of his era, Owen makes much use of the concept of covenant to talk about God’s 
economic involvement with creation.  The concept of the pactum salutis, or the covenant of 
redemption, is the predominant way that Owen and his contemporaries speak of the eternal and 
intratrinitarian basis for the redemptive mission of the Son.  This move changes, or at the very least 
confuses, Owen’s understanding of the relationship between the divine processions and missions 
and God’s relation to the world.  Related to this confusion is Owen’s understanding of each of the 
three persons as principles of action rather than God’s nature as the principle of all of God’s works 
ad extra.   
Therefore, in this chapter, I will argue that John Owen’s use of the covenant of redemption 
as the foundation of the Son’s mission confuses the processions and missions.  I will begin by briefly 
explaining Aquinas’ theology of the divine processions and missions so that both Owen’s 
dependence on and departure from Aquinas is clear.  Then, I will specifically investigate Owen’s 
 
 1  See, Dominic Legge, O.P., The Trinitarian Christology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 11.   
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theology of the divine missions.  Next, I will show what happens when Owen introduces the 
covenant of redemption into his account.  Finally, I will argue that the attempt to ground the Son’s 
mission in the covenant of redemption confuses the divine processions and missions and, thus, risks 
introducing contingent dimensions within God ad intra.      
 
Aquinas on the Divine Processions and Missions  
 
I turn first to Aquinas’ theology of the divine persons in order to later understand both 
Owen’s dependence on and development of Thomas.2  Thomas’ theology of the divine missions is 
built upon the exegesis of passages such as John 8:42 where Jesus says that he proceeds from the 
Father.3  The Son’s procession, however, does not begin in the economy of grace.  Economic 
missions are founded upon and patterned after the eternal divine processions.4  While it is more 
common for theologians to speak of the procession of the Holy Spirit—and this is certainly true for 
Owen—for Thomas, procession is a way to speak of the origin of both the Son and the Holy Spirit in 
relation to the Father.5  When speaking of the Trinitarian persons, the concept of procession does 
not imply motion, as it does for creatures.6  Rather, procession in God is ‘a leading out of an origin 
from its own principle; and because in God one divine person is from another, as from a principle, in 
this way is procession properly in God.’7  The first principle is the Father.8  Therefore, the divine 
processions are a way to conceptualize the eternal origin of the three persons of the Trinity, ordered 
as they are.  Since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are eternal, procession is a way to speak of 
 
 2  On Aquinas’ Trinitarian theology see, Gilles Emery, O.P., The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).  On Aquinas’ Christology 
see, Legee, Trinitarian Christology; chapters one and two especially pertain to this present chapter.   
3  εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· εἰ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἦν ἠγαπᾶτε ἂν ἐμέ, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον καὶ 
ἥκω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐλήλυθα, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνός με ἀπέστειλεν.   
 4  See, Aquinas, ST I, q. 27, a. 1; Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 52-53. 
 5  Although when speaking of the persons’ specific personal properties, Aquinas uses procession to 
speak of the Holy Spirit’s relation to the Father and the Son, he uses generation to speak of the Son’s relation 
to the Father.  See, Aquinas, ST I, q. 28, a. 4 and q. 32, a. 3.     
 6  Aquinas, Sent. I. D. 13, a. 1, ad. 1.  
 7  Aquinas, Sent. I. D. 13, a. 1, co.  
8  The Father is the principle in that he has no procession and is the fount of deity.    
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the eternal generation of the Son from the Father and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from 
both the Father (primarily) and the Son (secondarily).  Or, to say it another way, in Thomas’ account, 
processions are a way to speak of the relations of origin between the divine persons.   
The three divine persons are the one and simple God.  Therefore, there is no inequality or 
hierarchy of the divine persons of the Trinity.  However, there is an order among the divine persons.9  
The Father is the origin, or fountain, of the Godhead, and has no procession.  The Son’s generation, 
or procession, is that he is eternally begotten from the Father.  Likewise, the Holy Spirit’s spiration is 
his eternal procession from both the Father and the Son.10  Trinitarian order does not posit a priority 
to one person over the others.  Rather, order reveals that the persons are from another, the Father 
alone excepted as the fountainhead and source of the Son and the Holy Spirit.11  The Father who has 
no procession is not more divine than the Son or the Holy Spirit, nor is he the Son or the Holy Spirit.  
The Son who proceeds, or is begotten, from the Father is not less divine than the Father, though he 
is not the Father or the Spirit.  The Holy Spirit who proceeds from both the Father and the Son is not 
less than the Father or the Son, nor is he the Father or the Son.  Processions describe the One God 
who exists in three distinct persons.     
The divine processions are vital to understanding how God relates to the world as the divine 
processions provide a linchpin between the divine relations of God ad intra and God ad extra.  The 
eternal processions are the principle and pattern for the divine missions of both the Son and the 
Holy Spirit as ‘the divine missions are temporal extensions of the divine processions.’ 12  Thus, in 
Thomas’ theology, the divine missions are the historical effects of the eternal processions.  Aquinas 
 
 9  Aquinas, ST I, q. 33, a. 1 and q. 42, a. 3.   
 10  Thomas teaches that there is a natural generation of subsistent realities in creation, so the Son’s 
procession can be given the specific name of generation.  There is no natural procession of love within 
creation, so the Holy Spirit’s procession is named more generally as procession.  However, Thomas does call 
the Spirit’s procession spiration since it is the Spirit that proceeds.  See, Aquinas, ST I, q. 27, a. 4, ad. 3; Emery, 
Trinitarian Theology, 52-53.  
 11  Aquinas, ST I, q. 33, a. 1, s. c., co, and q, 42, a. 3, co.   
12  The eternal processions are the principle as they are the one God.  Scott Swain and Michael Allen, 
‘The Obedience of the Eternal Son.’ International Journal of Systematic Theology, 15, no. 2 (April 2013), 134.  
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explains, ‘It must be said that a mission not only conveys procession from a principle, but also 
determines the temporal end of the procession.  Or, mission includes the eternal procession, and 
something added, namely a temporal effect.’13  Therefore, there is a double procession—one eternal 
and one temporal that both issue forth from the same eternal principle.  Yet, importantly, a 
temporal procession, this extension, and a divine mission are not synonymous.   This is because a 
procession always has the divine persons’ relationship to their principle, namely the divine nature, in 
view—even when they issue forth a temporal effect—whereas a divine mission, strictly speaking, is 
the relation of the one sent to the created effect.14  Processions are the eternal relations of origins 
among the three persons of the Trinity and are not dependent on the temporal extension or on the 
divine missions.  The eternal processions are the foundation for the temporal processions and the 
divine missions.  The fruit of the divine missions is the economy of grace.  Importantly, the eternal 
processions, the relations of origin, are necessary since God exists eternally as Triune.  Yet, the Son 
and Holy Spirit freely undertake their missions—a point that is important when considering Owen’s 
construction below (a point that is important for Torrance as well).15   
In a quote that will be important for understanding Owen’s construction of the covenant of 
redemption, Aquinas explains the relationship between divine missions and processions in this way:  
‘The concept of mission includes two things; of which one is the habitude of the one who is sent to 
the one who sends; the other is the habitude of the one sent to the end for which he is sent.  By this, 
however, anyone who is sent is shown to have a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the 
one who sends.’16  Legge helpfully explains, ‘There are, therefore, two key elements that constitute a 
divine mission: (1) the person’s eternal procession, and (2) the divine person’s relation to the 
creature in whom this person is made present in a new way, according to some created effect.’17  To 
 
13  Aquinas, ST I, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3.   
14  Aquinas, ST, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3.     
15  See Bruce D. Marshall, ‘The Unity of the Triune God: Reviving an Ancient Question,’ The Thomist: A 
Speculative Quarterly Review 74, no. 1 (2010): 20-23.  
16  Aquinas, ST, q. 43, a. 1, arg. 2.  
 17  Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 15.  
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put this in terms of the Son, the first habitude, or relation, is the relation and order that exists 
between the Father and the Son.  The second habitude is the relation between the Son who is sent 
and the creatures/creation to which he is sent.  Such an understanding allows Thomas to anchor the 
work of the divine persons’ ad extra, the divine missions, in the eternal processions in God’s 
essence, and therefore in God’s will, because God’s essence and God’s will are convertible.  The 
divine processions are in God’s one nature.18  Thus the procession of the Son is the principle from 
which his divine mission occurs in time, because the Son is of God’s nature, which is the principle of 
all God’s acts.  Importantly, Aquinas’ theology of the divine processions allows him to understand 
God for us in a way consistent with this Trinitarian order – God in se.  The Son’s mission is the 
temporal term of his eternal relation of origin.   
 
Owen’s Theology of the Divine Processions and Missions  
 
Owen’s theology of the divine procession and missions builds upon his Thomistic inheritance, 
but his polemical context – especially his Socinian interlocutors – lead him away from Thomas at 
several key points.19  Therefore, comparing Owen to Aquinas leads us one step closer to answering 
the question driving this chapter—does Owen anchor the mission of the Son in the divine processions 
or in the covenant of redemption?  The answer to this question unfolds as we investigate Owen’s 
understanding of the Son’s procession and mission, and their relation to God’s eternal will and 
decrees, as well as their execution in history through God’s works of creation and providence.20   
 
 18  Important for Thomas’ construction is the doctrine of perichoresis, which Owen will call ‘mutual in-
being.’    
 19  Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 47.  The Socinian’s radical understanding of sola scriptura led to an 
anti-metaphysical understanding of God that was ‘lethal to classical Christian theism.’  Trueman, Reformed 
Catholic, 47.  Owen has the Socinians in mind throughout his works, but his major polemic work against the 
Socinian leader John Biddle is Vindiciae Evangelicae, which is volume 12 of Owen’s Works.  Owen was 
commissioned by the English Parliament to write this work to refute Biddle’s Twofold Catechism.  Trueman, 
Reformed Catholic, 47-48.     
 20  Owen, Works 1:473-476.  
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First, Owen’s articulation of the three divine persons is very similar to Aquinas’.  Owen is clear 
that God is one ‘in respect of his essence and being.’21  Yet it is also true that God is ‘one in three 
distinct persons.’22  And while Owen’s understanding of natural theology is more limited than 
Aquinas’, Aquinas and Owen are in full agreement that God is known as Trinity only by supernatural 
revelation.23  Owen writes, ‘Now, the sum of this revelation in this matter is, that God is one;—that 
this one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;—that the Father is the Father of the Son; and the Son, 
the Son of the Father; and the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of the Father and the Son; and that, in respect of 
this their mutual relation, they are distinct from each other.’24  The divine persons are distinct as each 
person, or hypostasis, subsist distinctly in God’s one essence.25  Owen defines person in this way:  
‘Now, a divine person is nothing but the divine essence, upon the account of an especial property, 
subsisting in an especial manner.’26  This special manner is ‘by certain peculiar relative properties’ 
 
 21  Owen, Works 1:473.  
 22  Owen, Works 1:473.  
 23  In Owen’s theology, only those redeemed in Christ are able to make use of natural theology.  The 
fall is so great that natural theology for the unregenerate is impossible.  See, McGraw, Heavenly Directory, 40-
41.  It is precisely this understanding of natural theology that leads Owen to narrow his understanding.     
 24  Owen, Works 2:377.   Typical of the Reformed Orthodox era, Owen is more concerned with the 
practical use of the Trinity than speculation as Thomas would understand speculation.  Once again, we see a 
truncated understanding of revelation at work.  In the paragraph immediately following this quote, Owen 
shows his practical concerns:  ‘This is the substance of the doctrine of the Trinity, as to the first direct 
concernment of faith therein. The first intention of the Scripture, in the revelation of God towards us, is, as 
was said, that we might fear him, believe, worship, obey him, and live unto him, as God. That we may do this in 
a due manner, and worship the only true God, and not adore the false imaginations of our own minds, it 
declares, as was said, that this God is one, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;—that the Father is this one God; 
and therefore is to be believed in, worshipped, obeyed, lived unto, and in all things considered by us as the 
first cause, sovereign Lord, and last end of all;—that the Son is the one true God; and therefore is to be 
believed in, worshipped, obeyed, lived unto, and in all things considered by us as the first cause, sovereign 
Lord, and last end of all;—and so, also, of the Holy Ghost. This is the whole of faith’s concernment in this 
matter, as it respects the direct revelation of God made by himself in the Scripture, and the first proper 
general end thereof. Let this be clearly confirmed by direct and positive divine testimonies, containing the 
declaration and revelation of God concerning himself, and faith is secured as to all it concerns; for it hath both 
its proper formal object, and is sufficiently enabled to be directive of divine worship and obedience.’  Owen, 
Works 2:377.  Owen’s well known Communion with God is an extended meditation on the practical nature of 
the Trinity, Owen, Works:2.  On Owen’s practical concerns in regards to Trinitarian theology see, McGraw, 
Heavenly Directory, 58-69, 212; Ryan M. McGraw, John Owen Trajectories in Reformed Orthodox Theology 
(Cham, Switzerland:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 9-42; and on the Reformed Orthodox more generally, see, 
Muller, PRRD 4:147. 
 25  ‘The distinction which the Scripture reveals between Father, Son, and Spirit, is that whereby they 
are three hypostases or persons, distinctly subsisting in the same divine essence or being.’ Owen, Works 2: 
407.   
 26  Owen, Works 2:407.  Interestingly, Letham claims that both Aquinas and Owen struggle with the 
concept of person in a way typical of western theology.  However, Letham’s comparison of Owen and Western 
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which are the relations of origin that eternally exist within the three persons of the Trinity.  Following 
Thomas, for Owen, the divine processions refer to the Son’s eternal generation from the Father and 
the Holy Spirit’s procession from both the Father and the Son.27  The Father uniquely is the ‘fountain 
of the Godhead.’28  The Son is eternally begotten from the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from 
both the Father and the Son.29  Owen writes: 
As in the person of the Father there is the divine essence and being, with its property 
of begetting the Son, subsisting in an especial manner as the Father, and because this 
person hath the whole divine nature, all the essential properties of that nature are in 
that person. The wisdom, the understanding of God, the will of God, the immensity of 
God, is in that person, not as that person, but as the person is God. The like is to be 
said of the persons of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.30 
The distinct persons of the Trinity are the one essence of God.  The distinction is only a modal 
distinction, not a real distinction, and pertains to the divine persons and never the divine essence.  
Importantly, these processions are immanently in God and do not refer to God’s creation or 
creatures; God’s works ad extra are works of the entire Trinity even though some works are 
appropriated to one of the divine persons.  The theory of appropriation allows us to attribute certain 
works to each of the three persons but maintains every act ad extra always involves God as Trinity 
because God is one.31  Every work of the Trinity ad extra is the work of each person even as 
particular works are appropriated to particular persons.  This is the doctrine of inseparable 
operations, which Owen clearly affirms:   
There is no such division in the external operations of God that any one of them 
should be the act of one person, without the concurrence of the others; and the 
reason of it is, because the nature of God, which is the principle of all divine 
operations, is one and the same, undivided in them all. Whereas, therefore, they are 
the effects of divine power, and that power is essentially the same in each person, the 
works themselves belong equally unto them: as, if it were possible that three men 
 
Trinitarianism to the ‘Eastern approach’ is anachronistic and misses the catholicity of both Aquinas and Owen.  
Western Trinitarian theology does emphasis the three divine persons and both Aquinas and Owen are aware of 
the wider tradition.  Letham, ‘John Owen’s Doctrine of the Trinity,’ 197. 
 27  Owen, Works 2:405.   
 28  Owen, Works 1:472.  
 29  Owen, Works 1:472.  
 30  Owen, Works 2:407.    
 31  On the theory of appropriation see, Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 312-337. 
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might see by the same eye, the act of seeing would be but one, and it would be 
equally the act of all three.32 
Here, Owen very clearly affirms the doctrine of inseparable operations.  All of God’s works ad extra, 
the divine missions, are undivided works of the Trinity.  God’s nature is the principle of all his works.  
Distinction is among God’s works ad intra, the divine processions.  
 Yet, as Owen qualifies the relationship between God’s works ad intra, (the divine 
processions) and God’s works ad extra (the divine missions), his independence and departure from 
Aquinas begins to appear.  While at times Owen affirms that God’s nature is the principle of divine 
acting, at other times he seems to suggest the persons themselves are principles of action.  For 
instance, in his Brief Declaration and Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Owen writes of the 
divine persons ‘that they are distinct, living, divine, intelligent, voluntary principles of operations or 
working, and that in and by internal acts one towards another, and in acts that outwardly respect 
the creation and the several parts of it.’’33  Owen’s understanding of ‘voluntary principles’ is quite 
innovative and troubling.34  The theory of inseparable operations is built upon the understanding 
that the principle of God’s acts is God’s nature.  In chapter 1, we saw that Owen at times speaks of 
God’s name as the principle of action and at other times God’s nature.  A related confusion appears 
to be at work here.  Importantly, for Owen, these ‘distinct acts’ can relate to either the processions 
or the missions.  Owen explains, ‘And these actings, as was said, are either such as where one of 
 
 32  Owen, Works 3:162.  Owen is discussing the role of the Holy Spirit in Christ’s human nature, which I 
will discuss in the next chapter.  The point here is that Owen clearly affirms the doctrine of inseparable 
operations.      
33  Owen, Works 2:405.  
34  Owen’s use of the plural principles is, I think, quite significant.  God’s one nature is not doing the 
same work that it does in other places in Owen and throughout Aquinas’ works.  While entering into the 
debate over whether or not the Reformed Orthodox are influenced by Scotist, Vidu’s comment is illuminating: 
‘From Duns Scotus onward…a different account of action becomes influential in Western thought, an account 
that uproots activity from nature and suspends it by the faculty of the free will, itself understood as standing 
free from nature.’   Adonis Vidu, The Same God Who Works All Things:  Inseparable Operations in Trinitarian 
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2021), 185-186.  For representative articles with 
differing opinions on Scotist influence upon the Reformed Orthodox, See, Muller, ‘Not Scotist,’ 127-150, and 
Antonie Vos, ‘Scholasticism and R eformation’, Willem J van Asselt and Eef Dekker, eds. Reformation and 
Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 99-119.   
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them is the object of another’s actings, or such as have the creature for their object.’35  It is here, in 
these acts ad extra, that Owen possibly posits separable operations of the divine persons with his 
introduction of a plurality of principles.  The ad intra acts of the divine persons are ‘separable’ as 
they are the distinct acts or the personal properties of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  While 
perhaps unintentional and inconsistently employed throughout his works, Owen posits a distinct act 
for each person both in God ad intra, and in God ad extra.  Such a construction makes it hard to 
affirm the undivided ad extra work of the Trinity.   
 To be clear, Owen does not intentionally depart from opera Trinitas ad extra sunt indivisa.36  
Rather, very clearly, Owen affirms:  
Hereby each person having the understanding, the will, and power of God, becomes a 
distinct principle of operation; and yet all their actings ad extra being the actings of God, 
they are undivided, and are all the works of one, of the self-same God. And these things 
do not only necessarily follow, but are directly included, in the revelation made 
concerning God and his subsistence in the Scriptures.37 
Each divine person as a person subsisting in the one divine essence has, or better is, all of the attributes 
of God.  However, notice that Owen here says that as subsisting persons, the divine persons become 
‘a distinct principle of operation.’  While Owen affirms the traditional understanding of the inseparable 
operations of the Trinity, this move is quite innovative and is related to Owen’s articulation of the 
covenant of redemption, even if unintentional.  He attempts to follow Scripture and answer the 
 
35  Owen, Works 2:406. 
 36  Spence claims that Owen’s affirmation of inseparable operations is inconsistent with Owen’s claim 
that the divine persons condescend particularly to certain works with no concurrence, but only approval and 
consent from the other divine persons.  Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 129-133.  Woo claims that Spence 
misunderstands Owen and that Owen is not inconsistent, but in fact affirms both the actions of particular 
divine persons ad extra and the doctrine of inseparable operations.  Woo, ‘The Pactum Salutis and the Trinity’, 
91-97.  As I will argue later in this chapter, I think that Spence’s analysis is more correct, though it should be 
said very clearly that positing separable operations is not Owen’s intention.  Woo is correct in this regard, but 
he misses some of the dogmatic inconsistencies that arise in Owen’s understanding of personal works ad 
extra.  Woo’s defence of Owen is similar to Whitman’s, but both discussions are narrowly focused on Christ’s 
incarnation.  See, Tyler R. Whitman, ‘The End of the Incarnation: John Owen, Trinitarian Agency and 
Christology,’ International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 3 (2013): 284-300. 
37  Owen, Works 2:407.  
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questions of the Socinians who understand God in a more Unitarian way.  Thus, Owen’s thought is 
indebted to the past while influenced by his own context.38  
 
God’s Good Love 
 
 Before considering how all of this relates to Owen’s construction of the pactum salutis, 
turning again to Owen’s Meditations, as I did in chapter 1, helps us see that Owen never lets go of 
the basic Thomistic inheritance, but nonetheless Owen’s introduction of the covenant of 
redemption, I think, marginalises God’s communicative goodness.  In Owen’s Mediations, recall, 
there is a robust understanding of God’s goodness at work that is lacking in ΧΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ, though 
even here, God’s goodness and love is revealed only in the incarnation.39  This is not to suggest that 
Owen intentionally removes God’s goodness, but that Owen’s polemical context leads him to 
prioritize redemptive grace in a way that causes Owen to construct his theology around the pactum 
salutis, rather than a robust theology of divine goodness and the corresponding Trinitarian order 
that is founded upon the divine processions.40   Owen’s revised understanding of God’s goodness is 
one that does not properly relate God’s nature to the divine persons.  Furthermore, Owen’s shifting 
of the principle of divine action from nature to persons is also related to this struggle.  Therefore, 
investigating Owen’s Meditations allows us to see Owen’s basic Thomistic construction of God’s will 
 
 38  Spence believes that Owen intentionally departs from the tradition at this point claiming that 
Owen is ‘no longer wholly committed’ to the theory of inseparable or indivisible operations.  Spence, 
Incarnation and Inspiration, 135-137.  Spence’s claim that Owen is ‘no longer wholly committed’ to inseparable 
operations is too strong.  Owen is still wholly committed to inseparable operations, but the logic of his 
formulations leads him away from the doctrine as Thomistically understood.   
39  In the Gould edition of Owen’s work and in the Banner of Truth reprint, the shorter work, 
Meditations, follows ΧΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ.  Mediations is printed in two parts. According to Gould, Owen did not think 
the two chapters comprising part two were complete at the time of his death, so they were not included in the 
original work.  However, the handwritten manuscripts that survived Owen’s death were added as part two of 
Meditations.  See, Gould, ‘Prefatory Note,’ in Owen, Works 1:274.  
 40  This is related to Owen’s understanding that natural theology is very limited in terms of what it can 
communicate to fallen creatures.  See, McGraw, Heavenly Directory, 40-41. 
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and its relations to the divine processions and missions.41  This will then help us to later understand 
the theological implications of Owen’s addition of the covenant of redemption to God ad intra.42   
 To recap, we have introduced and uncovered this basic structure of processions and 
missions within the tradition broadly and, more specifically, in Owen’s own theological works.  Now 
we can begin to look more closely at Owen’s understanding of the Son’s mission.  Rightly 
understanding the mission of the Son is vital, because at the heart of the Son’s mission is nothing 
less than the revelation of God who is love.  Owen writes:   
How, then, shall we know, wherein shall we behold, the glory of God in this, that he is 
love? The apostle declares it in the next words, 1 John 4:9, “In this was manifested the 
love of God towards us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, 
that we might live through him.” This is the only evidence given us that “God is love.” 
Hereby alone is the divine nature as such made known unto us,—namely, in the 
mission, person, and office of the Son of God; without this, all is in darkness as unto 
the true nature and supreme operation of this divine love.43  
The Son’s mission is rooted in God’s love.  Owen’s chief concern in Meditations is to show that God 
the Son reveals the love that God is.  Notice, though, that even in his more Thomistic treatise, 
Owen’s understanding of the Son’s mission limits knowledge of God more narrowly than a more 
robust natural theology.44  Creation, it seems, does not reveal God’s good love.  Nevertheless, 
Owen’s basic Thomistic instinct remains as he formulates his understanding of the relation of God’s 
will to God’s decrees by rooting God’s love in the more basic attribute of goodness.  God acts in his 
 
41  In order to give a full account of Owen’s thought on this topic, I will draw from ΧΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ as 
well, but discussion of the pactum salutis will come in the next section of this chapter.    
42  We can only speculate that Owen, as a Christian minister, designs the essay in the way he believes 
will be most pastorally helpful and beneficial to his congregation.  Whatever Owen’s circumstantial 
motivations, this work shows that Owen does follow a basic Thomistic structure as he explains this relation of 
the processions and missions. To be clear, Owen does mention the pactum salutis in Meditations, but it is not 
developed and does not do as much theological work as it does throughout Owen’s other writings.     
43  Owen, Works 1:301.  
 44  While, Owen never rejects all natural theology, he does greatly limit the role of natural theology 
due to the Reformed Orthodox emphasis on the noetic effects of sin (and Owen’s fear of Socinianism).  
Natural, creaturely knowledge alone will never rightly reveal that God is love. See, Rehnman, Divine Discourse, 
73-89.    
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‘perfect love’ because God’s nature is ‘infinite being and goodness.’45  Yet, goodness moves in a 
Christological direction.   
 In Meditations, Owen easily shifts from procession and mission language to will and decrees, 
because the economic missions are the fulfilment of God’s decrees that are made in accordance 
with God’s will.  God’s decrees are expressive of God’s will and are revealed in the economy through 
God’s works of creation and providence.   Missions are not the cause of creation and providence 
generally but pertain to the work of the Son and the Holy Spirit in the redemptive economy.  The 
missions and their effects are the terms that the divine processions have in the world.  Following in 
Thomas’ footsteps, the will which God’s decrees express always tend toward the good and, 
therefore, God is their end.46   
Owen’s turn to God’s goodness is very intentional.  God’s decrees are ‘acts of infinite 
goodness.’47  What is more, God’s goodness is the ‘communicative principle’ that makes all of God’s 
decrees effectual in history and cannot help but communicate itself to creation and creatures.48  
Owen writes, ‘He is good, and he doth good—yea, he doth good because he is good, and for no 
other reason—not by the necessity of nature, but by the intervention of a free act of his will.’49  
However, the principle of God’s love for creatures is always his eternal, internal love that the three 
divine persons equally and fully share – that is, God in se is always the principle or foundation.  Love 
is convertible with God’s nature.  Once more, we encounter the foundation of the divine 
processions.  Here Owen shows that God’s goodness as it exists eternally between the three divine 
persons, and then as revealed economically, follows this important pattern.  God is good.  And 
therefore, he communicates or reveals himself to his creation and creatures.    This allows Owen to 
 
 45  Owen, Works 1:368.  I have already introduced Owen’s understanding of God’s goodness, and his 
inconsistencies, in chapter one.  I return to goodness here, not only to review this important point, but also to 
show how this narrowing view of revelation leads him to the covenant of redemption.    
 46  Aquinas, ST I, 2. 19, a. 1, ad. 1.      
47  Owen, Works 1:59.  
48  Owen, Works 1:59.  
49  Owen, Works 1:59.  
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say: ‘The divine nature is eternally satisfied in and with its own goodness; but it is that principle 
which is the immediate fountain of all the communications of good unto others, by a free act of the 
will of God.’50  Notice here that the principle of operation is God’s love, which is God’s nature.   
As God’s goodness is communicated to the fallen creation through the missions of the Son and 
Spirit, it takes on a special form that Owen calls grace or love.51  God’s communication of his love is 
the heart of the Son’s mission.  However, God’s love expresses God’s antecedent and eternal will. 
Thus, the Son’s mission is ultimately rooted in the Father’s love.  God’s will is convertible with 
Trinitarian love, because God is one and because, love is the first movement of God’s will.52  God is 
love.  God is his will.53  Therefore, Christ’s mission is founded upon the Father’s love.  Owen writes, 
‘And this love of the Father acted itself in his eternal decrees, “before the foundation of the world,” 
Eph. i. 4; and afterwards in sending his Son to render it effectual, John iii.16.’54  Furthermore, the 
cause of God’s election before the foundations of the world is love which is God’s will.  Owen 
explains, ‘And whereas this election, being an eternal act of the will of God, can have no moving 
cause but what is in himself,—if we could look into all the treasures of the divine excellencies, we 
should find none whereunto it could be so properly ascribed as unto love.’55  Notice the close 
relation in Owen’s thought of decree, will, and mission.  God’s love, which is convertible with God’s 
will, informs all of God’s decrees.  God’s motive for all that he does in the world is his love, or 
goodness, which is made known and communicated through the mission of the Son.  Here, goodness 
is communicative, but notice Owen’s focus on redemption.  Creational goodness is cut off at the fall, 
which is one of the major reasons for the pactum salutis.   
 
50  Owen, Works 1:59. In a related work Owen writes similarly, ‘In this state of infinite, eternal being 
and goodness, antecedent unto any act of wisdom or power without himself to give existence unto other 
things, God was, and is, eternally in himself all that he will be, all that he can be, unto eternity.  Owen, Works 
1:368.  That this revelation occurs by the free act of God’s will is very important for this discussion, and I will 
return to it in the last section of this chapter. 
51  Owen, Works 1:60.    
52  Aquinas, ST I, q. 20, a. 1, co.   
53  See Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 1 and ST I, q. 20, a. 1, co.  
54  Owen, Works 1:333-334.  
 55   Owen, Works 1:334. 
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Whatever else the Son’s mission might entail, Owen consistently speaks of the mission of the 
Son as the revelation of his love in the redemption of God’s elect.  Therefore, even as Owen speaks 
of God’s decrees or counsels more generally, he is already thinking in terms of redemption from sin.  
Thus, Owen writes, ‘In and with him, God laid the foundation of all his counsels concerning his love 
toward the children of men.’56  God, for Owen, cannot overlook sin, and thus the mission is the 
historical manifestation that sin has not terminated God’s love for his elect.  Therefore, Owen writes, 
‘This eternal act of the will of God the Father doth not contain in it an actual approbation of, and 
complacency in, the state and condition of those that are elected; but only designeth that for them 
on the account whereof they shall be accepted and approved.’57  Since God can only will that which 
is good, he does not will that his creatures rebel against him, but they do.  Therefore, God eternally 
elects his people who will return to him through the redemptive work of the Son.58  
To explain God’s love exegetically, Owen turns to Romans 5:8, where the apostle Paul writes 
that while creatures were still sinners, God shows his love for them through the death of his Son.  
Even though this love is God’s goodness directed toward sinful creatures, God’s love is not 
reactionary.  Rather, this love is rooted in God’s nature.  Therefore, after citing this key text, Owen 
writes ‘“God is love,” saith the apostle.  His nature is essentially so.  And the best conception of the 
natural internal actings of the holy persons, is love; and all the acts of it are full of delight.  This is, as 
it were, the womb of all the eternal counsels of God, which renders his complacency in them 
ineffable.’59  God’s love is convertible with God’s nature, but God’s love is also an internal act by 
which the divine persons love one another.  The divine processions of the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit are relations of love.  It is this eternal love ad intra that allows Owen to understand God’s 
love ad extra, God’s love for his church.  In this way, the divine processions are the foundation and 
 
56  Owen, Works 1:55.  
57  Owen, Works 1:334.  
58  Owen, Works 1:334. 
59  Owen, Works 1:60.  
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pattern for the divine missions.60  God’s economic love is the temporal extension of God’s eternal 
love into creaturely history: 
Hence doth he so wonderfully express his delight and complacency in the actings of his 
love towards the church: “The Lord thy God in the midst of thee is mighty; he will save, 
he will rejoice over thee with joy; he will rest in his love; he will joy over thee with 
singing:” Zeph. iii. 17. The reason why, in the salvation of the church, he rejoiceth with 
joy and joyeth with singing—the highest expression of divine complacency—is because 
he resteth in his love, and so is pleased in the exercise of its effects.61   
God’s love ad intra is the foundation for all the effects of God’s love ad extra.   And these effects 
reveal to us God who is love.  These effects make known God’s will and decrees that the redemptive 
mission of the Son executes in history to reveal the Father’s love.  Owen writes, ‘Wherefore the love 
of the Father unto the Son, as the only-begotten, and the essential image of his person, wherein the 
ineffable delight of the divine nature doth consist, was the fountain and cause of all love in the 
creation, by an act of the will of God for its representation.’62  
 In sum, God’s will is expressive of God’s eternal decrees that direct and govern human 
history.  These decrees are carried out in the economy of God’s grace, in part, by the Father’s 
sending of the Son and Spirit.  Particularly, God’s intratrinitarian goodness and love is the cause of 
the God’s work ad extra whereby he, out of his great love, sends his Son for this redemptive mission 
(Jn 3:16).   Owen writes, ’God out of his infinite goodness, grace, and love to mankind sent his only 
Son to deliver them out of this condition.’63  God’s nature is the principle of operation in 
Meditations.  The goal of this section is to show Owen’s modified understanding of the relation 
between God’s nature and the divine persons.  This revision continues as Owen adds the pactum 
salutis to his discussion of the divine procession and missions.  If God’s goodness is the foundation of 
God’s love and is communicative in nature – both things we have just seen Owen affirm – why does 
Owen add the covenant of redemption which takes on a foundational role of its own?  One major 
 
 60  At this point, Owen follows Aquinas.  See, Aquinas, ST 1., q. 27 and q. 43.    
61  Owen, Works 1:60.  Very importantly, this line of exegetical reasoning shows that however much 
Owen is indebted to the tradition that runs through Thomas Aquinas, he more so desires to let exegesis guide 
and direct his theological conclusions.    
62  Owen, Works 1:146.  
63  Owen, Works 2:421.  
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reason seen so far is that the goodness of the original creation no longer communicates God – at 
least not in the same way that it did before humanity’s fall into sin. 
 
Owen’s Use of the Pactum Salutis  
 
 Owen’s construction and use of the covenant of redemption is one of the most important 
aspects of his theology.64  The question of precisely how the Son carries out his mission in history has 
a complex answer across Owen’s corpus of work.  Owen’s introduction of the covenant of 
redemption introduces a new element to his understanding and our discussion of how the divine 
processions relate to the temporal missions.   The covenant of redemption, or pactum salutis, arises 
out of the development of covenant theology during the Reformed Orthodox era and tries to 
understand biblical texts that speak of the Father giving the Son work to do, or appointing the Son to 
come into the world (Ps 2:7; Jn 17; Heb 10:7).65  Muller defines the pactum salutis as follows:  ‘In 
Reformed federalism, the pretemporal, intratrinitarian agreement of the Father and the Son 
concerning the covenant of grace and its ratification in and through the work of the Son incarnate.’66  
 
 64  See, Tweeddale, Owen and Hebrews, 53-83 where Tweedale refers to the covenant of redemption 
as ‘the foundation of redemption’.  Also, see, Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 87-92. Woo helpfully explains that 
‘Owen used various terms to denote the pactum salutis.  He refers to it as “covenant of the mediator,” 
“covenant of the Redeemer,” “covenant of redemption,” and “eternal compact”.’  Woo, ‘The Pactum Salutis 
and the Trinity’, 111. 
65  See Richard A. Muller, ‘Toward the Pactum Salutis: Locating the Origins of a Concept,’ Mid-America 
Journal of Theology, no. 18 (2007): 11-65; J.V. Fesko, The Covenant of Redemption: Origins, Development, and 
Reception, Reformed Historical Theology, vol. 35, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Bristol, CT:  Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2016).  On Owen’s covenant theology particularly, see, Baylor, ‘“He Humbled Himself”: Trinitry, 
Covenant, and the Gracious Condescension of the Son in John Owen,’ 165-194; Ferguson, Christian Life, 20-32;  
McGraw, Heavenly Directory, 140-186; Rehnman, ‘Trichotomous or Dichotomous,’; Trueman, Reformed 
Catholic, 67-100; Tweeddale, Owen and Hebrews, 53-82.  While covenant theology is not monolithic, the basic 
structure is that God first makes a covenant of works, or covenant of life, with Adam in the Garden of Eden as 
he is the federal head of humanity.  When Adam and Even fall into sin, God makes a covenant of grace which 
understands the promised seed of the woman to be, ultimately, Jesus Christ.  He is the new federal head who 
redeems all the Father gives to him.  The covenant of grace is one covenant but unfolds historically through 
the different administrations of the covenant to Abraham, Moses, Phineas, David, and finally Jesus Christ.  The 
foundation of the covenant of grace is the covenant of redemption.  Reformed theologians debate the nature 
of the Mosaic covenant.  Some believe it is a new covenant of works, and others hold that it is an 
administration of the one covenant of grace.  Owen’s covenant theology is somewhat nuanced as he holds 
that there are four, not simply three covenants because he believes the Mosaic covenant is a new covenant of 
works.  See, Owen, Hebrews 6:3-177.  
66  Muller, DLGTT:252.  
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The Son ‘covenants’ with the Father, agreeing to fulfil the promise of the Father’s testamentum 
through his work as Mediator.67  The covenant of redemption serves as the pretemporal and eternal 
foundation for the covenant of grace.68  In fact, one reason for the introduction of this doctrine is to 
distinguish between the Father’s covenant with the Son and the covenant between Christ and the 
elect – God ad intra and God ad extra.  Owen writes, ‘First we must distinguish between the 
covenant that God made with men concerning Christ, and the covenant that he made with his Son 
concerning men.’69  The pactum salutis, therefore, attempts to explain the foundation for the Son’s 
free and voluntary redemptive saving of his elect.  No longer is God’s one nature the foundation, but 
the divine persons and their covenanting activity is now the principle of redemption.  Accordingly, 
the goal of this section is not to give an exhaustive treatment of Owen’s theology of the covenant of 
redemption, but to show that Owen’s introduction of the pactum salutis shifts the anchor of the 
Son’s mission from the divine processions to this covenant.  The result is an insecure foundation.     
Aligning himself with the Reformed Orthodox more broadly, Owen defines the pactum in a 
way that shows its foundational nature in his understanding of the Son’s earthly mission.  Owen 
writes, ‘This is that compact, convention, or agreement that was between the Father and the Son, 
for the accomplishment of the work of our redemption by the mediation of Christ, to the praise of 
the glorious grace of God.’70  As the concept grows in the wider Reformed tradition, so too does the 
covenant of redemption develop within Owen’s theology.  The pactum salutis is absent in early 
works – such as A Display of Arminianism – but plays a very prominent role in his later works.71  
 
67  Muller, DLGTT:252.  
68  Although not all reformed and covenantal theologians of the Reformed Orthodox era, or today, 
hold to the covenant of redemption.  See, Fesko, The Covenant of Redemption, 68-72.  For two modern 
Reformed theologians who holds to the covenant of grace, but not to the covenant of redemption.  See, 
Robert Letham, The Westminster Assembly: Reading Its Theology in Historical Context (Phillipsburgh, NJ:  P&R, 
2009), 235-236; Robert Letham, Systematic Theology (Wheaton, IL:  Crossway, 2019), 431-438; A.T.B. 
McGowan, ‘Karl Barth and Covenant Theology,’ in Engaging With Barth: Contemporary Evangelical Critiques, 
ed. David Gibson and Daniel Strange (Nottingham, UK:  Apollos, 2008), 131. 
69  Owen, Hebrews, 2:78.    
70  Owen, Works 12: 497.  
 71  Yet in his late work Meditations, the covenant of redemption is mentioned but not as foundational 
as it is in Owen’s other works.  For a detailed analysis of the development of the pactum in Owen, see, Woo, 
‘The Pactum Salutis and the Trinity’, 109-114.  
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Owen’s clearest articulations are found in Exercitation XXVIII72 and in Vindiciae Evangelicae.73  In 
both places, Owen’s understanding of this pre-temporal agreement is nearly identical, but Owen’s 
explanations grow more detailed given his desire to maintain Trinitarian orthodoxy.74  Particularly, 
Owen explains his account of the relation of God’s essential will to personal wills of the divine 
persons.  One reason Owen shifts God’s unified will to the divine persons is because he holds that 
intertrinitarian covenant results from the divine counsels among the three divine persons.75  In 
Owen, ‘counsels’ are nearly synonymous with the covenant of redemption and lead to this shift and 
emphasis on the divine persons.76     
How then does the covenant of redemption function within Owen’s theology of the divine 
missions?  The covenant of redemption is the foundation of salvation and, therefore, of the Son’s 
mission.77  The Father sends the Son ‘in the fullness of time,’ because in eternity past, the Father and 
the Son made an agreement that the Son would come and fulfil his redemptive mission.  This 
agreement is one of the ‘eternal transactions’, or the voluntary covenanting, that takes places 
between the divine persons – recall Owen’s ‘voluntary principles’.  These counsels were carried on 
‘“per modum foederis,” “by way of covenant, compact, and mutual agreement, between the Father 
and the Son”.’78  Owen is not unique in anchoring the Son’s mission in the covenant of redemption.  
 
72  Owen, Hebrews 2:77-97.  
73  Owen, Works 12:496-508.  Though mention of the covenant is found throughout Owen’s Works,  
see, Owen, Works 1:55-56, 88; 2:178; 5:179-180, 191-192, 258; 6:434; 9:586-588; 10:185; 11:299; 12:605; 
16:342; Hebrews 2:131, 153, 196; 3:45, 225, 410; 4:413-414, 495; 5:489, 510, 577; 6:56-57, 300, 448; 7:240, 
349, 475.  Woo compiled this list, see, ‘The Pactum Salutis and the Trinity’, 111no.143 and no.144.  The 
covenant of redemption is also found in Owen’s Geater Catechism, see, Owen, Works 1:481 and his 
Communion with God, see, Owen, Works 2:118-119.  See, Woo, ‘The Pactum Salutis and the Trinity’, 111 and 
Kay, Trinitarian Spirituality, 168.     
 74  Owen is aware that some will think that his theology of the covenant of redemption is tritheistic.  
See, Woo, ‘The Pactum Salutis and the Trinity’, 124.  
 75  Divine counsels are undertaken by the three divine persons rather than God as one.  This is a shift 
from nature to person as the principle of God’s works.  
76  Fesko notes:  ‘For Owen, the counsel of God and the pactum are very closely related.’  Fesko, 
Covenant of Redemption, 65.  While I generally agree with Fesko at this point, often Owen seems to write of 
God’s counsel in a way that does not merely ‘closely associate’ the two concepts.  Rather, they often appear 
synonymous in Owen’s thought. Fesko likely has in mind that the covenant of redemption is often seen as a 
‘Christologically focused subset’ of God’s counsels or decrees.   
 77  McGraw, Heavenly Directory, 145; Tweeddale, Owen and Hebrews, 58-53; Trueman, Claims of 
Truth, 137; Reformed Catholic, 87-92.  
78  Owen, Hebrews 2:77.    
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Writing once more of the Reformed Orthodox in general, Muller writes, ‘This eternal pactum 
provides, moreover, a foundation for the relationship between the Father and the Son that is 
worked out in the temporal economy.’79 Owen concurs:  
Wherefore, as it is said that the Father loved us, and gave his Son to die for us; so also 
it is said that the Son loved us, and gave himself for us, and washed us in his own 
blood. These things proceeded from and were founded in the will of the Son of God; 
and it was an act of perfect liberty in him to engage into his peculiar concernments in 
this covenant. What he did, he did by choice, in a way of condescension and love. And 
this his voluntary susception of the discharge of what he was to perform, according to 
the nature and terms of this covenant, was the ground of the authoritative mission, 
sealing, and commanding, of the Father towards him. See Ps. 60:7, 8; Heb. 10:5; John 
10:17, 18.80  
Notice what Owen says here.  The Father’s love is the cause of the Son’s mission.  However, even 
though the Father sends the Son, God the Son freely consents to the terms of the covenant of 
redemption.  The Son is a voluntary principle of action.  Owen wants to maintain the free and 
voluntary nature of the Son’s mission.  As a result, Owen concludes that it was the Son’s free choice 
to fulfill the obligations of the pactum salutis, and this free choice is the ‘ground of the authoritative 
mission’ of the Son.  The Son’s mission is free, because all things outside of God are free in keeping 
with their contingency.  Owen’s language of ‘free choice’ reveals that his understanding of God’s 
freedom is not the same as Aquinas’ account of God’s freedom.   This is clearly a shift away from 
Trinitarian order that allows us to understand the divine processions as the foundation and pattern 
of the divine missions.  
 
God’s Will, Decrees, and the Pactum 
 
 It is here that the insecurity of the pactum salutis as the foundation of redemption begins to 
emerge, particularly because Owen’s use of the covenant of redemption causes him to explain God’s 
will in a personal rather than essential register.  With the introduction of the covenant of 
 
79  Muller, ‘Toward the Pactum Salutis. 23.  
 80  Owen, Hebrews 2:87.    
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redemption, Owen’s understanding of the relation of God’s will and God’s decrees changes from his 
articulation in Display of Arminianism.81  In Aquinas and in Owen’s earlier works, God’s will is God’s 
essence, and God’s decrees are expressive of God’s eternal and free will.  Nothing external to God’s 
will is the cause of God’s will.82  Yet, as the covenant of redemption develops in Owen’s thought, the 
will of the Father and the will of the Son are predicated personally instead of simply as the will of 
God.  Importantly, applying the will of God to one of the divine persons – as they are each subsisting 
persons within the one essence of God – is not what is troubling in Owen.  What is troubling is that 
Owen’s predication of will to the Father and the Son seems to work with a different understanding 
of freedom – Owen usually prefers voluntary – leading to an understanding of the divine counsels 
that comes close to understanding these counsels as an agreement between three individuals.83  In 
fact, Owen even goes so far as to call the pactum a ‘consultation’ between the Father and the Son.84  
As a result, Owen seems to shift God’s freedom from God’s nature to the divine persons.  Taken to 
 
 81  Owen’s Display of Arminianism is one of his earlier works, published in 1642.  Recall from chapter 
one, that Owen follows Thomas in his understanding of God’s will and decrees.  Five years later, Owen briefly 
mentions the covenant of redemption in The Death of Death in the Death of Christ.   As Owen’s thinking 
matures, though, he appeals to the covenant of redemption more frequently and technically.  As mentioned 
above, more developed formulations are found in Owen’s 1655 Vindiciae Evangelicae and in Owen’s 
Exercitation XXVIII found within his Hebrew’s commentary that was published from 1668-1684.  Letham thinks 
that Owen changes his mind on God’s will.  Although I disagree with Letham’s claim that Aquinas’ doctrine of 
simplicity makes God’s will necessary, he is on to something regarding Owen’s understanding of God’s will.  I 
am not convinced that Owen intentionally changed his mind to the position that God’s essence and will are not 
coterminous, but Owen’s formulations lead in this direction.  Letham, ‘Trinity in its Catholic Context,’ 193.    
82  See chapter 1 and Owen, Works 1:473 and Owen, Hebrews 5:505.  
 83  I am somewhat sympathetic to Barth’s critique of the covenant of redemption:  ‘The conception of 
this inter-trinitarian pact as a contract between the persons of the Father and the Son is also open to criticism. 
Can we really think of the first and second persons of the triune Godhead as two divine subjects and therefore 
as two legal subjects who can have dealings and enter into obligations one with another? This is mythology, for 
which there is no place in a right understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity as the doctrine of the three 
modes of being of the one God, which is how it was understood and presented in Reformed orthodoxy itself. 
God is one God.’  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh, UK:  T&T Clark, 1985), 65.  That said, Barth’s solution that the covenant of grace expresses God’s 
being lacks an adequate distinction of God in se and God for us.  I will address this important point in chapter 5 
on Torrance’s doctrine of God.   
 84  Owen, Hebrews 6:468.  This is not the case of Owen using a word that has a different meaning in 
his day than today – something that does happen throughout Owen’s Works.  According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, consultation has always meant:  ‘The action of consulting or taking counsel together; deliberation, 
conference.’  "consultation, n.". OED Online. September 2020. Oxford University Press. 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39957?redirectedFrom=consultation (accessed October 25, 2020). Even if 
Owen is thinking in Latin, the meaning of consulto, consultare is the same.  ‘consulto, āvi, ātum, 1, v. freq. a. 
[consulo]. I. To reflect, consider maturely, to consult, take counsel, deliberate.’  C.T. Lewis and C. Short, 
Harper’s Latin Dictionary (Oxford, UK: Harper Brothers, 1891), 442.  
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an extreme that Owen himself does not, such an understanding could posit three free persons 
instead of the one free God who exists in three persons (or three gods).85  Understandably, Owen is 
concerned to counter the Socinian understanding that the Son and Spirit are not divine in the same 
way as the Father.86  The risk, however, is a possible conflation of essence and persons and an 
undoing of the Trinitarian order.    An order is revealed in the divine processions that pattern and 
inform the divine mission of the Son.  This closing section, therefore, will show how Owen’s use of 
the pactum salutis as the anchor of the Son’s mission and does not adequately distinguish 




 This inadequacy is the result of Owen’s personal predication of God’s will.  In both Vindiciae 
Evangelicae and in Exercitation XXVIII, Owen argues that the pactum is the ‘ground and foundation’ 
of Christ’s death87 and the foundation of Christ’s priesthood.88  Owen’s struggle to hold together 
God’s will as both essential and personal comes to the fore as he writes that it is the ‘will of the 
Father appointing and designing’ the Son’s mission that is this ‘compact.’89  Predicating God’s will 
personally leads Owen to posit a separate will for the Father and for the Son.90  Yet God’s simplicity 
 
 85  Tritheism is a common critique against the covenant of redemption.  See, Letham, ‘Trinity in its 
Catholic Context,’ 196. 
 86  Possibly at work here is also Calvin’s innovative idea that the Son is autotheos, though Owen in 
many places affirms the Trinitarian order of persons and does not speak of the Son as autotheos.  We know 
Owen read Calvin, and at the Westminster Assembly, there was division among those who followed Calvin and 
those who followed the tradition on this point.  See, Chad van Dixhorn, ‘Post-Reformation Trinitarian 
Perspectives,’ in Retrieving Eternal Generation, ed. Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2017), 180-207.  For Calvin’s understanding of the Son as autotheos, see, Brannon Ellis, Calvin, 
Classical Trinitarianism, & The Aseity of the Son (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).  The concept of 
the Son’s aseity remains a debated point. 
87  Owen, Works 12:496.  
88  Owen, Hebrews 2:77.  
89  Owen, Works 12:497.  
90  Vidu again helpfully explains: ‘The concept of will itself was understood to be located in nature and 
not in the person, as the controversy over monothelitism revealed…Today we tend to think of will, and indeed 
operations that are willed less as a natural capacity and more as a faculty of spontaneity.  Historically this is 
due to the gradual detachment of will from nature.  Many scholars lay the blame for this separation at the feet 
of John Duns Scotus.’  Vidu, The Same God, 187-188.  The point here is not to criticize Scotus so much as to 
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ought, I think, to guard against such concepts.  However, Owen, who himself is entrenched in the 
Thomistic tradition, knows that some will see this predication of distinct wills for each person of the 
Trinity as a departure from classical theism.  Owen answers this objection: 
It is true, the will of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is but one.  It is a natural 
property, and where there is but one nature there is but one will:  but in respect of 
their distinct personal actings, this will is appropriated to them respectively, so that 
the will of the Father and the will of the Son may be considered [distinctly] in this 
business; which though essentially one and the same, yet in their distinct personality it 
is distinctly considered, as the will of the Father and the will of the Son.  
Notwithstanding the unity of essence that is between the Father and the Son, yet is 
the work distinctly carried on by them; so that the same God judges and becomes 
surety, satisfieth and is satisfied in these distinct persons.91 
At this point, some might defend Owen’s move by saying that he speaks only of the human nature of 
Christ and the Son’s economic subordination to the Father.  However, Owen clearly has more in 
mind as he places these two wills into eternity, saying, ‘And whatever is expressed in the Scripture 
concerning the will of the human nature of Christ, as it was engaged in and bent upon its work, it is 
but a representation of the will of the Son of God when he engaged into this work from eternity.’92  
Owen appears to affirm more than the Thomistic understanding of Trinitarian order and possibly 
risks introducing some kind of eternal subordination of the Son.93  At least in part, this concern stems 
from Owen’s understanding that Christ’s mediation occurs in both his divine and human natures.94  
Owen is careful to posit a subordination resulting from the covenant, not a subordination because 
the Son is less divine than the Father.  However, notice that Owen at least opens the doors to 
subordination of the Son within God in se.  The Father is the ‘prescriber, the promiser, and lawgiver; 
and the Son was the undertaker upon his prescription, law, and promises.’95  While it is true that the 
 
show that a shift from nature to persons changes the way that some within the tradition understand will and 
action.   
91  Owen, Works 12:497.  Notice Owen’s understanding of ‘distinct personal actings’.   
 92  Owen, Hebrews 2:87.     
 93  On God’s will and the Son’s subordination, see, D. Glenn Butner, Jr., The Son Who Learned 
Obedience: A Theological Case Against the Eternal Submission of the Son (Eugene, OR:  Pickwick Publications, 
2018), 122-149.  
 94  Trueman rightly explains that the covenant of redemption develops, in part, due to the 
Reformation’s understanding that Christ’s mediation occuring in both his divine and human natures.  See, 
Trueman, ‘Atonement and the Covenant of Redemption,’ 212-213. 
 95  Owen, Hebrews 2:85.  
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covenant of redemption has Christ’s redeeming work in view, it is worth considering whether the 
covenant of redemption pulls the economy of grace into the immanent Trinity.  Importantly, Owen 
rejects the traditional analogical answers of how we understand biblical texts that speak of the Son’s 
subordination.  Aquinas, for example, argues that the Son is inferior to the Father only in his human 
nature.96  This reading is analogical in that it begins with understanding Christ within God’s economy 
but looks to God in se to define what inferiority means for God the Son in John 14:28.  God ad intra 
is not defined by anything contingent.97  Owen explains his understanding of the Son’s inferiority:  
And on this account it is that our Saviour says his Father is greater than he, John 14:28. 
This place, I confess, the ancients expound unanimously of the human nature only, to 
obviate the Arians, who ascribed unto him a divine nature, but made, and absolutely in 
itself inferior to the nature of God. But the inferiority of the human nature unto God or 
the Father is a thing so unquestionable as needed no declaration or solemn 
attestation, and the mention of it is no way suited unto the design of the place. But 
our Saviour speaks with respect unto the covenant engagement that was between the 
Father and himself as to the work which he had to do.98 
The Son’s earthly obedience to the Father is not rooted in Christ’s two natures, but the covenant of 
redemption.  Thus Owen’s formulation of the pactum salutis opens the door for a departure from a 
 
 96  Aquinas, Joan. Cap. 14, lec 8, no. 1970.  
 97  Aquinas’ explanation is very helpful and reveals Owen’s independent interpretation: ‘This passage 
led Arius to the disparaging statement that the Father is greater than the Son. Yet our Lord’s own words repel 
this error. One should understand the Father is greater than I, based on the meaning of I go to the Father. Now 
the Son does not go to the Father insofar as he is the Son of God, for as the Son of God he was with the Father 
from eternity: in the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God (John 1:1). Rather, he is said to go to 
the Father because of his human nature. Thus when he says, the Father is greater than I, he does not mean I, 
as Son of God, but as Son of man, for in this way he is not only inferior to the Father and the Holy Spirit, but 
even to the angels: we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, crowned with glory and honor 
on account of his passion and death (Heb 2:9). Again, in some things he was subject to human beings, as his 
parents (Luke 2:51). Consequently, he is inferior to the Father because of his human nature, but equal because 
of his divine nature: he did not think it robbery to be equal to God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a 
servant (Phil 2:6).’  Aquinas, Joan. Cap. 14, lec. 8, no. 1970.  
 98  Owen, Hebrews 2:84-85. In the paragraph just before this quote, Owen writes, ‘Now, this 
declaration the Scripture abounds in: Ps. 16:2, “Thou hast said unto the LORD, Thou art my Lord.” These are 
the words of the Son unto the Father, as is evident from verses 9–11. Ps. 22:1, “My God, my God.” Ps. 40:8, “I 
delight to do thy will, O my God.” Ps. 45:7, “God, thy God, hath anointed thee.” Micah 5:4, “He shall stand and 
feed in the strength of the LORD, in the majesty of the name of the LORD his God.” John 20:17, “I ascend unto 
my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God.” Rev. 3:12, “I will make him a pillar in the temple of 
my God; … and I will write upon him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God.” All which 
expressions argue both a covenant and a subordination therein.’  Owen, Hebrews 2:84.  In part, Owen appears 
to follow Calvin more than Aquinas at this point.  Calvin understands John 14:28, and similar texts, not as 
referring to Christ’s two natures, but to Christ’s estates of humility and exaltation.  While I affirm Christ’s 
humility and exaltation, reading John 14:28 in this way is a shift from metaphysical to soteriological reasoning.  
See, Calvin, John 2:102-103.       
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Chalcedonian two-nature Christology.  This is clearly not Owen’s desire, but no longer do these texts 
speak of Christ’s earthly obedience carried out in his human nature.  True, Christ obeys as a unified 
person, but properly speaking, the divine nature cannot obey the divine nature.99  Owen’s 
understanding is problematic, because the covenant of redemption speaks of the Son’s 
subordination ad intra.100   
 This, in part, is why Owen shifts predication of God’s will to the divine persons.  Knowing 
that some will find this problematic, Owen asks, ‘How, then, can it be said that the will of the Father 
and the will of the Son did concur distinctly in the making of this covenant?’101  Owen’s answer is 
that God’s will is one, but because each of the three divine persons subsist distinctly, each divine 
person possesses God’s one will in a distinct way.  Owen explains his understanding of united yet 
distinct wills: 
This difficulty may be solved from what hath been already declared; for such is the 
distinction of the persons in the unity of the divine essence, as that they act in natural 
and essential acts reciprocally one towards another,—namely, in understanding, love, 
and the like; they know and mutually love each other. And as they subsist distinctly, so 
they also act distinctly in those works which are of external operation. And whereas all 
these acts and operations, whether reciprocal or external, are either with a will or 
from a freedom of will and choice, the will of God in each person, as to the peculiar 
acts ascribed unto him, is his will therein peculiarly and eminently, though not 
exclusively to the other persons, by reason of their mutual in-being. The will of God as 
to the peculiar actings of the Father in this matter is the will of the Father, and the will 
of God with regard unto the peculiar actings of the Son is the will of the Son; not by a 
distinction of sundry wills, but by the distinct application of the same will unto its 
distinct acts in the persons of the Father and the Son.102  
Unsurprisingly, Owen makes a clear distinction between the subsisting relations of the divine 
persons ad intra, and their distinct acts ad extra.  However, notice what Owen says in regards to 
works ad extra.  These works happen in the economy either by a will or ‘from a freedom of will and 
choice.’103  Language of freedom and choice is pactum salutis language, and it appears that the 
 
 99  I think it is possible to construct a theology of Christ’s mediation in both natures that remains true 
to Chalcedon, but that is beyond the scope of this study.    
 100  Here, we clearly see that theology proper influences, and shapes, our understanding of all the 
other theological loci.    
101  Owen, Hebrews 2:87.  
 102  Owen, Hebrews 2:87-88.   
103  Owen, Hebrews 2:88  
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introduction of the covenant of redemption is why Owen locates God’s will personally and not 
essentially.  It is Owen’s understanding of the divine processions and their mutual in-being that leads 
Owen to employ the theory of appropriations to argue for distinct wills that are really the one will of 
God.104  Yet, to locate God’s will personally and to apply the theory of appropriation to the persons 
and not God’s essence, is quite innovative.105  Theologically, this innovative use of the theory of 
appropriation risks positing not simply three persons but three gods. 106 
 It is precisely Owen’s understanding of the relation of God’s will to the three persons that 
does not allow him simply to found salvation on God’s good will.  Is God’s will still convertible with 
God’s good nature for Owen?  How does a personal will express the decrees of the one God and 
maintain the doctrine of inseparable operations?  To further complicate the matter, the covenant of 
redemption is not a decree in the proper sense of the term.  Owen explains: 
And in this respect the covenant whereof we treat differeth from a pure decree; for 
from these distinct actings of the will of God in the Father and the Son there doth arise 
a new habitude or relation, which is not natural or necessary unto them, but freely 
taken on them. And by virtue hereof were all believers saved from the foundation of 
the world, upon the account of the interposition of the Son of God antecedently unto 
his exhibition in the flesh; for hence was he esteemed to have done and suffered what 
he had undertaken so to do, and which, through faith, was imputed unto them that 
did believe.107 
The question of the pactum’s relation to the decree is carefully developed during the rise of 
covenant theology as a whole.108  As theologians constructed more detailed formulations of the 
covenant of grace, the covenant of redemption became a way to resolve the tension between God’s 
eternal decrees and the covenant of grace.109  Reformed Orthodox generally conclude that the 
 
 104  ‘Mutual in-being’ is Owen’s term for perichoresis.    
 105  Letham argues that Owen changes his mind on the location of God’s will.  See, Letham, ‘Trinity in 
its Catholic Context,’ 193-194.  
 106  Tay is correct that Owen says he is applying, not appropriating, the will to each of the persons.   
However, Tay’s explanation that applying and appropriating solves the problem for Owen is unconvincing, 
because it is not clear that Owen himself means something different between the two concepts.    
107  Owen, Hebrews 2:88.    
108  Muller, ‘Toward the Pactum,’ 61-64.  
109   Muller, ‘Toward the Pactum,’ 17.  For a recent attempt to locate the covenant of redemption with 
God’s decrees and, thus, much closer to Thomas on God’s will, see, Scott R. Swain, ‘Covenant of Redemption,’ 
in Christian Dogmatics: Reformed Theology for the Church Catholic, ed. Michael Allen and Scott R. Swain 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 107-125.  
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decree and covenant of redemption are related, but they are not merely two ways of saying the 
same thing.110  And they are not saying the same thing, because God’s decree speaks of God as one, 
whereas the pactum salutis, at least for Owen, speaks of the ‘distinct acts’ of the divine persons.111   
  Owen does not completely dismiss God’s decrees, but rather, the introduction of the 
covenant of redemption leads Owen to say all the decrees were ‘laid in the person of the Son 
alone.’112  Owen has clearly shifted the anchor of the divine mission of the Son to the covenant of 
redemption, but he also does something quite interesting when he says that the distinct acts of the 
Father and the Son in the covenant of redemption create new relations or habitudes among the 
divine persons.  These new relations do not change God’s essence or God’s will, because this 
habitude is not ‘natural or necessary’.  It is freely, and presumably by choice, entered into by the 
Father and the Son.113  As defined in the opening section of this chapter, the divine mission of the 
Son does create a new habitude to the creature to which he is sent.  However, this is not what Owen 
says here.  Rather, Owen argues that the federal transactions between the divine persons creates a 
new habitude among the persons of the Trinity that the persons enter into freely.  Owen writes:  
Thus, though this covenant be eternal, and the object of it be that which might not 
have been, and so it hath the nature of the residue of God’s decrees in these regards, 
yet because of this distinct acting of the will of the Father and the will of the Son with 
regard to each other, it is more than a decree, and hath the proper nature of a 
covenant or compact. Hence, from the moment of it (I speak not of time), there is a 
 
 110  Muller, ‘Toward the Pactum,’ 61.   Muller explains: ‘The point is very much like that made 
concerning the divine attributes:  given the simplicity or uncompoundedness of the divine essence, the 
attributes are essentially identical—they are not however, formally or rationally identical.  In as much as the 
eternal decrees represent the divine willing of all things, including the salvation of the elect, and the pactum 
salutis represents the divine willing concerning the whole work of salvation, from a trinitarian perspective, 
there is and must be, given the terms of the older orthodoxy, an essential identity of the decree and the 
pactum…Nonetheless as in the case of the divine attributes, there are significant formal differences between 
the eternal decree and the pactum salutis.’  Muller, ‘Toward the Pactum’, 61.  
 111  In the midst of a debate with Richard Baxter on God’s decrees, Owen turns his attention directly 
to the redemptive mission of the Son and writes, ‘We are not at all speaking of a right founded on God’s 
decrees.’   Rather, the foundation of salvation is the pactum salutis.  Owen writes, ‘The covenant of God with 
Christ about the pardoning, justifying, and saving of those for whose sin he should make his soul an offering; 
which covenant, respecting Christ as mediator, God and man, is not to be reckoned among the mere decrees 
and purposes of God, containing in itself all those promises and engagements whereon the Lord Jesus in the 
work of redemption rolled himself.’  Owen, Works 10:477.   
112  Owen, Works 1:62.  The use of person here is very important as it sets up Owen’s theology of 
Christ as the mediator. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is also important to think through what 
such a construction says about the mission of the Holy Spirit.    
113  Owen, Hebrews 2:88.  
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new habitude of will in the Father and Son towards each other that is not in them 
essentially; I call it new, as being in God freely, not naturally.114  
Recall here that a divine mission has two key elements:  the divine person’s eternal procession and 
‘the divine person’s relation to the creature in whom this person is made present in a new way, 
according to some created effect.’115  Owen seems to develop this basic Thomistic understanding, in 
order to formulate his theology of the covenant of redemption.   Whether intentionally or not, Owen 
has formulated, not only a pre-temporal covenant, but a pre-temporal mission.  Owen has placed a 
mission within God in se.  Yet if we follow Thomas’ understanding of what a mission is, Owen 
conflates processions and missions by placing this new relation within the three divine processions.  
Owen is clear that this relationship is not ‘essential’ but if this is the case, has Owen confused God 
for us with God in se?  A new relation does arise in the mission of the Son as the Son is made present 
in a new way to some created effect.  The new relation arises within creation, God’s works ad extra.  
To say it another way, in the Son’s covenantal condescension, he is made present in a new way to 
creation and creatures.  But how can God be made present to God in a new way?  Aquinas uses 
freedom to refer to things contingent, but Owen seems to use freedom language to speak of this 
eternal relation between the Father and the Son that arises from this covenant.  When Aquinas 
handles the divine missions, he very clearly says that a divine person ‘neither begins to be where he 
was not before, nor does he cease to be where he was.’116  What Owen means by a ‘new relation 
between the Father and the Son’ is not clear and theologically problematic.  The concept of 
covenant is grounded in God ad intra, but is most helpful in describing, not God’s inner life, but 
God’s ad extra works.  In formulating the covenant of redemption, Owen lets the Son’s mission 
inform his divine procession instead of the other way round. Owen, even if slightly, risks letting God 
ad extra serve as the foundation for God ad intra.   
 
 
114  Owen, Works 12:497.  
 115  Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 11.  
 116  ST I, q. 43, a. 1, ad. 2.   
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Conclusion   
 
 The goal of this chapter is to discover what anchors the Son’s mission in Owen’s theology of 
the three divine persons. I have shown that Owen is greatly indebted to Aquinas’ Trinitarian 
theology and clearly has Aquinas’ understanding of the procession and missions in mind as he 
formulates his understanding of the pactum salutis.  Nevertheless, Owen confuses the procession 
and missions precisely at this point.  To conclude this chapter, I will critique this confusion and the 
related confusion of the persons ‘voluntary, distinct acts.’  I propose that in order to construct a solid 
foundation for the Son’s mission, we must return to the Trinitarian order of persons that the divine 
processions reveal.   
 Such a foundation is not completely foreign to Owen himself.  Speaking of Christ’s 
incarnation, Owen writes, ‘He was in the form of God,—that is, he was God, participant of the divine 
nature, for God hath no form but that of his essence and being; and hence he was equal with God, in 
authority, dignity, and power.  Because he was in the form of God, he must be equal with God; for 
there is order in the Divine persons, but no inequality in the Divine Being.’117  Since the covenant of 
redemption risks too closely aligning the non-hierarchical order of the Trinity, God in se, with the 
Son’s economic obedience, God for us, it is better to formulate the sending of the Son beginning 
with the Father’s auctoritas.  This is not to introduce subordination within God ad intra – as the 
covenant of redemption risks – but to say that what unfolds in God’s economy is truly founded upon 
and patterned after God’s inner life.  The Father as author, or source, of the Trinity sends the Son in 
a way that corresponds economically to the Son’s eternal generation.  Christ’s earthly procession is 
founded upon and patterned after his eternal divine procession.  The Son’s mode of action can be 
distinct without a voluntary covenant and without applying, or appropriating, God’s one will to each 
of the divine persons.118   
 
117  Owen, Works 1:326.  
 118  Gilles Emery, ‘The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint Thomas Aquinas,’ The Thomist: A 
Speculative Quarterly Review 69, no. 1 (January 2005):  51.  
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 Aquinas understands that God does all things through the Son (Jn 1:3) in a way that ‘is not 
appropriation but it is proper to the Word, because the fact that he is the cause of creatures is had 
from someone else – the Father from whom he has his being.’119  The Father as the author of the 
Trinity refers to the property of the Father as principle of the Son.120  Emery explains:  
The Son exists in receiving eternally his being from the Father and he acts in receiving 
eternally his act from the Father.  The action of the Father and the Son is one; the 
principle of this action is also one (it is the divine nature or essence); the effects of the 
action are common to the Father and to the Son.  But the actors (the subjects of the 
act:  operantes) are personally distinct and their mode of action is also distinct.121 
Owen comes very close to this understanding but departs from Thomas when he understands each 
person as ‘distinct principles of action.’122  As shown above, this understanding is related to Owen’s 
personal predication of God’s will.  Owen’s appeal to the persons’ perichoresis (what Owen calls 
‘mutual in-being’) is correct, but the divine persons are mutually in one another as the one divine 
nature.  It is from this common nature that each of the persons act and why the works of God ad 
extra are inseparable.  The Son does act as the Son, but his works ad extra are expressive of his 
relation of origin with the Father, not of his relation to creatures.123  Owen’s soteriological 
foundation risks reversing this all-important order.  Another way to say this is that the Son’s mode of 
acting in the world follows his mode of being.  Therefore, to posit three principles of action logically 
suggests three principles of being as well.  If we formulate the Son’s mission along these lines, the 
covenant of redemption is at best unnecessary, and at worst un-trinitarian, as the modus essendi 
and modus operandi are expressive of the order of the divine persons.124 
 
 119  Aquinas, In Ioan, cap. 1, lec. 2, no. 76.   
 120  Emery, ‘Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action,’ 51.  
 121  Emery, ‘Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action,’ 51.  See also, Aquinas, ST I, q. 39, a. 8.   
 122  Woo argues that Owen harmonizes the tradition, especially Augustine and John of Damascus just 
as Aquinas harmonizes them.  However, Woo draws too straight a line between Aquinas and Owen by not 
accounting for both developments and inconsistencies in Owen’s thought.  See, Woo, ‘The Pactum Salutis and 
the Trinity’, 107-109  
 123  Emery, ‘Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action,’ 53-54.  
 124  Emery, ‘Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action,’ 56.  
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  In Owen’s construction of the covenant of redemption, the Son’s economic obedience is not 
rooted merely in the Son’s assumption of human flesh.125  Owen rightly wants to ground the Son’s 
economic obedience in God’s inner-life.  However, given what I have outlined above, it is better to 
say that the Son’s eternal generation is the foundation of his mission that takes the shape of 
obedience once he assumes human flesh.  The Son’s eternal generation, not the covenant of 
redemption, is the foundation of his mission.  What is new is not a new eternal relation as Owen 
suggests.  Rather, when the Son enters fallen creaturely history, the shape of his generation is 
human obedience to the unified will of God that always wills the good.  Once sin invades God’s 
creation, the good takes the shape of salvation which is accomplished through the obedient Son.  
The obedient Son obeys as God for us precisely because he is eternally from another.  Texts that 
speak of the Father’s sending or appointment of the Son are best understood as analogically 
pointing to God’s processions, based upon the Trinitarian order of subsistence rather than a true 
covenant.  When Owen works with a robust understanding of God’s goodness, he formulates his 
understanding of the Son’s mission much closer to the way I am calling for here.  When goodness is 
overshadowed by the pactum salutis, Owen departs from analogical predication and reasoning that 
is built upon a robust understanding of God ad intra as the foundation for God ad extra.  God’s 
communicative goodness, which is common to God’s essence and the three divine persons is, I am 
arguing, the foundation of the Son’s mission.  The pactum salutis seems to fill the void when grace is 
understood in a way that disconnects grace from God’s goodness.  As revelation narrows, a new, 
albeit questionable, foundation is constructed.  We are now ready to see how Owen’s theology of 
the covenant of redemption informs his understanding of the Son who comes in the fullness of time 
(Gal 4:4).  
 
 125  Baylor, ‘“He Humbled Himself”,’ 186. 
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Chapter 3: Owen’s Theology of Christ’s Priesthood  
 
 The Son who comes ‘in the fullness of time’ (Gal 4:4) is the one eternally begotten of the 
Father who takes to himself a human nature in his economic mission.  The mission of the eternal Son 
is accomplished in his one person in which his human and divine natures are united.  The person of 
Christ ‘is the foundation whereon the church is built,’ writes Owen.1  It is as this person that the Son 
undertakes the office of priest.  Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to grasp the basic contours of 
Owen’s Christology that inform his office of priesthood.2  This will prepare us for a more focused 
treatment of Owen’s understanding of Christ as Mediator in the following chapter.  To this end, I will 
first present Owen’s Chalcedonian Christology that largely follows the Thomistic tradition, but 
significantly diverges in Owen’s understanding of Christ’s assumption and the role of the Holy Spirit 
on Christ’s human nature.3  After this, I will briefly discuss Owen’s view of the human condition 
before the fall into sin, as this influences his understanding of both Christ’s priesthood and God’s 
decrees.  Third, I will introduce the basic elements of Owen’s theology of priesthood which centre 
upon Christ’s oblation and intercession.  Finally, I will conclude by asking how Owen’s articulation of 
Christ’s priesthood is influenced by his theology proper, especially as it relates to God’s will and 
God’s justice.  
 
Owen’s Chalcedonian Christology  
 
 The Son who is sent into the world by the Father comes as the incarnate One who has both a 
divine and human nature.  Thus Christ undertakes his earthly mission as the God-man. The 
incarnation raises perennial questions about how we understand the Son now present in human 
 
1  Owen, Works 1:13.  
 2  Christ’s priesthood seems to occupy Owen’s mind throughout his works and life.  See, Trueman, 
Claims of Truth, 187.  
3  On the Thomistic influence in Owen’s Christology, see, Cleveland, Thomism, 121, 131-152.  Alan 
Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 144-149; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 29-44, 155.  
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history through his mission.  Owen’s most sustained work of Christology is his Christologia, though 
Pneumatologia and Hebrews also reveal important aspects of Owen’s Christological thought.4  In 
Christologia, Owen begins by tracing the history of Christological debate and development that 
concludes with the Council of Chalcedon in 451.5  Unlike T.F. Torrance, as we shall later see, Owen 
places himself firmly within this Chalcedonian tradition, which gives conceptualisation to the 
question of how to understand and relate Christ’s two natures.  After tracing the history of 
Christological reflection, Owen summarizes his basic Chalcedonian Christology:  ‘But I speak of the 
person of Christ as unto the assumption of the substantial adjunct of the human nature, not to be a 
part whereof his person is composed, but as unto its subsistence therein by virtue of a substantial 
union.’6  While Owen’s language is difficult, he articulates an understanding of Christ as the eternal 
divine Son of God who takes to himself his human nature in the incarnation.  Christ’s human nature 
subsists through what Owen calls a substantial union, a term he uses interchangeably with the more 
commonly used hypostatic union.  This substantial or hypostatic union is a way to conceptualise how 
Christ’s human nature relates to his divine nature.  The two natures are united in the one person of 
Christ without mixture or confusion.   
 Typical of the Reformed tradition, Owen very intentionally focuses on Christ’s unified 
person, because we rightly understand Christ as the Mediator only when we first understand the 
 
 4  In this section, I focus on Owen’s thought in Christologia but do make references to Hebrews and 
other important works as well.  I turn to Pneumatologia below to discuss Owen’s theology of Christ’s 
assumption and the role of the Holy Spirit upon his human nature.   
5  Owen, Works 1:13-17.  ‘We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to 
confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in 
manhood; truly God and truly man, of a reasonable [rational] soul and body; consubstantial [coessential] with 
the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the Manhood; in all things like 
unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, 
for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the Manhood; one and 
the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, 
indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the 
property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or 
divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ: 
as the prophets from the beginning [have declared] concerning him, and the Lord Jesus Christ himself has 
taught us, and the Creed of the holy Fathers has handed down to us.’ Philip Schaff, ed., The Creeds of 
Christendom (New York, NY:  Harper and Brothers, 1890), 62-63.    
6  Owen, Works 1:15. 
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person who is the Mediator.7  The hypostatic union is the foundation of Christ’s mediation that he 
makes as the God-man.  Christ’s divine and human natures are united in his one person.  It is as this 
person that Christ undertakes his earthly mission.  Owen explains:   
For although the knowledge of him mentioned in the Gospel be not confined merely 
unto his person in the constitution thereof, but extends itself unto the whole work of 
his mediation, with the design of God’s love and grace therein, with our own duty 
thereon; yet is this knowledge of his person the foundation of all the rest, wherein if 
we mistake or fail, our whole building in the other parts of the knowledge of him will 
fall unto the ground.8 
If we get Christ’s person wrong, we misunderstand his priestly work as well.9  Therefore, Owen 
wants to avoid the speculation of the ‘schoolmen’ who, he believes, go beyond Scripture.10  We are 
not told who these ‘schoolmen’ are, yet it is clear Thomas Aquinas is not included in their number.  
In fact, Owen’s construction of the hypostatic union is perhaps more indebted to Aquinas than any 
other part of his theological system, though even here Owen’s polemical mind and independent 
thought is seen in his understanding of Christ’s assumption and the role of the Holy Spirit within the 
hypostatic union -  more on this below.    Nevertheless, while Owen is not as exhaustive as Thomas is 
in Tertia Pars questions two through eight, even a brief comparison of the two theologians reveals 
Aquinas’ influence upon Owen’s Christology.11  In Aquinas, Owen finds a dialogue partner who 
 
 7  Owen’s person Christology is the subject of the chapter 4.    
8  Owen, Works 1:223.  
9  Christ’s person and work, however, should be not seen as two isolated parts or things that Christ 
possesses.  Christ undertakes his priestly work as this person.  Nor should Christ’s person and work be 
collapsed, as Torrance does, so that talk of Christ’s work becomes redundant.  Torrance’s fear is that such 
conceptualization divides God and leaves us with a Son ‘behind the back’ of an angry Father.  Both Owen’s and 
Torrance’s accounts of Christ’s person and work reveal not only their Christology but their doctrine of God.  
This is the case because the incarnation forces us to consider the relation of God in se and God for us. 
10  Owen, Works 1:224.  Importantly, Owen is suspicious of speculation, while Aquinas thinks 
speculation is at the heart of theological reflection.  Typical of the Puritans, Owen is greatly concerned with the 
‘use’ of doctrines.  However, the real difference between Owen and Aquinas is a different understanding of 
what speculative theology means.  Both Owen and Aquinas make use of philosophical tools in their theological 
construction while demanding their theology derive from exegesis of Scripture.  The wholesale rejection of 
speculation needs to be nuanced, which even Owen himself does as he rejects the schoolmen but builds upon 
Thomas.    
11  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 2-8.  While Owen writes of Christology in many places, in chapter 18 of 
Christologia, titled ‘The Nature of the Person of Christ, and the Hypostatical Union of his Natures Declared’ 
Owen is clearly following Thomas’ trajectory of thought.  It also seems that Owen expects his readers to know 
Thomas as well, because he mentions that Aquinas rejects three of the four ways the hypostatic union were 
understood by the ‘Master,’ who is Peter Lombard, without indicating what are the four ways and which are  
acceptable.  If we compare this statement to Aquinas’ work, we find Owen is likely referring to ST III, q. 2, a. 6, 
co.  This comparison also reveals that Aquinas explains Lombard’s three ways, not four ways.  Owen’s mistake, 
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avoids the wrong type of speculation and derives his theology from divine revelation.  Following the 
Scriptures and with the aid of the great Dominican doctor, Owen gives his account of Christ’s divine 
and human natures united in his one person.  Owen first explains what the Chalcedonian tradition 
means in saying that the Son of God assumes, or takes to himself, a human nature.  Owen begins, 
‘The first thing in the divine constitution of the person of Christ as God and man, is assumption.’12  
Importantly, at the heart of Owen’s theology of the assumption is the conviction that Christ’s 
primary reason for assuming a human nature is to make his priestly self-sacrifice.  The assumption is 
necessary for Christ to fulfil his priestly office and work.  
 
Assuming a Human Nature 
 
 Following Chalcedon, Owen is clear that the eternal divine Son of God, the second person of 
the Trinity, takes to himself a human nature.  This assumption occurs through the act of Christ’s 
power and grace, in which Christ takes his human nature into ‘personal subsistence with himself.’13  
The Son’s assumption is an immediate divine act.14  Christ does not take to himself a human being, 
but only a human nature.  Although, in assuming the human nature Christ is a true and complete 
human being.  Owen is clear that Christ assumes a human nature and not a human person, because 
assuming a particular person makes the divine Son related to this person, but he would not himself 
 
likely means that he is working from memory.  Owen, Works 1:224.  See also, Cleveland, Thomism, 121-152; 
Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 14-42, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 152-160. 
12  Owen, Works 1: 224.  
13  See, ST III, q. 2. a. 10.   
 14  Kapic helpfully explains, ‘Owen believes this language protects the distinction and unity of the two 
natures.  Since the divine nature is immutable and impassible, Owen sees that the assumption proved to be 
the only way for the incarnation to occur; otherwise the divine would have ceased to be divine by becoming 
human.’  Kapic, Communion with God, 81.  
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be a human being.15  Assuming a human nature, and not a ‘particular person’, is all that Christ needs 
to be a ‘full and complete’ human person.16  Owen writes of Christ’s human nature:   
But he took it to be his own nature; which it could no ways be by personal union, 
causing it to subsist in his own person.  And he is therefore true and perfect man:  for 
no more is required to make a complete and perfect man but the entire nature of man 
subsisting; and this is in Christ as a man, the human nature having a subsistence 
communicated unto it by the Son of God.17 
Christ does not assume a human person, a certain man, but only a human nature.  In order to clarify 
the distinction Owen is making here, he uses the traditional conceptualization of anhypostasia and 
enhypostasia that distinguishes Christ’s two natures and safeguards against positing that Christ is 
two individuals in his incarnation.18  Christ’s human nature is anhypostatic, because it has no 
independent existence apart from its union to the Son of God.  Anhypostatic is a piece of negative 
theology.  Positively, Christ’s human nature is also enhypostatic in that it has its existence and 
subsistence in its union with the divine Son.19  Human nature is anhypostatic in that it ‘has no reality 
outside its manifestation in particular men and women.’20  What is more, Christ does not assume an 
ideal humanity that somehow includes all human being on the basis of Christ’s incarnation.21  In this, 
Owen’s theology of Christ’s assumption is different from Torrance’s who, following Barth, works 
with a revisionary understanding of anhypostasis and enhypostasis.22   
 
 15  See, Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 34.  Owen explains, ’For if he had by any way or means 
taken the person of a man to be united unto him, in the strictest union that two persons are capable of, a 
divine and a human, the nature had still been the nature of that other person, and not his own.’  Owen, 
Hebrews 3:461.  
 16  Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 34.  
 17  Owen, Hebrews 3:453.  
 18  Kapic, Communion with God, 83.  See also, Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 35; Trueman, 
Claims of Truth, 156.  See, Muller, DLGTT:27, 106; Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 93.  
 19  Owen writes, ‘In itself it is ‘anhypostatic’, – that which hath not a subsistence of its own, which 
should give it individuation and distinction from the same nature in any other person.  But it hath subsistence 
in the person of the Son, which thereby is its own.’  Owen, Works 1:233.  Literally, anhypostasis means ‘no-
hypostatsis’ and enhypostasis means ‘in-hypostasis.’  Kapic, Communion with God, 83.  
 20  Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 37.  
 21  This is not to suggest Torrance holds to Christ’s assumption of an unfallen nature, since he believes 
Christ’s assumption of a fallen nature is vital to his person.  By ideal here, I mean generic or universal human 
nature.        
 22  See, Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 36-37.  On Barth’s theology of an/enhypostasis, see, 
Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-
1936 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 358-367.  I discuss Torrance’s revision in both chapters 7 and 
8.   
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 This act of assumption is both passive and active.  In assuming the human nature, the divine 
nature is active while Christ’s human nature is passive.23  Importantly, the act of assumption is ‘the 
foundation of the divine relation between the Son of God and the man Christ Jesus and, as an act ad 
extra, is a work of the undivided Trinity.  Owen is clear that the act of assumption is a Trinitarian act: 
opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt.  Therefore, in the incarnation, God’s unity is maintained.  Each 
of the three divine persons of the One God act in the Son’s earthly mission.  Using the theory of 
appropriation, Owen explains that the Father designates, the Holy Spirit forms the nature assumed, 
and the Son actively takes on a human nature.  Yet this assumption is a ‘peculiar act’ of the second 
person of the Godhead, God the Son.24  It is the Son alone who actively takes on a human nature.25   
 Lying behind this distinction of the active and passive acts of the hypostatic union is Owen’s 
understanding that God is pure act.  Cleveland rightly points out that Thomas and Owen both 
articulate a theology of assumption in which the active divine nature takes to itself a passive human 
nature because God is actus purus.  The divine nature of the Son is pure act because he is God in 
whom there is no potentiality.  None of the divine acts are passive.  Christ’s human nature, on the 
other hand, is mixed with both act and passive potency and, therefore must be passive in the act of 
assumption.26  God as pure act governs Owen’s understanding of Christ’s assumption and leads him 
to conclude that only the human nature is capable of being assumed.27  The divine nature, as divine, 
cannot be assumed.  Only the divine, fully actual Son can assume a human nature without changing.  
The hypostatic union implies relation whereas assumption implies action. 28  A right understanding of 
Christ’s assumption is vital for Owen’s account of the person involved in the hypostatic union, in 
distinction from the actual union, which speaks of the relation of Christ’s two natures.  Owen 
explains: 
 
23  Owen, Works 1:224. Owen cites Heb 2:14-16 to exegetically support his claim.  
24  Owen, Works 1:225.  
25  Owen, Works 1:225.  
26  Cleveland, Thomism, 138.  
 27  See, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 156.  
28  Aquinas, ST, III, q. 2, a. 8, arg. 2.    
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This assumption and the hypostatical union are distinct and different in the formal 
reason of them. (1.) Assumption is the immediate act of the divine nature in the 
person of the Son on the human; union is mediate, by virtue of that assumption. (2.) 
Assumption is unto personality; it is that act whereby the Son of God and our nature 
became one person. Union is an act or relation of the natures subsisting in that one 
person. (3.) Assumption respects the acting of the divine and the passion of the human 
nature; the one assumeth, the other is assumed. Union respects the mutual relation of 
the natures unto each other. Hence the divine nature may be said to be united unto 
the human, as well as the human unto the divine; but the divine nature cannot be said 
to be assumed as the human is. Wherefore assumption denotes the acting of the one 
nature and the passion of the other; union, the mutual relation that is between them 
both.29  
To clarify, the incarnation requires both assumption and union, but Christ’s taking to himself a 
human nature is not synonymous with the hypostatic union.  Union is a mediate act that results from 
the immediate act of assumption.  In the assumption, the divine assumes and the human is 
assumed, whereas, in the hypostatic union, there is a relation of Christ’s divine and human natures 
as they are united in Christ’s one person.  This act of assumption is foundational in Owen’s theology 
of Christ’s priesthood.   
 
The Hypostatic Union 
 
 The chief end of the Son of God’s assumption of his human nature, for Owen, is his office of 
priest.  Christ’s incarnation involves more than his priestly work.  For instance, Christ is king and 
prophet.  Yet, as prophet and king, the Son of God primarily teaches and reigns over his church 
through the Holy Spirit both before and after his earthly mission, ‘and this he might have done to the 
full though he had never been incarnate.’30  However, Christ’s priesthood is impossible without the 
assumption of his human nature.  Owen writes, ‘But our high priest without the assumption of our 
nature he could not be, because without this he had nothing to offer…Had not God prepared him a 
body, he could have had nothing to offer. He was to have a self to offer to God, or his priesthood 
 
29  Owen, Works 1:225-226.  This distinction between assumption and union is also found in Thomas, 
see, ST, III, q. 2, a. 8. 
30  Owen, Hebrews 3:472.  
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had been in vain.’31  Clearly at work here is Owen’s understanding of God’s justice and how it relates 
to Christ’s priesthood.  Christ comes as priest in order to satisfy God’s vindicatory justice.  Christ’s 
priestly sacrifice and satisfaction, for Owen, are necessary once humanity falls into sin.  Without the 
Son of God taking to himself a human nature in the incarnation, there is no sacrifice for sin.  Thus 
Owen says, ‘God had showed that no other sacrifice would be accepted or be effectual for that end 
which was designed unto this office.  On this, therefore, is laid the indispensable necessity of the 
incarnation of Christ.’32  
 Christ as priest must be God and man.  Therefore, the human nature assumed by the Son of 
God is not an isolated or detached nature.  Rather, in the one person of Christ, his divine and human 
natures are united.  Owen very clearly defines the hypostatic union as ‘the union of the divine and 
human nature in the person of the Son of God, the human nature having no personality nor 
subsistence of its own.’33  This union cannot be essential as it is not a union of the entire Godhead, 
but it is a union that obtains hypostatically, or personally, within the person of Christ.34  Clearly 
aligning with the Chalcedonian tradition, Owen explains that this union does not change God or the 
Son’s eternal divine nature.  Neither is there any mixture, confusion, or distance between Christ’s 
two natures, nor is this union ‘accidental.’35  An accidental union of Christ’s two natures would result 
in two persons not one.  Owen writes, ‘There is no other union in things divine or human, in things 
spiritual or natural, whether substantial or accidental, that is of the same kind with it;—it differs 
specifically from them all.’36  In order to help explain the importance of this point, Owen, again 
closely following Aquinas, compares and contrasts different types of union.  Understanding the 
 
31  Owen, Hebrews 3:473.  
32  Owen, Hebrews 3:472.   
33  Owen, Works 1:228.  
34  This term, hypostatic, emerges as the common way to speak of the union of Christ’s two natures as 
a result of the Christological debates and the development of terminology between the East and West.  Owen 
knows this history and relays the parts important for his purposes in his chapter on the hypostatic union in his 
Christologia, see:  Owen, Works 1:3-27, 223-235.  See also Muller’s definition of essentialiter and hypostatikos: 
Muller, DLGTT:110, 155.   
35  Owen, Works 1:226-227.  Owen’s discussion here follows the patristic authors and debates.   
36  Owen, Works 1:228.  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 6, co.  
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nature of the union involved in the hypostatic union is crucial for avoiding the ancient errors of both 
Nestorianism, Eutychianism, and some articulations of Arianism.37  An accidental hypostatic union 
leads either to the error of the monophysites who hold that the two natures of Christ mix into one 
or to the error of Nestorius that leaves Christ’s two natures disconnected and, therefore, two 
persons.38  Both, Owen explains, misunderstand the nature of Christ’s hypostatic union.39   
 Christ’s hypostatic union is unique.  The foundation of the hypostatic union is the Son’s 
eternal generation from the Father – God ad intra.  Somewhat surprisingly, Augustine says that the 
human nature of Christ is more in the Son of God than the Son is in the Father and suggests that the 
union of Christ’s two natures is more glorious than the union of the eternal divine Son with the 
Father.40  Owen is sympathetic to Augustine’s point but is clear that the union of the divine persons 
is more glorious: 
The most glorious union is that of the Divine Persons in the same being or nature; the 
Father in the Son, the Son in the Father, the Holy Spirit in them both, and both in him. 
But this is a union of distinct persons in the unity of the same single nature. And this, I 
confess, is more glorious than that whereof we treat; for it is in God absolutely, it is 
eternal, of his nature and being. But this union we speak of is not God;—it is a 
creature,—an effect of divine wisdom and power. And it is different from it herein, 
inasmuch as that is of many distinct persons in the same nature;—this is of distinct 
natures in the same person. That union is natural, substantial, essential, in the same 
nature;—this, as it is not accidental, as we shall show, so it is not properly substantial, 
because it is not of the same nature, but of diverse in the same person, remaining 
distinct in their essence and substance, and is therefore peculiarly hypostatical or 
personal.41  
 
37  Owen, Works 1:228-233.  
38  Owen, Works 1:229-231.  See also, Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 6, co.   Owen works within an historical 
context in which Nestorian ideas were revived by the Socinians.  Owen writes, ‘This being the opinion of 
Nestorius, revived again in the days wherein we live, I shall declare wherein he placed the conjunction or union 
of the two natures of Christ,—whereby he constituted two distinct persons of the Son of God and the Son of 
man, as these do now.’  Owen, Works 1:230.   
39  Owen tells us that the mixture of the two natures is the error of Eutyches, while Nestorius holds to 
five types of union that are all accidental in nature.  Owen summarizes Nestorius’ view of union (all accidental 
in nature) as 1. A union of inhabitation; 2. A union of the affections; 3. A union of dignity and honour; 4. A 
union of agreement or will; 5. A union of equivocal denomination.  Owen, Works 1:229, 331-332. 
40  Owen, Works 1:228.  Owen and Aquinas both quote De Trinitate Lib. I, cap. 10.20, where Augustine 
writes, ‘Homo potius est in filio Dei, quam filius in Patre.’  Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 9, s. c.   
41  Owen, Works 1:228.  Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 9, ad. 3.   
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The hypostatic union is essential within Christ’s person and not accidental.  However, the hypostatic 
union is not itself divine—this is what Owen means when he says it is not ‘properly substantial.’  
Rather, the union of Christ’s two natures is creaturely, or relative, and not God absolutely—or God in 
himself.  This is why Owen speaks of the hypostatic union as a creaturely work, or ‘effect.’  The 
hypostatic union of Christ’s two natures is a work ad extra.  Augustine, at least in Owen’s judgment, 
risks confusing the Creator with the creature.  While Owen often lacks the similitude of the 
Creator/creature distinction, here he works with a robust understanding of the ever greater 
dissimilarity between Creator and creature.  This distinction is underpinned by his Thomistic 
metaphysical understanding that God cannot be really related to anything creaturely.  Thus, the 
hypostatic union is a created effect.  Therefore, it cannot be more glorious than the union of the 
three divine persons in the one essence of God.  As an effect, the cause of the hypostatic union is 
God’s grace and not Christ’s obedience.42  Drawing from Augustine, positively, Owen writes, ‘For 
whereas all the inherent grace of the human nature of Christ, and all the holy obedience which 
proceeded from it, was consequent in order of nature unto this union, and an effect of it, they could 
in no sense be the meritorious or procuring causes of it;—it was of grace.’43 Thus Owen summarizes 
his understanding of the hypostatic union, writing, ‘The divine persons are eternal and essential’, 
whereas the hypostatic union ‘was a temporary, external act of divine wisdom and grace.’44 
 In Owen’s mind, the hypostatic union is not abstract theology, or merely ‘academic’ 
speculation.  Rather, the necessity for Christ’s priesthood lies behind Owen’s Chalcedonian 
Christology.  The Son of God comes as the Messiah.  Therefore, the promise of Christ’s incarnation in 
the Old Testament necessitates the hypostatic union for Owen.  God’s justice is essential and must 
take the form of punishment against sin.  Therefore, the incarnation is not God’s fitting response to 
 
 42  Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 10, co.  
43  Owen, Works 1: 227.  Aquinas also quotes Augustine to say the hypostatic union is by grace and 
not merit.  Aquinas, ST III, 2. 2, a. 10, s. c., co.      
44  Owen, Works 1: 228.  Owen’s use of ‘temporary’ is obsolete according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary but means ‘belonging to this present life or the world.’  Owen is listed as an example of this use.  
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘Temporary, d.’ accessed October 29, 2020, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
198959?redirectedFrom=temporary#eid.     
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humanity’s plight, but rather the necessary response.  Christ must have a human nature in order to 
have something to offer.  The mediator must also be fully God.   
   
Communication of the Natures 
 
 Importantly, the Messiah who comes carries out his earthly mission as this one person in 
two natures.  The union of Christ’s natures does not take away their distinction, but how to speak of 
Christ’s unified acts has long troubled theologians.  Therefore, Owen next explains the ‘communion 
of the distinct natures of Christ hypostatically united.’ 45  The properties of one nature are 
communicated to the other nature in the unity of Christ’s person.46  Here, Owen aligns with his 
Reformed tradition employing the communicatio idiomatum of Christ’s two natures.    Following the 
Reformed Orthodox in contrast to the Lutheran tradition that posits a real communication of 
properties between Christ’s divine and human natures, Owen holds that there is not a ‘real 
communication of the properties of the divine nature and the human,’ because the natures do not 
conflate or mix together.47  God’s divine essence, of which the divine nature of the Son is, cannot 
really relate to anything creaturely.  Thus, the divine nature operates as divine and the human as 
human.  ‘But it is the same person, the same Christ, that acts all these things,—the one nature being 
his no less than the other.’48  Importantly, Owen emphasizes that Christ’s work ‘in every act of his 
mediatorial office’ is not divided, ‘is not to be considered as the act of this or that nature in him 
alone, but it is the act and work of the whole person,—of him that is both God and man in one 
 
45  Owen, Works 1:233.  
 46  See, Muller, DLGTT:69-70.  
47  Owen, Works 1:233-234.  ‘Each nature doth preserve its own natural, essential properties, entirely 
unto and in itself; without mixture, without composition or confusion, without such a real communication of 
the one unto the other, as that the one should become the subject of the properties of the other. The Deity, in 
the abstract, is not made the humanity, nor on the contrary. The divine nature is not made temporary, finite, 
limited, subject to passion or alteration by this union; nor is the human nature rendered immense, infinite, 
omnipotent. Unless this be granted, there will not be two natures in Christ, a divine and a human; nor indeed 
either of them, but somewhat else, composed of both.’  Owen, Works 1:234. 
48  Owen, Works 1:234.  
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person.’49  The Christian Scriptures attribute some things only to the human nature and others only 
to the divine.  In addition, sometimes the Scriptures speak of Christ’s one person by mentioning one 
of his natures, but assigns the properties of the other nature to it.  An example of the former is ‘the 
Word became flesh, and the latter, ‘the Lord of glory was crucified.’50  The priestly Christ is both God 
and man.  In Communion with God, Owen writes: 
That there is a second person, the Son of God, in the holy trinunity of the Godhead, we 
have proved before. That this person did, of his infinite love and grace, take upon him 
our nature,—human nature,—so as that the divine and human nature should become 
one person, one Christ, God and man in one, so that whatever he doth in and about 
our salvation, it is done by that one person, God and man, is revealed unto us in the 
Scripture as the object of our faith: and this is that which we believe concerning the 
person of Christ. Whatever acts are ascribed unto him, however immediately 
performed, in or by the human nature, or in and by his divine nature, they are all the 
acts of that one person, in whom are both these natures.51  
Christ’s two natures are united personally so that any act of one nature – while truly an act of that 
nature – is at the same time an act of Christ’s one person.  If this were not the case, Owen 
consistently argues, then he is not able to reconcile sinners to God.  Thus a proper understanding of 
the communication of Christ’s natures in his one person is essential for Christ’s priestly work.52  
Owen brings this all together when he explains that some things said of Christ necessitate that he is 
the God-man with two natures in one person.  In particular, Christ’s offices of prophet, king, and 
priest are not undertaken on account of one nature rather than the other, but as the person of 
Christ.53  It is precisely the hypostatic union that is the foundation of these acts—acts in which Christ 
 
49  Owen, Works 1:234.  Recall that Owen interprets John 14 to speak of the covenant of redemption 
and not of Christ’s two natures doing the work proper to each.  A person Christology, typical of the Reformed, 
must be careful to not let the focus on Christ’s person undermine a two nature Christology.  There need not be 
a competition between Christ’s persons and natures.  As a unified person, some of Christ’s works are divine 
and some of his works are human.  The classic example of this is John 11 where Christ as human weeps and 
Christ as divine raises Lazarus back to life.  
50  Owen, Works 1:234-235.  Owen explains that Christ is the Lord of glory according to his divine 
nature, but the divine nature is not crucified.  Scripture speaks in this way at times because of Christ’s unified 
person.  
 51  Owen, Works 2:414-415.    
 52  See, Kapic, Communion with God, 80; Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 39-42; Tay, Priesthood of 
Christ, kindle loc. 2147 of 6499. Trueman, Claims of Truth, 176-179; Reformed Catholic, 94.  
53  Owen, Works 1:235.  Yet, as we saw above, Owen argues that Christ could fulfil the office of king 
and prophet without becoming incarnate, which suggests that Christ does not need a unified person to be king 
or prophet.  See, Owen, Works 1:234-235.  
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represents God to people and people to God.  Only the God-man, the one person of Christ can fulfill 
these offices.  And this person, who exists in two natures, is the only one qualified to fulfill Christ’s 
priestly office and work.  Christ must become human so ‘“that he might be a powerful and merciful 
high priest.”’54   Owen comments on Isaiah 9:6, ‘That the same person should be “mighty God” and a 
“child born,” is neither conceivable nor possible, nor can be true, but by the union of the divine and 
human natures in the same person.’55  Here we are given a glimpse of how Owen’s doctrine of God, 
Christology, and soteriology all work together.  This is crucial, because, for Owen, the climatic work 
of Christ is his priestly sacrifice that reconciles sinners to God.  
 
The Holy Spirit and Christ’s Assumed Human Nature  
 
 Owen’s theology of Christ’s hypostatic union clearly builds upon, and in many ways repeats, 
Aquinas’ Chalcedonian Christology.  Therefore, Cleveland’s suggestion that Owen’s theology of the 
assumption and the hypostatic union ‘is nearly identical to that of Thomas’ is somewhat 
persuasive.56  However, Cleveland’s conclusion that Owen’s Christology ‘is derived directly from the 
Christological teaching presented in the Summa Theologiae’ does not account for the key points at 
which Owen purposefully differs from Aquinas.  This divergence comes with Owen’s understanding 
that the act of assumption is the only immediate act of the divine nature on the human nature.57  In 
Owen’s Christology, Christ’s divine nature does not sustain the human nature that he assumes.  
Rather, the role of the divine nature ‘is restricted to the act of personal union.’58  Owen writes, ‘The 
only singular immediate act of the person of the Son on the human nature was the assumption of it 
into subsistence with himself.’59  In part, Owen’s thought follows the theory of the communications 
 
54  Owen, Hebrews 3:466.  
55  Owen, Works 1:226. Owen makes a similar argument from John 8:58 and also cites John 1:14, Acts 
20:28, Rom 9:5, Col 2:9, and 1 John 3:16. 
 56  Cleveland, Thomism, 3.    
 57  Owen, Works 1:225.    
 58  Oliver D. Crisp, ‘John Owen on Spirit Christology,’ Journal of Reformed Theology 5 (2011): 10.  
 59  Owen, Works 3:160.  
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of properties between Christ’s two natures in Christ’s one person.  However, Owen makes all acts of 
the Son in his human nature after the assumption ‘voluntary.’60  The Holy Spirit, not Christ’s divine 
nature, is the efficient cause of God’s works ad extra in Owen’s Christology.   
 I will return to this point of causality momentarily, but to understand Owen’s innovation 
notice, first, that Owen agrees with Aquinas that assumption implies both the act of assuming and 
the term of the assumption.61  The act of assumption is an act common to all three divine persons.  
The external works of God are undivided.62  Owen writes, ‘As unto original efficiency, it was the act 
of the divine nature, and so, consequently, of the Father, Son, and Spirit.  For so are all outward acts 
of God – the divine nature being the immediate principle of all such operations.’63  The term, which 
is the act of taking on human nature, is ‘the peculiar act of the person of the Son.’64  The undivided 
Trinity is the principle, and efficient cause, of the Son’s assumption of a human nature.65  However, 
in Owen’s thought, this efficient causality of God as one nature applies only to the act of 
assumption.  After Christ assumes his human nature, the efficient causality shifts from God’s nature 
to the person of the Holy Spirit.  Christ’s divine nature is not directly involved in Christ’s human 
obedience and passion. The Holy Spirit sustains and empowers Christ’s earthly life. After Christ’s 
initial act of assuming a human nature, in which the divine nature acts directly, all other acts of the 
incarnate Christ are done through the work of the Holy Spirit on Christ’s human nature.66   
 
 60  Owen, Works 3:160, 180.  
 61  Owen, Works 1:225, cf. Aquinas, ST III, q. 3, a. 4, co.   
 62  Owen, Works 1:225, cf. Aquinas, ST III, q. 3, a. 4, co.   
 63  Owen, Works 1:225.    
 64  Owen, Works 1:225.  Cf. Aquinas, ST III, q. 3, a. 4, co.   
 65  Owen’s old English ‘efficiency’ can mean:  ‘The fact of being an operative agent or efficient cause.’  
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘Efficiency, 1.a.’ accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/59741?redirectedFrom=efficiency#eid.  Legge affirms that Thomas also is thinking in terms of efficient 
causality.  See, Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 104. 
 66  Owen’s understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit on Christ’s human nature develops throughout 
his life.  Early on, Owen’s understanding is fairly typically in that he understands the Holy Spirit to work in 
Christ’s virginal conception, and in his passion and resurrection.  However, in Pneumatologia (1674) Owen 
argues that the Holy Spirit sanctifies Christ at the moment of his conception.  Owen, Works 3:168-169.  
Trueman makes an important connection between Owen and Aquinas:  ‘What is interesting here is that 
Owen’s argument is that human nature, albeit pure and undefiled as in Christ, is as yet on its own incapable of 
living supernaturally to God, an argument reminiscent of Thomistic understanding of human nature, and one 
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 While it is true that Owen’s formulation is an attempt to defend the integrity of both Christ’s 
divine and human natures, it is hard not to conclude that this divergence from Aquinas results from  
Owen’s polemical context.67  Owen is not correcting the tradition he inherits, but at least in part, he 
is answering the Socinians who claim that if the person of Christ is divine, then he has no need for 
the work of the Spirit on his human nature.68  In response, Owen says that the assumption is the only 
immediate act of ‘the person of the Son on the human nature’ and the ‘only necessary consequent 
of this assumption of the human nature, or the incarnation of the Son of God, is the personal union 
of Christ.’69  All other acts of the Son of God toward the human nature ‘are voluntary.’70 Therefore, 
the Holy Spirit ‘is the immediate, peculiar, efficient cause of all external divine operations.’71  Owen’s 
innovation answers the Socinian challenge to a Chalcedonian Christology, but it risks violating the 
doctrine of inseparable operations – a risk present in Owen’s use of the pactum salutis as well.  In 
fact, Owen’s construction at this point is somewhat similar to his understanding that the divine 
persons are ‘distinct principles of operation.’72  To be clear, just as before, Owen is not intentionally 
revising or violating the doctrine of inseparable operations.  The Holy Spirit proceeds from both the 
Father and the Son and is the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4:6).  Therefore, the Spirit is ‘the immediate 
 
which connects both to medieval notions of the donum superadditum and, by way of structural analogy, to the 
divine condescension in the original covenant of works.’  Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 94-95.   
 67  See, Kapic, Communion with God, 85.  Kapic is correct that Owen attempts to maintain the integrity 
of both of Christ’s natures and the unity of his person.  In Christologia, Owen is nearly identical to Aquinas as 
he follows Chalcedon very strictly.  However, in Pneumatologia, when he is addressing his Socinian 
interlocutors, Owen’s innovative ‘Spirit Christology’ is rather different.  Spence believes Owen holds together 
the traditional Chalcedonian Christology (Spence refers to this as incarnation) and his Spirit Christology 
(Spence calls this inspiration).  Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 63.  See also, Crisp, ‘John Owen on Spirit 
Christology,’ 14.  Spence’s ‘incarnation’ and ‘inspiration’ is his attempt to hold together the metaphysical 
concerns of Chalcedon and the historical concern that arise from the biblical text.  Trueman, rightly, finds 
Owen doing something similar.  See, Trueman, Reformed Catholic, 95-98.  See also, Myk Habets, Theology in 
Transposition, 170-173.  Habets’ use of Owen’s Spirit Christology seems to place Owen within a tradition that 
leads to Christ assuming a fallen human nature.  While Habets does not say Owen held this view, drawing a 
line from Owen to Edward Irving is indeed very questionable.    
 68  Owen, Works 3:160.  Structurally, Owen’s construction looks similar to the donum superadditum, 
but this does not lead Aquinas away from a two nature Christology.  Owen might look similar, but constructs 
his understanding of Christ’s human nature and the Holy Spirit for different reasons than does Aquinas.      
 69  Owen, Works 3:160.  
 70  Owen, Works 3:161.  Kapic also notices that Owen builds his understanding of the Spirit’s role on 
Christ’s human nature on this distinction between assumption and union.  Kapic, Communion with God, 85. 
 71  Owen, Works 3:161.    
 72  See chapter 2.    
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operator of all divine acts of the Son himself, even on his human nature.’73  Intentionally or not, 
however, Owen has removed the divine nature as the principle of divine action within Christ’s 
temporal mission.  Owen knows this maneuver is innovative, so he defends his construction:  
To clear the whole matter, it must be yet farther observed that the immediate actings 
of the Holy Ghost are not spoken of him absolutely, nor ascribed unto him exclusively, 
as unto the other persons and their concurrence in them.  It is a saying generally 
admitted, that  Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa…But the things we insist on are 
ascribed eminently unto the Holy Ghost, on the account of the order of his subsistence 
in the holy Trinity, as he is the Spirit of the Father and the Son; whence, in every divine 
act, the authority of the Father, the love and wisdom of the Son, with the immediate 
efficacy and power of the Holy Ghost, are to be considered. Yea, and there is such a 
distinction in their operations, that one divine act may produce a peculiar respect and 
relation unto one person, and not unto another; as the assumption of the human 
nature did to the Son, for he only was incarnate.74 
It might appear that Owen follows Aquinas and understands, by appropriation, that the Holy Spirit is 
the One who perfects and completes God’s works ad extra.  However, at the very least, Owen 
confuses efficient causality with the Spirit’s appropriated works.  Only God as One is the efficient 
cause of all of God’s works ad extra.  This is what the doctrine of inseparable operations maintains.  
Appropriating works ad extra to particular divine persons does not shift efficient causality from 
God’s nature to the divine persons – at least not for Aquinas. 75   
 In Aquinas’ theology of the assumption, the Son’s ‘humanity has a relation to the Son 
“according to esse”.’76  To say the Son is the terminus of the assumption builds upon Thomas’ 
theology of the divine missions that holds to the doctrine of inseparable operations – ‘a mission’s 
created effect is efficiently caused by all three divine persons.’77  The mission’s effect is related to 
one divine person and his personal property ‘as a terminus, so that the divine person who is sent in 
that effect is truly made present.’78  Therefore, the creature does have a distinct relation to a divine 
 
 73  Owen, Works 3:162.  
 74  Owen, Works 3:162.    
 75  Cleveland does not address Owen’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as efficient cause likely 
because Cleveland only examines Christologia and not Pneumatologia.  
 76  Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 107.  
 77  Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 105.    
 78  Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 105.  This is the theology of the divine missions introduced in 
chapter 2.   
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person – in this case, Christ’s created human nature.  This is possible in two ways.  First, this distinct 
relation between the one sent and the creature can be one of exemplary causality.79  Aquinas 
illustrates this way of exemplarity as ‘an infusion of love is the term in a way similar to the personal 
procession of the Holy Spirit.’80  Love joins the creature to the distinct personal procession of the 
Holy Spirit.81  Second, there is also a relation according to being.82  Aquinas explains, ‘Or there is a 
term according to esse; and this mode is unique to the incarnation, through which the human nature 
is assumed into the esse and unity of the divine person.’83  While Owen agrees that the assumption 
terminates in the Son alone, it seem plausible that he understands the relation of Christ’s human 
nature to the divine in terms of Aquinas’ first way and not the second way.84  Yet, for Aquinas, these 
are not two equal ways of understanding Christ’s assumption.  The uniqueness of the incarnation, 
and the doctrine of inseparable operations means that the term of Christ’s assumption is according 
to being, God as one, and not the divine persons.  Here, Owen’s shifting the divine will to the 
persons that we encountered in his theology of the divine processions carries over into this 
understanding of the incarnation.  Locating the divine will personally, rather than essentially, leads, 
at points, to a hasty identification of God ad intra with God ad extra.  
 
Owen’s Theology of Priesthood  
 
 All of this finally leads us into the heart of Owen’s theology of priesthood because the 
hypostatic union is the foundation of Christ’s mediation.85  In the Son’s act of assumption, Christ 
 
 79  Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, co.    
 80  Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, co.   
 81  See, Legge, Trinitarian Christology, 106.  
 82  Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, co.     
 83  Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, co. One objection to Thomas’ formulation is that the esse of God is 
one and not three.  In response, Aquinas develops an understanding of the ‘personal esse’ of the Son.  This is 
related to Aquinas’ understanding of personal action that is not merely appropriation – as mentioned in 
chapter 2 – and Aquinas’ understanding of the personal mode of Trinitarian acts.  See, Legge, Trinitarian 
Christology, 106-111; Emery, ‘Personal Mode,’ passim.   
 84  Thus, Owen’s appeal to the order of subsistence in the block quote above.    
 85  For treatments of Owen’s theology of Christ’s priesthood that cover Owen’s development and 
polemics, see, Tay, Priesthood of Christ, chapter 4; Research Companion, 159-170; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 
185-197; Reformed Catholic, 87-92.  
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enters a state of humiliation.  Commenting on Heb 2:6, Owen writes, ‘The whole counsel and 
purpose of God concerning the salvation of mankind, in and by the humiliation, exaltation, and 
whole mediation of “the man Christ Jesus,” is couched therein.’86  Typical of the Reformed Orthodox, 
Owen understands that Christ fulfils his offices in two different states – humiliation and exaltation.87  
Christ’s humiliation consists of his incarnation and obedience in which he fulfils the law and suffers 
his passion.88  In Christ’s state of exaltation, he is raised back to life and ascends to the Father’s right 
hand, interceding for his church.89  Christ’s mediation occurs in both his humiliation and exaltation 
and is carried out as the God-man (though the focus of this section is on Christ’s oblation and not his 
intercession).  Speaking of ‘all the acts and duties of’ Christ’s ‘mediatory office,’ Owen says, ‘For they 
are all resolved into the union of his natures in the same person, without which not one of them 
could be performed unto the benefit of the church.’90 Christ’s priesthood is not something other 
than his mission.  Rather, Christ’s mission includes his undertaking, and fulfilling, the office of priest.   
 I have shown that the foundation of the Son’s mission in Owen’s theology is the covenant of 
redemption rather than the eternal processions of the divine persons and the goodness that God is.  
Therefore, Christ’s priestly office is also rooted in the pactum salutis as it is part of the divine mission 
of the Son of God.  This is clear when Owen comments on Heb 5:5, a text that speaks of Christ’s 
appointment as high priest.  As a descendant of the tribe of Judah, to whom God makes no promise 
of priesthood, Christ has no claim to the priesthood.  Rather, Christ must be appointed to his priestly 
office.  Owen explains, ‘But as for himself, neither did he take this honour to himself, nor was it 
possible that so he should do; for the whole office, and the benefit of his discharge of it, depended 
on a covenant or compact between him and his Father.’91  Christ does not make himself high priest.  
 
 86  Owen, Hebrews 3:337.  Notice that the covenant of redemption, not God’s goodness, is the 
foundation of salvation for Owen.   
 87  Owen, Works 1:483.  Owen’s office Christology is also typical of the Reformed Orthodox and is 
covered in chapter 4.    
 88  Owen, Works 4:484.  
 89  Owen, Works 4:484.  
90  Owen, Works 1:228.   
91  Owen, Hebrews 4:485.  
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Rather, he is appointed the great high priest by the Father in the covenant of redemption.  Owen 
writes, ‘And so we are come to the well-head or the foundation of salvation.  Here lieth the 
immediate sacred spring and fountain of the priesthood of Christ, and of the sacrifice of himself, 
which in the discharge of that office he offered unto God.’92  When the pactum salutis, and not 
God’s nature, is the foundation of salvation, God’s communicative goodness is marginalised. 
 
Priesthood before the fall?  
 
 Lying behind this move of founding Christ’s priesthood in the covenant of redemption is 
Owen’s conviction that the need for Christ’s priesthood exists only once Adam and Eve rebel against 
God and sin enters the world.  Therefore, Owen roots Christ’s priestly mission in the pactum salutis, 
rather than God’s decrees, because priesthood is primarily about redemptive sacrifice.  This is why 
the pactum salutis is not a pure decree.  There is no priest before the fall.   To place the necessity of 
Christ’s priesthood within God’s eternal will and decrees would make God mutable and passible—
something that Owen very clearly wants to avoid—and could lead one to conclude that God is the 
author of sin and evil, which Owen clearly denies throughout his works.  God is not reactionary in 
the face of sin.  The introduction of sin and evil into creaturely history does not change God, and, 
therefore, cannot change eternal decrees or violate God’s will.93  God cannot will evil.  God does not 
decree sin.94  Owen clearly writes, ‘I shall therefore, first, manifest, that there was no priesthood to 
be in the state of innocency.’95 
  Therefore, just as Owen roots the entire mission of the Son in the covenant of redemption, 
the foundation of Christ’s priestly office is also the covenant of redemption.  Yet, as important as the 
 
92  Owen, Hebrews 2:95.    
 93  Though recall from chapter 1 that Owen struggles to properly distinguish God in se and God for us 
with regard to God’s justice at just this point.    
94  Though Owen, like most of the Reformed Orthodox, does allow for God permitting sin to occur.  
See, Owen, Hebrews 2:30-32. 
95  Owen, Hebrews 2:16.  
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covenant of redemption is in Owen’s theology, as he explains the economic foundation of Christ’s 
priestly ministry, he often references the Messianic promise of Gen 3:15.96  In so doing, however, 
Owen does not explicitly connect the pactum salutis to God’s promise to send his Son.  Clearly, 
Owen sees a connection, but he does not develop this connection.  Thus, at points, Owen’s 
soteriological concerns shift the foundation of Christ’s priesthood from eternity, the pactum, to 
history, Gen. 3:15.  Commenting on Heb 2:17, Owen writes, ‘The especial office of priesthood, for 
one to perform it in behalf of others, came in after sin, upon the first promise.’97  This line of thinking 
is directly tied to Owen’s understanding that a priest is one who makes sacrifices.  Since there were 
no sacrifices in the Garden of Eden, there also were no priests.98  Once more, a tension between God 
in se and God for us is at work.  Owen does not deny that the Abrahamic promise is founded upon 
the covenant of redemption, but he blurs the important order due to his concern for redemptive 
history so much so that the promise, at times, seems to be the foundation for Christ’s mission rather 
than part of the fulfilment of the covenant of redemption.  Owen’s line of thought is unclear.   
 Given Owen’s understanding of the role of Christ as priest, his soteriological foundation is 
not too surprising, though it does raise the question of whether or not priesthood is limited to a 
fallen creation or not, and, more to the point, whether Owen’s view of God’s justice is motivating his 
conclusions on both the prefallen condition and the nature of Christ’s priesthood.99  More surprising 
is what Owen says next:  ‘In the state of innocency every one was to be priest for himself, or perform 
in his own name the things which with God he had to do, according unto the law of creation.’100  
However, if Owen is consistent with this argumentation throughout his work, a serious 
misunderstanding of Adam as the federal head under the covenant of works emerges.  Even before 
 
 96  For Owen’s understanding of the Old Testament more generally, see, Tweeddale, Owen and 
Hebrews, chapter 4.    
97  Owen, Hebrews 3:471.   
98  Owen, Hebrews 2:16.  
 99  In large part, Owen is countering the Socinians who construct their Christology exclusively in terms 
of Christ’s office as prophet.  Christ is not divine, for the Socinians, but he does reveal God’s will and is a good 
teacher.  In part, Owen’s focus on priesthood is a polemical overreaction.  See, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 168-
168-169.  
100  Owen, Hebrews 3:471.   
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the fall into sin, Adam and Eve stand as the ‘first parents’ or covenant head of humanity.  Owen 
seems to affirm some type of general and individual priestly office, or at least function, before the 
entrance of sin.  However, this function is disconnected from the federal headship of Adam that 
Owen affirms very clearly in other places.101  Adam does not become the covenant head of humanity 
only after the fall.  Yet, Owen suggests a pre-fall situation in which each person acted toward God 
individually, and the need for one to act on their behalf results only from the entrance of sin.  If 
Owen simply means that once Adam falls into sin, humanity falls with him and now lives under the 
covenant of works, well and good.  However, Owen’s argumentation raises questions about his 
understanding of Adam, not only as the head of humanity, but as a type of Christ.102  I doubt Owen 
would say that the other offices characteristic of Reformed Christology, prophet and king, enter only 
after humanity’s fall.103  If Adam in the state of innocence is not already prophet, king, and priest, 
the office of priesthood is a reaction to sin.  These offices can take redemptive shapes after sin, but if 
they arise only in response to sin, then Owen is mixing God ad extra with God ad intra.104   
 More to the point, Owen’s understanding of Christ’s priesthood follows his understanding of 
God’s justice.  Owen’s pre-fall theology reveals that the same concerns that lead Owen to root 
Christ’s mission in the covenant of redemption leave him with no place for a priesthood before the 
fall.  Both are tied to his understanding of sin and sacrifice.  To this end, in ‘Exercitation XXVI, Owen 
writes, ‘That which ensues on both is, that there was no counsel of God concerning either 
priesthood or sacrifice in that state or condition.’105  God does decree Christ’s priesthood, but only 
with respect to God’s knowledge that humanity falls.  Owen writes:    
From what hath been spoken it appears that there was no decree, no counsel of God, 
concerning either priest or sacrifice, with respect unto the law of creation and the 
state of innocency. A supposition of the entrance of sin, and what ensued thereon in 
 
101  In his ‘Greater Catechism,’ Owen affirms that all humanity was in Adam when he fell from the 
state of innocence, leading me to conclude that Owen does understand Adam as a federal, or covenant, head 
of all humanity making his comments here all the more unclear.  Owen, Works 1:477.   
102  Owen does understand Adam as a type of Christ, see:  Owen, Works 5:275, 323; 10:353, 391.  
 103  Recall that only Christ’s priesthood necessitates the incarnation.    
 104  Owen’s argumentation here calls into question the typical nature of Adam’s headship and Christ’s 
that is the foundation of a ‘two Adam’ Christology along the lines of Rom 5:12-21.  
 105  Owen, Hebrews 2:16.  
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the curse of the law, lie at the foundation of the designation of the priesthood and 
sacrifice of Christ.106 
Owen narrowly understands Christ’s priesthood as primarily oblation, because he believes that 
God’s self-revelation is ‘cut off’ by humanity’s fall into sin.  At work here is Owen’s natural theology 
that downplays the communication of God’s goodness in the created order.  For instance, Owen 
writes that humanity forfeits acting as their own representative before God according to the law of 
creation because sin ‘cut off all gracious intercourse between God and man.’107  In response, God 
provides ‘a new way’ which is the promise of Gen 3:15.108  Sin, for Owen, cuts off God’s self-
communication so that God’s goodness is now exclusively redemptive.   
Owen’s understanding is complex.  As is so often the case in Owen, he tries to hold together a 
more Thomistic way of formulating his thought while incorporating the developing Reformed 
Orthodox tradition.109  Owen does all of this, not as one writing a systematic theology, but largely as 
separate works of polemical theology.  For instance, in another polemical work, On the Divine 
Original of Scripture, Owen writes: 
The eternal fountain of all grace, flowing from love and goodness, lies in God’s 
election, or predestination. This being an act of God’s will, cannot be apprehended but 
as an eternal act of his Wisdom or Word also. All the eternal thoughts of its pursuit lie 
in the covenant that was between the Father and the Son, as to the Son’s undertaking 
to execute that purpose of his.110 
Notice that Owen does not outright deny that God is good and communicative, but his narrowing of 
natural theology shifts his understanding of goodness from God’s nature to the divine persons.111  
Thus, God’s goodness shifts to the covenant of redemption; the goodness of God’s nature is no 
 
 106  Owen, Hebrews 2:41-42.  
 107  Owen, Hebrews 3:471.  
 108  Owen, Hebrews 3:471.    
 109  Owen lived and worked with one foot in the old medieval world and one foot in the newly 
emerging modern world.  See, Carl R. Trueman, ‘John Owen and Modernity: Reflections on Historiography, 
Modernity, and the Self,’ 35-54.  
 110  Owen, Works 16:341.   In this work, Owen responds to the Quakers and their theology of the inner 
light of humanity.  Owen’s interlocutors make him very cautious about natural knowledge of God.  To concede 
that God’s goodness is communicative opens the door to the Quaker’s inner light.  Owen, Works 16:282. 
111  Good is a transcendental which can be said either essentially or personally.  See, Emery, Gilles 
Emery, O.P., ‘Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in St. Thomas Aquinas,’ The Thomist 64 
(2000).  The point here is that Owen thinks of goodness more in terms of the personal register at the expense 
of the essential register.  
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longer the foundation of God’s redemptive communication.  Rather, it is the incarnation.  Owen 
does not connect Christ’s incarnation to God’s communicative goodness already at work within the 
natural world.  Christ’s incarnation flows from God’s goodness, but it is a disruptive goodness made 
known only in and through the incarnation.  As Owen’s view of revelation narrows, so does his 
understanding of the scope of God’s communication of his goodness.  Christ as priest reveals God’s 
goodness primarily through Christ’s life-long oblation that disruptively redeems God’s elect.   
 That Christ’s priesthood is predestined – that it is part of God’s eternal and sovereign plan 
and decree –  is not a debated point.  In fact, Owen references Aquinas on ‘the predestination of the 
man Christ Jesus’ in his Exercitation on Christ’s priesthood.112  However, Owen believes that Aquinas’ 
formulation of Christ’s predestination does not take the fall fully into account.  Aquinas understands 
Scripture to assign the motive of the incarnation to Adam’s sin.  Owen writes, ‘Aquinas himself 
determines this whole matter, with an assertion which would have been to his own advantage to 
have attended unto upon other occasions.’113  In the sentence immediately after this initial 
comment, Aquinas goes on to say that God’s power makes Christ’s incarnation without sin 
theoretically possible.114   Such a view is too speculative for Owen.  Many of Owen’s contemporaries 
hold Aquinas’ view, but only as it is ‘much improved by the modern Scotists.’115  This much improved 
understanding of Christ’s predestination is the covenant of redemption. 116  It is much improved 
 
112  Owen, Hebrews 2:29.  ST III, q. 24.   
 113  Owen, Hebrews 2:29.    
 114  Aquinas, ST III, 2, a. 3, co.  I return to Christ’s predestination in my conclusion.    
115  Owen, Hebrews 2:29.  
 116  There is some debate on whether or not the medieval doctrine of Christ’s predestination is related 
to the rise of covenant theology or not.  Richard Muller writes, ‘There are two views on the relation of the 
predestination of Christ and the covenant of redemption, which are related to the question of whether there is 
a "tension" between covenant and predestination, with covenant serving to offset Reformed 
predestinarianism. Those who assume a positive answer to the question, like Bertus Loonstra, Verkiezing, 
verzoening, verbond: beschrijving en beoordeling van de leer van het “pactum salutis” in de gereformeerde 
theologie [Bertus Loonstra, Election, Reconciliation, Covenant: Description and Evaluation of the Doctrine of 
the “pactum salutis” in Reformed Theology] (Den Haag: Boekencentrum, 1990), see the two doctrines as quite 
distinct and basically unrelated. Others (like me) who assume a negative answer to the question, tend to see 
the relationship and view the predestination of Christ, when explained in a fully trinitarian manner, as a 
predecessor doctrine to the full pactum salutis.’  Richard A. Muller, email message to author, September 25, 
2020.    
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because Christ’s incarnate mission is predestined after humanity’s fall into sin.  There is no need for 
a priest who offers himself as an oblation and sacrifice if there is no sin.  Thus, Owen agrees that 
Christ was predestined for his mission, but he disagrees with a supralapsarian understanding of the 
decrees to which Owen thinks Aquinas’ doctrine of Christ’s predestination leads.  However, rather 
than align with an infralapsarian ordering of God’s decrees, Owen suggests that the whole debate is 
too speculative.117  Owen is most concerned about an ordering of the decrees that places Christ’s 
incarnation prior to the permission for humanity to sin.118  The ordering of decrees is for human 
understanding as they are all one, given that God’s will and decree are not divided because God’s 
essence, which his will is, is one.  Therefore, Owen says that ‘there cannot be a priority in the pre-
ordination of Christ unto the decree of the permission of the fall and entrance of sin.’119  Scripture 
communicates that Christ was predestined to come in his incarnation ‘before the foundation of the 
world’ (1 Pet 1:20), but this is always with respect to redemption.120  Importantly, Owen’s 
understanding derives not from an infralapsarian ordering of God’s decrees, but from redemptive 
history.  Desiring to avoid the speculative lapsarian debate, Owen once more makes this recurring 
move from the covenant of redemption to the promise of Gen 3:15.  Owen explains that the 
incarnation is predestined ‘in answer to the first promise concerning the seed of the woman, which 
respected our recovery from sin.’121   
 Owen’s desire to avoid speculation and exegete Scripture is admirable.  However, exactly 
what Owen means by making this move is uncertain as he risks basing the eternal counsel of the 
covenant of redemption on an historical promise made within God’s economy.  Christ’s priesthood is 
predestined in response to sin, which means it cannot be part of God’s eternal will and decree.  This 
 
 117  Owen, Hebrews 2:30-31.  
118  Owen does not seem to find much value in the infra versus supra lapsarian debate.  Owen, 
Hebrews 2:29-31.  The supralapsarian position holds that Christ was predestined and decreed to come as the 
Redeemer before the decree that permits sin.  The infralapsarian position would say the decree for Christ’s 
mission is made in response to fallen humanity.  See Muller, DLGTT:172-173, 348-350. 
119  Owen, Hebrews 2:32.  
120  Owen, Hebrews 2:33.  
121  Owen, Hebrews 2:33.  
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is precisely why the pactum does so much work in Owen’s theology.  However, this mixing of the 
soteriological and eternal risks placing the economy of grace within God himself.   On the one hand, 
Owen wants to affirm that the covenant of redemption speaks of God in himself.  It is introduced to 
‘protect’ God’s will and decree from the charge of mutability and passion.  On the other hand, 
Owen’s mixing of the covenant of redemption with the protoeuangelion leads me closer to 
concluding that the pactum salutis does not distinguish, and perhaps confuses, God in se and God 
for us.  Owen’s formulation, in my judgment, risks making humanity’s need for salvation 
determinative of God's being.   
 As Owen turns back once again to this ‘especial counsel’, this confusion does not go away.122  
In fact, Owen makes a similar move with a different text.  Owen turns to Prov 8 to argue for the 
Son’s eternal existence as well as the mutual delight that exists between the persons of the Trinity.  
Owen connects Prov 8 to Psalm 40:7-8 where the psalmist writes of the Son’s delight in his 
obedience to the Father in his mission.  Owen’s struggle to relate God ad intra and God ad extra 
arises once again when Owen explains that the origin of the Son’s delight and mission is that it is 
written in a ‘book.’123  Owen finds warrant for his reading by turning to Heb 10:7 and explaining that 
this book is the ‘book of life’ or nothing ‘other but the counsel of God concerning the salvation of the 
elect by Jesus Christ.’124  Book of life, here, relates to the counsel, but Owen goes on to say that this 
counsel written in the book of life is ‘transcribed into the beginning of the book of truth, in the first 
promise given unto Adam after the fall.’125  While it is not completely clear what Owen means by this 
transcribing, the move is similar to what he said above about the predestination of Christ.  Yet, in the 
Hebrews Commentary, when Owen treats Heb 10:7, he simply says, ‘The coming of Christ, the Son of 
God, into the world, his coming in the flesh by the assuming of our nature, was the effect of the 
 
 122  Owen, Hebrews 2:41-42.  Truman also recognizes this dual foundation at work in Owen: ‘Christ’s 
high priesthood finds its ultimate causal ground in the intratrinitarian covenants, and its historical inauguration 
in the earthly ministry of Christ.’  Trueman, Claims of Truth, 187. 
123  Owen, Hebrews 2:70.    
124  Owen, Hebrews 2:70.  
125  Owen, Hebrews 2:70.  
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mutual counsel of the Father and the Son.’126  Does Owen equate the first promise of the gospel in 
Gen 3:15 with the pactum salutis?  Owen is unclear on how pactum and promise relate due to his 
soteriological reading of God in se.  In the last chapter, Owen’s understanding of the covenant of 
redemption and the role it plays in the Son’s mission revealed similarly conflicting and confusing 
thoughts.  Owen’s understanding of Christ’s priesthood reveals a similar struggle to properly relate 
God ad intra and God ad extra placing the foundation of Christ’s priesthood upon a somewhat 
unreliable ground.   
 
Christ’s Oblation and Intercession  
 
 Laying aside these questions for the moment, at the heart of Owen’s theology of Christ’s 
priesthood is Christ’s oblation and intercession.  In his ‘Greater Catechism’, Owen defines the 
oblation of Christ as:  ‘The offering up of himself upon the altar of the cross, an holy propitiatory 
sacrifice for the sins of all the elect throughout the world; as also, the presentation of himself for us 
in heaven, sprinkled with the blood of the covenant.’127  Christ’s oblation includes both his 
humiliation – his sacrificial life and death – and his work of exaltation – his heavenly self-
presentation and intercession.  Owen explains Christ’s priestly prayer as: ‘His continual soliciting of 
God on our behalf, begun here in fervent prayers, continued in heaven by appearing as our advocate 
at the throne of grace.’128  Therefore, the main thing that Christ’s intercession achieves is the elect’s 
possession of the redemption Christ secures in his oblation.129  Thus Christ’s sacrifice for sinners is 
the essence of his priestly work.130   
 
126  Owen, Hebrews 6:460.  
127  Owen, Works 1:481.  
128  Owen, Works 1:483.  
129  Owen, Hebrews 2:152.  
 130  It is worth noting that the focus of Christ’s priesthood is predominately weighted toward sacrifice.  
In Owen’s Greater Catechism, he spends fourteen questions and answers on Christ’s sacrifice.  Owen devotes 
ten questions to Christ’s oblation and only one to Christ’s intercession.  Owen, Works 1:481-483.  
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 In part, Owen’s writings on Christ’s priesthood are a response to his historical context and to 
one of his most common dialogue partners, the Socinians.  They deny the sacrifice of Christ and the 
very office of Christ’s priesthood, saying it is merely a metaphor.131 Owen therefore crafts 
‘Exercitation XXXI’ in response to the Socinians.132  More to the point, his desire to refute the 
Socinians could be one of the reasons that Owen understands the work of Christ as priest primarily 
in terms of sacrifice.   Owen counters the Socinian objection by saying, ‘I say, therefore, that ֹּכֵהן, 
“cohen,” is properly θύτης, “a sacrificer;” nor is it otherwise to be understood or expounded, unless 
the abuse of the word be obvious, and a metaphorical sense necessary.’133  If Christ is not really a 
priest, then there is no sacrifice for sin, and this is why the Socinian objection greatly troubles Owen.  
He writes, ‘The principal work of the Lord Christ as our high priest, and from which all other actings 
of his in that office do flow, was to make reconciliation or atonement for sin.’134  Without Christ’s 
sacrifice on the cross, there is no forgiveness of sin.   
 However, sin is not the ‘immediate object of reconciliation.’135  God, who is displeased with 
sin, is the immediate object of Christ’s priestly work.  Therefore, as the God-man, Christ undertakes 
his priestly office as both divine and human to reconcile sinful humans to God through his once-for-
all self-sacrifice.  This reconciliation happens as Christ’s priestly sacrifice satisfies God’s justice.  
 
131  Owen, Hebrews 2:139, 145.  Owen’s polemical context and debates with Richard Baxter clearly 
shape his understanding of God’s justice and theology of atonement.  See, Tay, Priesthood of Christ, 60-63, 
136-146; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 188. 
132  Owen, Hebrews 2:139.  Owen writes, ‘It is therefore principally with respect unto them that I have 
here proposed the nature of that office unto consideration.’  Owen, Hebrews 2:139.  It is true that Owen’s 
theology of Christ’s priesthood is also, in part, a response to Roman Catholic and Arminian theologians.  
Apparently, Owen wrote an unpublished work titled Tractatu de Sacerdotio Christi, contra Armin. Socin. Et 
Papistas, nondum edition.  See, Trueman, Claims of Truth, 189n11.  Trueman claims that Owen’s editor refers 
to this work in the ‘Prefatory Note’ to The Duty of Pastors and People Distinguished where the editor says most 
of this unpublished work is likely included in Hebrews.  Owen, Works 13:2.  In addition to these three 
influences, Tay points out that Owen also worries about what he believes is a widespread ‘misconception and 
misapplication of Christ’s priestly acts of oblation and intercession.’  Owen has in mind those who hold to a 
universal redemption rather than a position of limited atonement.  Tay, Priesthood of Christ, 88. 
133  Owen, Hebrews 2:11.  Torrance understands Christ’s priesthood primarily as one of a ‘truthsayer, 
or seer, i.e. one who has to do with the Word of God…All that the priest does…answers to the Word given to 
the priest…and only in relation to that primary function does he have the other functions of oblation and 
intercession.’  T.F. Torrance, Royal Priesthood: A Theology of Ordained Ministry (2nd ed., London, UK: T&T 
Clark, 1993), 1.    
134  Owen, Hebrews 3:481.  Principal here means chief or highest not God’s nature.  
135  Owen, Hebrews 2:145.    
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Owen’s most elaborate defences of his understanding of the nature of atonement are found in his 
answer to John Biddle in Vindicae Evangelicae and in Of The Death of Christ, where Owen debates 
Richard Baxter.136  What is important for the argument of this chapter is how Owen builds upon the 
Anselmic tradition in formulating his understanding of satisfaction to reflect his doctrine of God’s 
justice.137 Humanity’s estrangement from God due to sin dishonours God and creates a debt that 
requires satisfaction.138  The debt, the honour stolen from God, must either be repaid or the person 
punished.139  Yet in order to repay God who is infinite, an obedience of infinite value is needed.  The 
satisfaction God requires must be proportional to the dishonour, or sin committed.140  Owen follows 
Anselm in saying that no ordinary person could pay the infinite debt of sinned owed to God.  What is 
needed is one who is both God and man.  Owen’s understanding of satisfaction clearly builds on 
Anselm.  However, Anselm understands satisfaction more in terms of ransom and as a fitting 
response to sin, whereas Owen understands Christ’s oblation as penal and essential due to his 




 Owen brings together the concerns of this chapter as he makes the connection between his 
theology of Christ’s priesthood and Christ’s incarnation.  This sacrifice is effective for reconciliation, 
because Christ is uniquely qualified to fulfil this office. Jesus Christ is free from the guilt and 
 
 136  Owen, Works 12:passim and Works 10:430-471. On Owen and Baxter, see, Cooper, Formation of 
Nonconformity, 197-226; Tay, Priesthood of Christ, 133-145; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 203-225. 
 137  See, Kapic, Communion with God, 69-71; Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 67-70; Tay, 
Priesthood of Christ, 72, 139; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 152, 188.       
 138  Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, I.11  
 139  Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, I.14.    
 140  Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, I.12. 
 141  Kapic writes, ‘Only a mediator who is both truly God and truly man could bring redemption.  Such 
an assertion by Owen reflects not only a long tradition within Western theology going back to Chalcedon, but 
also the modifications of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with their common theological emphasis on 
judicial satisfaction theory.’  Kapic, Communion with God, 69. For a helpful overview of how the Reformed 
tradition more generally develops Anselm, that affirms satisfaction while taking modern challenges seriously, 
see Cornelis van der Kooi and Gijsbert van den Brink, trans. Reinder Bruinsma and James D. Bratt, Christian 
Dogmatics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2017), 461-466.       
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corruption of original sin, because he was conceived by the Holy Spirit in the Virgin’s womb and not 
by ‘natural procreation.’142  If Christ’s human nature were taken by ‘natural generation’, then Christ: 
would not have furthered the end of his priesthood, but have enervated the efficacy of 
it, and have rendered him incapable of being such a priest as he was to be; for 
whereas the original contagion of sin is derived by natural procreation, had he been by 
that means made partaker of human nature, how could he be “holy, harmless, 
undefiled, separate from sinners,” as it became our high priest to be? chap. Vii. 26.  
Again, it was not necessary that this human nature should have its individuation from 
itself, and a particular subsistence in and by itself;—yes, this would have overthrown 
his priesthood; for whereas the efficacy thereof depends on the excellency of the 
divine nature, this could not have given its influence thereunto, had not the human 
nature been taken into the same personal subsistence with itself.  Only as we said, 
that he should have a human nature, truly and really as the brethren, and therein be 
like them, this was necessary, that he might be an offering priest, and have of his own 
to offer unto God.143 
As humanity sinned against God, a human representative is needed in order for God and humanity 
to be reconciled.  This human representative cannot be simply any human person.  Only this person, 
who is free from sin, but also the God-man, is qualified to offer himself as the reconciling sacrifice.  
And this person, exists only as his human nature is assumed and united to Christ’s divine nature.  
Thus, Owen writes, ‘The ‘first and principal [primary] end of the Lord Christ’s assuming human 
nature, was not to reign in it, but to suffer and die in it…Glory was to follow, a kingdom to ensue, but 
suffering and dying were the principal work he came about.’144  Only as God and man could Christ’s 
sacrifice satisfy God’s wrath and justice.  
 Owen’s theology of Christ’s priesthood is built upon his Chalcedonian Christology.  The 
eternal Son of God takes to himself a human nature in order to carry out his earthly mission.  At the 
heart of Christ’s mission is his office of priesthood.  Christ’s assumption is important because it is his 
entrance into the state of humiliation in which he offers himself as a sacrifice for sin.  Owen’s two-
nature Christology is vital, because only this person who is both God and man can offer a sacrifice 
that satisfies God’s justice.  To satisfy wrath is a work of the divine nature.145  At the same time, 
 
142  Owen, Hebrews 3:467.    
143  Owen, Hebrews 3:467.   
144  Owen, Hebrews 3:447.  
 145  Owen, Works 1:479.  
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Christ’s true humanity is just as necessary so ‘that the nature that had offended might suffer, and 
make satisfaction, and so he might be every way a fit and sufficient Saviour for men.’146  Owen’s 
Christology is Chalcedonian and indebted to Aquinas.  However, I have shown that Owen’s 
understanding of the Holy Spirit upon Christ’s human nature reveals his unclear distinction between 
God in se and God for us.  A similar obscurity is found in Owen’s attempts to relate the pactum 
salutis to Gen 3:15.  Surely Owen does not intend to base God’s inner life upon the historical 
promise to redeem.  However, it is hard not to conclude that Owen is, at best, unclear at this point.  
At worst, Owen conflates God ad intra and God ad extra due to his soteriological reading of God in 
se.  Thus, the foundation of Christ’s priesthood is somewhat unstable.    
 Owen’s soteriological reading leads him to prioritize redemptive grace in such a way that 
narrows God’s self-communication.  Rightly, Owen emphasizes the incarnate mission of the Son, but 
he removes the communicative nature of God’s goodness.  This move leads to a narrow 
understanding of Christ’s priesthood in almost exclusively penal and sacrificial terms.  Owen’s 
narrowing of natural theology, or his prioritizing of redemptive goodness, is motivated by his 
polemical context.  This is clearly seen with Owen’s understanding of the Holy Spirit’s impact on 
Christ’s humanity and his development of the Anselmic satisfaction theory of atonement.  It seems 
fair to say that even here, though less than in the previous two chapters, Owen struggles to properly 
relate God in se and God for us.   
 Owen tells us humanity is ‘cut off’ from God due to sin.  Therefore, God’s goodness is 
communicated only through the incarnation.  While I never want to downplay the importance of 
Christ’s incarnation, a Thomistic rendering of God’s goodness would prove a more secure foundation 
for Owen’s Christology.   To adjust the role of God’s goodness is really to understand God in a slightly 
different way.  This shift does not greatly effect Owen’s Christology, but it does change his 
understanding of the Son’s priestly mission.  Rather than coming upon the foundation of God’s 
 
 146  Owen, Works 1:479.  
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goodness already communicated within creation, Christ now comes to restore the original goodness 
that was ‘cut off’ by sin.  The incarnation is how God communicates his goodness for Owen.  
However, from a Thomistic perspective, creation is a communication of the very goodness of God to 
that which is not God.  God’s nature necessitates that what is made ex nihil must be good.  This 
extends to all created things.  Only God who is ‘infinite being in self-subsistence’ can communicate 
his infinite goodness to something outside himself, or even to that which, prior to God’s 
communication, did not exist.  If God is good, then he cannot stop doing, i.e., communicating, 
goodness to his creation that he freely created, even if that creation is fallen, as it is.  This 
understanding of goodness does not void the need for Christ’s priesthood.  Sin does demand 
satisfaction.  God and human beings do need to be reconciled.  God’s communication of his 
goodness, or his love, is not ‘cut off’ but takes a redemptive shape once sin enters his creation.  
God’s redemptive goodness is not given by virtue of creation.  Redemptive grace is freely given by 
God and is not given equally to each creature.  If this is the case, then, divine judgment is not 
something in opposition or equal to God’s goodness.  Rather, judgment would be God’s goodness in 
its opposition to all that is not good.  Such a foundation allows us to avoid the narrowing at work in 
Owen that leads to an insecure foundation.    Nevertheless, this is, as I will show, the understanding 
of God’s nature on which Owen builds his theology of Christ’s mediation.  
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Chapter 4: Christ the Mediator in Owen 
 
 ‘There is one mediator of God and humanity’ (1 Tim 2:5).  Christ’s mediation is larger than 
his priesthood, yet in many ways it is at the heart of understanding the oblation and intercession 
that this person of the mediator makes.  As Owen develops his theology of Christ’s priesthood, he 
joins a longstanding, yet shifting tradition of reflection.  Augustine and Aquinas both approach the 
question of Christ’s person from a speculative, metaphysical point of view.  Understanding what 
Christ is, is very important for our understanding of Christ’s incarnate work.  As a result, considerable 
space was given to Aquinas’ and Owen’s investigation of the hypostatic union in chapter 3.  
However, at the Reformation, a shift to a person and office Christology begins.  This is especially true 
in the Christology of John Calvin.1  Metaphysical concerns remain important but begin to be slightly 
displaced by soteriological concerns.  As the rapidly changing world of the early modern period shifts 
to a more anthropocentric way of seeing the world, humanity and history take on a new importance.  
Accordingly, Calvin is deeply concerned with soteriology.  Speaking of Calvin, Muller writes, ‘Having 
already announced the historical person of the mediator in terms of the soteriological task set 
before the person, his interest is not in the metaphysical problem of how such a union of natures is 
possible but the reality of the historical person of the mediator and the necessity of seeking the 
person of Christ not in the eternal person of the Son but in the incarnate mediator.’2  This is the 
theological matrix Owen inherits. 
 In this chapter, I will show that Owen develops a theology of Christ’s mediation that 
attempts to hold together both metaphysical and soteriological concerns.  In order to better 
understand what Owen does theologically, I will first trace this shift from Christ as mediator only in 
his human nature to mediator in both natures.  I will do this by examining key texts in both Aquinas 
and Calvin.  This background will lay the foundation for Owen who cannot escape Calvin’s turn to the 
 
 1  See, Stephen Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2004).    
2  Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree:  Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from 
Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids, MI:  Baker Academic, 2008), 29.  
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economy and his dynamic office Christology; nor can he escape the tradition’s long-held 
metaphysical understanding of Christ the mediator.  I will conclude by arguing that Owen adopts 
Calvin’s office Christology, while holding on to Thomas’ metaphysics.  Unsurprisingly, Owen brings all 
of this together with the covenant of redemption, but in so doing, he once again too closely aligns 
God ad intra and God ad extra.3   
 
Aquinas on Christ the Mediator 
 
 Prior to the Reformation, the majority of western theologians understood Christ’s work of 
mediation as occurring in his human nature only.  Christ is a unified person, but metaphysically 
speaking, God has no need to mediate God.4  Aquinas joins this western tradition in formulating his 
theology of Christ’s mediation.  Aquinas’ understanding of Christ as mediator is driven chiefly by 
exegesis, though his exegesis is influenced by his philosophical and theological commitments.  
Aquinas’ primary text for constructing Christ’s mediation is 1 Tim 2:5.5  The ‘man’ Jesus Christ stands 
between God and humanity in order to unite humanity to God.  In the Medieval context, to mediate 
is to stand between the two parties (in this case God and humanity) and join them together.6  Christ 
the mediator is the only one that can unite human beings to God, because his death reconciles 
sinners to God.7  While a person-focused Christology develops in full at the Reformation, Aquinas 
also understands Christ’s work to be the work of his one person.  As the mediator, Christ is similar to 
 
 3  Spence takes a somewhat similar approach beginning with the theology of Christ as mediator in 
Athanasius, Anselm, Calvin and Owen.  Spence, Inspiration and Incarnation, 65-83.  Spence does not bring 
Aquinas into the conversation, likely because he finds Calvin holding together both Athanasius’ divinely 
oriented mediation and Anselm’s humanly oriented mediation.  This sets up Spence’s investigation of whether 
or not ‘Owen was able to maintain successfully the unity of Christ’s personal action.’  Spence, Inspiration and 
Incarnation, 80.  
 4  In the midst of this project, our family read John 17 one night after dinner.  Our four-year-old 
daughter asked, ‘Why does it say Jesus prays to God if he is God?’  This question is similar to the medieval 
metaphysical concerns.    
5  Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 1, co.  
6  Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 1, co. Note here Aquinas’ use of officium as well.  Below I will show that 
Calvin’s understanding of Christ as the mediator in both natures, at least in part, is driven by his different 
conception of both office and person. 
7  Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 1, co.   
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both God and humanity as he is the God-man.8  However, it is more proper for Christ to mediate in 
his human nature because the Son is homoousion with the Father and the Holy Spirit.9  Aquinas 
reasons from his understanding of a mediator, one who stands between and unites, and concludes 
that neither of these can be said of Christ as God, but only as a human being.10  As a human being, 
Christ is far away from God, due to his human nature, yet above the rest of humanity due to grace 
and glory.11  Mediation does not happen in the divine nature, because God cannot, indeed has no 
need, to mediate between himself.  Christ’s divine nature is not far away from God.   
 
Aquinas on John 11  
 
 Yet the incarnate Christ on earth raises interesting questions.  The Gospels attribute both 
divine and human characteristics to the one person of Christ.  However, it is precisely these 
exegetical considerations that make a Chalcedonian understanding so important.  When teaching 
John 11, Aquinas explains, ‘Here it is observed that Christ is true God, and a true human being.  
Therefore, almost everywhere in his actions the divine is said to be mixed with the human and the 
human with the divine.’12  Aquinas is not saying the two natures are mixed together, but following 
Chalcedon, he is simply affirming that whatever is said of either nature can be attributed to the one 
person of Christ.  John 11 is a clear example of how this works itself out in the life of Christ.  The one 
person of Christ has divine power to raise Lazarus from the dead, while at the same time, the human 
nature of Jesus causes him to grieve for his deceased friend.  In fact, one reason that Christ weeps, 
says Aquinas, is ‘to prove his condition and the truth of his human nature.’13  Clearly, then, John 11 
and the ST present Christ as one person with two natures.  Thomas explains it like this: 
 
 8  Aquinas, Super I ad Timotheum, cap. 2, lec. 1, no. 64.2.  
 9  Aquinas, Super I ad Timotheum, cap. 2, lec. 1, no. 64.2.  See also, Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 2.  
10  Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 2, co.   
11  Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 2, co.  The person of Christ has ‘glory’ in his earthly life, says Thomas, 
because he already experiences the beatific vision.  See, ST III, q. 10. 
12  Aquinas, Ioan, cap. 11, lec. 5, no. 1532.   
13  Aquinas, Ioan, cap. 11, lec. 5, no. 1535.   
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Now, when it says “because you have heard me,” if this is interpreted of Christ, in so 
far as he is a human being, there is no difficulty.  Christ was less than the Father, and 
accordingly it is suitable for him to pray to the Father, and to be heard by him.  But if, 
as Chrysostom wishes, to interpret it of Christ, in so far as he is God, then the meaning 
has trouble:  for in so far as Christ is God, it is not fitting for him to pray or be heard, 
but it is better that he hears the prayers of others.14 
While Thomas believes that whatever is said of the incarnate Son can be said of the whole person, 
he still distinguishes between the actions of each nature.  To say that the divine nature ‘hears’ would 
undermine the unity of the Godhead.  Therefore, Christ is one person but he is mediator only in his 
human nature.  Christ’s prayer for Lazarus expresses that Christ, in his human nature, ‘is not a 
stranger to the Father, but recognized him as his principium.’15  Notice how the order of Trinitarian 
persons relates to a two-natures Christology.  The Son is heard by the Father in order to fulfil the 
Father’s will.  ‘Therefore, because the will of the Father and the Son is the same, whenever the 
Father fulfils his own will, he fulfils the will of the Son.’16  Christ’s human will is not separate from, 
but perfectly conformed to the Father’s, or God’s, divine will.  Unlike Owen’s personal predication of 
God’s will, for Aquinas God’s will remains essential even in Christ’s redemptive mission.  God’s will is 
one.  Christ truly fulfils the will of God in his human mediation because the Divine cannot mediate to 
the divine—because the Divine is one.  Christ mediates between God and humanity as man because 
he is far removed from both—from God due to his human nature, yet above the rest of humanity 
due to grace and glory.   
 Thomas also answers the objection that taking away sin is a divine work and Christ must, 
therefore, be mediator as God and not as man.  The logic of this objection is similar to Owen’s view 
of God’s justice.  The satisfaction of God’s wrath necessitates the mediator’s deity.  Only the divine 
Son is ‘able to save to the uttermost, and to satisfy the wrath of his Father, which no creature could 
perform.’17  Thomas’ nuanced response reveals that Christ’s divine nature is at work in his theology 
 
14  Aquinas, Ioan, cap. 11, lec. 6, no. 1553. 
15  Aquinas, Ioan, cap. 11, lec. 6, no. 1555.  Notice here the divine processions fund the Son’s mission.     
16  Aquinas, Ioan, cap. 11, lec. 6, no. 1553    
17  Owen, Works 1:479.  
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of mediation.  Thomas argues that Christ as God takes away sin authoritatively, and makes 
satisfaction for sin as a human being.  Different from Owen, Aquinas’ conception of God’s justice 
does not necessitate divine mediation.  Thomas’ denial of the need for the divine nature to be 
involved in satisfying sin is noteworthy given how the tradition develops in Owen’s era.18   
 
Aquinas on Hebrews 1:3 
 
 The author of Hebrews, writes of God’s climatic and final word – his Son.  In Heb 1:3, God 
speaks in and through his Son, because the Son is the ‘splendour of glory and figure of his 
substance.’19  Substance and figure, in Aquinas’ Hebrews, speak of Christ’s divine nature.  The Son’s 
splendour reveals his co-eternity with the Father.  The Son as the figure of the Father’s substance 
reveals the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father, and the Son’s divine power that he has in 
common with the Father.20  Importantly, Thomas’ discussion of why the epistle uses the word 
substance instead of nature reveals his metaphysical concerns.21  A nature can be multiplied, 
Thomas argues, but the substance is never multiplied.  Aquinas writes, ‘For the substance of the 
Father is not another than the Son’s.  For substance is not divided according to diverse individuals.’22  
Aquinas, then, reads Heb 1:3 as a text primarily about Christ’s divine nature.  In both his Hebrews 
and in the ST, Aquinas always seeks to begin with God in se.  As a result, Thomas’ primary focus is 
metaphysical, always seeking to properly understand God and all things in relation to God.  God in se 
is always the foundation of God for us.  The order matters.  This is not to say Thomas is unconcerned 
with history or soteriology but that they are not his starting point as they sometimes are for Calvin 
and the tradition that develops after him.   
 
18  Aquinas, ST III, q. 26, a. 2, ad 1, ad 2, and ad 3.  
 19  Quoting here the Vulgate, Aquinas’ Bible.  ‘qui cum sit splendour gloriae et figura substantiae eius.’    
20  Aquinas, Hebraeos, cap. 1, lec. 2, no. 36. 
21  The Vulgate, Thomas’ Bible, uses substantiae whereas the Greek text reads τῆς ὑποστάσεως 
αὐτοῦ.    
22  Aquinas, Hebraeos, cap. 1, lec. 2, no. 29. 
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Calvin on Christ the Mediator  
 
 Calvin works with one foot inside the medieval world focused upon the metaphysics of 
Christ’s person and with the other foot inside the early modern world that, at least theologically, 
gives a new prominence to anthropological and soteriological questions and concerns.  This creates a 
tension between an account of Christ’s person within salvation history and the ontological identity 
that is the foundation of the person’s economic activity.  This leads Calvin away from the traditional 
metaphysical understanding of Christ’s person.23  Edmondson claims that rather than focus on a 
‘static mode of being’, Calvin develops his understanding of Christ’s person as a ‘dynamic mode of 
acting.’ 24  This claim misunderstands the dynamic nature of Aquinas’ Christology but highlights the 
shift at work nevertheless. Edmondson correctly argues that in Calvin, Christ is Mediator in his 
threefold office of prophet, priest, and king.  This formulation of an office Christology in Calvin is a 
shift, even if slightly, away from a robust two-nature Christology to a person – and office – focused 
Christology.25  
 The shift emerges as we examine Calvin’s Christology broadly and focus once more on 
Calvin’s interpretation of key Christological texts.  The telos of the hypostatic union is more than 
instrumental, and the relationship between Christ’s two natures is organic.  Here, Calvin is 
purposefully distancing himself from the medieval understanding that Christ’s human nature is an 
instrument through which Christ works.  Christ, as the God-man, is the foundation of the office.  In 
fact, for Calvin, Christ’s divinity is made accessible only through his humanity.  In Calvin’s mind, God 
 
23  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 186.  Edmondson’s work is very helpful and enlightening.  
However, his work does deserve one point of caution.  Edmondson fills a gap by focusing on Calvin’s 
Christology as found in Calvin’s commentary.  Yet it is vital to remember that Calvin understands his 
commentaries and Institutes to work together.  Calvin removes long and technical theological discussion from 
his commentaries to make them more readable.  However, the commentaries were never meant to be read in 
isolation from his Institutes.    
24  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 187.  
 25  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 185-190.  We need not pick one or the other.  My point is that 
this shift occurs in Calvin.  In the Institutes, Calvin clearly affirms a two-natures Christology.  However, Calvin’s 
innovation that the Son is a se moves him away from a more traditional understanding of the Trinitarian order.  
This move carries over into his Christology that does not deny Christ’s two natures, but focuses on Christ’s 
unified person.   
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is hidden without the revelation of Christ.  And it is Christ as Mediator that ties together Christ’s 
person and office.26  Thus, to speak of the person or the Mediator is to speak of the same reality.  In 
the Institutes, Calvin says that many misread the Gospel of John when they try to assign certain 
works of Christ to one of his natures.  He pointedly says, ‘Here we cannot excuse the error of the 
ancient writers who pay no attention to the person of the Mediator, obscure the real meaning of 
almost all the teaching one reads in the Gospel of John, and entangle themselves in many snares. Let 
this, then, be our key to right understanding: those things which apply to the office of the Mediator 
are not spoken simply either of the divine nature or of the human.’27  Further, Raitt claims that the 
only place in Calvin’s commentary where Calvin clearly distinguishes between Christ’s two natures 
rather than focus on his one person is John 8:58.28 
 Therefore, Calvin’s motivation for developing a person-focused theology of Christ as 
mediator is driven by his reading of the biblical texts alongside his concern that Jesus Christ truly 
reveals God.  Christ is Mediator because he is Immanuel, God with us.29  Christ is not simply another 
human being that has divine power to save; however, we can find the power of God to save only in 
Christ’s weakness, in his humanity.  ‘So Calvin likens the relationship between Christ’s two natures to 
that of a fountain and the channel by which that fountain pours itself out.’30  Calvin’s emphasis 
alternates between Christ’s divinity and his humanity, but Calvin’s conception of Christ’s two natures 
is organic.  Calvin does not deny the hypostatic union, or a two-nature Christology, but he is more 
 
26  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 185.  
27  Calvin, Institutes:2.14.3.  Leading into this statement is Calvin’s direct comments about interpreting 
John’s Gospel: ‘But the passages that comprehend both natures at once, very many of which are to be found in 
John’s Gospel, set forth his true substance most clearly of all. For one reads there neither of deity nor of 
humanity alone, but of both at once: he received from the Father the power of remitting sins [John 1:29], of 
raising to life whom he will, of bestowing righteousness, holiness, salvation; he was appointed judge of the 
living and the dead in order that he might be honored, even as the Father [John 5:21–23]. Lastly, he is called 
the “light of the world” [John 9:5; 8:12], the “good shepherd,” the “only door” [John 10:11, 9], the “true vine” 
[John 15:1]. For the Son of God had been endowed with such prerogatives when he was manifested in the 
flesh. Even though along with the Father he held them before the creation of the world, it had not been in the 
same manner or respect, and they could not have been given to a man who was nothing but a man.’ 
28  Jill Raitt, ‘Calvin’s Use of Persona,’ in Calvinus Ecclesiae Genevensis Custos, ed. Wilhelm H. Neuser 
(Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang, 1984), 281.    
29  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 183.  
30  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 184.  
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concerned with how Christ acts in history to fulfil his office of the mediator.  To this end, Calvin shifts 
focus from what this person is to how this person works for lost and fallen humanity.   
 Calvin’s driving question is not metaphysics, but how finite and sinful humanity can truly 
know God.  This is why Calvin’s understanding of Christ’s person and office must go together.  ‘Christ 
does not simply play the part of the Mediator for Calvin; he is the Mediator, and this office or role 
has its particular colour and shape in so far as it is personned by Christ.’31  Understanding the 
concept of persona is crucial for Calvin.  Edmondson explains, ‘Thus, we are discussing Calvin’s 
doctrine of Christ’s person only in the light of his understanding of Christ’s office because we can 
only grasp the full implication of who Christ is in light of what he has done.  Indeed, who he is, that 
is, the Mediator, is simply a restatement of what he has done.  His identity is in one sense 
dynamically defined.’32  In Calvin’s thought, then, the persona of Christ is a dynamic office.  As a 
result, Calvin develops an office Christology that seeks to show how Christ fulfils the Old Testament 
offices of prophet, priest, and king.33 
 Calvin’s understanding of Christ as mediator is driven by this understanding of office flowing 
from his concept of persona.  This is clearly the case in his Hebrews commentary, when Calvin 
distances himself from the tradition at this very point.  In Heb 1:3, Calvin’s Latin text reads, 
‘substantiae ejus’ which is a translation of the Greek ‘τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.’34  Calvin’s shift comes 
with his insistence that human beings truly know God in Christ.  Thus, Calvin writes: 
The word ὑποστάσις, which, by following others, I have rendered substance, denotes 
not, as I think, the being or essence of the Father, but his person; for it would be 
strange to say that the essence of God is impressed on Christ, as the essence of both is 
simply the same. But it may truly and fitly be said that whatever peculiarly belongs to 
the Father is exhibited in Christ, so that he who knows him knows what is in the 
Father. And in this sense do the orthodox fathers take this term, hypostasis, 
considering it to be threefold in God, while the essence (οὐσία) is simply one. Hilary 
everywhere takes the Latin word substance for person. But though it be not the 
Apostle’s object in this place to speak of what Christ is in himself, but of what he is 
really to us, yet he sufficiently confutes the Arians and Sabellians; for he claims for 
 
31  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 189.  
32  Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 191.  
33  Calvin, Institutes:2.15.   
34  Calvin, Hebrews, 36.    
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Christ what belongs to God alone, and also refers to two distinct persons, as to the 
Father and the Son. For we hence learn that the Son is one God with the Father, and 
that he is yet in a sense distinct from him, so that a subsistence or person belongs to 
both.36  
As we saw above, Aquinas reads Heb 1:3 as speaking to ‘what Christ is in himself.’  Calvin does not 
deny the unity of the Godhead, and clearly says the Father and the Son are of the same essence.  
However, the ‘substance’ of God, for Calvin, can be known only by analogy.  This is related to Calvin’s 
understanding of God for us: ‘We must allow that there is a degree of impropriety in the language 
when what is borrowed from created things is transferred to the hidden majesty of God. But still the 
things which are evident to our senses are fitly applied to God, and for this end, that we may know 
what is to be found in Christ, and what benefits he brings to us.’37  Christ as mediator must be for 
God’s people and must truly make God known.   
 God’s essence is hidden therefore God is known only in and through the person of the 
mediator.  Calvin writes, ‘The glory of the Father is invisible until it shines forth in Christ.’38  Calvin’s 
exegesis leads him away from speculation on Christ’s natures to reflection upon Christ’s one person.  
God in and of himself is unknowable, but the Son is the express image of the Father.  Thus, Calvin 
writes, ‘By the second word we are reminded that God is truly and really known in Christ; for he is 
 
36  Calvin, Hebrews, 37.   Calvin explains this same passage in a very similar way in the discussion of 
the Trinitarian persons in Institutues:1.13.2: ‘But because some hatefully inveigh against the word “person,” as 
if humanly devised, we ought first to see with what justice they do this. The apostle, calling the Son of God 
“the stamp of the Father’s hypostasis” [Heb. 1:3], doubtless assigns some subsistence to the Father wherein he 
differs from the Son. For to consider hypostasis equivalent to essence (as certain interpreters have done, as if 
Christ, like wax imprinted with a seal, represented in himself the substance of the Father) would be not only 
uncouth but also absurd. For since the essence of God is simple and undivided, and he contains all in himself, 
without portion or derivation, but in integral perfection, the Son will be improperly, even foolishly, called his 
“stamp.” But because the Father, although distinct in his proper nature, expresses himself wholly in the Son, 
for a very good reason is it said that he has made his hypostasis visible in the latter. In close agreement with 
this are the words immediately following, that the Son is “the splendor of his glory” [Heb. 1:3, cf. Vg.]. Surely 
we infer from the apostle’s words that the very hypostasis that shines forth in the Son is in the Father. From 
this we also easily ascertain the Son’s hypostasis, which distinguishes him from the Father.’  
37  Calvin, Hebrews, 35.  Calvin is close to the analogia entis as developed by Przywara who builds his 
doctrine of analogy from Aquinas’s theology.  To reason from analogy is to begin with God’s created effects 
and reason back to God in himself.  This method is analogical in that we can know something of God as Father 
from good human fathers, but this is not to suggest God is simply a larger, more perfect father in the way 
human fathers are.  There is an analogy that allows us to speak of God, but not an identity.  While Calvin’s 
method is somewhat similar, at least in his Hebrews, he does not move on from the effects of Christ’s 
incarnation to God in himself.  God in se is largely hidden, but we can know God for us.   
38  Calvin, Hebrews, 35.  
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not his obscure or shadowy image, but his impress which resembles him, as money the impress of 
the die with which it is stamped.’39  It is not so much the case the Calvin denies ‘what Christ is in 
himself’ as it is not his main concern.  Calvin’s concern is that the Christ who walks among us is truly 
Immanuel.  Raitt agrees, writing, ‘It is indeed a particular insistance of Calvin that we know God only 
as he acts toward us.’40  Just as important to Calvin is that the person of the Son who comes in the 
fullness of time is this God.  Calvin’s focus and reasoning on the person is strikingly similar in the 
Institutes, John, and Hebrews.  Importantly, notice that a narrowing of God’s revelation is already 
creeping into the Protestant tradition with Calvin.  This is not to suggest that Calvin’s development 
of a person-Christology is misguided.  Indeed, Calvin’s conception is very biblical and Nicaean.  
However, focus on Christ’s person begins to understand God’s revelation in a more Christ-exclusive 
way.  Creation no longer communicates God’s goodness in the same way it does for Aquinas.41 
 Relatedly, one question arises—does Calvin’s focus on person and his emphasis on the Son 
as autotheos instead of eternal generation lead the way for the development of the covenant of 
redemption?  Muller explains, that for Calvin even in the Old Covenant, Christ is the mediator.  
Muller writes that Calvin’s statements:  
have, however, a different purpose and systematic implication than the Chalcedonian 
emphasis on the eternal person of the Son.  Calvin’s interest is still in the work of 
mediation between God and man on the identification of Christ as mediator.  The 
eternal Son is designated as mediator prior to the incarnation and performs his office 
in the communication of God’s Word to man.  Furthermore, Calvin’s doctrinal 
determination of the Son as God emphasizes the full Godhead of the Son rather than 
the eternal generation of his person as stressed by Chalcedon and by the later Greek 
theology.  As person the Son subsists in relation to the Father by generation, but as 
God—considered according to his divinity—he contains in and of himself the full 
essence of the Godhead.  Here we encounter the concept of the aseity of Christ’s 
divinity so crucial for the later Reformed treatment of predestination as a function of 
soteriology or, more precisely, of the larger trinitarian-christological structure of 
doctrine; and also we have here come to the other pole of Calvin’s Christology, the 
 
39  Calvin, Hebrews, 36.  
40  Raitt, ‘Calvin’s Use of Persona,’ 278.  
41 This is not to suggest that creation does not reveal God’s goodness for Calvin as it clearly does.  See, 
Calvin, Institutes I.v.      
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emphasis on the transcendent divinity of the Son which is revealed in the person of 
the mediator, the God-man.42   
While working within a broadly Chalcedonian Christology, then, Calvin nuances the classical 
approach to Christ’s person.  This is true of the Reformed tradition more generally as well, and is 
found in Owen.  Muller continues, ‘Calvin and those who followed his argument of doctrine strove to 
manifest the unity of the person in the unity of the work.  Here the focus of the act of mediation is 
the divine-human person rather than the flesh assumed by the divine person.’43  Calvin’s lack of a 
robust theology of the Son’s eternal generation leads him away from a robust two-natures 
Christology. 
  In this section, I have argued that Calvin’s theology makes a turn toward salvation history, 
God for us.  In Calvin, knowledge of God is profoundly soteriological.  Whereas Aquinas is interested 
in John 14:10, ‘Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?’, Calvin is more 
interested in John 14:9, ‘The one who has seen me has seen the Father.’44  In Calvin, there is a shift 
away from considering God in and of himself, to soteriology – to God who is for his elect.  Strikingly, 
Raitt says of Calvin’s understanding of persona:  ‘It should be noted that while Calvin evidences 
knowledge of the pre-Chalcedonian discussions and of medieval definitions, he adopts none of them 
but works out his own expression from the Scriptural base in Hebrews.  He follows his own principle 
“I refuse to philosophize beyond the grasp of my faith.”’45  Even if Raitt claims too much, it is clear 
that Calvin does not understand or use persona in the same way as the Chalcedonian tradition that 
precedes him.46   
 
42  Muller, Christ and the Decree, 29-30.  
43  Muller, Christ and the Decree, 33.  
 44  ‘οὐ πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί ἐστιν;… ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν 
πατέρα.’ 
45  Raitt, ‘Calvin’s Use of Persona,’ 275-276.  Principle here does not refer to God’s nature, but means 
something like Calvin’s own criterion.   
 46  On Calvin’s influence upon Owen at this point, Spence writes, ‘It is the idea implied here, that the 
person of Christ in his role as Mediator is the subject of the saving work accomplished in both his natures, 
which John Owen recognized to be so crucial for Christology and which he, therefore, went on to develop as a 
foundation of his own theology.’  Spence, Inspiration and Incarnation, 70.  As the next section will show, 
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Owen on Christ the Mediator 
 
 Owen works as a reformed theologian, deeply influenced by both Aquinas and Calvin, with 
deep Augustinian roots.  All of these influences come together in Owen’s own theology of Christ as 
mediator.  Christ’s mediation is a dominant theme throughout Owen’s works and, in many ways, 
Owen tries to bring together the concerns of both Aquinas and Calvin.47  Following Calvin, Christ’s 
work as mediator is carried out through his threefold office of king, prophet, and priest.48  All of 
Christ’s acts on behalf of his church ‘are circumscribed and limited by that office.’49  Christ’s 
redemptive work is bound to Christ’s condescension and humiliation in which he undertakes his 
office of mediator between God and man.50  Owen is clear that in view here is not the Son of God 
absolutely considered as God, but Christ as mediator—one person in two natures.  It is as this one 
that Christ fulfils the offices of which his mediation consists.  Owen explains:   
The exercise of the mediation of Christ is confined unto the limits of his threefold 
office. Whatever he doth for the church, he doth it as a priest, or as a king, or as a 
prophet. Now, as these offices agree in all the general ends of his mediation, so they 
differ in their acts and immediate objects: for their acts, it is plain,—sacerdotal, regal, 
and prophetical acts and duties,—are of different natures, as the offices themselves 
are unto which they appertain; and for their objects, the proper immediate object of 
the priestly office is God himself, as is evident both from the nature of the office and 
its proper acts.51  
Christ’s work is circumscribed to one of his three offices, because through the execution of each 
office, Christ accomplishes his work of mediation on behalf of the church.  All three offices are 
 
Spence is partially correct, but does not account for Owen’s struggle to hold together both Aquinas and Calvin 
in his theology of Christ’s mediation.    
 47  Other works that treat Owen’s theology of mediation include:  Kapic, Communion with God, 69, 88-
89; Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 71-83; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 151-198; Reformed Catholic, 92-98. 
48  Owen, Hebrews 5:524.  
49  Owen, Hebrews 5:524.   
50  Owen, Hebrews 5:524.  See also, Owen Works 1:85: ‘It is by the exercise and discharge of the office 
of Christ—as the king, priest, and prophet of the church—that we are redeemed, sanctified, and saved.  
Thereby doth he immediately communicate all Gospel benefits unto us—give us an access unto God here by 
grace, and in glory hereafter; for he saves us, as he is the mediator between God and man.’   
 51  Owen, Works 3:629.    
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general works of mediation, but the acts and objections of Christ’s works correspond to one of the 
three offices.  The acts of Christ’s priestly office are oblation and intercession.52 
 Owen is not identical to Calvin, but he too develops an office-based Christology that makes 
much of the person of Christ.  This is clearly seen in Owen’s Hebrews as he exposits chapter 7 and 
the nature of Christ’s priesthood.  It is this combination of office and person that makes Christ the 
one who can save his people to the uttermost.  Owen writes, ‘The principal reason of the all-
sufficiency of the office-power and ability of Christ is taken from his own person, which alone was 
capable of a trust of such a power, and able to execute it unto all the ends of it.  He alone, who was 
God and man in one person, was capable of being such a king, priest, and prophet, as was able to 
save the church unto the uttermost.’53  While the phrase ‘office-power’ is awkward, it helps make 
Owen’s point that any work done according to any of Christ’s offices has ‘power’ and ‘ability’ 
because of the person who occupies these offices.54  Clearly, Owen is influenced by Calvin at this 
point.  
 When Owen comes to Heb 1:3, he also interprets this text as a description of the person of 
Christ, but as Owen’s exposition unfolds, he follows Calvin only in part.  In this exposition, Owen 
brings together the medieval metaphysical emphasis as well as Protestant soteriological concerns.  
Owen teaches that there are three parts to the description of Christ in Heb 1:3. The first is ‘what he 
is’, the second is what Christ does, and the third, ‘the consequent of them both.’55  Owen’s 
 
 52  Owen, Works 3:629.  Owen continues his explanation: ‘For as to the nature of the office, “every 
priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and 
sacrifices for sins,” Heb. 5:1. A priest is one who is appointed to deal with God in the behalf of them for whom 
he executes his office. And the acts of the priestly office of Christ are two, oblation and intercession, of both 
which God is the immediate object. He offered himself unto God, and with him he makes intercession. But the 
immediate object of Christ’s kingly and prophetical offices are men or the church. As a priest, he acts with God 
in our name and on our behalf; as a king and prophet, he acts towards us in the name and authority of God.’  
Owen, Works 3:629.  
53  Owen, Hebrews 5:525.  Principal here means chief or primary.   
54  Owen makes this even clearer in the next paragraph: ‘Wherefore, in the consideration of this 
office-power of Christ, wherein all our salvation doth depend, we have two things to attend unto:  (1.) His 
person who bears these offices, and who alone is fit and able so to do; and, (2.)  The especial nature of the 
office as committed unto him.  One these grounds he was able to do infinitely more as a priest than all the 
priests of the order of Aaron could do.’  Owen, Hebrews 5:525.  
55  Owen, Hebrews 3:88.  
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development of these first two ways is instructive for his theology of Christ’s mediation.  Owen’s 
what question is metaphysically concerned with understanding how the person of Christ is ‘the 
radiance of God’s glory and the exact imprint of his nature.’  In this text, Owen says that we find ‘a 
double difficulty.’56  Generally, this description of Christ raises questions about the constitution of 
Christ’s nature, but more specifically, Owen is interested in ‘the particular meaning and importance 
of the word or expressions themselves.’57  In regards to the what question, Owen knows the 
tradition and that ‘some’ before him believe the descriptions refer ‘only’ to Christ’s divine nature.58  
Owen even claims this verse is where the Nicene Creed gets the phrase ‘God from God, and Light of 
Light,’ but this is not all that the author of Hebrews has in mind, he argues.59  Rather than with these 
ancient and modern expositors, Owen aligns himself with those theologians who believe this verse 
refers to Christ’s incarnation.  Heb 1:3 speaks of the person of Christ.  Owen knows the 
interpretations of ‘the ancients generally’ and Aquinas and the shift that his reading, following 
Calvin, introduces to the traditional understanding of Christ as mediator.60   
 Without letting go of metaphysical concerns – as we shall see – Owen here shifts his 
interpretation of Heb 1:3 in a soteriological direction.  In so doing, Owen clearly follows Calvin and 
not Aquinas.  Owen believes this person-focused grid is the way to read the entire epistle.  ‘It is not 
the direct and immediate design of the apostle,’ Owen writes, ‘To treat absolutely of either nature of 
 
56  Owen, Hebrews 3:89.  
57  Owen, Hebrews 3:89.  
 58  Interestingly, Owen lists Calvin as one who understands this text to speak of Christ’s divine nature.  
As we have seen, Calvin thinks both natures are in view in Heb 1:3, but that the focus is on Christ’s person.  
Owen, Hebrews 3:89.  
59  Owen, Hebrews 3:89.  The interpretation of the creed, particularly the meaning of ‘God of God,’ 
was debated at the Westminster Assembly, which occurred at the beginning of Owen’s pastoral and academic 
career.  The discussion at the Assembly was not about the person of the Mediator, but the Son’s eternal 
generation from the Father.  With Calvin’s focus on the Son as autotheos, he led some of the Reformed 
tradition to rethink the divine mission of the Son.  I believe this departure from a rigorous understanding of 
the Son’s eternal generation led to the formulation of the covenant of redemption and Torrance’s doctrine of 
election and lies behind Calvin’s person Christology.  This is not to suggest that a person and office Christology 
is wrong, but to show that losing a robust doctrine of God – in this case the divine processions – has 
consequences as we move into salvation history.  Christ’s person and his execution of his threefold office can 
be constructed in a way that seeks to let the divine processions truly be the foundation of the divine missions.  
See, Chad van Dixhorn, ‘Post-Reformation Trinitarian Perspectives,’ in Retrieving Eternal Generation, ed. Fred 
Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 2017), 180-207. 
 60  Owen, Hebrews 3:89.  
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Christ, his divine or human, but only of his person.’61 This exegetical move motivates Owen’s 
understanding of Christ in history and is worth quoting at length:  
Hence, though the things which he mentioneth and expresseth many some of them 
belong unto, or be the properties of his divine nature, some of his human, yet none of 
them are spoken of as such, but are all considered as belonging unto his person. And 
this solves that difficulty which Chrysostom observes in the words, and strives to 
remove by a similitude, namely, that the apostle doth not observe any order or 
method in speaking of the divine and human natures of Christ distinctly one after 
another, but first speaks of the one, then of the other, and then returns again to the 
former, and that frequently. But the truth is, he intends not to speak directly and 
absolutely of either nature of Christ; but treating ex professo of his person, some 
things that he mentions concerning him have a special foundation in and respect unto 
his divine nature, some in and unto his human, as must every thing that is spoken of 
him. And therefore the method and order of the apostle is not to be inquired after in 
what relates in his expressions to this or that nature of Christ, but in the progress that 
he makes in the description of his person and offices; which alone he had 
undertaken.62 
Owen’s move is nearly identical to Calvin’s but departs from Aquinas who is more concerned with 
attributing certain qualities and actions to either Christ’s human or divine natures throughout his 
incarnate mission.63  No longer is Owen concerned to say that some things are attributed to Christ’s 
divine nature and others to his human, but that everything, speaking of Christ’s incarnation, is said in 
regards to the one person of Christ.  Owen is not denying that Christ has two natures in his 
incarnation, but he does argue, with Calvin, that Scripture does not parse things out as neatly as the 
Chalcedonian tradition. Owen is convinced that ‘the apostle’ is not concerned with this metaphysical 
understanding, but with the ‘person and offices,’ that is to say, the does question is given primacy 
over the what question.   At this point, Owen seems to follow Calvin into a more dynamic office 
Christology.   
 However, Owen does not, indeed cannot, altogether disregard metaphysical considerations; 
there is a ‘double difficulty’ here.  There is a true attempt, even a struggle, in Owen’s theology to 
hold together both Thomas and Calvin.  Owen’s Christology is an attempt to hold together God in se 
 
61  Owen, Hebrews 3:90.  
62  Owen, Hebrews 3:90.  
63  Recall that Aquinas corrects Chrysostom by limiting Christ’s action to his human nature.  Calvin and 
Owen both say the ‘problem’ is resolved with a focus on Christ’s one person. 
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and God for us in a way that takes both Medieval and Reformation concerns seriously.  This is not to 
suggest metaphysics and soteriology compete with one another in Owen.  Rather, the ‘double 
difficulty’ is how to hold both together in a way that honours the primacy of divine being and human 
knowing.    This tension is on full display as Owen continues his explanation of Heb 1:3.64  The main 
point of Hebrews is to show the ‘dignity, pre-eminence, and exaltation above all’ of the person of 
Christ.65  Hebrews does focus on the person of Christ and his work of mediation, but the constitution 
and full understanding of this person is ‘not only consequentially to his discharge of the office of 
mediator, but also antecedently, in his worth, fitness, ability, and suitableness to undertake and 
discharge it,—which in a great measure depended on and flowed from his divine nature.’66  Recall 
that in Calvin, these titles are ‘for our own benefit’ due to God’s hiddenness.67  In Owen’s thought, 
there is more to the Son than simply revealing the invisible God.  Owen is not unconcerned with the 
Son’s revelation of the Father, but ‘this could not be done without manifesting what the Son is in 
himself in reference unto the Father; which both the expressions do in the first place declare.  They 
express him such an one as in whom the infinite perfections and excellencies of God are revealed 
unto us.’68  A slight difference from Calvin emerges at this point.  Calvin does not deny the what 
question, but labours to show that God in himself is known only through the Son.  Owen does not 
disagree with Calvin, but instead of focusing on God’s hiddenness, he stresses that this Son can be 
known because of what he is in eternity past.  Owen concludes that Heb 1:3 speaks of both the Son’s 
eternal relation to the Father and to the incarnate mediator who truly makes known the Father’s 
glory and person to us.69   
 
 64  As further proof that Owen struggles to hold together metaphysical and soteriological concerns 
within the developing Reformed tradition, in Christologia, Heb 1:3 is a proof text defending that the Son is ‘the 
essential image of the Father’ and Owen interprets this text as speaking of the Son’s personal subsistence not 
his incarnate person and office.  Owen, Works 1:71.  
65  Owen, Hebrews 3:90.  
66  Owen, Hebrews 3:90.  
67  Calvin, Hebrews, 35.  
68  Owen, Hebrews 3:91.  
69  Owen, Hebrews 3:91.  
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 Owen appears to align with Calvin over Aquinas when he writes, ‘I shall not enter into any 
dispute about the meaning of the word ὑπόστασις, or the difference between it and οὐσία.’70  The 
Vulgate, Aquinas’ Bible, translates hypostasis as substantia because Jerome thinks that hypostasis 
should not be used to speak of the three divine persons.71  Owen acknowledges that ‘of that mind 
are many still, it being so rendered by the Vulgar translation.’72  Owen distances himself from this 
Thomistic rendering:  ‘But the consideration of these vexed questions tending not to the opening of 
the design of the apostle and meaning of the Holy Ghost in this place, I shall not insist upon them.’73  
However, Owen cannot explain how the Son reveals the hypostasis of the Father without returning 
to the question what is God.  The Son is essentially the ‘express image’ of his Father.74  The Son must 
be of the same essence as the Father, or else the Father ‘could not be fully satisfied in him, nor 
represented by him.’75   
 Here, Owen moves toward the foundation of theology proper – God in se.  The ‘form’ or 
‘image’ of God that Christ is truly makes God known, but this form is not exclusively discovered in 
the incarnate person.  Rather, the Son being in the form of God is a reference to his divine nature, 
not simply to his one person. To be in the form of God, is to be God essentially.76  Owen continues, 
‘This he was absolutely, antecedently unto his incarnation, the whole nature of God being in him, 
and consequently he being in the form of God.’77  In fact, the soteriological revelation of God in and 
through Christ is possible because Christ is of the ‘same nature of the Father’ and, therefore, has 
‘the power, goodness, holiness, grace, and all other glorious properties of God.’78  This is what shines 
forth as Christ represents the Father to the world.  Owen concludes with a remarkable note of 
balance that brings together metaphysical and soteriological concerns:  ‘And both these seem to be 
 
70  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.   
 71  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.  
 72  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.  
 73  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.  
74  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.   
75  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.  
76  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.  
77  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.  
78  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.    
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comprised in this word, χαρακτήρ; both that the whole nature of God is in him, as also that by him 
God is declared and expressed unto us.’79  God in se is the foundation of God for us.   
 This struggle to properly hold together both metaphysical and soteriological considerations 
regarding Christ’s person is not limited to the book of Hebrews; it is scattered throughout Owen’s 
works.  During his exegesis of Heb 1:3, Owen turns to John 14:10-11 to help make his point.  Notice 
the differences between Owen and Calvin on John’s Gospel as Owen tellingly writes: 
The Father being thus in the Son, and the Son in the Father, whereby all the glorious 
properties of the one do shine forth in the other, the order and economy of the 
blessed Trinity in subsistence and operation require that the manifestation and 
communication of the Father unto us be through and by the Son; for as the Father is 
the original and fountain of the whole Trinity as to subsistence, so as to operation he 
works not but by the Son, who, having the divine nature communicated unto him by 
eternal generation, is to communicate the effects of the divine power, wisdom, and 
goodness, by temporary operation. And thus he becomes “the brightness of his 
Father’s glory, and the express image of his person,” namely, by the receiving his 
glorious nature from him, the whole and all of it, and expressing him in his works of 
nature and grace unto his creatures.80  
At this point, Owen moves away from Calvin and back to Thomas employing a more straightforward 
theology of the Son’s mission built upon the Trinitarian order of operations.  The Son’s mission is 
founded on the Trinitarian order, the divine processions.  Owen lets eternal generation do the heavy 
theological lifting.81  This is the rich, complex tradition and theology that lies behind Owen’s theology 
of Christ as mediator.  Owen struggles to properly relate God ad intra and God ad extra precisely 




79  Owen, Hebrews 3:95.   
80  Owen, Hebrews 3:99.  Recall that Owen’s use of ‘temporary’ simply means occurring within time.   
81  Recall, though, that Owen never fully develops this as he could do to the prominent role of the 
covenant of redemption throughout his theology.   
 82  Owen cannot let go of his classical doctrine of God as he encounters polemical opponents and 
developing theological ideas.  Furthermore, Owen’s concern to hold together both metaphysical and economic 
considerations is seen as well in his Greater Catechism in chapter ten on the person of Christ: ‘Q. 1. What doth 
the Scriptures teach us of Jesus Christ?  A. Chiefly two things; first, his person, or what he is in himself; 
secondly, his offices, or what he is unto us.’  Owen, Works 1:478.  
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Mediator of the Old and New Covenants 
 
 We must be careful at this point not to conclude that Owen merely gives lip service to 
Calvin’s concerns.  Owen takes the covenant of grace very seriously.  And what ties God in se and 
God for us together in Owen, despite his appeal to eternal generation, is really the covenant of 
redemption.  The mission of the Son is to bring into reality the promise of Gen 3:15. This happens, 
according to Heb 8:6, as Christ fulfils his work as Mediator, which is nothing less than the 
establishment of the new covenant, the covenant founded on better promises.83  Christ’s work as 
mediator is broader than his priesthood, yet for Owen, Christ’s priestly work stands at the centre of 
this work.  It is the priest through his self-sacrifice who brings this new covenant into reality.  The old 
covenant priests are inferior to the person of Christ and, therefore, the old covenant sacrifices could 
never truly deal with sin.  As a result, Owen holds that ‘the principal part of his [Christ’s] mediation 
consisted in the “giving himself a ransom,” or a price of redemption for the whole church.’ 84  The 
metaphysical and soteriological struggle that Owen inherits leads him to develop these ideas, 
unsurprisingly, by appealing to the covenant of redemption, and not eternal generation.  Jesus Christ 
is the mediator of the new covenant, and, in fact, Owen equates the covenant of redemption with 
the covenant of the mediator. Christ the mediator is the one who brings the new covenant into 
existence.  Heb 8:6 says that Christ is ‘the mediator of a better covenant.’  This discussion in Heb 8 
comes during the epistle’s treatment of Christ as the great high priest.  The heart of his priestly 






83  Owen, Hebrews 6:54.  
84  Owen, Hebrews 6:55.  
85  Owen, Hebrews 6:49.  
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Mediator of Creation  
 
 The old covenant, at least in one sense, is a preparation and pattern for the new covenant.  
Therefore, Owen’s understanding that Christ is the mediator of creation is worth exploring for a 
moment.  References to Prov 8 occur often in Owen’s Works.86  Owen understands the personified 
Wisdom of Prov 8 to be the Son of God, but this Son ‘“was set up.’”87  This setting up, or exalting, 
cannot refer to the divine nature.  The Son absolutely is God and not capable of exaltation.  ‘But,’ 
writes Owen, ‘There was a peculiar glory and honour belonging unto the person of the Son, as 
designed by the Father unto the execution of all the counsels of his will.’88  The Son has a ‘peculiar 
glory’ as this person even before the creation of the world.   Scripture’s revelation that the world 
was created through Christ is important in Owen’s theology of mediation.  Owen writes, ‘Thus the 
apostle having declared the honour of the Son as mediator, in that he was heir of all, adds thereunto 
his excellency in himself from his eternal power and Godhead; which he not only asserts, but gives 
evidence unto by an argument from the works creation.’89  It is important for the Son to be involved 
in the work of creation in order to confirm his lordship and authority when he comes as the 
incarnate mediator.90   Christ, the eternal Son who made the worlds, has creation and all things 
within creation ‘put under his power as mediator and head of the church.’91  
 Creation is subservient to Christ and his elect, because Christ is the ‘mediator of the church’ 
even before his incarnation.92  In fact, says Owen, ‘God in infinite wisdom ordered all things in the 
first creation, so as that the whole of that work might be subservient to the glory of his grace in the 
new creation of all by Jesus Christ.  By the Son he made the worlds in the beginning of time, that in 
 
86  See, Owen, Works 1:54; 2:33, 118, 391; 12:243, 501. Owen connects Heb 1:3 with Prov 8 and John 
1 when talking about the ‘The Word of the Lord.’  Owen, Hebrews 1:216-217.  
87  Owen, Works 1:54.  
88  Owen, Works 1:55.  
89  Owen, Hebrews 3:76.  
90  Owen, Hebrews 3:76-77.  
91  Owen, Hebrews 3:77.  
92  Owen, Hebrews 3:77.  The church, for Owen, would be comprised of God’s elect throughout time 
and place.  Therefore, Christ is the mediator even before his earthly mission.  
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the fullness of time he might be the just heir and lord of all.’93  Christ’s mediation in both creations 
are brought together in John 1 as the Apostle writes that it is the ‘eternal Word absolutely’ and ‘as 
incarnate’ that are said to create the world.94  While Owen does not collapse creation and 
redemption, Christ’s mediation in the original creation is vital as it is the basis for Christ’s work of 
renewing the creation through his mission of redemption.  Owen explains this connection:  ‘For this 
end, then, God made all things by him, that when he came to change and renew all things, he might 
have good and right and title so to do, seeing he undertook to deal with or about no more but what 
he had originally made.’95  God is free and his work of creation is not necessitated by anything.  In 
fact, it could have been otherwise.  Owen writes: 
The holy and blessed Trinity could have so ordered the work of creation as that it 
should not immediately, eminently, and signally have been the work of the Son, of the 
eternal Word; but there was a further design upon the world to be accomplished by 
him, and therefore the work was signally to be his,—that is, as to immediate 
operation, though as to authority and order it peculiarly belonged to the Father, and 
to the Spirit as to disposition and ornament, Gen. i. 1, 2; Job xxvi. 13.  This, I say, was 
done for the end mentioned by the apostle, Eph. i. 10.  All things at first were made by 
him, that when they were lost, ruined, scattered, they might again, in the appointed 
season, be gathered together into one head in him.96 
What is more, not only are all things made by, and gathered to, Christ, but ‘“all things were made for 
him,”’ (Col 1:16) so that Christ may be the head of the church ‘that is, that he might be the fountain, 
head, spring, and original of the new creation, as he had been of the old.’97   
 Interestingly, after a lengthy exegetical defence of his reading of Christ’s role in the original 
creation, Owen warns us not ‘to inquire much into the reason of this economy and dispensation.’98  
Yet Owen does ‘inquire much,’ and things get interesting.  Above, Owen reasons from Prov 8 that 
the person of Christ, not just the divine nature, is involved in the original creation and is the 
 
93  Owen, Hebrews 3:77.      
94  Owen, Hebrews 3:78.  
95  Owen, Hebrews 3:78.  
96  Owen, Hebrews 3:78-79.  
97  Owen, Hebrews 3:79.  Making the same point once more, continuing with reference to Col 1, Owen 
writes, ‘The apostle in these words gives us the whole of what we intend, namely, that the making of the 
worlds, and of all things in them, in the first creation by the Son, was peculiarly subservient to the glory of the 
grace of God in the reparation and renovation of all things by him as incarnate.’  Owen, Hebrews 3:79. 
98  Owen, Hebrews 3:79.  
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‘foundation of all the counsels of God.’99  Owen has not left behind his robust understanding of 
Christ’s hypostatic union, nor does he claim any kind of eternal incarnation.  However, it is worth 
asking if this focus on the person of Christ leads to confusion, if not conflation, of the ontological 
Trinity and the economy of grace.  In other words, it is worth asking what happens when the human 
nature of Christ is somehow already in covenant within the eternal councils of God?  The obvious 
answer to this question seems to be that this is simply a prediction and plan for Christ’s incarnation 
in the future.  In fact, this is what Owen attempts to do in this formulation.100  However, it is hard 
not to conclude that the new intra-Trinitarian relation created in Owen’s formulation of the pactum 
salutis leads to this focus on the person.  Furthermore, this leads Owen to replace an emphasis on 
the Son’s eternal generation with the agreement made between the Father and the Son in the 
covenant of redemption.  And this leads Owen’s thought to some unlikely places.101   
 In fact, Owen even comes close to making sin necessary for this correspondence between 
the old and new creations.  All things take place by the counsel of God’s will antecedent to any 
effects of God’s will.102  Therefore, the subjection of all of creation to the Son, or Word, incarnate, is 
God’s ‘eternal design.’103  This antecedent will of the Son as creator is the ‘blessed foundation’ that 
gives the Son the ‘right to be ruler and lord of all angels and men, the whole creation, in and of 
heaven and earth.’104  Owen continues to describe the importance of the first creation for the new 
creation suggesting that God antecedently wills and designs from eternity ‘that his [Christ’s] great 
and everlasting glory should arise from the new creation and the work thereof.’105  The old creation 
does radiate with God’s glory, but this glory is only a general glory of God’s ‘“eternal power and 
 
99  Owen, Works 1:55.  This is similar to Owen’s understanding of John 14 not referring to Christ’s two 
natures, but to Christ’s obedience that he agrees to in the pactum salutis.    
100  Owen, Works 1:45, 54-64.  
 101  This move is related to Owen’s shift from the Trinitarian order to the covenant of redemption for 
understanding the Son’s mission.  It is also worth asking whether Owen’s new relation opens the door to an 
eternal incarnation.  This is clearly not what Owen intends, but his construction of the pactum together with 
this explanation of Christ’s mediation at least raises the question.   
102  Owen, Hebrews 3:80.  
103  Owen, Hebrews 3:80.  
104  Owen, Hebrews 3:80.  
105  Owen, Hebrews 3:80.  
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Godhead,” Rom. 1. 20’ that are made known throughout the creation.106  This glory is somewhat 
limited.  God’s ultimate will is to glorify himself through his Son rather than through creation.  
Owen’s narrowing understanding of natural revelation in a Christ-exclusive direction informs his 
thinking, but a problem with understanding God’s antecedent will begins to emerge.  This leads 
Owen to push the pattern (of old and new creation) too far when he writes – ‘and therefore did he 
suffer sin to enter into the world, which stained the beauty of it, and brought it wholly under the 
curse.’107  While Owen would never say that God is the cause of sin, he comes close here.  Even if we 
read ‘permit’ for ‘suffer’ in Owen’s quote, the larger issue is whether Owen has located sin in God’s 
antecedent will.   
 The full glory of God cannot be revealed in the old creation.  Owen does not believe the 
incarnation would happen without the fall into sin.  Therefore, Owen suggests, or at least opens the 
door to suggesting, that the world is made so that Christ can come.   Surprisingly, Owen appeals to 
Jewish Rabbis to suggest that ‘the world was made for the Messiah.’108  What is more, Owen also 
suggests that even before the fall, the creation longs to be in subjection to Christ.  Owen writes, ‘This 
ariseth from that plot and design which God first laid in the creation of all things, that they, being 
made by the Son, should naturally and willingly, as it were, give up themselves unto obedience unto 
him, when, he should take the rule of them upon the new account of his mediation.’109  We should 
not over-read Owen here, given that he is building an argument for the original creation as the basis 
and pattern for the Son’s inheritance and lordship of the new creation.  This future lordship is based 
on Christ’s mediation.  Owen does not align creation and redemption like Torrance.  However, given 
Owen’s theology proper, along with his understanding that there is no plan for Christ’s priesthood 
until after the fall into sin, this comment is a bit surprising.  Creation is already looking to 
redemption.  What Owen reveals once again is that God’s goodness is not doing the foundational 
 
106  Owen, Hebrews 3:80.  
107  Owen, Hebrews 3:80.  
 108  Owen, Hebrews 3:77.    
109  Owen, Hebrews 3:81, emphasis added.   
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work that it should in his theology of creation.  A theology of God’s goodness holds that God creates 
the world because he is good.  Goodness communicates itself, internally and externally.  When God’s 
communication narrows toward soteriology, it is only another small step to conflate creation and 
redemption.  It is true that the Son’s mission arises in response to sin and the need of redemption, in 
Owen’s thought.  However, Owen seems to suggest that sin serves the greater purpose of God’s 
glory.  Due to sin, the original creation cannot answer ‘the end for which it was made and erected, 
namely, to declare the glory of God.’110  Sin’s curse extends to creation.  However, the ‘solution’ is 
not to read creation and redemption so closely together, but to build both upon the foundation of 
God’s goodness, that is, God in se.  If God’s goodness is the motive for creation and redemption, sin 
must not be placed in God’s good will.   
 It is hard not to conclude that Owen replaces goodness with justice.  As Owen discusses the 
promised Messiah, once again Owen’s view of God’s justice is on display in a rather striking away.  
This unfolds as Owen discusses the angels, that fallen angels are left in a fallen state.  God could 
have left all humanity to perish, but he does not.111  God does not have to redeem, but there is ‘no 
necessary reason’ for him not to redeem either, and there are many ‘evidences’ that God does 
provide a way for the ‘recovery’ of humankind.112   The first evidence Owen gives is ‘The glorious 
properties of the nature of God, whose manifestation and exaltation in all the works that outwardly 
are of him he designeth, do require that there should be salvation for sinners.’113   God’s works ad 
extra reveal God truly.  Yet, sin, Owen suggests, leads to a more complete revelation of God.  There 
is a lot to say about this idea, but, first, it is worth letting Owen speak for himself: 
Even this matter of the salvation of sinners conduceth, yea, is necessary, unto the 
manifestation of some of those divine excellencies wherein no small part of the glory 
of God doth consist. God had, in the creation of all things, glorified his greatness, 
power, wisdom, and goodness.  His sovereignty, righteousness, and holiness, he had in 
like manner revealed in that holy law which he had prescribed unto angels and men 
for the rule of their obedience, and in the assignation of their reward. Upon the sin of 
 
110  Owen, Hebrews 3:81.  
111  Owen, Hebrews 1:151-160.  
112  Owen, Hebrews 1:159.  
113  Owen, Hebrews 1:159.  
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angels and men, he had made known his severity and vindictive justice, in the curse 
and punishment inflicted on them. But there were yet remaining undiscovered, in the 
abyss of his eternal essence, grace and pardoning mercy; which in none of his works 
had as yet exerted themselves or manifested their glory. And in case no remedy be 
provided for mankind under the evils mentioned, and their utter ruin, as they must 
have perished accordingly, so those glorious properties of the nature of God,—all ways 
of exerting their proper and peculiar acts being secluded, all objects of them 
removed,—could not have been equally glorified with his other holy attributes.114  
Here, Owen says God is more glorified through what is revealed about God in redemption than in 
creation.  Notice that Owen seems to make sin and redemption necessary in some way.  It would be 
easy to give Owen the benefit of the doubt and conclude that he is not saying sin is necessary, but 
that once there is a fallen creation, redemption of that creation leads to a deeper revelation of God.  
Specifically, creation makes known God’s ‘vindictive justice.’115  However, notice that Owen says 
God’s ‘grace and pardoning mercy’ remain ‘undiscovered, in the abyss of his eternal essence.’116  
Without redeeming God’s elect, something of God’s nature remains hidden and inaccessible.  Here, 
Owen’s view of justice prevails as it replaces God’s divine goodness.   
 However, like Torrance – as we will see – Owen has a deep concern to show that the God 
made known in Christ is truly God.117  Following Calvin, Owen clearly wants to say that Christ is really 
who God is.  This raises the possibility that a person Christology, combined with the covenant of 
redemption, risks confusing God ad intra and God ad extra.  Owen is not saying that God’s revelation 
is absolute knowledge of God.  God’s properties are still made known through ‘effects.’  However, 
the problematic element is that God’s essence now includes ‘pardoning mercy and ‘grace.’  Owen 
speaks of both God’s essential goodness, God in se, and God’s redemptive goodness, God for us.  
However, God is goodness.  God does not have redemptive goodness in the ‘abyss of his eternal 
 
114  Owen, Hebrews 1:159-160. The extended quote reads:  ‘The creatures know nothing in God but as 
it is manifested in its effects. His essence in itself dwells in “light inaccessible.” Had never any stood in need of 
grace and mercy, or, doing so, had never been made partakers of them, it could not have been known that 
there was that kind of goodness in his nature, which yet it is his design principally to glorify himself in. The 
necessity, therefore, of the manifestation of these properties of God, his goodness, grace, mercy, and 
readiness to forgive, which can only be exercised about sinners.’  Owen, Hebrews 1:160.   
115  Owen, Hebrews 1:159.  
116  Owen, Hebrews 1:159.  
 117  For all the differences between Owen and Torrance theologically and historically, it is noteworthy 
that both work in a context in which the deity of Christ is challenged.    
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essence.’  Rather, God’s goodness is an accommodated goodness, so to speak, as God encounters 
the original creation and then his fallen creatures.  Owen conflates absolute and relative attributes 
of God, and makes sin necessary, at least necessary for the revelation of those characteristics hidden 
deeply in God’s essence that, apparently, only rise to surface once creation is fallen and in need of 
redemption.  In other words, Owen does not adequately ground the acts of goodness in God’s 
ontological goodness.  God does good, because God is good.118  The order of knowing follows the 
order of being.  Owen’s understanding of Christ as mediator develops, then, in part, out of reflection 
on Christ’s mediation in the original creation.119   
 
 
118  Interestingly, Owen makes this distinction in his Christologia: ‘As wisdom is the directive principle 
of all divine operations, so goodness is the communicative principle that is effectual in them. He is good, and 
he doth good—yea, he doth good because he is good, and for no other reason—not by the necessity of nature, 
but by the intervention of a free act of his will. His goodness is absolutely infinite, essentially perfect in itself; 
which it could not be if it belonged unto it, naturally and necessarily, to act and communicate itself unto any 
thing without God himself. The divine nature is eternally satisfied in and with its own goodness; but it is that 
principle which is the immediate fountain of all the communications of good unto others, by a free act of the 
will of God. So when Moses desired to see his glory, he tells him that “he will cause all his goodness to pass 
before him, and would be gracious unto whom he would be gracious:” Exod. 33:19. All divine operations—in 
the gracious communication of God himself—are from his goodness, by the intervention of a free act of his 
will. And the greatest exercise and emanation of divine goodness, was in these holy counsels of God for the 
salvation of the church by Jesus Christ. For whereas in all other effects of his goodness he gives of his own, 
herein he gave himself, in taking our nature upon him. And thence, as he expresseth the design of man in his 
fall, as upbraiding him with folly and ingratitude, “Behold, the man is become as one of us,” Gen. 3:22, we 
may, with all humble thankfulness, express the means of our recovery, “Behold, God is become like one of us,” 
as the apostle declares it at large, Phil. 2:6–8. It is the nature of sincere goodness—even in its lowest degree—
above all other habits or principles of nature, to give a delight and complacency unto the mind in the exercise 
of itself, and communication of its effects. A good man doth both delight in doing good, and hath an abundant 
reward for the doing it, in the doing of it. And what shall we conceive concerning eternal, absolute, infinite, 
perfect, unmixed goodness, acting itself in the highest instance (in an effect cognate and like unto it) that it 
can extend unto!’  Owen, Works 1:59.  
 119   How Christ is the creator of the original creation is expressed in the New Testament as πάντα διʼ 
αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν (John 1:3).  Some in Owen’s day, especially the Socinians, 
taught that Christ was creator only of the new creation.  After addressing his interlocutor’s position, Owen 
explains that: ‘Διʼ οὗ, “by whom;” not as an instrument, or an inferior, intermediate, created cause: for then 
also must he be created by himself, seeing all things that were made were made by him, John 1:3, but as God’s 
own eternal Word, Wisdom, and Power, Prov. 8:22–24, John 1:1,—the same individual creating act being the 
work of Father and Son, whose power and wisdom being one and the same undivided, so also are the works 
which outwardly proceed from them. And as the joint working of Father and Son doth not infer any other 
subordination but that of subsistence and order, so the preposition διά doth not of itself intimate the 
subjection of an instrumental cause, being used sometimes to express the work of the Father himself, Gal. 1:1.’  
Owen, Hebrews 3:74.  Also, Owen argues that in the New Testament, ‘διά with a genitive’ never speaks of the 
final cause, but only the efficient cause.’   Owen, Hebrews 3:70.   
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Mediator of the New Covenant  
 
 Yet the new creation, as we have just seen, is always closely at hand.  How does Owen hold 
all of this together?  In bringing the old covenant to an end, God is not reacting to humanity’s fallen 
condition.  In some way, as Owen shows, this is God’s plan from eternity past.  Therefore, the 
foundation of Christ’s mediation must be grounded in something besides creaturely history.  Owen 
holds together his metaphysical and soteriological concerns via the covenant of redemption.  Many 
theologians, explains Owen, reason that the new covenant is inaugurated through Christ’s death.  
However, if the ‘procuring cause of the new covenant’ is the death of Christ, whereby God is ‘so well 
pleased with what Christ did’ that he ‘entered into a new covenant with mankind’, then ‘the whole 
nature of the mediation of Christ is overthrown.’120  God is impassible.  This means that the 
‘procuring cause’ cannot be found outside of God himself.  The death of Christ occurs in the 
economy of grace; it is a work ad extra.  God does not react, indeed cannot react, even to the death 
of his own Son.  Owen is constantly aware that works ad extra, must have an ad intra foundation 
even if he confuses them at times.  Thus, Owen writes, ‘Neither can anything that is absolutely 
eternal, as is this decree and counsel of God, be the effect of, or procured by, any thing that is 
external and temporal.’121  Therefore, the ‘procuring cause of the new covenant’ is not Christ’s 
death—as this is external and temporal—but the procuring cause is the ‘counsel of God.’122   
 Owen’s argument here is nuanced.  The eternal decree, which is the work ad intra of the one 
God, relates economically to the covenant of grace and the election of God’s people for salvation.  
The counsel of God relates to the work ad intra of the three divine persons, which for Owen is the 
pactum salutis.  This concept is key for understanding how Owen relates, but does not equate, the 
covenant of redemption with the divine decree.  As a result of this theological move, even God’s 
decree of election cannot be the procuring cause of the new covenant or of Christ’s mediation.  The 
 
120  Owen, Works 5:190, 191.    
121  Owen, Works 5:191.  
122  Owen, Works 5:191. 
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foundation of both the covenant of grace and Christ’s mediation is the ‘spring and fountain of it’ 
which is ‘this idea of it in the mind of God.'123 This idea is the covenant of redemption, which Owen 
also calls the covenant of the mediator.  Owen explains this distinction between the covenant of 
grace and the covenant of redemption like this: 
But in the covenant of the mediator, Christ stands alone for himself, and undertakes 
for himself alone, and not as the representative of the church; but this he is in the 
covenant of grace. But this is that wherein it had its designed establishment, as unto 
all the ways, means, and ends of its accomplishment; and all things are so disposed as 
that it might be effectual, unto the eternal glory of the wisdom, grace, righteousness, 
and power of God. Wherefore the covenant of grace could not be procured by any 
means or cause but that which was the cause of this covenant of the mediator, or of 
God the Father with the Son, as undertaking the work of mediation. And as this is 
nowhere ascribed unto the death of Christ in the Scripture, so to assert it is contrary 
unto all spiritual reason and understanding. Who can conceive that Christ by his death 
should procure the agreement between God and him that he should die?124  
Since the mediator is Jesus Christ, for Owen, the mission of the mediator and coming of the new 
covenant cannot be separated.  A mediator implies that at least two parties are involved and that 
these two parties are ‘in such a state and condition as that it is no way convenient or morally 
possible that they should treat immediately with each other as to the ends of the covenant; for if 
they are so, a mediator to go between is altogether needless.  So was it in the original covenant with 
Adam, which had no mediator.’125  But fallen humanity has no hope of return to God without this 
middle person.  Owen writes, ‘A mediator must be a middle person between both parties entering 
into covenant; and if they be of different natures, a perfect complete mediator ought to partake of 
each of their natures in the same person.’126   
 
123  Owen, Works 5:191.  
124  Owen, Works 5:191.  Owen clearly shows this distinction between the covenant of redemption 
and the covenant of grace in the first half of the paragraph from which this quote is taken.  Owen writes, ‘It 
may be considered with respect unto the federal transactions between the Father and the Son, concerning the 
accomplishment of this counsel of his will. What these were, wherein they did consist, I have declared at large, 
Exercitat., vol. ii. Neither do I call this the covenant of grace absolutely; nor is it so called in the Scripture. But 
yet some will not distinguish between the covenant of the mediator and the covenant of grace, because the 
promises of the covenant absolutely are said to be made to Christ, Gal. 3:16; and he is the πρῶτον δεκτικόν, or 
first subject of all the grace of it.’  Owen, Works 5:191. 
125  Owen, Hebrews 6:55.  
126  Owen, Hebrews 6:56.  
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 Yet the new covenant is not only superior to the covenant of works made with Adam, but 
also better than the Old Covenant mediated by Moses.  Moses is the mediator of the old, but Christ, 
the new mediator, is far superior.127  Owen explains of Christ, ‘He is, in the new covenant, the 
mediator, the surety, the priest, the sacrifice, all in his own person.’128  The mediator takes away sin 
and brings God’s elect into covenant with God.  Christ, in his economic mission, submits to the 
Father, yet he freely takes on the office of mediator.   Christ’s free and ‘voluntary undertaking’ 
requires that he make satisfaction for sin and that he ‘procure and purchase, in a way suited unto 
the glory of God, the actual communication of all good things prepared and proposed in this 
covenant; that is, grace and glory.’129  Notice that the communication of goodness is not located in 
God’s nature, but in the pactum.  Jesus Christ as mediator, acts and fulfils his priestly office to fulfil 
his voluntary choice made by his voluntary principle of action.  The person of Christ is the mediator 




 Christ’s appointment as Mediator in the pactum brings the strands of this chapter – and all 
of Owen’s theology - together.  While the covenant of redemption is the agreement between the 
Father and Son, without the church in view (as Owen says in the previous quote), this covenant is 
the eternal ground for the covenant of grace.  Covenant and mediation work together because it is 
as the representative of the new covenant that Christ fulfils his office and work as priest.  Christ’s 
work is not communicated to the sinner outside of covenant.  It is theoretically possible that Christ’s 
work of mediation would have redeemed no one.  Trueman suggests: 
One could engage in an illuminating thought experiment at this point:  for Owen, it 
would have been possible for the Logos to become incarnate, to live a sinless life, to 
die on the cross, to be resurrected from the dead, and to ascend to the right hand of 
the Father—and for the whole process to have no salvific value whatsoever.  The mere 
 
127  Owen, Hebrews 6:56.  
128  Owen, Hebrews 6:55.  
129  Owen, Hebrews 6:57.  
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ontological constitution of Christ as the God-man would have had no wider 
significance had he not been appointed as the federal representative of his people 
under the terms of a covenant.  The efficacy, the value, the very nature, of Christ’s 
mediation is entirely determined by the terms of the covenantal structure of 
salvation.130 
While this is hypothetically possible, and never would have actually happened, the logic is certainly 
correct.  The covenant of redemption is the basis of the Son’s mission.  The Son’s procession does 
not fund and pattern his historic mission.  Rather, the Son’s covenantal act funds and patterns his 
mission.  In that covenant, the Son is given a people whom he redeems in the fullness of time.131  
The rise of covenant theology is related to this shift from a two-natures Christology to a person and 
office Christology.   
 Thus, Owen’s attempt to integrate both Aquinas and Calvin is commendable, though he 
properly relate metaphysical and soteriological concerns.  However, if God in se is pure act, then the 
dynamic Christ Calvin seeks is already the Christ of Aquinas.  Owen rightly constructs a metaphysical 
account of Christ’s mediation that also takes Calvin’s desire to show that Christ is God with us, and 
God for us, seriously.  Calvin risks missing that he is God for us precisely because of what he is from 
eternity past.  It is because of what the Son is that he is this person who saves to the uttermost.   
Owen attempts to develop a theology of Christ as mediator that is both dynamic and metaphysically 
robust.   
 However, Owen’s attempt to hold both traditions together, leads him to shift from a 
Thomistic understanding of the divine missions to the covenant of redemption.  In my judgement, 
Owen, at times, transposes God in se and God for us with his articulation of the covenant of 
redemption.  The reason for this conflation is that the foundation of the economy, God’s 
communicative goodness – God ad intra – is not operating in Owen’s thought at this point.  Even 
though Owen speaks much of goodness, and even sounds like Aquinas in many places, he does not 
 
130  Trueman, ‘Atonement and the Covenant of Redemption,’ 217.  
131  This logic is why most reformed and covenantal theologians would hold to some version of 
particular redemption as does Owen in The Death of Death in the Death of Christ, Owen, Works 10:140-428.  
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develop God’s goodness in the foundational way Augustine and Aquinas do.  Owen comes close to 
this formulation, but his soteriological concerns lead to points of confusion.  However, in this 
discussion of the old and new creation, Owen finds a pattern and a preparatory aspect to the 
original creation that sets the stage for redemption, the recreation begun in Christ’s incarnation, 
resurrection, and ascension.  If we extrapolate from this that God created the world, not so that 
Christ could come, but out of his goodness, then we can reason that God’s goodness is also the 
reason and foundation of the new creation.  The one begotten from eternity past, the one who 
eternally is good, comes in the fullness of time out of this same goodness.  God has not changed.  
Rather creation has changed.  Once creation is fallen, though, God’s goodness does not end.  It is still 
poured out on his creation and creatures.  The difference is that this goodness now takes the shape 
of mercy towards God’s elect and justice toward God’s non-elect.132  Rather than nuancing God’s 
divine attributes as Owen does, if we follow Thomas’ more simplified line of thought we can begin to 
better understand the Son’s mission.  The Son’s eternal generation from the Father teaches us that 
God is eternally good and does good in his good (though fallen) creation.  God’s goodness is the 
foundation of the Son’s mediation in both creation and redemption.133     
 God’s chief act of goodness is this divine mission of redemption, but the Son does not reveal 
something hidden or unknown within the Trinity.  Rather, the mission of the Son reveals that God is 
good.  As good, he does good – he loves. The One eternally generated from the Father, his divine 
procession, is expressed in his divine mission in loving faithfulness.  While God is free not to redeem, 
in many ways redemption is the economic outpouring of his eternal love.  The piece of the puzzle, so 
to speak, that is confusing is not that God’s love extends into creaturely history.  This has been the 
case since the beginning of the first creation and is rooted in the eternal love that God is.  The true 
 
 132  It is not purely justice for the non-elect, at least not before Christ returns.  There is a natural 
goodness still at work in creation that is not redemptive.  On the relation of goodness, or love, to justice and 
mercy along the lines I suggest here, see, Aquinas, ST I, q. 20, a. 3-4.   
 133  This understanding of goodness is not a type of redemptive universalism.  As I argue in the 
conclusion, God’s goodness is free and, therefore, not given to the same degree, or in the same way, to all 
creatures.   See, Aquinas ST I, q. 6, a. 4 and q. 20, a. 3, co.   
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mystery is how sin entered God’s good world.  Our minds quickly reach their limits and rightly so—
for sin is an absurd nothingness.  We can understand well enough that creation is fallen and the 
human motivations that led Adam and Eve to take and eat that fateful day in Eden.  Yet, sin lies 
beyond ultimate explanation.  However, God’s love does not.  God’s love is on full display in the first 
creation as well as the recreation.  God’s love is on full display in the person of this Son who comes 
in his mission as the mediator who turns God’s elect back toward their Creator.  And his love is so 
deep that he redeems the absurdity of sin turning those condemning words into words of life— 
‘Take and eat; for this is my body broken for the life of the world.’  This is the both the person and 
work of the Son. 
 
Recap and Transition 
 
 I began this study seeking to defend my claim that theology proper is the foundation of the 
entire theological system.  Throughout this first section, Owen is clearly working with a robust and 
Thomistically influenced understanding of God ad intra and God ad extra.  Owen affirms the major 
claim of this study.  Nevertheless, as I have shown, at points soteriological concerns take priority 
over metaphysical and ontological concerns in Owen’s theology.  In part, Owen transposes God in se 
and God for us due to his polemical context, I think, that results in his narrowing understanding of 
natural theology and revelation.  Due to his opposition to the Socinians’ confidence in human 
reasoning, the knowledge of God available through creation is greatly reduced – if not altogether 
erased – in Owen’s thought.134 
 This creates a tension in Owen’s understanding of God’s nature.  God is good, but Owen 
leaves the communicative nature of God’s goodness either underdeveloped or attempts to shift the 
communication of divine goodness to the pactum salutis.  However, in my judgment, the Trinitarian 
 
 134  Recall that Owen’s precise understanding of natural theology is difficult to deduce.  See, 
Rehnman, Divine Discourse, 76-82.  
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theology demanded by such a move leads to a revised understanding of God’s simplicity and God’s 
nature.  This is seen particularly in the way Owen understands God’s justice and the foundational 
role that the covenant of redemption plays throughout this thought.  As a result, Owen wrestles with 
how to maintain both metaphysical and soteriological concerns in a way that takes his Thomistic 
heritage seriously, while also answering the questions of the early modern Protestant world.  Thus, 
Owen struggles, at times, to properly relate God ad intra and God ad extra.  Nevertheless, Owen 
strives to be a God-centred theologian.   
 In the second half of this study, I introduce Thomas F. Torrance into my inquiry into the role 
theology proper plays across the theological loci.  Owen and Torrance make great dialogue partners 
because they both work within with the, broadly speaking, reformed tradition.  Owen as one 
appropriating Aquinas and Torrance as one clearly working with a different ontology.135  Also, they 
both – although in their own distinctive ways – seek to let theology proper inform their theology, 
though soteriological readings of God in se means, that at points, they do not succeed.  Both share 
similar concerns, though, as we will see, Torrance answers these concerns differently than Owen.  
The narrowing of revelation began in Owen, is taken further in Torrance.  While Torrance affirms 
God in se, the suggestion that God in se is somehow distinct, and to be distinguished, from God for 
us is too dualistic and leaves humanity without a true knowledge of God.  This is not to suggest that 
Owen anticipates Torrance or is a seventeenth century version of Torrance.  Such an understanding 
claims too much and does not account for each theologian’s historical context and independence of 
thought.  However, the narrowing of revelation and the consequent marginalization of God’s 
goodness is a theme that runs through Torrance as well – even if in more intentional and revisionary 
ways.   
 
135  Aquinas holds to a participatory ontology.  This is vital for his understanding of analogy and 
properly relating being and knowing, or God in se and God for us.  Owen’s ontology is similar to Aquinas’ but is 
influenced by covenant that leads to some of the differences in his use and understanding of analogy.  
Torrance works with a Trinitarian ontology, though in saying this I am not suggesting Torrance is a social 
Trinitarian.   
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 Perhaps no reformed theologian since Owen has thought as much about Christ as our 
mediator as has T.F. Torrance.  Both Owen and Torrance seek to understand Christ as mediator in 
light of God in himself.  While Owen struggles to properly relate God in se and God for us, Torrance 
more purposely and intentionally seeks to remove any distinction.  This shifts the foundation of 
salvation from divine goodness to Christ’s election in Torrance’s thought.  In a sense, this move is 
similar to Owen’s use of the covenant of redemption.  And while Owen and Torrance are two quite 
different theologians, we will gain an understanding of the consequence of founding salvation on 
something other than divine goodness.  We turn now to see how Torrance understands God’s saving 












Part II: Thomas F. Torrance’s Foundation of Christ’s Mediation 
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Chapter 5: Torrance on God’s Being-in-Act 
 
 Like Owen, Thomas F. Torrance is also a God-centred theologian.  The purpose of this study’s 
second part is to investigate Torrance’s account of God ad intra and God ad extra with the goal of 
discovering if God in se is consistently employed as his foundation for Christ’s mediation.  As we shall 
see, Torrance has much to say about God’s inner life.  Importantly for Torrance, however, God’s 
revelation in Christ is a revelation of God’s inner life.  Torrance’s theology proper begins and ends 
with Christ.  God is only known as he reveals himself in and through the person of his Son.  
Therefore, in Torrance’s theology, the incarnation informs his understanding of God as Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.  In fact, the incarnation does more than inform Torrance’s theology proper.  In many 
ways, the incarnation determines, as we shall see, Torrance’s understanding of God.  Torrance’s 
starting point is soteriological and, at times, does not properly safeguard against introducing 
contingency into the order of being.  Torrance explains, ‘It is this knowledge of God in Christ which 
governs all, which tells us that God is eternally Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.'1  As a result, Torrance’s 
theology is decidedly Christological in that he seeks to understand God only in and through the 
incarnate Christ.  Torrance’s theology must begin in the economy of redemption; only then can we 
then reason back to God’s inner life.2  As we will see, however, Torrance’s method is not one that 
reasons from effects in creation back to the Creator.  Rather, God in se and God for us are identical.  
The narrowing at work in Owen’s theology is taken to an extreme in Torrance.  Thus, ‘it is not some 
prior ontology, but Christology which is all-determining in our knowledge of God.’3  Therefore, any 
knowledge of God in se, begins with the incarnation of the divine Son.  Torrance writes, ‘The 
incarnation constitutes the one actual source and the one controlling centre of the Christian 
 
 1  Torrance, The School of Faith,, lxxiii.   
 2  This is Torrance’s method, however, Torrance does not see this approach as a Christology from 
below.  In fact, Torrance (as we will see in a future chapter) wants to move past the ‘Christology from above’ 
or ‘Christology from below’ way of thinking.  However, Torrance’s understanding of revelation means that 
theology must begin in the economy because that is where God reveals himself.  And this revelation is not 
general but particular, namely in and through God incarnate, Jesus Christ.    
 3  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxiii.  
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doctrine of God…Everything hinges here upon the personal identity between Jesus and God.’4  This is 
why Torrance gives primacy to soteriological, and not ‘abstract metaphysical’ speculation about 
God.5   
 It is important to see the nuance at work in Torrance’s theological methodology.  All 
knowledge of God comes from God himself.6  However, the only way human beings know God is 
through the incarnate Son.    Following Rahner, the traditional distinction between the economic and 
ontological Trinity is not helpful in Torrance’s mind.7  Torrance instead speaks of an evangelical 
Trinity (economic) and a theological Trinity (ontological).  His real concern is not to separate the two, 
avoiding a dualistic understanding of God rendering God unknowable to his creatures.8  The 
ontological is the economic.  The God revealed economically in Christ is God himself—there is no 
God behind the back of Jesus Christ.  God for us is God in se.  Torrance avoids the trap of both a 
Christology from below and from above by employing his most important theological concept – the 
 
 4 Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 14.  Torrance’s full quote is important:  ‘This does not mean that all our 
knowledge of God can be reduced to Christology, but that, as there is only one Mediator between God and 
man, who is himself both God and Man, and only one revelation of God in which he himself is its actual 
content, all authentic knowledge of God is derived and understood in accordance with the incarnate reality of 
God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, and is formulated in doctrinal coherence with Christology. This is to say, 
doctrinal statements about God are possible and true only when Christologically grounded, for only in Jesus 
Christ do we really have to do with an objective personal self-revelation of God which bridges the distance 
between God and us and which is identical with the very Being of God himself. We cannot think and speak of 
God truly apart from his Word and his Act in the incarnation, and that means, apart from Jesus Christ. 
Otherwise expressed, Jesus Christ is the one place given to us within space and time where we may know God 
the Father, for it is only in him, the only begotten Son of the Father, that the very Nature of God is revealed 
and that we may draw near to him through his reconciling and saving activity and know him in accordance 
with his Nature. Thus the Incarnation constitutes the one actual source and the one controlling centre of the 
Christian doctrine of God, for he who became man in Jesus Christ in order to be our Saviour is identical in 
Being and Nature and Act with God the Father revealed in and through him. He is not some created 
intermediary between God and the world but the very Word and Son of God who eternally inheres in the 
Being of God so that for us to know God in Jesus Christ, and to know him as the God and Father of the Lord 
Jesus Christ, is really to know God as he is in himself in his eternal Being as God and in the transcendent Love 
that God is. He is in himself not other than what he is toward us in his loving, revealing and saving presence in 
Christ.’  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 17-18.  
 5  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 14-15.  
 6  Theology is ultimately circular as God is both beginning and end, object and subject.  This 
methodological circularity is at play throughout Torrance’s work.  See, Torrance, Christian Doctrine, XXXV, 27, 
28, 29, 173-175, 181, 197.   
 7  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 7.  
 8  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 7.   
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homoousion.  The theological Trinity and evangelical Trinity do not compete; they hold together 
precisely because the incarnate Son is homoousios with the Father.  Torrance explains: 
If the economic or evangelical Trinity and the ontological or theological Trinity were 
disparate, this would bring into question whether God himself was the actual content 
of his revelation, and whether God himself was really in Jesus Christ reconciling the 
world to himself.  That is the evangelical and epistemological significance of the 
homoousion (“consubstantial”, of one substance, or of one and the same being with 
the Father) formulated by the Council of Nicaea in AD 325.9 
Christ incarnate is homoousion with the Father and, therefore, is Torrance’s controlling norm for all 
of theology.  God’s revelation in and through Jesus Christ is revelation of his inner life.  Torrance 
writes, ‘If God’s Logos inheres in his own Being eternally, and that Logos has become incarnate in 
Jesus Christ, then it is in and through Christ that we have cognitive access into the Being of God, into 
his inner divine intelligibility of Logos.’10  The incarnation reveals God’s very being, and this real and 
true knowledge of God comes through and in the Son’s incarnation, because the Son is homoousion 
with the Father.  This means that we can really know God in himself through the Son’s revelation of 
God.  God as he exists for us is also who God is as he exists eternally as God in se. 
 I will return specifically to Torrance’s Christology in a later chapter.  Yet, as we proceed, 
Torrance’s theological method, as briefly sketched above, is always at work.  Only through the 
incarnate Son who is homoousion with the Father do creatures know anything of God’s being.  
Keeping this always in mind, I now investigate Torrance’s doctrine of God more specifically.  In this 
chapter, I will first briefly discuss Torrance’s epistemology and methodology, because epistemology, 
revelation, and soteriology are very closely related if not at times synonymous in Torrance’s work.  
Second, I will explore Torrance’s understanding of God’s being-in-act.  Third, I will investigate 
Torrance’s construction of God’s name, ‘I am.’  Lastly, I will show that Torrance’s understanding of 
God’s being-in-act and God’s name, ‘I Am’, shapes the way Torrance understands God’s decrees and 
perfections.  I will argue that Torrance’s understanding of God’s being in act leads Torrance to 
 
 9  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 7.  
 10  Thomas F. Torrance, Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and 
Science (1980; repr., Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 151.   
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subsume his doctrine of God under Christology, and even soteriology.  The result is that Torrance’s 
theology is built upon a soteriological metaphysic that leaves Torrance with a God who acts but with 
no foundation for his act. 
 
Epistemology and Method  
 
 Much like Owen, theology proper is foundational in Torrance’s thought.  Torrance writes, ‘It 
is, I believe, in its doctrine of God that the really fundamental character of any church tradition 
becomes revealed.  That is certainly true of the whole Reformed tradition from John Calvin to Karl 
Barth.’11  Uncovering Torrance’s theology proper, however, proceeds differently than with Owen 
who builds his understanding of God rooted in the traditional question: quid sit Deus.  That Torrance 
aligns Calvin and Barth, but leaves out Owen and the Reformed Orthodox is telling and revealing. 
The Reformed Orthodox, thinks Torrance, are guilty of the dualistic approach to the doctrine of God 
that plagues western theology.  Torrance explains: 
Thus, right from the start, over against the Latin patristic and medieval notions of the 
immutability and impassibility of God, often construed in Aristotelian terms of the 
Unmoved Mover, the theologians of the Reformed church laid the emphasis upon the 
sovereign majesty of the mighty, living, acting God, with a closer relation between the 
mighty acts of God in Israel and in the kingdom and church of Christ.12 
The Reformed tradition after Calvin makes a fundamental mistake by turning back to Aristotelian, or 
better, Thomistic theological formulations that leave God unknowable precisely because of the 
dualism that such an approach entails.  The way to overcome this dualistic and detached approach 
to God is to know God as he reveals himself in Christ.13  Calvin, argues Torrance, overcomes the 
western dualistic theology by the ‘reversal of the stereotyped medieval questions:  quid sit, an sit, 
quale sit…For Calvin, the primary question became, Who is God?  Who is the One who acts in this 
 
 11 Torrance, ‘The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition,’5.   
 12  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 5.  
 13  Torrance writes, ‘God is known only through God, on the ground of God’s self-revelation and 
gracious activity towards us, for it is only through Christ and the Spirit that we have access to God.  The God 
we know in this way is never mute or inactive.’  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 5.  
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merciful and loving way toward us in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.?’14  Calvin, Torrance continues, 
builds his theology proper not centred upon quid sit Deus but on qualis sit Deus.15  This reversal of 
questions avoids dualistic and ‘abstract questions as to essence and possibility’ and allows theology 
to discover ‘the nature of God disclosed in God’s self-revelation.’16  Torrance agrees with Calvin’s 
warnings that theological reflection should avoid needless speculation and that it is better to adore, 
rather than investigate, God’s essence.17  Torrance writes, ‘The fact that the Being of God is 
intrinsically incomprehensible renders all our attempts to grasp the “essence” or “quiddity” of God 
as no more than cold and empty speculations.’18    
 Calvin’s removal of God’s quiddity further changes an sit from a ‘question of possibility’ to ‘a 
critical question as to whether our modes of thought are appropriate to the nature of God.’19  It is 
this epistemological concern that resonates so strongly with Torrance.  Calvin’s reversal changes the 
‘character of the questions’ that theology asks from ‘dialectical questions designed to clarify the 
logical structure of a set of propositions’ to ‘open interrogative questions designed to bring to light 
the distinctive nature of the realities under investigation.’20  Dualistic modes of thought cannot truly 
know God, but a theology driven by these interrogative questions forces ‘the truth out into the 
open.’21  Thus, removing quid sit Deus opens the way for Torrance’s doctrine of God to take its 
proper shape. 
 
 14  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 6.  ‘what he is…whether he exists…what kind he is.’ 
 15  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 13. Torrance’s claim that Calvin intentionally reverses ‘the order 
of questions asked by the medieval schoolmen’ is debatable.   
 16  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 13.  While Torrance’s reading of Calvin is debatable, the 
important thing to notice here is the shift away from metaphysics in Torrance’s theology proper.    
 17  Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity,’ Calvin Theological Journal 25 (1990): 165.   
 18  Torrance, ‘Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity,’ 165.       
 19  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 13.  
 20  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 14.  
 21  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 14.  Torrance’s concern here is to understand God objectively.  
His approach calls into question even our ‘hidden presuppositions and prejudgments’ so that the reality 
investigated (in our case God) ‘is really understood objectively of itself and in accordance with its nature.’ I am 
sympathetic with Torrance’s concern, to a point, but he seems to overestimate the capabilities of human 
intellect given his theology of divine revelation.  This is driven by the epistemological concerns found 
throughout Torrance’s work.  In fact, this concern is so prevalent that it is not an exaggeration to suggest that 
Torrance’s theology proper cannot be understood apart from his understanding of revelation and, therefore, 
his epistemology as well.  
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 Interestingly, in his article ‘Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity’, Torrance cites Calvin’s Institutes 
1.3.1; 1.5.1, 9; 1.13.1, 21 to support his claim that Calvin warns us to avoid speculative theology.  It is 
true that Calvin warns of philosophical speculation in 1.13.21.  However, the larger context of 
Calvin’s thought is his development and defence of the sensus divinitatus as well as God’s 
accommodation of himself to his creatures.  Furthermore, later in this same article, Torrance cites 
Calvin in defence of his claim that when we know God through God; God is known ‘in the truth and 
reality of his Being.’22  Here, Torrance cites Institutes 1.13.19-20.  This is quite interesting and reveals 
a fundamental misunderstanding of Calvin’s theology of God’s revelation and knowledge.  Calvin 
does speak of knowing God only through God, but he does not speak of knowing God’s being.  
Instead, in 1.13.19, he references Augustine’s De Trinitate V, which is where Augustine reflects upon 
how Scripture speaks of God both relatively and absolutely.  Torrance admits that our finite and 
sinful minds can never know God as God knows himself, but his dismissal of Augustine’s distinctions, 
which is the foundation for the Reformed Orthodox formulation of archetypal and ectypal 
knowledge, leads him to make confusing and, at times, contradictory claims about the type of 
knowledge human creatures have of God.     
 Nevertheless, Torrance does not read Calvin in this way, but in line with his own 
epistemology.  Therefore, it is no surprise that Torrance rejects the ‘Latin theology’, which includes 
Thomas and Owen.  Instead Torrance builds upon Rahner’s work that rejects the ‘Western approach’ 
spearheaded by Augustine.  The major problem with this dualistic theology, Torrance argues, is that 
it gives primacy to the One God at the expense of the three persons.  The One and the Three must 
never be separated.  In fact, the Augustinian De Deo Uno method of theology leaves much of 
Western theology trapped in this dualistic way of knowing God with the result that God is ultimately 
unknowable.  Here, Torrance brings together Calvin and Rahner offering the solution that theology 
must allow the reality of what we investigate—the Triune God—to determine the shape of our 
 
 22  Torrance, ‘Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity,’ 167.      
161 
 
methodology.  What is needed, argues Torrance, is a stratified structure of knowing that seeks to 
understand, not merely the external works of God, but God’s inner being that the incarnate Christ 
reveals to creatures.23  Torrance explains that rather than an approach from below, economic, or 
above, ontological, ‘we must think of the two conjunctively as a whole.’24  If theological reflection 
begins from either above or below, instead of holding both together concurrently, then theology 
remains stuck in a dualistic way of thinking.25  As a result, Torrance’s Trinitarian theology is not only 
Christ-conditioned, but it also ‘must be soteriologically conditioned from end to end.’26  This is the 
case because the God made known in Christ’s revelatory and salvific acts is the true God.27  This 
telling admission colours Torrance’s theology proper throughout.  To grasp Torrance’s methodology 




 23  Torrance develops a critical realist approach to knowledge that he calls ‘depth exegesis.’ This 
consists in Torrance’s development of a ‘stratified structure’ for understanding the Trinity, which moves us 
ever deeper into the Trinitarian mystery.  The three levels are: first, the primary, or most basic level.  This is 
the level of ordinary experience; second, is the level of scientific theory, which seeks ‘for a rigorous logical 
unity or empirical and conceptual factors’; the third level is that of ‘a more refined and higher logical unity.’  In 
theory, this is a refining process that could go on indefinitely, but Torrance believes that in practice, three 
levels are sufficient to reach a grasp of the reality of the thing in question.  This applies to all scientific 
investigation, but the special nature of theology, namely the mystery and majesty of God himself, means this 
theory applies in a unique way to dogmatic inquiry.  Torrance believes this process of inquiry leads to a real 
understanding of things in themselves.   As applied to theology, the first level is the evangelical and doxological 
level, which is the level of religious experience and worship.  The second level is the theological level.  This 
level seeks to lay bare underlying epistemological commitments, traces the coherence of thought, and moves 
on to a deeper and more precise knowledge of God.  The goal is not to apprehend theological content, but the 
‘economic and trinitarian structure of God’s self-revelation.’  At the heart of this level, is the homoousion.  The 
third level is the higher theological level, which is concerned with the economic and ontological structure that 
level two uncovers. Here, too, the homoousion is of the utmost importance.  See chapter 3 in Torrance, 
Christian Doctrine, 32-72.  See also, Torrance, Ground and Grammar, 156-159. 
 24  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 114.  
 25  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 114. Torrance understands the major heresies of the Church history, 
namely Docetism and Ebionitism as dualisms.  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 114. 
 26  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 49.  While Torrance does not fully agree with Rahner, this is why he 
thinks Rahner’s approach is basically correct.  Torrance concludes this quote by writing, ‘We are thus led to 
hold that the evangelical Trinity and the theological Trinity, the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity, 
are the obverse of one another.’  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 49.  
 27  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 5.  
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God’s Being-in-Act  
 
 This is clearly the case when Torrance argues that a soterologically determined theology is 
one that never separates God’s being and act.  Torrance writes, ‘If God’s energeia, or “act” inheres in 
his Being, and that act has taken the form of Jesus Christ in the incarnation, so that he is identical 
with the action of God (and thus with the eternal decision or election of God), then we know God in 
accordance with the acts of his Being, in accordance with his activity in disclosing himself to us.’28  
Therefore, understanding God’s being, or οὐσία, begins with God’s act, which is the incarnation.  
Torrance writes, ‘The act of the ever-living God is identical with Jesus…This is God’s unique act, his 
reality-in-the-act, and apart from this act there is no God at all.’29  Torrance formulates his 
understanding of being and act by turning to the catholic tradition of the church, first to the ancient 
church fathers.  As he does, Torrance concludes that the concept of being derives from Greek 
philosophy, but in Christian theology, ‘governed by God’s redemptive activity in history’, being 
means something quite different than the static being discussed by the philosophers.30  
Unfortunately, Christian theology often turns back to the philosophers resulting in a dualistic 
approach to theology that Torrance is so concerned to reverse.   
 Two theologians who avoid theological dualism are Athanasius and Karl Barth.  As a result, 
both are prominent influences on Torrance’s understanding of God’s being and act.31  Torrance 
writes that ‘in Karl Barth we have been given another Athanasius contra mundum, doing battle 
against modern Sabellians and Arians alike, against misunderstanding on the right and on the left, 
and out of it calling the Christian Church away from time-conditioned and culture-oriented 
 
 28  Torrance, Ground and Grammar, 152.  
 29  Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert Walker (Downers Grove, 
IL: IVP Academic, 2008), 107.  
 30  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 116.  
 31  As we saw above, Torrance would put Calvin in this stream of theology as well, but throughout the 
corpus of his works it is Barth, and to greater degree Athanasius, who most influence Torrance.  Barth’s 
influence never goes away, but Torrance’s reading of the homoousion, inspired by Athanasius, is the key to all 
of Torrance’s theology including his engagement with the natural sciences.  This is not to suggest Torrance is 
unoriginal.  Rather, Torrance builds upon the concept of homoousion that he finds primarily Athanasius.       
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distortions to a fuller and far more adequate account of the person and work of Christ than we have 
known for centuries.’32  In both Athanasius and Barth, Torrance finds theological resources that 
avoid the dualistic modes of theology.  While Torrance’s reading of Barth, and especially Athanasius, 
is uniquely his own, both construct a theology that holds together God’s being and God’s act.  In 
both, being is always living and dynamic, never static and unmoved. 
     Athanasius features so prominently in Torrance’s theology because, living and working in the 
Greco-Roman world, Athanasius seeks to ‘establish the Hebraic and Christian doctrine of God’ in 
contrast to any Platonic and static understanding of God’s being. Athanasius also rejects Aristotelian 
and Stoic epistemological conceptions that understand being as something static.33  Being, in 
Christian theology, Torrance says, is living, dynamic, and personal being.34  Therefore, a truly 
Christian theology must not follow Aristotelian metaphysics that understands God as static as most 
western theology does.35  To follow this Greek conception of being, Torrance believes, is to separate 
God’s being and act and to introduce a dualism – something that Torrance holds must not be done.36  
Divine revelation, not external sources, must define the concepts and terms we use in theology.  
Revelation is Jesus Christ in Torrance’s theology.  Nature does not reveal God.37  Accordingly, 
revelation is constrained by being understood in terms of Christ incarnate who allows us to begin to 
speak of the nature of the realities in our theological reasoning.38  Athanasius does this by 
reconstructing a more profound epistemology that dismantles the ‘Hellenic view of God and the 
world.’39  Torrance explains that Athanasius accomplishes this reversal by maintaining that while 
 
 32 Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 
22.  
 33  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 220.  
 34  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 116.  
 35  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 116.  
 36  Here, Torrance misunderstands Aquinas’ and the Western Church’s appropriation of Aristotelian 
metaphysics.  An understanding of being funded by Aquinas’ understanding of actus and potentiae is not 
static, but dynamic, living, and personal as well.   
 37  Torrance’s theology of revelation also denies the classic Reformed understanding of general 
revelation as well.    
 38  It is interesting that Torrance makes this claim about external sources when he clearly builds his 
epistemological approach on the philosophy of Michael Polanyi and John Mackintosh Macmurray.   
 39  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 220.  
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‘God is beyond all created being and all human devising (ἐπίνοια),’ he still remains transcendent 
‘Being’ who ‘really and truly is God (ὁ ὂςτως ὢν Θεός).’40  Torrance’s understanding of being draws 
from his reading of Athanasius and Barth.  This is clear when Torrance writes of Athanasius’ concept 
of being: 
In speaking of the being or οὐσία of God, Athanasius used the term in its simplest 
sense as that which is and subsists by itself, but allowed that to be changed and 
transformed by the nature of God.  Thus the οὐσία of God as Athanasius understands 
it is both being and presence, presence in being, and being and activity, activity in 
being, the transcendent Being of God the Creator who is actively, creatively present in 
all that he has made, upholding it by the Word of his power and by his Spirit.41 
Understanding ousia in an Athanasian way reveals the personal nature of God’s being and how it 
relates to his power, lordship, and covenant faithfulness to his people.42   
 Accordingly, this supports Torrance’s repeated warning that we must not understand God’s 
oneness in a generic sense.  It is impossible to speak of the one God without simultaneously 
speaking of the three persons.  At stake is the ‘essential oneness’, not just of God, but of God’s 
‘Being and Act.’43  A compromise of this ‘essential oneness’ would mean that the incarnate Christ is 
‘detached’ from God’s being and thus his mission is not a saving one.44  Any type of dualism, for 
Torrance, means that Christ is not really God, and if Christ is not really God, then there is no saving 
mission.  This concern leads Torrance to Athanasius and the concept of homoousion, which, as we 
will see, is key to Torrance’s entire theological project.  Rather than a static conception of God’s 
being, ‘Athanasius much preferred to use verbs rather than nouns when speaking of God as the 
mighty living and acting God.’45  In Athanasius, then, Torrance finds a theologian who posits a living, 
not static, God, because he avoids the very dualism Torrance himself is so concerned to root out of 
his account of God’s being and act. 
 
 40  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 218.    
 41  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 218-219. 
 42  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 116.  
 43  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 115.  
 44  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 115.  
 45  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 118.  
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 As much as Torrance builds upon Athananius, Calvin, and Barth, he also has much affinity 
with Rahner’s approach to the Trinity.  Torrance appreciates Rahner’s well known maxim:  ‘The 
“economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic” Trinity.’46  
Torrance thinks that Rahner’s ‘making the Economic Trinity the norm for all our thought and speech 
about God’ destroys the isolation in dogmatic theology between De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino.47  
However, Torrance fears that even Rahner’s maxim is guilty of dualism if it presents two trinities.  
Especially problematic is Rahner’s stance that the immanent Trinity is the ‘necessary condition’ for 
God’s economic self-revelation.48  Such an understanding introduces an abstraction into the Trinity, 
and possibly leads Rahner to understand the economic Trinity only as a mere instrument God uses to 
reveal the immanent Trinity.49  Torrance fears that what is known of God economically might not be 
God’s being, but something detached.  However, Torrance thinks Rahner is simply confused at this 
point, because his maxim does, in fact, equate the immanent and economic Trinity.50  The economic 
is the immanent.  Torrance explains:  
The Trinity ad extra and ad intra is identical, because the self-communication of God 
to us in the Son and in the Spirit would not be a self-communication of God to us, if 
what God is for us in the Son and in the Spirit were not proper to God himself.  
Conversely it is because God is in himself and for himself Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
that he is free to communicate himself as Triune in the economy of salvation.51 
Torrance, then, finds basic agreement with Rahner, with Torrance’s slight modification of Rahner’s 
maxim.  This basic agreement means that Rahner is one of the few theologians who breaks free from 
dualistic ways of understanding the Trinity.  Thus, Rahner is similar in approach and thought to 
 
 46  Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York, NY:  The Crossroad Publishing Company, 
1997), 22.  See, Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 78-80.  
 47  Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 78.  
 48  Torrance critiques an important footnote in Rahner’s work.  See Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 
79.  In this footnote, Rahner writes, ‘We should not overlook the following logical connections:  if the Trinity is 
necessary as “immanent,” if God is absolutely “simple,” and in fact freely communicates himself as “economic” 
Trinity, which is the “immanent” Trinity, then the “immanent” Trinity is the necessary condition of the 
possibility of God’s free self-communication.’  Rahner, Trinity, 102n. 21.  
 49  Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 80.  
 50  Torrance writes, ‘Thus when the confusion in Rahner’s thought, or in our reading of him, is cleared 
away, the question must be raised as to how far we have any serious disagreement with him.  Torrance, 
Trinitarian Perspectives, 80. 
 51  Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 80.  
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Athanasius and Barth.52  Rahner, like Athanasius and Barth (and Torrance as well) seeks to show that 
God is in himself what he is in his revelation.  All important in Rahner’s construction, Torrance 
concludes, is the homoousion.53   
 In many ways, Torrance understands his method as nearly identical to Rahner with one 
important difference.  Rahner focuses on how the Trinity ad intra is the Trinity ad extra.  Torrance, 
however, reasons that Trinitarian theology must focus on how the Trinity ad extra is the Trinity ad 
intra.  As much as Torrance wants to find agreement with Rahner, this difference is significant and 
seemingly motivated by the fact that Rahner holds a more traditional understanding of an 
ontological Trinity.  Torrance, as we will see, does not.54  Torrance at times , unintentionally, allows 
humanity’s need for salvation determine God’s being due to his understanding of God and 
revelation.  Therefore, theology is overly impacted by creaturely history.  And theologians ought not 
to bring metaphysics with them into Trinitarian theology.55   Clearly, Torrance’s doctrine of God is 
soteriologically motivated.  God for us determines God in se, but this foundation is not terribly 
stable.   
 
God’s Names Himself ‘I Am’ 
 
 Vital to Torrance’s doctrine of God is his understanding of homoousion.  Theology proper 
that is not trapped in a metaphysical dualism gives priority to God as Father/Son, i.e., homoousion, 
rather than beginning with God as Creator.  Torrance affirms the Creator/creature distinction 
characteristic of the reformed tradition, but to begin with God as Creator is too generic an 
understanding of God and easily leads back to dualistic ways of thinking.56  Torrance finds historical 
 
 52  Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 81.  
 53  I will return to this point later when considering Torrance’s Christology, but Torrance finds that 
Jungel’s theology of the cross carries forward the true logic of Rahner’s method.  Torrance, Trinitarian 
Perspectives, 83.  
 54  Torrance believes that his focus will lead East and West closer together.  Torrance, Trinitarian 
Perspectives, 101.  
 55  Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 101.  
 56  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 49-51.  
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warrant for beginning with God as Father and not some generic and distant creator in Athanasius.  
To begin with God as creator is to know God by his works, something external to God, ‘and which as 
such do not really tell us anything about who God is or what he is like in his own nature.’57  
Torrance’s distrust of natural theology is why he works with a Christ-exclusive understanding of 
revelation.  Athanasius, argues Torrance, comes to this conclusion through his reflection on God’s 
self-naming of Ex 3:14:  ‘I am who I am.’58  Torrance cites an important passage from Athanasius in 
order to help make his point: 
When you hear it said ‘I am who I am’, and ‘In the beginning God created the heaven 
and the earth’, and ‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord’, and ‘Thus says the 
Lord Almighty’, we understand nothing else than the very simple and blessed and 
incomprehensible Being of him who is (αὐτὴν τὴν ἁπλῆν καὶ μακαρίαν καὶ 
ἀκατάληπτον τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίαν νοοῦμεν), for although we are unable to grasp what 
he is (ὄ, τι ποτέ ἐστιν), yet on hearing ‘Father’ and ‘God’ and ‘Almighty’ we understand 
nothing else to be signified than the very Being of him who is (αὐτὴν τῆν τοῦ ὄντος 
οὐσίαν). And if you have said of Christ that ‘he is the Son of God’, you have thereby 
said that ‘he is from the Being of the Father (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός)’. And since the 
Scriptures have anticipated you in declaring that the Lord is the Son of the Father, and 
the Father himself has already said ‘This is my beloved Son’—and a son is no other 
than the offspring of his father—is it not evident that the Fathers of Nicaea were right 
to have said that the Son is from the Being of the Father (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός)?59 
From this, Torrance concludes, ‘That…it is the Fatherhood of God as revealed in Jesus Christ that 
determines for us precisely how we are to understand the nature of his divine Being.  “To name God 
Father is to signify his very Being.”’60  Building upon this trajectory of thought, Torrance connects Ex 
3:14 to the ‘I am’ statements found in the New Testament, explaining that Christ’s ‘I am’ statements 
in the Gospel of John ‘can be understood only in terms of his being homoousios with God.’61  Thus 
the “I am” of God and the “I am” of Christ in their bearing upon one another determined for 
Athanasius, as they must surely do for us, the Christian understanding of the divine Being or οὐσία 
 
 57  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 50.  Notice this is quite different than Aquinas’ notion of analogical 
predication largely practiced by Owen also.  As creatures, we cannot begin anywhere else than God’s effects, 
but we analogically reason back to understanding God’s nature in an ectypal manner.   
 58  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 118.   
 59  In Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 118.  Torrance wrongly cites this as De syondis 34.  It is, rather, De 
synodis 35.    
 60  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 118.  The phrase quoted here is from Athanasius, De synodis, 35.    
 61  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 119.  
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as living self-revealing and self-affirming personal Being.’62  God as ‘I am’ reveals ‘the personal 
nature of God’s Being’ and is revealed to humanity ‘in the acutely personalized form of Jesus Christ 
his incarnate Son.’63  The person of the Son reveals that God’s being is personal.64  The relation of the 
‘I am’ of God and the ‘I am’ of Christ leads Torrance to an understanding of an ‘ontological 
interrelation between the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity’ that is ‘profound and 
intensely personal.’65  This ‘ontological interrelation’ is rooted in God’s act, the incarnation, in which 
God’s being is revealed to creatures.  There is no creaturely understanding of God without this 
revelation of God’s being-in-act.  
 Torrance’s appeal to Ex 3:14 is not unique.  Aquinas and Owen also begin their discussions of 
God’s existence with Moses standing before the burning bush.66  What is unique is the way Torrance 
understands and develops theology proper in relation to this foundational text.  As we have seen, 
Torrance claims that the Reformed doctrine of God (by which he means his own theology proper) is 
characterized by ‘its sharp departure from the Latin idea of God (Deus sive natura) which is taken up’ 
and ‘is given its greatest expression in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.’67  Though for Torrance, 
Aquinas’ development of this Latin doctrine of God did not go far enough.  The problem with 
Aquinas, for Torrance, is Aquinas’ analogy of being.  Torrance understands this analogy of being as 
violating the Creator/creature distinction, because rather than truly distinguishing God and the 
creature, Aquinas holds on to a ‘notion of a hierarchy of being.’68  As a result, Aquinas’ project begins 
with a generic conception of being read into theology from Greek philosophy.  This influences the 
way the burning (but not consumed) bush story is read and used in theology proper.  In this light, 
 
 62  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 119.  
 63  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 119.  
 64  Torrance quotes Barth to support this claim:  ‘It follows from the trinitarian understanding of God 
revealed in the Scripture that this one God is to be understood not just as impersonal lordship, that is as 
power, but as the Lord; not just as absolute Spirit but as Person, that is as an I existing in and for himself with 
his own thought and will. This is how he meets us in his revelation. This is how he is thrice God as Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit.’  Barth, CD I/1:349-350.  Notice, though, Barth’s emphasis on God in himself.     
 65  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 119.  See, Colyer, How to Read, 303-308. 
 66  Aquinas, ST I, q. 2, a. 3, co.  Owen, Works 1, 368.     
 67  Torrance, School of Faith, lxx.   
 68  Torrance, Theological Science, 60.  
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Torrance explains his reading of Aquinas:  ‘The doctrine of the Being of God was formed through a 
philosophical ontology, and then the Biblical idea of God was added on to it, the God of the Old 
Testament, the I am that I am, and the Holy Trinity of the New Testament.’69 
 Torrance is very appreciative of Aquinas’ attempt to construct a ‘realist and unitary basis for 
the knowledge of God.’70  Yet, Aquinas’ construction of natural theology ‘abstracts from God’s 
activity’ and, therefore, can only speak of ‘the Being of God in general and in abstracto.’71  Such an 
understanding of creation leaves Thomas with an autonomous natural theology thrown back upon 
creaturely reason that drives ‘a wedge between the Being of God as such and his triune being.’72  
This construction leads Thomas, and the tradition, away from the dynamic and personal 
understanding of God’s being.  Torrance continues: 
But here the I am that I am was interpreted only in terms of the aseity of God, and not 
also in terms of the God who alone can name Himself, and who is not known or 
knowable apart from His self-naming or self-revealing, while the doctrine of the Trinity 
had to be made to fit in with the basic ontology through alleged vestigial Trinitatis in 
creaturely being.  The result was that the God thus conceived was a prisoner of a 
general concept of being.  Even as First Cause He could not be conceived apart from 
his effects, but only as bound with them in the same conceptual system of necessary 
relations.’73 
In response to Aquinas and the larger Western tradition, Torrance aligns himself with Calvin, quoting 
without citation Calvin’s claim that he revolts from this ‘“frigid doctrine of the Sorbonne”’ just as 
 
 69  Torrance, School of Faith, lxx-lxxi.    
 70  T.F. Torrance, ‘The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,’ Religious Studies 6, 
no. 2 (1970), 132.  Torrance seems to change his own view of natural theology from the first publication of The 
School of Faith (1959) and this article interacting with, and slightly critiquing, Karl Barth’s understanding of 
natural theology (1970).   
 71  Torrance, ‘Problem of Natural Theology,’ 132.  
 72  Torrance, ‘Problem of Natural Theology,’ 132.  Torrance takes seriously that Aquinas himself was 
not trying to formulate an autonomous natural theology.  Nevertheless, Aquinas, due to the influence of 
Augustine, does not escape the problematic dualism of western theology.  The goal of Aquinas’ work is not to 
produce an autonomous natural theology, but the dualistic way of formulating his theology leads Thomas to 
such a construction anyway.  Torrance writes of Thomas’ natural theology, ‘That his was not given an entirely 
independent status is clear from the fact that he did not regard it as achieved through the unaided reason 
merely developed philosophically, but as achieved only through reason already adapted to God by his grace, 
and therefore to be included in his theology.  Nevertheless, it is a natural theology which abstracts from God’s 
activity and in the nature of the case can only reach as far as the Being of God in general and in abstracto.’  
Torrance, ‘Problem of Natural Theology,’ 132. 
 73  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxi.    
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Torrance himself does as well.74  Rather than knowing God ‘through being and caused effects’, God is 
to be known ‘in the way He actually has made Himself known in His revealing and reconciling 
work.’75   
 Torrance’s realist approach to revelation leads our understanding of ousia away from static 
Greek conceptions of being to a dynamic, living conception of God’s being.  Turning once more to 
Athanasius, Torrance now explains how the ousia relates to the three hypostases.76  The name of 
God, ‘I am’, signifies his being, but it also shows that his being is personal being.77  However, 
Torrance reasons that God as ‘I am’ is understood, and in some way, determined, by the fact that 
God’s name is revealed economically and soteriologically.  Torrance elaborates this point in 
Theological Science:   
The object of theological knowledge is the living, loving, acting God, God in His action 
toward us.  God’s objectifying of Himself does not cease to be His self-giving action, 
and therefore knowledge of God is correspondingly in actu, a knowledge that is 
spontaneous, free and active, analogous in nature to the freedom and motion in God’s 
self-giving.  It is not true knowledge if it steps outside of this movement, or seeks to 
abstract the content from it, and, so to speak, to freeze it, as something that we can 
return to at will, and handle and manipulate as we desire.  Moreover the God who 
gives Himself as the object of our knowledge comes to us within the movement of 
time where we have our being and our knowing, so that we cannot know Him by 
seeking to step outside of this historical existence, or by seeking to abstract knowledge 
from that movement or relationship in time and turn it into timeless ideas or 
propositions that have their truth timelessly.’78 
Torrance is on to something important.  It is true that being is revealed only through action.  This is a 
point that is fundamental to Aquinas’ theological metaphysics as well.  Aquinas also works with a 
 
 74  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxi.    
 75  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxi.   
 76  Torrance’s understanding of the three divine persons will be treated in the next chapter.    
 77  Torrance writes, ‘It is at this very point, then, in the bearing of the ‘I am’ of God and the ‘I am’ of 
Christ upon one another, that we may discern how profound and intensely personal the ontological 
interrelation between the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity is. If God were ontically other in his 
eternal Being than the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit whom we encounter and know in the economy of 
redemption proclaimed to us in the Gospel, there would be no objective basis for God’s revelation of himself 
to us or for any divine truth in the soteriological message of the Gospel, or, therefore, in the Christian doctrine 
of the Holy Trinity.’  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 119. 
  
 78  Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 40.  
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realist epistemology that posits ‘action as the “self-revelation of being.”’79  On the self-revealing of 
being through action, Clarke writes with Thomas in mind, ‘It is through action, and only through 
action, that real beings manifest or “unveil” their being, their presence, to each other and to me.’80  
The conclusion of this insight is that the nature of being ‘is self-revealing and self-communicative’ 
and, therefore, ‘intrinsically dynamic, not static.’81  The difference between Torrance and the 
Thomistic approach to being is that for Torrance God in se is God in actu, as the quote from 
Theological Science shows.  There is no primacy of being for Torrance because the divine being is 
never static.  Torrance defines God’s nature differently than either Thomas or Owen.  Yet, compared 
to Aquinas, Torrance’s understanding conflates being and act, leaving Torrance with no true 
foundation for God to act in the world.  It is true that God is known through his actions, however, to 
say this is not to conflate, or equate, God’s being with God’s acts.   
 By dropping quid sit Deus from his doctrine of God, Torrance misses an important 
understanding common in the catholic tradition of the church that says agere sequitur esse.82  If God 
is all act and no being, which I think is the logical conclusion of Torrance’s formulation, then there is 
no true foundation for God’s acts.  Being only acts if it first exists.83  Torrance’s soteriological reading 
of Ex 3:14 at the expense of any kind of ontological reading is significant theologically.  Torrance’s 
foundation is insecure because his merging of being and act removes, as is the case with Owen, 
God’s communicative goodness.  Torrance understands God’s nature differently than Aquinas and 
much of the western tradition.84  The similitude of divine goodness is not the basis for God’s 
 
 79  W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (2001; repr., 
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 12.  
 80  Clarke, The One and the Many, 31-32.  
 81  Clarke, The One and the Many, 32.  
 82  Clarke, The One and the Many, 33.  ‘To act follows to be.’    
 83  Clarke, The One and the Many, 33.  See, Aquinas, SCG I, cap. 16.  
 84  Owen’s understanding is struggling between a more Thomistic and modern conception of God’s 
nature.  Torrance’s conflation is much more intentional.    
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communication to creatures.  Rather, God must disruptively reveal himself.85  The result is that 
Torrance’s doctrine of God allows us to say that God does good, but not that God is good.   
 
‘I Am’ as Covenantal Name 
 
 Torrance continues discussing God’s name in the Old Covenant and connects God’s being 
and act to the covenant of grace.86  The covenant is vitally important to the Reformed tradition and, 
though not always apparent, Torrance’s understanding of the covenant informs much of his 
theology.  God condescends to the creation he makes through covenant.  The covenant, then, 
bridges the Creator/creature divide.  This move is not novel and is found in many Reformed 
thinkers.87  However, Torrance’s formulation of an eternal covenant of grace is a major difference 
from Owen’s covenant theology, or ‘federal Calvinism.’ Federal Calvinism, says Torrance, introduces 
a ‘bifurcation’ into theology proper, because the introduction of a covenant of redemption and a 
covenant of works is an introduction of natural theology.88  Torrance understands the development 
of this strand of (federal) covenant theology as a turn away from Calvin and Knox and back to 
scholasticism.  Therefore, federal theology is trapped in the Latin heresy.89  Torrance is certainly 
influenced by Barth at this point, but also argues that his understanding of covenant theology is in 
basic agreement with the older Scottish theology that traces its roots from John Knox back to John 
Calvin.90  In order to show the contrast between Owen and Torrance, Torrance’s understanding of 
covenant is worth quoting at length: 
The Covenant of Grace, as it has been called, embraces not only many but the whole 
of creation, involving a covenanted correspondence between the creation and the 
Creator—that is, not one reposing upon some inherent relation of likeness between 
the essence of God as such and the essence of man as such, but solely upon the 
 
8585  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 119. 
 86  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 121.  
 87  For example, see WCF 7.1.  
 88  Thomas F. Torrance, Scottish Theology: From John Know to John McLeod Campbell (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1996), 61, 63. 
 89  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 61.  
 90  See Torrance, Scottish Theology, 1-92. 
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gracious decision of God to create a world utterly distinct from Him and yet to assume 
it beyond anything it possesses in itself into such close relation with Him that it may 
reflect His Glory and be the appointed theatre of His revelation.  Thus Reformed 
theology sought to assert the relation between Creator and creature, Grace and 
nature, in such a way as to repudiate any confusion or reversibility on the one hand 
and any separation or dichotomy on the other, for it took as its guide in understanding 
that relation the fulfilment of God’s Covenant of Grace in Jesus Christ.  In His 
incarnation and redemption the Covenant is seen, as Barth has expounded it in our 
day, as the inner ground of creation, and creation is seen as the outer ground or form 
of the Covenant.91 
Leaving aside the veracity of Torrance’s interpretation of the development of covenant theology, 
theologically it is significant that Torrance makes the covenant of grace eternal.  In so doing, 
covenant replaces creaturely likeness to God.  Following Barth, Torrance understands covenant in 
this way because he holds that there is a ‘relation between the faithfulness of God and the created 
order, or the relation between covenant and creation.’92 There is no covenant of redemption or 
covenant of works.  There is simply the one covenant of grace.  Grace comes before law (before 
nature).  And grace must come before law, because creation is proleptically conditioned by 
redemption in Torrance’s thought.   
 Distinct from federal theology a covenant is not something God enters into with creatures, 
but is in place from their very creation.  This is a significant difference.93  Torrance formulates his 
covenant theology in this way due, at least in part, to his understanding of God’s self-naming.  
Torrance writes: 
The significant point to be emphasised here is that the self-naming of God as Yahweh 
is bound up with the covenant of steadfast love and truth he made with Israel. The 
divine pronouncement ‘I am who I am / I will be who I will be,’ is not isolated from the 
establishing of a holy fellowship between Yahweh and Israel which he backs up with 
his own Being: ‘I am the Lord’, and reinforces with his promise ‘I will be with you’. The 
Being of Yahweh is his Being-in-union with his people. God is revealed as he who freely 
chooses Israel for fellowship with himself and even adopts Israel as his first-born son, 
and as he who in his covenant love commits himself to this people in fellowship and 
 
 91  Torrance, Theological Science, 70.  
 92  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 219.  I will discuss below the possible significance of such a ‘relation.’    
 93  WCF 7 uses the language of ‘voluntary condescension’ to express the idea of God entering into 
covenant with creatures after they are created in God’s image. This is not a temporal, but a logical distinction 
meant to express that creation does not entail covenant.     
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pledges himself in the fulfilment of their redemption in virtue of a bond of kinship or 
community which he establishes between them and himself.94 
God’s self-naming depends on the covenant, on God’s relationship with Israel.  Unlike Aquinas and 
Owen, God’s name ‘I am’ is not metaphysical, but soteriological.  Torrance does not say that God’s 
being depends on creatures, but only that God is known in this way—his being is known by his 
people who are in communion with him.  To be sure, the motivation for this formulation is 
Torrance’s constant desire to avoid an understanding of God as the static god of the philosophers 
and not the living God of revelation.  Torrance affirms an ontological Trinity, but one that is not 
separate, or different from the God we meet in Jesus Christ – this is why Torrance critiques even 
Rahner.  Therefore, Torrance concludes that God’s dynamic being is God’s parousia with his people, 
and since God is a dynamic being, he is his being for others.95  And because creatures cannot know 
God in himself, knowledge of ‘the Being of God’ comes only in the ‘fellowship created through his 
self-naming, self-affirming and self-giving to his people.’96  There is no natural theology.  Therefore, 
God’s being ‘is the living dynamic Bering (ζῶσα καἱ ἐνεργητικὴ οὐσία) of God’s redeeming presence 
to them, with them and for them.’97 This covenantal relation and revelation flows ‘freely from the 
ground and will of his own transcendent Self-Being.’98  Covenant, it seems fair to conclude, replaces 
ontology in Torrance’s theology.  Jesus Christ is the covenant who makes known the very being of 
God in creaturely history.  Yet, such a move does not distinguish God in se and God for us.     
 A covenant is a relationship established by God, between God and his people.  Furthermore, 
to speak of God as God of the covenant is to speak of his condescension to the creation that he has 
made.  The covenantal concept implies the Creator/creature distinction in that covenant signifies 
God’s relation to creatures.  Therefore, covenant functions like one of God’s negative names, and, in 
fact, in Scripture, God is named the God of the covenant.  Aquinas writes, ‘It must be said that 
 
 94  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 122.  
 95  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 123.  
 96  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 123.  
 97  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 123.  
 98  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 123.  
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because names of God that are called negative, or that which signifies his relation to creatures, it is 
clear that in no way do they signify his substance, but rather the distance of his relation to some 
creature, or his relation to some other, or rather the relation of some creature to himself.’99  To 
speak of covenant, then, is not to speak of God in se, but of God in relation to creation and 
creatures.  Covenant is an economic term.  Therefore, when Torrance makes the covenant of grace 
eternal, he makes God’s relation to his people eternal.  However, if we read covenant concepts in 
light of Thomistic relations, Torrance’s construction is problematic.  Aquinas explains, ‘It must be 
said that certain names import a relation to the creature, said of God in time, and not from 
eternity.’100  Further, this relation is not merely an idea, but is a reality that occurs in time, but not in 
eternity.   
 At stake in this discussion is the Creator/creature distinction—something that Torrance 
himself very strongly affirms.  However, if the relation of God to creatures is moved into eternity, 
into the inner life of God, there is an eternal relation, not simply the idea of a future relation.  
Torrance’s confusion of these categories is why he says that God is a God for us and that God loves 
us more than he loves himself.101  Yet, such a statement seems contrary to God as being ‘wholly 
other.’  A transcendent God who is not like his creation, yet loves creature more than he loves 
himself reveals Torrance’s concern to show that God is truly God, yet he is knowable and reveals 
himself in Christ as the love that God is.  The effort to hold these two realities together, though, 
leads Torrance into a position from which he has no resources to say God is independent of the 
world.  God is ‘wholly other,’ in Torrance’s thought, but he is only known as ‘wholly other,’ in the 
Son’s mission which makes known God’s love for the world.  Perhaps Torrance does not make 
creation necessary, but his covenantal theology too closely aligns the order of being and knowing.  
To be clear, Torrance does not knowingly make God dependent on creation, but this is the logical 
 
 99  Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, a. 2.    
 100  Aquinas, ST I, I, q. 13, a. 7, co.    
 101  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 244.  
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conclusion of placing the covenant within God’s inner-life.  Torrance writes, ‘This is indeed what 
Barth affirmed when he spoke of the creation as a “temporal analogue”, taking place outside of God, 
of that event in himself by which God is Father of the Son.’102   At the very least Torrance’s desire to 
maintain God’s freedom from his creation and, thus, to maintain the Creator/creature distinction is 
correct but does not succeed.   
 
Analogia Entis  
 
 In part, this is due to Torrance’s understanding of how God relates to his creation, 
particularly his rejection of the analogia entis.  Several times Torrance mentions the well-known 
dialogue between Barth and Przywara clearly aligning himself with Barth’s rejection of the analogia 
entis because both Torrance and Barth believe such an analogy of being posits a natural theology 
independent of God’s revelation.103  The analogia entis, then, is not a way to articulate the 
Creator/creation distinction for Torrance, because it leaves theology in the realm of general being 
and not the Triune and living God of Christianity.  However, neither Aquinas, nor Przywara 
understand analogia entis in this way.  Rather, both use the analogy of being as a way to speak of 
both God’s similarity to creatures created in the image and likeness of God and the creatures’ ever-
greater dissimilarity.  Interestingly, Torrance in Theological Science, rightly understands the analogia 
entis as explained by Przywara as an analogy of both similarity and dissimilarity, a point that Barth 
seems to miss.104  John Betz explains that Przywara and Barth part ways due to their understanding 
of nature and grace.105  And it is Torrance’s understanding of nature and grace that leads him to 
 
 102  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 219.  Emphasis mine.    
 103  Torrance, Ground and Grammar, 88; Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical, 138, 185, 186; 
Theological Science, 78, 189. 
 104  See, Torrance, Theological Science, 189-190; Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis:  Metaphysics:  
Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentely Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 371-373.  See also, John R. Betz, ‘Translators Preface,’ in Przywara, 
Analogia Entis:  Metaphysics:  Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, Erich Przywara (Grand Rapdis, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 20-22. 
 105  Betz, ‘Translator’s Preface’, 21.  
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understand covenant theology, and the Creator/creature distinction, in the way that he does.  A 
theology that makes use of the analogia entis ‘maintains the similarity-in-difference between God 
and creatures (a similarity that the sinfulness of human beings cannot altogether destroy)’, whereas 
‘dialectical theology, precisely to the extent that it denies any potentia oboedientialis, ironically 
collapses the very difference between God and creature that it seeks to maintain at all costs.’106  
 When Torrance interacts with Przywara in Theological Science, he acknowledges that there 
is a Protestant form of the analogia entis.107  However, the Protestant Orthodox are not brought into 
discussion.  Rather, the Protestant version of the analogy of being leads to the subjectivism of 
Schweitzer and Bultmann and does not give true knowledge of God.108  Torrance seems to dismiss 
the principle of similarity within ever-increasing dissimilarity due to his dialectical theology of 
revelation.  Torrance explains of both the Catholic and Protestant versions of the analogia entis:  ‘All 
these ways ultimately fail to wrestle seriously with the basic fact upon which the Christian Gospel 
rests and with which it stands or falls, the condescension of God to enter our lowly and creaturely 
existence in Jesus Christ.’109  It is Torrance’s Christ-exclusive view of revelation that causes him to 
oppose the analogy of being even while wanting to maintain the very thing the analogy maintains—
the distinction between Creator and creature.  In order to truly know God, the covenant, God’s 
condescension, must be within God’s inner life, and, therefore, eternal as well.  Furthermore, 
Torrance’s understanding of God’s revelation makes God’s inner-life knowable only in the 
incarnation through an act of God’s disruptive grace.   
 Like Owen’s possible overreaction to the Socinians, Torrance’s concern to avoid natural 
theology may lie behind his theology of revelation.  There is no true similarity between God and 
creatures in Torrance’s thought.  As a result, Torrance is clear that God’s covenant ‘is not to be 
 
 106  Betz, ‘Translator’s Preface’, 21.  In the quote, Betz contrasts Catholic theology and dialectical 
theology, however it is not correct to say that only Roman Catholic theology makes use of an analogy of being.  
As we have seen, Owen and the Reformed Orthodox build theology around a similar understanding of nature 
and grace though nature is severely limited in Owen.   
 107  Torrance, Theological Science, 189.  
 108  Torrance, Theological Science, 189-190.  
 109  Torrance, Theological Science, 190.  
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thought of in terms of an analogy of being (analogia entis), for the Creator and creation are 
ontologically utterly disparate.’110  Torrance rightly emphasizes the ever-greater dissimilarity 
between Creator and creatures.  In this sense, God, as created, is ‘utterly disparate’ from creatures.  
God is God and creatures are made.  However, absent in Torrance’s understanding, similar to Owen 
at points, is the similitude that exists between Creator and creatures.  To be sure, it is a similitude 
that does not downplay the ever-greater dissimilarity that obtains between God and creatures, but a 
true similitude nonetheless. 
 Yet, Torrance, like Barth, cannot escape analogy altogether because all human knowledge of 
God is analogical knowledge.  This is where God’s disruptive grace comes in.  Creatures are ‘utterly 
disparate’ from God, but nevertheless, ‘in the wonder of his free out-going love and grace the 
universe took form as a created counterpart to the uncreated movement of Love within the Holy 
Trinity.’111  Therefore, there is a created correspondence between the eternal generation of the Son 
in God ad intra and God ad extra.112  Thus, there is an analogy of relation, but not one of being.113   
Torrance’s analogy of relation arises out of his dialectical theology, especially his understanding of 
revelation and grace.  This formulation of analogy allows Torrance to speak of both an ‘ontological 
difference and created likeness’ between God and creatures.114  However, Torrance’s ‘analogical 
correspondence of opposites’ is held together by the incarnation and, therefore, collapses creation 
into redemption.  There is no creation per se – God does not call his creation good apart from a 
proleptic understanding of Christ’s redeeming work.  Thus, Torrance leaves no real room for any 
type of likeness in his understanding of analogy.  As a result, Torrance does not have the theological 
foundation to truly articulate a doctrine of creation and, therefore, a true Creator/creature 
 
 110  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 219.  
 111  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 219.  
 112  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 220.  Torrance does not use the terms ad intra and ad extra.  I use 
them to help explain what Torrance means by ‘within’ and ‘outwith’ the life of the Holy Trinity.    
 113  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 220.  
 114  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 220.  
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distinction.115  Torrance’s understanding of creation as proleptically conditioned by redemption 
confuses the proper understanding of the analogia entis.  This is why Torrance ends this section on 
analogy with the incarnation, i.e., God’s disruptive grace. 
 This concern factors so prominently in Torrance’s doctrine of God, at times God’s 
soteriological acts ad extra, merge with the very Being of God.  An eternalised covenant moves 
beyond the common conception of covenant as God’s condescension to a conflation of the God in se 
and God for us.   It is important to see this nuance in Torrance’s thought.  The conflation of 
ontological and economic is not intentional. However, the soteriologically conditioned way in which 
Torrance understands ‘the self-grounded Being of God’ leads to an articulation of theology proper 
that, at least at points, makes God’s being dependent on having a creation in need of redemption – 
God exists only as he is in communion with his people.  Torrance surely would say that it is not God’s 
being that is dependent on creation, but that our creaturely knowledge of God only comes, and can 
only come, through the economy of redemption.  And in the economy we learn that God is eternally 
for humanity.  Thus, God’s being ‘is his Being-in-Communion.’116  Torrance writes: 
While the Being of God is not to be understood as constituted by his relation to others, 
that free outward flowing of his Being in gratuitous love toward and for others reveals 
to us something of the inmost nature of God’s Being, as at once transcendent and 
immanent—God in the highest and God with us and for us, the divine ousia being 
understood as parousia and the divine parousia being understood as ousia. Hence it 
may be said that the Being of God is to be understood as essentially personal, dynamic 
and relational Being. The real meaning of the Being or I am of God becomes clear in 
the two-way fellowship he freely establishes with his people as their Lord and Saviour, 
for it has to do with the saving will or self-determination of God in his love and grace 
to be with them as their God as well as his determination of them to be with him as his 
redeemed children.117 
 
 115  Though writing of Barth, Susannah Ticciati’s critique of Barth’s doctrine of creation – that he 
actually does not have a doctrine of creation, only a doctrine of new creation (all grace and no nature) applies 
to Torrance as well.  See, Susannah Ticciati, ‘How New Is New Creation?  Resurrection and Creation Ex Nihilo,’ 
in Eternal God, Eternal Life: Theological Investigations into the Concept of Immortality, ed. Philip G. Ziegler 
(London: T&T Clark, 2016), 89-114.  
 116  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 124.  
 117  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 123-124.  
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It is true that God is only known as he makes himself known.118  However, this commixing of ousia 
and parousia is problematic as it blends together God ad extra and God ad intra once more.  More 
problematic is that this line of reasoning raises the question of whether or not God knows himself 
without his creatures and creation.  Of course, Torrance does not say this, and would not say this, 
but the way he formulates God’s self-revelation and human knowledge of God, often times I wonder 
if God can truly know himself, in and of himself, in Torrance’s theology.   
 The analogia entis has much to say about how we know God, but it is also related to God’s 
own divine knowledge.  As we will explore in the next section, related to the doctrine of analogy are 
God’s affections and (lack of) passions.  And God’s affections and (lack of) passions are related to 
God’s divine knowledge.  Muller writes, ‘God knows things because of himself or in his essence – not 
because of or by means of the things.  Since a passion has its foundation or origin ad extra and its 
terminus ad intra, it cannot be predicated of God and, in facts, fails to correspond in its dynamic 
with the way God knows.’119  A soteriological metaphysic makes God’s knowledge dependent on the 
contingent creation instead of God in himself.  If God’s being is a ‘Being in Communion’ how, then, 
does God truly know things as God apart from creation and creatures in Torrance’s theology?  The 





 Torrance returns once again to God’s self-naming as ‘I am who I am’ in order to set up his 
discussion of what it means for God to be immutable and impassible.  At work in Torrance’s 
 
 118  However, this knowledge is not restricted to soteriological knowledge.  There is a creational, 
natural, knowledge of God that God communicates to creatures made in his image and likeness living in his 
creation.    
 119  Muller, PRRD 3:554.  
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understanding of the divine perfections is his formulation of God’s being as personal being.120  
Whatever it means for God to be immutable, immutability is neither Aristotle’s unmoved mover, nor 
the ‘moved unmover’ of process theology.  Both deny God’s freedom.121  Rather, God is the self-
moved God who is free to become while remaining what he always has been, is, and will be. God’s 
immutability, then, is better understood as the constancy and faithfulness of his life.  God fulfils his 
eternal purpose of love in creation and redemption, manifested in Christ, so that we know that God 
is absolutely reliable.  Torrance here makes immutability a function of the covenant of grace, rather 
than a metaphysical perfection of God.  God’s immutability is only known in history as God keeps 
and fulfils the promises of his covenant in Christ.  Torrance is certainly correct that God’s character is 
revealed through this salvation history.  However, Torrance’s foundation of God’s faithfulness is 
God’s self-revelation, not what and who God is ontologically.  Torrance does something similar with 
the related perfection of impassibility.    
 If all that impassibility means is that God is not reactionary, then Torrance agrees with his 
Reformed tradition.  Torrance distances himself from a metaphysical construal of impassibility.  
Better, says Torrance, is a soteriological approach, governed by God’s self-revelation.  If the 
homoousion is true, then in some way God is involved in the suffering of our world and in the 
suffering of the atonement.122  Appealing to the great soteriological principle that Jesus became 
poor so that we might become rich, Torrance affirms the fathers’ maxim, ‘the unassumed is the 
unredeemed.’123  From this, Torrance reasons that impassibility must be understood in this way.  
This is quite different than the typical Reformed understanding of immutability and impassibility that 
expresses that creation, and historical events, do not cause God to change or react in a way that 
 
 120  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 218-219. 
 121  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 239.  
 122  For Torrance, the homoousion leads us to see that the Son’s passion, his desire to redeem, his 
response to fallen humanity, falls within the being of God.     
 123  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 250.  
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violates his nature.  Torrance’s understanding of impassibility changes its meaning from something 
like ‘God cannot change and is not reactionary’ to ‘God is faithful.’   
 Informing Torrance’s theology of the divine perfections is his recurring concern to show that 
God is a God who is for his people.  Therefore, a true understanding of the doctrine of God must 
take seriously texts that speak of God’s love and care for creatures.  Any true apprehension of God 
must be able to understand God as ‘I Am’ as the God who also hears the cries of his people (Ex 3:7).  
Torrance’s pastoral instinct is correct and one that the Christian tradition has long attempted to 
explain.  Owen himself makes such an attempt in his interactions with the Socinian John Biddle who 
could not conceive of a static passionless god.  Thus, Biddle shares many of Torrance’s critiques of 
Owen’s Thomistic doctrine of God.124  The Reformed Orthodox agree that God is for his people, but 
this must be informed by theology proper. In order to articulate this in a way consistent with their 
doctrine of God, the Reformed Orthodox develop a long-standing distinction between God’s 
passions and affections.   
 It is possible that Torrance is unaware of this distinction, but this is unlikely.  The real reason 
Torrance does not make use of this distinction is that it is dualistic and employs a metaphorical and 
analogical understanding of God.  However, against any notion of an Unmoved Mover understanding 
of God, the Reformed Orthodox ‘assume that God has affections that characterize his relationship to 
the world and that some analogy can be drawn between these “divine affections” and the affections 
that belong to human willing.’125  Given that divine affections are understood in this analogical way, 
to say that God has affections is not to say that God changes essentially.  At the same time, a 
theology of divine affections very clearly avoids any conception of a static god.  Rather, God’s 
affections for his people are what lead God to act for them in history.126  Thus, affection speaks of 
God’s desire toward his people.  Yet, to say this is not to say that God is passionate for his people.  
 
 124  This is not to suggest that Torrance is a Socinian, but merely to point out the similarity of their 
critiques.    
 125  Muller, PRRD 3:553.  
 126  Muller, PRRD 3:553.  
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This distinction is very important.  The Christian tradition historically rejects passions in God because 
a passion acts upon the subject, in this case God.  Muller explains, ‘More important, the direction of 
the relationality is different in affections and passions:  affects are dispositions toward 
something…while passions are dispositions derived from something, such as suffering caused by 
something or someone other than one’s self.  It is in this sense of the terms that God is said to have 
affections but not passions.’127 
 And it is precisely this understanding of passion that Owen employs to answer Biddle.128  In 
rejecting this traditional understanding Biddle forces himself into an anthropopathism that posits 
affections and passions to be ‘really and properly in him [God] as they are in us.’129  Clearly, Torrance 
is not a Socinian, but something similar happens theologically when this distinction, which is built 
upon quid sit Deus that Torrance rejects, is lost.  To say it another way, when soteriology and history 
take the place of metaphysics, however inadvertently, God’s being is now founded on something 
contingent.  Torrance is correct to link God’s faithfulness with God’s immutability, but the link falls 
apart when the foundation of God’s faithfulness is contingent.  Both history and covenant are 
contingent realities outside of God himself.130  As Charnock says, ‘Mutability belongs to contingency; 
if any perfection of his nature could be separated from him, he would cease to be God.’131  God’s 
faithfulness, his ‘unchangeableness’ does ‘necessarily pertain to the nature of God’ not God’s 
historic revelation of himself or even an eternal covenant relation.132  To lose God’s immutability, or 
to redefine it in terms of creaturely contingency, is to lose a true theology of all of God’s perfections.  
Again Charnock explains: 
Immutability is a glory belonging to all the attributes of God. It is not a single 
perfection of the divine nature, nor is it limited to particular objects thus and thus 
 
 127  Muller, DLGTT:19.    
 128  Owen, Works 12:108.  Although, recall that Owen equates affections and passions arguing that 
neither can be attributed to God.   
 129  Owen, Works 12:109.  
 130  Of course, for Torrance they are not, but this is precisely the problem.    
 131  Stephen Charnock, The Complete Works of Stephen Charnock, vol. 1, Discourses on Divine 
Providence and The Existence and Attributes of God (1864; repr., Carlisle, PA:  Banner of Truth Trust, 2010), 
381.    
 132  Charnock, Works 1:381.  
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disposed. Mercy and justice have their distinct objects and distinct acts; mercy is 
conversant about a penitent, justice conversant about an obstinate, sinner. In our 
notion and conception of the divine perfections, his perfections are different; the 
wisdom of God is not his power, nor his power his holiness, but immutability is the 
centre wherein they all unite. There is not one perfection but may be said to be, and 
truly is, immutable; none of them will appear so glorious without this beam, the sun of 
immutability, which renders them highly excellent without the least shadow of 
imperfection.133 
Torrance has little recourse even to speak confidently of God’s continued faithfulness and, 
therefore, no real doctrine of the divine perfections.  This is why there is never a real development 
of the divine perfections in Torrance’s theology.134  
 
God’s Decrees  
 
 Torrance’s lack of quid sit Deus also leads him to redefine what is traditionally meant by 
God’s decrees.  In the Reformed tradition, the decrees of God are the ‘eternal, unchangeable 
purposes of his will, concerning the being and well-being of his creatures.’135  God’s decrees, then, 
are works ad intra founded upon the immutable God who carries out his decrees through the works 
ad extra of creation and providence.  However, for Torrance, this way of understanding confuses 
nature and grace and is an abstraction.136  To be more precise, God’s decrees are an abstraction 
when they are understood apart from the incarnate Word of God.  Torrance asks, ‘But what decree 
of God is there which is not also His Word, and the very Word who was made flesh in Jesus 
Christ?’137  While Torrance’s reading of the tradition is debatable, he claims that the trajectory of 
 
 133  Charnock, Works 1:381.  
 134   Holmes writes, ‘What is strikingly absent in Torrance’s doctrine of God is a doctrine of God’s 
attributes.’  Christopher R.J. Holmes, ‘Thomas F. Torrance and the Trinity,’ T&T Clark Handook of Thomas F. 
Torrance, ed. Paul D. Molnar and Myk Habets (London, UK:  T&T Clark, 2020), 171.  The closest Torrance comes 
are chapters 8 and 9 in Christian Doctrine of God.  It is these chapters that I draw from in this section.  
Importantly, this is a major difference with Barth who has much to say about God’s perfections.  See, Barth, CD 
II/1.29; Christopher R.J. Holmes, Revisiting the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes: In Dialogue with Karl Barth, 
Eberhard Jϋngel, and Wolf Krötke, Issues in Systematic Theology, vol. 15, ed. Paul D. Molnar (New York, NY:  
Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), 53-55. 
 135  Owen, Works 1:473.  
 136  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxvii.   
 137  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxviii.    
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Reformed theology proper follows this Christocentric path until the development of the Westminster 
Catechisms.138  In Westminster theology, Torrance claims, ‘Here we have quite clearly and definitely 
a combination with the Reformed doctrine of God of more abstract conceptions derived from 
scholasticism, with correspondingly strong stress upon God’s eternal and immutable decree.’139  To 
understand God in this way is to go behind the back of Jesus Christ incarnate by formulating an 
understanding of God independent from the person of Christ and then adding onto this generic 
conception ‘the knowledge of God revealed in the Person and Work of Christ.’140  The real mistake is 
that theology proper must not, indeed, cannot begin with God ad intra.  God does exist in se, but 
creatures have no way of knowing this apart from God’s disruptive, yet gracious, self-revelation in 
and through his Son.  Therefore, ‘it is not some prior ontology, but Christology which is all-




 Torrance’s rejection of metaphysics (quid sit Deus) is costly.  Behind Torrance’s theology 
proper is an ever present focus on who is God at the expense of what is God.  God’s being is 
personal, Torrance says.  Yet, theology can never truly rid itself of metaphysics altogether.  So, then, 
Torrance’s rejection of quid sit Deus, forces him to build a metaphysics focused solely on qualis sit 
 
 138  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxix.  Torrance claims that the catechisms of Calvin, John Craig, and, 
Heidelberg, and the Scots Confession mostly avoid abstraction.   
 139  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxix.    
 140  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxviii.    
 141  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxiii.   In Theological Science, Torrance writes, ‘Theological knowledge of 
God is not concerned with God in the abstract, with God as He is simply in Himself, as it were, as if our 
knowledge of God could be cut off from the fact that it is after all knowledge of God by man on earth and in 
time.  Theology is concerned with God as the Creator of the world, and therefore with God in His relation to 
the world of creaturely realities.  It is concerned with God as the heavenly Father who enters into communion 
with men as His children, and therefore with God in His relation to man and indeed with man in his relations to 
God…In theology, then, we have to do with God only as He has established man in the world in a relation to 
Himself, only as He has revealed Himself to man as Creator and Redeemer within the creaturely objectivities of 
the world, but for that reason we are committed in all theological activity to maintain faithful and responsible 




Deus.  This is why Torrance constructs a soteriological metaphysic.  And it is just this methodological 
commitment that proves so costly in the end because it shifts Torrance away from classical and 
traditional approaches to the doctrine of God into an approach that Sonderegger calls ‘theistic 
personalism.’142  Much of Torrance’s theology is driven by this understanding of God as person.  This 
is clear when Torrance claims that Calvin steers the doctrine of God away from what is God to who is 
God.143  Torrance is not alone as theistic personalism plagues much of modern theology that 
assimilates ‘the question of Deity into the question of identity.’144 This assimilation intentionally 
seeks to keep ‘substance metaphysics’ out of theology proper.145  Such an approach to theological 
reflection understands God’s omnipotence, for example, by beginning with created power and 
reasoning that God has an infinite amount of such power.  Most likely, Torrance would object to this 
claim as his method is meant to provide knowledge of things as they really are in themselves.146  
Torrance is clear that we are not to let things of creation inform how we understand God, but let 
God inform how we are to understand created realities – the analogia entis is reversed.  It seems, 
then, that Torrance must begin with salvation to understand God because God is only known 
disruptively by his soteriological acts.  Without the foundational understanding of God as ultimate 
reality, then God is simply a personified version of a human being and not independent and separate 
from the world he has made. 
 Torrance readily affirms creation ex nihilo.  However, at least classically speaking, Torrance’s 
own methodology can only speak of a salvation ex nihilo.  Torrance is on to something.  Creation ex 
 
 142  Katherine Sonderegger, ‘The God-Intoxicated Theology of a Modern Theologian,’ International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 21, no. 1 (January 2019), 24.  In this article, Sondregger attempts to show that 
John Webster never escapes theological personalism and is a good introduction to what is meant by this term 
‘theological personalism.’  See also, Oliver Crisp, Analyzing Doctrine:  Toward a Systematic Theology (Waco, TX:  
Baylor University Press, 2019), 33-34, 42-43.   
 143  Torrance, ‘The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition,’ 5-16.  This claim is highly 
debatable.    
 144  Sonderegger, Systematic Theology 1:xi.    
 145  Sonderegger, Systematic Theology 1:xi-xii.    
 146  Torrance’s view of revelation departs from Calvin’s understanding of God’s condescension and 
‘babbling’.  In Calvin, God’s revelation is accommodated to creatures.  In Torrance, the human mind can 
somehow know God in himself as their minds conform to God’s revelation.  This seems to be inconsistent with 
Torrance’s understanding of grace.    
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nihilo is vital for understanding how God can redeem sinners, those who have fallen into the 
nothingness of sin and now exist in that realm of nothingness and death.  Reflecting on the 
nothingness and death symbolised by Sarah’s barrenness and God’s promise of descendants to 
Abraham, St. Paul in Rom 4 argues that God ‘makes alive the dead and calls those that have no 
existence into existence.’  Clearly, there is an allusion back to God’s speaking of creation into 
existence – creatio ex nihilo – in order to describe the nature of salvation.  However, Torrance’s 
reading of redemption as proplectically present already in creation ends up denying the very 
doctrine of creation he seeks to affirm.  Creation after the fall is not good simply as creation.  Even 
God’s good world is soteriologically understood and conditioned.   
  Furthermore, Torrance’s rejection of the analogia entis, as we have seen, is at its core a 
rejection of quid sit Deus as well.  In Torrance, God is the one who is ‘wholly other.’  God is not like 
the creatures he makes.  However, in place of a true Creator/creature distinction we are left with an 
eternal covenant of grace and a real relation of God to the world.  Theologically, this move causes 
Torrance to collapse God’s existence into his essence and God’s essence into his existence.  This is 
the case because Torrance’s metaphysical rejection posits no real essence of God, but only an 
existence-in-act.  Act is intrinsic to existence, but act follows existence.  God must exist so that he 
can truly act both ad intra and ad extra.  Torrance blends together God’s acts and existence precisely 
because he does not distinguish between them.   
 Torrance’s soteriological concerns are pastoral and very commendable.  However, the 
ontological approach to immutability and impassibility lays the very foundation that allows us to say 
that God is faithful, the very foundation from which God immutably carries out his decrees.  What is 
more, Torrance’s formulation shows what happens when history is divorced from God in se.  
Working within a Kantian framework, Torrance can only formulate his understanding of God’s 
perfections on his dialectical understanding of God’s disruptive grace.  Covenant history, a 
contingency, is made the foundation of God’s divine perfections.  Replacing the metaphysical 
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foundation with an historical and soteriological one has implications, not only for God’s divine 
perfections, but for all of theology.  Once ontological categories are rejected, it becomes much 
easier to say that God suffers or that even God dies on the cross as Torrance himself does.147   
 Theological personalism is, I think, behind Torrance’s desire to show that God is for us at 
every point—God is so much for us that we begin to wonder if God can be God without us.  A telling 
example of how this plays out in Torrance’s thought is when Torrance writes of God’s love in The 
Christian Doctrine of God.  Torrance’s concern for God’s unity and God’s love is commendable, yet, 
his idea that God loves us more than he loves himself is problematic.  In fact, if God does not love 
himself more than anything else, than the glory of his love is lost.  Only because God is love, and 
therefore loves himself above all else, can God love us unconditionally.   While Torrance warns us to 
not read human understandings of father into God as Father, it seems that this is precisely what 
Torrance does here.148  A good human father will love his children more than he loves himself.  For 
instance, a human father’s love would likely cause him to push his child out from in front of an 
oncoming training knowing that when he does, he himself will be struck.  However, this is not how 
God loves.  This sounds lovely, but is driven by Torrance’s theological personalism and is 
theologically problematic.   This example of God’s love, clearly shows how Torrance’s soteriological 
metaphysic leads to a doctrine of God that is subsumed under soteriology – already we see that 
Torrance’s theology proper sets him up to conclude that God dies on the cross.   
 Initially, I was persuaded that Torrance’s reading of the Reformed tradition was correct.  
Therefore, I believed that his soteriological approach was the way to avoid a static and detached 
God.  And while I greatly appreciate Torrance’s Christcentred and pastorally motivated theology, as I 
read Torrance in light of the Augustinian and Reformed tradition, I became convinced that 
Torrance’s understanding of God in se leads to more problems than it solves given the way Torrance 
 
 147  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 248, 250-252.  I will return to this important move later when 
discussing Torrance’s Christology.   
 148  In this way, Torrance understands God in the very way he warns that the analogia entis does – as 
a bigger and greater version of ourselves.    
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relates God ad intra to God ad extra.  When theological reflection begins with God for us instead of 
God in himself, the result is that contingent history becomes necessary for God to be God, I now 
believe.  To say otherwise is to collapse God’s being and acts.  As I begin to re-evaluate Torrance’s 
approach to theology proper, I was struck by how often the Psalms speak of God doing good in the 
world because God is good.  Ultimately, Scripture led me to understand that distinguishing God in se 
and God for us is vital for properly speaking of both what and who God is.  Speaking of God in this 
way helps us to avoid commixing God’s being and act.  However, in Torrance, this admixture of 




Chapter 6: Torrance on Three Persons, One Being 
 
 As we turn now to consider Torrance’s theology of the three divine persons, his 
understanding of the relationship between hypostasis and being is key to his construction.  
Torrance’s theology of the divine persons builds upon and develops concepts he finds in Athanasius.  
Torrance finds Athanasius’ ‘profound revision in the meaning of οὐσία and ὑποστάσεις as used in 
Christian theology’ particularly helpful.1  While Athanasius agrees that God is one being in three 
persons, at times Athanasius uses being and person interchangeably.2  Yet, during the debates with 
the Arians, these theological concepts of person and being change and take on more specific 
meanings.3  God reveals himself as Father, Son, and Spirit, indeed, as three persons, but three 
persons who are the one being of God.  Therefore, to know God in and through Christ and the Holy 
Spirit ‘who inhere in his own eternal being,’ is to know him as he really is ‘in the inner relations of his 
own triune being.’4  This understanding of being and persons is crucial in Torrance’s thought and, as 
we shall see, it pushes his theology of the divine persons in a modalistic direction.  
 Torrance’s modalistic drift means there is much overlap between his theology of God as one 
and the three divine persons.  For instance, Torrance returns to Athanasius’ conception of personal 
being, just as he does when discussing God’s being.  Athanasius’ revisions change the understanding 
of being from one that is static to one that is dynamic and personal.  As Torrance incorporates this 
insight into his formulation of the three divine persons, the distinction between De Deo Uno and De 
Deo Trinitas is not readily apparent.    Torrance explains that ‘when associated with God’s self-
revelation in three distinct objective ὑποστάσεις as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, οὐσία signifies the 
one eternal being of God in the indivisible reality and fullness of his intrinsic personal relations as the 
Holy Trinity.’5  God’s revelation is of God’s persons, but if God is one, then each of the persons are 
 
 1  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 310.  
 2  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 310.  
 3  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 310-311.  
 4  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 311.  
 5  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 311.    
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fully God.  As a result, God’s self-revelation and self-giving are ‘intensely personal.’6  And because 
God makes himself known in revelation, God’s being is personal.  Torrance writes, ‘Far from being an 
abstract or general notion, therefore, οὐσία as applied to God had an intensely personal and 
concrete meaning.’7  Building upon his interpretation of Athanasius, Torrance holds that the three 
divine persons are all the one personal being of God because they mutually indwell one another.8 
 Lying behind Torrance’s discussion of perichoresis is his understanding of homoousion.  
Torrance follows Athanasius, explaining ‘that we must think of this coinherence as applying equally 
to the homoousial interrelations between the Spirit and the Son, and the Spirit and the Father, and 
thus to the whole Trinity, for unless the Being and Activity of the Spirit are identical with the Being 
and Activity of the Father and the Son, we are not saved.’9  There is no separation, nor even a true 
distinction, of the ontological Trinity and soteriology in Torrance.  God’s ‘inner coinherent relations’ 
uphold ‘the bond between the soteriological and ontological understanding of the Faith inherent in 
the homoousion.’10  Following the tradition in his own unique way, Torrance uses this concept of 
perichoresis to explain this bond.   
 Specifically, Torrance develops his understanding of the divine persons by investigating their 
perichoretic relations, or onto-relations.  Therefore, in this chapter, first, I will discuss what an onto-
relation is for Torrance.  Second, I will unfold Torrance’s understanding of the three divine persons 
as the distinct persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  With this understanding in place, I 
will then show more specifically how Torrance understands perichoresis.  Understanding the mutual 
 
 6  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 311.  
 7  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 211.  
 8  Explaining God’s unity in terms of perichoresis is commonly found in theological personalism.  In a 
helpful, and though provoking comment – that applies to Owen as well as Torrance – Crisp writes, ‘Theistic 
personalism emphasizes the fact that God is a person, like a human person, except for the fact that God is 
disembodied, perfect, and without defect of any kind.  It is a short, though crucial, step from this claim of 
theistic personalism to the notion that divine persons of the Godhead are centers of will and action and co-
operate within the divine life by means of the intimate relations they bear one another in perichoresis.  On this 
way of thinking the divine persons mutually interpenetrate one another so that together they share a single 
divine life.’  Crisp, Analyzing Doctrine, 43. 
 9  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 168.  
 10  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 169.  
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indwelling of the three divine persons is necessary in order to properly understand Torrance’s 
construction of God’s Monarchia.  Perichoresis, Torrance argues, deepens our understanding of 
God’s Monarchia.  Last, I will conclude this chapter by showing how Torrance’s theology of God’s 
monarchia reveals a modalistic tendency in Torrance’s construction of the three divine persons that 
comes precisely because of Torrance’s soteriological metaphysics.  The result of this construction is 
that, at least at times, Torrance conflates God’s being with the divine persons, causing his theology 




 The communion of God’s one being is also a communion of the three divine persons ‘who in 
their perichoretic interrelations are the one Being of God.’12  This concept of perichoresis is very 
important in Torrance’s theology of the three divine persons.  However, before we turn specifically 
to the mutual indwelling of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we must first understand 
Torrance’s onto-relational concept of a person.13  An onto-relation, for Torrance, ‘is the kind of 
relation subsisting between things which is an essential constituent of their being, and without 
which they would not be what they are.  It is a being-constituting relation.’14  The ‘primary instance’ 
of an onto-relation is the person, a concept introduced to the world by Christian theologians seeking 
to articulate the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of Christ.15  Torrance argues that the development 
of Trinitarian doctrine leads to a ‘new concept of a person’, yet his construction is more innovative 
 
 11  For an overview of Torrance’s Trinitarian theology, see, Holmes, ‘Torrance and the Trinity,’ 161-
172.  
 12  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 136. Notice the emphasis on being that we will find throughout 
Torrance’s theology of the divine persons.   
 13  On onto-relations, see, Colyer, How to Read, 308-312; Gary W. Deddo, ‘The Importance of the 
Personal in the Onto-relational Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,’ T&T Clark Handook of Thomas F. Torrance, 
ed. Paul D. Molnar and Myk Habets (London, UK:  T&T Clark, 2020), 143-160. 
 14  T.F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology:  The Realism of Christian Revelation (Downers 
Grove, IL:  InterVarsity Press, 1982), 42-43. Already, we find that Torrance’s category of onto-relations is about 
the being of the things, or persons, under consideration.    
 15  Torrance, Reality and Evangelical, 43.  
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than traditional at this point.16  Nevertheless, this new concept helps Torrance explain how the three 
divine persons are the one God.  In a paragraph very important for this chapter, Torrance explains 
how this all fits together in his mind: 
It was in connection with this refined conception of perichoresis in its employment to 
speak of the intra-trinitarian relations in God, that Christian theology developed what I 
have long called its onto-relational concept of the divine Persons, or an understanding 
of the three divine Persons in the one God in which the ontic relations between them 
belong to what they essentially are in themselves in their distinctive hypostases. Along 
with this there developed out of the doctrine of the Trinity the new concept of person, 
unknown in human thought until then, according to which the relations between 
persons belong to what persons are. Just as the differentiating relations between the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit belong to what they are as Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, so the homoousial relations between the three divine Persons belong to what 
they are in themselves as Persons and in their Communion with one another.17 
Here, Torrance wants to affirm the oneness of God, but also the true, distinct divine persons.  
However, Torrance’s account of ‘differentiating relations’ and ‘homoousial relations’ is not 
completely clear.  Differentiating relations seem similar to Thomas’s construction of the three divine 
persons’ relations of opposition, but it appears that Torrance is concerned that the persons’ oneness 
is not clearly affirmed with simply the concept of differentiating relations.18  Therefore, Torrance 
adds another type of relation, a homoousial relation, because Torrance is concerned to show that 
the three distinct persons are the one being of God.  Torrance is wrestling with how to hold the 
three and one together. Because he fears erring by Arianism or dualism, he focuses more on God’s 
unity and, therefore, God’s being, even as he speaks of the distinct persons.   
 As is the case with Aquinas, Calvin, and Owen, Heb 1:3 is an important text in Torrance’s 
thought.19  That the Son is the hypostasis of the Father is why the Christian tradition develops this 
new concept of person.   The Church’s understanding of person develops as the concept of 
hypostasis changes from its Greek impersonal and static meaning to a personal and dynamic 
 
 16  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 102.  
 17  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 102-103.  Importantly, Torrance constructs his understanding of the 
divine relations more by appeal to perichoresis than to the relations of origin. 
 18  Aquinas, ST I q., 28, a. 1 and a. 3.    
 19  The interpretation of hypostasis in Heb 1:3 in the thought of Aquinas, Calvin, and Owen is the 
subject of chapter 4.    
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meaning.  Whereas Aquinas, Calvin, and Owen differ on whether or not the hypostasis refers to the 
Son’s divine essence or to his incarnate person, such a distinction does not exist in Torrance.  The 
divine Son and the incarnate person are one and the same.  Torrance does not deny Christ’s pre-
existence or say there is no God in se, but the God we meet in the person of Christ is God in se.  If he 
is not, then we are left with a God detached from us and who is not really for us.  We are left with 
the impersonal Hellenistic God that Christian theologians distance themselves from in this very 
development of the concept of hypostasis.20  As a result, Trinitarian theology, says Torrance, begins 
to associate hypostatsis with God’s name and God’s face (i.e., God’s presence with his people) and 
Trinitarian dogma, then, takes on a very personal and dynamic idea ‘to such an extent that it became 
suitable to express the identifiable self-manifestation of God in the incarnate economy of divine 
salvation as Father, Son and Holy Spirit – that is, as three distinctive hypostatic Realities or 
Persons’.21   
 This transformation of the concept of hypostasis allows Torrance to speak of the onto, or 
substantive, relations of the three divine persons rather than understanding the three divine 
persons as ‘modes of being’ as some do.22  Torrance writes:  
The relations between the divine Persons are not just modes of existence but 
hypostatic interrelations which belong intrinsically to what Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
are coinherently in themselves and in their mutual objective relations with and for one 
another. These relations subsisting between them are just as substantial as what they 
are unchangeably in themselves and by themselves. Thus the Father is Father precisely 
in his indivisible ontic relation to the Son and the Spirit, and the Son and the Spirit are 
what they are as Son and Spirit precisely in their indivisible ontic relations to the 
Father and to One Another. That is to say, the relations between the divine Persons 
belong to what they are as Persons—they are constitutive onto-relations. ‘Person’ is 
an onto-relational concept.23 
 
 20  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 156.  
 21  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 156.  
 22  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  
 23  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  Torrance claims here to follow Gregory of Nazianzen and not 
'the other Cappadocians and Didymus the Blind' who spoke of modes of being.  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 
157.  Also, while Torrance does not mention Barth, he likely has Barth in mind as Barth prefers to speak of 
modes of being when formulating his understanding of the divine persons.  Barth writes, 'The concept of the 
revealed unity of the revealed God, then, does not exclude but rather includes a distinction (distinctio or 
discretio) or order (dispositio or oeconomia) in the essence of God.  This distinction or order is the distinction 
195 
 
The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one, not only as the ‘one Being in common’, but also in their true 
distinguishing characteristics that ‘hypostatically intertwine with one another and belong 
constitutively to their indivisible unity within the Trinity.’24  God’s being is not ‘whole or complete’ in 
any one (or two) of the persons, but only as all three share this ‘indivisible and continuous 
relation.’25  Onto-relations, then, speak of the ‘holistic interrelations between the three divine 
Persons’ that allow for each person to be what and who they are as persons.26  Clearly, then, 
Torrance affirms the three distinct persons of the Trinity.  However, Torrance’s understanding of 
ontic relations is one that posits a relation of being, not of person.  Torrance writes, ‘There is an 
indivisible and continuous relation of being between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit so that 
the Being of the Godhead is understood to be whole or complete not in the Father only but in the 
Son and in the Holy Spirit as well.’27  It is true that each of the divine persons is the being of God, but 
this is precisely why there is not a ‘relation of being’ but a relation between the divine persons.  
Torrance’s shift is subtle, but his overriding concern for God’s being leads to the blending of being 




 Continuing his focus on God’s unity, Torrance is clear that the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit are truly three persons, but they are not three individuals.  Torrance writes, ‘In this way the 
concept of perichoresis serves to hold powerfully together in the doctrine of the Trinity the identity 
of the divine Being and the intrinsic unity of the three divine persons.’29  Perichoresis helps to 
 
or order of the three "persons," or as we prefer to say, the three "modes (or ways) of being" in God.'  Barth, 
CD I/1.9.   
 24  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  
 25  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  
 26  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  
 27  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  
 28  Related to this is Torrance’s revision of the Trinitarian order of the divine persons, which we will 
explore below when we examine Torrance’s construction of God’s monarchia.    
 29  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 102. 
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express the divine persons ‘ontological derivation from the communion of Love in the Being of God 
between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who wholly interpenetrate and coinhere in one another in 
such a way that their personal distinctness as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit remains inviolate.  The 
Triune God is not only a fullness of personal Being in himself, but is also person-constituting Being.’30   
 Exegetically, perichoresis seeks to explain texts like John 14:10-11 that say the Son is in the 
Father and the Father in the Son.31  Perichoresis, then, honours the distinct persons, but says that 
each of the three persons wholly contain one another.32  Torrance is very careful to say that his 
understanding of perichoresis avoids a static, Greek conception of God’s unity.  Torrance writes, ‘It is 
important to note that perichoresis has essentially a dynamic and not a static sense, with the 
meaning of mutual indwelling and inter-penetrating one another in the onto-relational, spiritual and 
intensely personal way’.33  In order to help make his point, Torrance develops an understanding of 
the divine personas as enhypostatic.  Torrance writes:   
Since God is Spirit and God is Love, we must understand the perichoresis in a wholly 
spiritual and intensely personal way as the eternal movement of Love or the 
Communion of Love which the Holy Trinity ever is within himself, and in his active 
relations toward us through the Holy Spirit from within his homoousial relations with 
the Father and the Son. In this homoousial way the Holy Spirit is in himself the 
enhypostatic Love and the Communion of Love in the perichoretic relations between 
the Father and the Son, and as such is in himself the ground of our communion with 
God in the Love of the Father and Son. This was precisely the theme developed by the 
Apostle John in his Epistles, which had such a far-reaching impact on St Augustine.34 
 
Here, Torrance is building upon Epiphanius who applies the homoousion to the inner relations of the 
Trinity, as well as Cyril of Alexandria who writes of the ‘dynamic coinherence or mutual containing of 
 
 30  Torrance, Reality and Evangelical, 43. Athanasius, Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzus, John of Damascus, 
Augustine, Epiphanius, Basil, and Cyril of Alexandria are Torrance’s dialogue partners in this construction of 
perichoresis. 
 31  ‘πιστεύετέ μοι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί·  εἰ δὲ μή, διὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτὰ πιστεύετε.  
12 ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ τὰ ἔργα ἃ ἐγὼ ποιῶ κἀκεῖνος ποιήσει καὶ μείζονα τούτων 
ποιήσει, ὅτι ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα πορεύομαι.’   
 32  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 169.  Here, Torrance builds upon ideas he finds in both Athanasius 
and Hilary.  For Torrance’s understanding of the historical development of the concept of perichoresis see:  
Christian Doctrine, 169-171.   
 33  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 171.  
 34  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 171.  
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the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit essentially and enhypostatically within the Holy Trinity.’35  
There is no division within the Trinity.  The three divine persons are not simply with each other, but 
as God they mutually indwell one another.  Even with their own incommunicable properties, the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are united.36   
 
God the Eternal Father 
 
 God the Father is the almighty Creator, but he is also eternally the Father of his Son.  ‘The 
Almighty is Father, and the Father is Almighty.’37 Therefore, God as Father takes priority over God as 
creator.  In fact, the opening of the Nicene Creed makes this very point.  God is Father before he is 
Almighty.  Torrance elaborates the importance of this in his theology:  ‘There the omnipotence of 
the Creator, his power over all existents and realities whether visible or invisible, is not defined in 
some abstract metaphysical way, but is defined quite concretely with reference to God precisely as 
Father – it is such that he is the one eternal self-grounded Being who is the Source and Lord of all 
that was, is and ever will be.’38  The Father, then, must be understood as a Father who is eternally 
for his people.  Torrance writes: 
Nevertheless, as the Father Almighty, God does not exist for himself alone. While he is 
the ungrudging creative Source of all being distinct from himself, he has given his 
creatures a reality and a rationality of their own in continuous dependence on himself 
but delights to maintain them throughout all time and space in unceasing relation to 
himself and his providential purpose for them. This means that God directs us in our 
knowledge of him not to some superessential realm beyond the space-time universe 
which he has brought into being out of nothing but to his unceasing interaction with us 
in the midst of our creaturely and historical existence where in his loving purpose he 
makes himself known to us as our God and Father. And this means that our knowledge 
of God the Father is through his revealing and reconciling activity in the incarnate 
oikonomia and parousia of his Word by whom all things that are made were made, the 
 
 35  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 171.  Muller says this construction is found within the tradition but 
that it is not a common one.  Muller, DLGTT:106. 
 36  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 172.  
 37  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.  
 38  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.    
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Word who was with God and was God, but who in the fulfilment of God’s eternal 
purpose became flesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth.39  
Thus, Torrance’s conception of Father is one that begins in the history of salvation, in the economy 
of redemption.  That is to say, Father is only understood through the lens of history and soteriology 
and not through his being the Begetter.  The Trinitarian order does little work in Torrance’s 
innovative theology of the divine persons.  Torrance is certainly correct that we only know God as 
we exist in history and in a creaturely way.  However, Torrance’s theology of revelation limits what 
we can know of the Father such that even Scriptural texts that speak of God in se are redefined 
soteriologically.  Compared to Owen, Torrance’s narrowing of revelation is more extreme and more 
intentionally aligns God ad intra with God ad extra.  It is striking how often Torrance speaks of the 
economic Trinity even when discussing the persons’ interrelations, but it reveals that his 
soteriological metaphysic is at work throughout this Trinitarian theology.40  Any suggestion of 
dualism must be guarded against.   
 What is more, for Torrance, the Father is most fully known at the cross.41  In the Old 
Testament, God is rarely called Father.  When God is called Father, it is ‘almost exclusively in 
contexts concerned with redemption.’42  In such passages, father connotes God’s special relation to 
Israel.43  However, the idea of God as Father in the Old Testament is general and is more a title than 
a proper name.44  In the New Testament, Torrance argues,  ‘we find a radical change in the 
understanding of God, for “Father” is now revealed to be more than an epithet – it is the personal 
Name of God in which the form and content of his self-revelation as Father through Jesus Christ his 
Son are inseparable.’45 
 
 39  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.  
 40  Unsurprisingly, there is no real development of the Father's begetting of the Son and the Son's 
generation from the Father.  Torrance does not dismiss the concept of generation, but it does not do much 
work in his theology due to his soteriological starting point.      
 41  Recall how Torrance connects Jϋngel to Barth and Athanasius in chapter 5.    
 42  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 55.  
 43  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 55.  
 44  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 56.  
 45  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 56.  
199 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Torrance has a limited theology of God’s perfections.  
Whatever is known of God’s perfections are what the Son reveals.  This means that Torrance 
understands God’s almighty power only in terms of what God does and not what God is.  The Father 
is Father because he eternally generates the Son – something he does – though he does not 
generate the Son because he is Father.46  The Father as Creator does providentially care for his world 
and his creatures, but even this is understood in terms only of what God does in his creation.  
Torrance’s understanding of revelation leads to his conflation of the persons as he suggests that in 
the Son the Father comes to us.  It is only through God’s self-revelation in Christ that we truly know 
the Father ‘for it is through his unique filial relation to the Father that the nature of the Father is 
revealed to us, Father precisely and peculiarly as Father of the Son…Fatherhood and Sonship belong 
inseparably together in the one eternal Being of God.’47  Jesus Christ is God’s act and there is ‘no 
God but the God we see and meet in’ Christ because ‘there is no God behind the back of Jesus.’48  Of 
course, Jesus himself does say, ‘If you have seen me, you have seen the Father.’49  Yet, due to 
Torrance’s soteriological metaphysic, Torrance suggests that not only the Son comes to us, but the 
Father as well.  Torrance explains, ‘It is as the Father of the Son that in his love God has freely 
condescended to be our Father, and to make us his sons and daughters by grace.’50  The Father’s 
relation to the Son is ‘the inner ontological framework of the Gospel message.’51  And once this inner 
framework is revealed in the incarnation, ‘all our knowledge of God the Father, undefined before, 
now becomes defined.’52  God is known only through his gracious disruption in Christ.  In part, this is 
because Torrance’s foundation is built upon the divine persons’ perichoretic relations rather than 
God’s good nature. 
 
 46  Admittedly, Torrance does not make this nuanced point, but the logic of his understanding 
suggests this to be the case.     
 47  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.   
 48  Thomas F. Torrance, James B. Torrance, and David W. Torrance, A Passion for Christ: The Vision 
that Ignites Ministry, ed. Gerrit Dawson and Jock Stein (Eugene, OR:  Wipf & Stock, 2010), 17.  
 49  John 14:9. ‘ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν πατέρα.’    
 50  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.  
 51  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.  
 52  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 138.  
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 Thus, the incarnation is the ‘ontic and the epistemic link’ between God the eternal Father 
and God the Father of Jesus Christ.53  Who God is in himself, he is the same in relation to creatures.  
Torrance writes, ‘We are not given to know the one Fatherhood without the other Fatherhood, for 
they are one and the same Fatherhood whether God is considered as he is in himself in eternity or 
whether he is considered as he is toward us in time.’54  For Torrance, this distinction preserves God’s 
freedom to be for his people.  God is eternally Father apart from his people.  Therefore, his love is 
utterly free and his grace unconditional.55  God does not love his people because he needs his 
people to be a Father who loves, though Torrance’s argument at times risks implying the opposite.  
For instance, it is hard to see how equating God in se and God for us preserves God’s freedom as it 
seems to imply the opposite.  And while Torrance does mention the Son’s unique relationship to the 
Father, he also says that God as eternal Father and God as our Father in time ‘are one and the same 
Fatherhood.’56   
 Throughout Torrance’s theology of God the Father, his soteriological starting point leads to 
an inadequate distinction of persons in his thought.  For instance, a more traditional understanding 
of God as Father would not say that the Father condescends to us.  It is true that the Son makes 
known the Father, but the Father does not go to the cross.57  Rather, the Son does, precisely so that 
in Christ, we might, by grace, return to the Father.  Torrance’s focus on perichoresis at the expense 
of the processions and missions introduces confusion and conflation into his thought on this point.  
Strictly speaking, it is true the Son makes known the Father. The Father has no procession, and, 
therefore, no mission.  Thus, to speak of the Father’s condescension is problematic.  The Father 
sends the Son and, thereby, makes himself known to the world.  Torrance’s merging of being and 
persons pushes his understanding in a modalistic direction at this point.  Affirming with Scripture 
 
 53  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 141.  
 54  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 141.  
 55  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 141.  
 56  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 141.  
 57  The tendency in Torrance, and much modern theology, to say that God dies on the cross results 
from an underdeveloped doctrine of Christ’s two natures.  I will explore this in Torrance in a later chapter.   
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that Christ reveals the Father need not violate the Trinitarian order of operations.  The Father sends 
he does not come.  The Son truly reveals the Father because of their common essence and united 
will.   In Christ’s divine nature, God is present on earth, but the person of the Father is not. 
 Furthermore, God’s love for his Son is not free in the same way that God’s love is free for his 
contingent creatures.  If the Son is eternal, which he is, then the Father loves the Son eternally.  To 
love the Son and the Holy Spirit is not the Father’s voluntary decision, but is the eternal reality of the 
one God who exists in three persons.  As the Scriptures teach, God is love.  Furthermore, equating 
the love the Father has for the Son with the love the Father has for his people diminishes, or at least 
confuses, the unconditional nature of grace.  Jesus Christ is God’s natural Son.  Creatures return to 
the Father through the Son by the grace of adoption.  Torrance’s understanding of the relation 
between God’s being and act and God’s self-revelation lead him to speak of his love for his Son as a 
creaturely love or his love for his people as the very same love he has for the Son.58  If we lose the 
distinction between God’s natural Son and God’s adopted children, then we also lose the 
Creator/creature distinction.  What is more, if God is wholly other, it is hard to see how Torrance can 
speak of God’s love for his natural Son as the same as his love for his adopted children.  Perhaps the 
problem is that ‘absolute otherness is not transcendence, but merely a kind of “negative 
immanence”; for true transcendence must be beyond all negation.’59  Torrance’s soteriological 
metaphysics undermines God’s transcendence, but it allows Torrance to speak of God’s love in this 
way.  A fatherly love made known through God the Son, but one that conflates the divine persons 
and therefore, the Creator/creature distinction as well.  Here, we clearly see the importance of 
theology proper to all of theology. 
 
 
 58  Torrance’s understanding of God’s love seems to be influenced by theological personalism.    
 59  David Bentley Hart, The Hidden and the Manifest: Essays in Theology and Metaphysics (Grand 
Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2017), 99-100.  
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God the Son 
 
 As no one knows the Father, but the Son, so too no one knows the Son except for the Father 
who makes him known.  In his incarnate mission from the Father, the Son is what he eternally is in 
himself.  If the Son is not divine, then the gospel has no divine reality and there is no reconciliation 
or hope for humanity.  ‘Everything,’ says Torrance, ‘hinges on the unqualified oneness of the Father 
and the Son who are with the Holy Spirit the One Lord in whom we believe and whom we love and 
worship.’60  This is why the homoousion is so prominent throughout Torrance’s works.  Anything that 
looks like a dualism is a recapitulation of the Arian heresy for Torrance.  Jesus is God, and the 
homoousion proves this to be the case.  Therefore, in the incarnation, we can be sure that in Christ 
God is truly revealed.  Torrance writes, ‘In the incarnation God has communicated his divine Self to 
us in Jesus Christ…The knowledge of Jesus Christ as the eternal Son of God is given to us only in the 
trinitarian structure of God’s revealing of himself through himself, that is, as Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit.’61  Notice once more, the focus is on God’s being revealed through the persons.  Even here, 
Torrance’s focus on divinity, due to his aversion to dualism, leads his theology of the Son in a slightly 
modalistic direction.  The Son as homoousion does more than articulate the Son’s divinity in 
Torrance’s theology.  Torrance is clear that the Son is divine, but the real concern is that God in 
himself is truly what he is in his revelation and activity in Jesus Christ.62  Torrance writes of the Son, 
‘His revelation of God was made through embodying God’s self-revelation and self-giving to mankind 
in himself as the Son of Man, in the form of his personal Being as the one Mediator between God 
and man.’63 
 As the Son of God and Son of Man, Jesus Christ ministers both the things of God to man and 
the things of man to God. This twofold movement, and the Father-Son relation, must not be 
 
 60  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 142.  
 61  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 143.  
 62  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 143.  
 63  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 143.  
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understood merely as an external relation of persons, but as subsisting eternally within the being of 
God.  The result of this formulation is that both the incarnation and the atonement occur in the ‘Life 
and Being of God.’64  We will return to the incarnation and atonement in a later chapter, but for now 
it is enough to see how Torrance understands the Son’s relation to the Father and Holy Spirit within 
the Holy Trinity.  This is an understanding that once again leads to a hasty identification of God’s 
being and person.  
 As Torrance continues to unfold his theology of the Son, the stress on God’s unity remains.  
Torrance says we can understand the Son’s relation to the Trinity both absolutely and relatively.65  
The Son considered absolutely is God in se, true God of true God.  The Son as God is everything that 
the Father and Holy Spirit are, except that he is not the Father or the Holy Spirit.66  ‘When 
considered in himself, he is himself very God, and has divine Life from himself.’67  The Son 
considered relatively, ‘ad alium’, is a particular and distinct person, ‘yet of the same equal being with 
them so that he constitutes hypostatically with them the eternal Communion of the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, three Persons, one Being.’68  The particular and ‘individual characteristics’ of the 
persons do not separate them, ‘but constitute their deep mutual belonging together.’69  The Son, as 
well as the Father and the Holy Spirit, indwell each of the other persons ‘homoousially and 
hypostatically.’70  However the incarnation (and the atonement) is something new in God’s being: 
Since the Father-Son relation subsists eternally within the Communion of the Holy 
Trinity we must think of the incarnation of the Son as falling within the eternal Life and 
Being of God, although, of course, the incarnation was not a timeless event like the 
generation of the Son from the Being of the Father, but must be regarded as new even 
 
 64  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 144.  
 65  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 144.  
 66  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 145.  
 67  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 144.  Immediately after this sentence, Torrance cites John 5:26:  
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ἔδωκεν ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Torrance’s translation 
of the verse is correct, but his interpretation seems to read the Son as autotheos into the text.  That the Son is 
given (by the Father) to have life in himself should, I think, be read to reflect the Trinitarian order.  The Father, 
as fountain, generates the Son and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.  Torrance seems to follow Calvin and 
the idea of the Son as a se, or autotheos; that is not found in the ancient church’s exegesis of John 5:26.    
 68  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 145.  
 69  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 145.  
 70  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 145.   
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for God, for the Son of God was not eternally Man any more than the Father was 
eternally Creator.71 
This must be true if being and act cannot be separated.  Once again, the lack of a robust theology of 
processions and missions has ontological ramifications.  Torrance’s avoidance of the processions and 
missions to formulate his theology of the divine persons is related to his convergence of being and 
person, which is related to Torrance’s melding of God’s being and act, which all are the product of 
Torrance’s identification of God in se by God for us.  
 
God the Holy Spirit  
 
 Torrance’s explanation of God the Holy Spirit follows a similar path as his theology of the 
Son.  Absolutely, the Holy Spirit is also very God of very God.  The being, ousia, of the Holy Spirit is 
the same being as the Father and the Son.  Absolutely, ‘God is Spirit’ speaks of God’s deity ‘without 
distinction of Persons, and is equally applicable to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.’72  
Relatively, the Spirit is a distinct person, or hypostasis, who together with the Father and Son, are 
intrinsic to the one being of God.73  The Holy Spirit is homoousion just as the Son and ‘like the Father 
and the Son’ is ‘both ousia and hypostasis, and with the Persons of the Father and the Son is 
eternally in God and inseparable from him who is one Being, three Persons.’74   Importantly, just as 
the Son and Spirit indwell one another, in their missions there is an indwelling of the Son and Spirit 
in us.  In his mission, ‘the Holy Spirit does not bring to us any independent knowledge of God or add 
any new content to God’s self-revelation, but while the knowledge of the Spirit himself as well as of 
the Father is derived through the Son, it is mediated and actualised within us through the presence 
and activity of the Holy Spirit.’75  The Spirit is sent as the Spirit of truth, who, as the Spirit of the 
 
 71  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 144.  
 72  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 148.  
 73  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 147-148.  
 74  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 148.  Torrance’s description of the divine persons as in God rather 
than the persons are God understands the divine persons in a way similar to theological personalism.    
 75  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 147.  
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Father and the Spirit of the Son, leads the church into all truth ‘and is recognised accordingly as 
himself God, true God of true God.’76  Again, notice that Torrance cannot leave behind soteriological 
considerations for long as he constantly turns back to God for us.   
 The objective ground of our reception of the Holy Spirit is Christ’s reception, who having 
received the Spirit without measure, gives the Spirit to his people.  Therefore, we are united to the 
Father.  There is a correspondence between the indwelling of the Son and the Spirit with the 
indwelling of the Spirit in the people of God.  This indwelling is objective and leaves no room for 
subjective introspection.  Torrance explains, ‘While corresponding to the mutual indwelling of the 
Spirit and the Son in the Holy Trinity there arises through the two-fold mission of the Son and the 
Spirit an indwelling of the Spirit and the Son in us, and an indwelling of us in the Father through 
union with them, this is essentially an “objective inwardness”’.77  In union with Christ, we participate 
in the communion of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – the communion that the three divine persons 
‘have among themselves and are in themselves.’78  We participate in Christ’s saving acts that are 
‘grounded objectively in the homoousial Communion of the eternal Spirit and eternal Son in the Holy 
Trinity.’79  Therefore, there is no separation of ‘theologia’ and ‘oikonomia’, there is no separation of 
God’s being and act.  Here, we see how much soteriology informs Torrance’s theology of the divine 
persons.    
 This correspondence between the Spirit’s perichoresis and the Christian believer’s union 
with Christ in the Spirit is important for understanding Torrance’s theology of the person of the Holy 
Spirit.  Torrance expands this idea in an important passage: 
Regarded in this way, from his internal enhypostatic relation to the Trinity, the Holy 
Spirit is to be understood as the presence to us and with us of the Lord God in the 
ever-living and ever-active reality of his divine Being. The fact that God is Spirit and 
that the Holy Spirit is God means that far from being static the Being of God is 
essentially and eternally dynamic. Hence the presence among us of the Holy Spirit is 
the immediate parousia (παρουσία) of the dynamic Being (οὐσία) of God in his 
 
 76  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 147.  
 77  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 148.  
 78  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 148.  
 79  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 149.  
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sublime Holiness and Majesty as the Lord God Almighty, the transcendent Creator and 
Lord of all existence from whom and in whom we live and move and have our being. It 
must be emphasised, therefore, that in the Spirit we have to do with God in the unity 
of his Being and his Act.80  
While theologians most often use enhypostatic to speak of Christ’s human nature, it is used less 
often, as Torrance uses it here, to refer to the perichoresis of the divine persons.81  Importantly, 
Torrance employs this concept to once again stress the being, not the person, of the Holy Spirit.  The 
Spirit does not so much come in his divine mission doing his work of revealing the Father and Son, as 
he comes simply as the being of God in salvation history.  Very clearly, then, we see the interrelation 
of revelation and God’s act and being and the modalistic drift of Torrance’s theology of the Holy 
Spirit. 
 It could be claimed that Torrance is simply following the tradition that holds the works of 
God ad extra are undivided. In fact, Torrance says something similar to this: 
While God is the Holy Trinity of three Persons, there is yet one divine activity 
(ἐνέργεια) and one divine Being in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. It is this 
unity of Activity, and unity of Being, and the unity of the Trinity, which force 
themselves upon our faith and understanding when we know God in the Spirit, and 
know the Spirit himself as the divine Person who in his oneness with the Father and 
the Son realises and actualises among us the presence and power of God’s eternal 
Being. When the Holy Spirit is in us, God is in us and the Son is in us also. Thus it is 
particularly as we move from the doctrine of the Son to the doctrine of the Spirit that 
we have to think of the one Being of God in his Acts, and of the one Activity of God in 
his Being. That was true both of the theology of Athanasius in his conception of the 
Activity of God as inhering in the very Being of God as ἐνούσιος ἐνέργεια, and of the 
theology of Karl Barth in his conception of the Being of God in Act and of the Act of 
God in his Being. Any separation between the Being and the Activity of God would 
imply that God is not after all in himself always and reliably what he is toward us 
through his Son and in his Spirit, and that, so far as the Spirit is concerned, it would 
imply that God is not really by Nature what he imparts to us through his Son and in his 
Spirit.82 
Torrance seems to mean something different than the traditional doctrine of inseparable 
operations.  The primary revelation, whether by the Holy Spirit or the Son, is God’s very being.  
Therefore, Torrance says more than the traditional formulation because, for Torrance, God’s act is 
 
 80  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 149.  
 81  Muller, DLGTT:106.  
 82  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 149.  
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Jesus Christ.  Yet, if the Son exhausts the act and activity of God, there seems to be little place for 
the Spirit to truly be the Spirit.  Torrance’s Christ-exclusive constraining of revelation is at work once 
again.  As a result, Torrance does not adequately account for the need to also emphasize the lack of 
confusion between being and act.  God’s being and act are not separate, but they are distinguished.  
The result of merging being and act together, leads to Torrance’s slightly modalistic conception.   
 
Summary of the Divine Persons  
 
 Lastly, a fair summary of Torrance’s understanding of the three divine persons is that, for 
Torrance, the onto-relations of the three divine persons are ‘their being for one another.’83  The 
three divine persons all participate in God’s one divine activity.  The goal of this divine activity is the 
revelation of God as Trinity who is love.84   Torrance explains: 
In the incarnate Son the whole undivided Trinity was present and active in fulfilling the 
eternal purpose of God’s Love for mankind, for all three divine Persons have their 
Being in homoousial and hypostatic interrelations with one another, and they are all 
inseparably united in God’s activity in creation and redemption, not least as those 
activities are consummated in the incarnate economy of the Son.85  
To recap, this quote makes clear what I have argued thus far.  Torrance’s theology of the divine 
persons conflates God’s being and the divine persons due to his soteriological metaphysic.  The Son 
is the being common to the three divine persons, but the ‘undivided Trinity” is not in the Son.  The 
Son is not the Father or the Holy Spirit though he is fully divine.  Torrance blurs the divine procession 
 
 83  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 163.  
 84  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 162-163.  
 85  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 162.  Torrance continues, repeating what he said about God’s love in 
chapter 5:  ‘In refusing to spare his dear Son but in delivering him up in atoning sacrifice for us all, God the 
Father reveals that he loves us with the very Love which he bears to himself, and that with Jesus Christ he 
freely gives us all things. If God is for us in this way what can come between us? And in giving us his one Spirit 
who proceeds from the Father through the Son and sheds abroad in our hearts the very Love which God 
himself is, God reveals that there is nothing that can ever separate us from him in his Love. Through the Son 
and in the Spirit, we are taken into the triune Fellowship of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy 
Spirit. Thus in an utterly astonishing way the Holy Trinity has committed himself to be with us and among us 
within the conditions of our human and earthly life in space and time, but, it need hardly be said, without 
being subjected to the processes and necessities of created space and time, and without in the slightest 
compromising the mystery of his divine transcendence.’  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 162.  
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resulting in this modalistic drift found throughout his theology of the divine persons.  Such a 
foundation remains insecure.   
   
God’s Monarchia 
 
 As we have seen, the concept of perichoresis, for Torrance, clarifies the onto-relations of the 
three divine persons.  More specifically, perichoresis explains ‘the coordination that obtains between 
them [the divine persons] and their unity in the divine Monarchia.’86   Athanasius’ reflections on 
perichoresis ‘provided the theological basis for the doctrine of coinherence’ by deepening and 
refining ‘the concept of the homoousion which gave expression to the underlying oneness in being 
and activity in the incarnate Son and God the Father upon which everything in the Gospel 
depended.’87  Torrance finds Athanasius using homoousion, not only as a way to speak of the 
oneness of the divine essence, but as a way to clarify the real distinctions of the divine persons ‘and 
their coinhering with one another in the one Being of God.’88  The three persons do not merely 
communicate their distinct properties to one another (communicatio idiomatum), but mutually 
indwell one another.89  Perichoresis, then, helps to conceptualize that even when we speak of the 
divine persons, the Trinity may be known only as a whole.  Even if we are to focus on one of the 
persons, that person is fully God.90  Again, Torrance’s focus is on the unity of God more than the 
persons, even when Torrance considers the persons.   
 
 86  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 168.  I am not sure what Torrance means by ‘the coordination that 
obtains’, but given the context of this chapter, I think Torrance is speaking of what he calls the ‘coinherence’ of 
the three divine persons.  That is to say, ‘the coordination that obtains’ is the perichoresis of the persons. 
 87  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 168-169.  
 88  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 169.  Torrance’s blurring of the divine persons is not intentional.  The 
three persons really are three persons, but the way Torrance formulates the divine processions and God’s 
monarchia do not escape the modalistic drift at work in this thinking.    
 89  Perhaps this is how Torrance reads a more Thomistic theology of divine missions and processions.  
If that is the case, Torrance misunderstands Thomas, but it helps to explain why he moves toward perichoresis 
at the expense of processions.  
 90  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 169.  Torrance admits that Athanasius does not use the terms 
perichoresis or coinherence, he finds the concept present in Athanasius’ construction of homoousion.  
Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 169. 
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 At least in one sense, then, God’s unity takes priority in Torrance’s Trinitarian thought.  
Perichoresis is a refining of the homoousion applied to the whole Trinity that deepens our 
understanding of God’s ‘indivisible wholeness.’91  As a result, perichoresis must ‘govern our 
understanding of the divine processions and missions of the Son and the Spirit from the Monarchy 
which, without a lapse into a remnant Origenist subordinationism, cannot be limited to the Father.’92    
Perichoresis ‘does not dissolve the distinctions between the three divine Persons unipersonally into 
the one Being of God.’93  Without diminishing the divine persons, perichoresis rejects ‘any Arian or 
partitive conceptions of Deity.’94  The three divine persons are not dualistically detached, but indwell 
and interpenetrate each of the other persons while remaining distinct persons.  However, Torrance’s 
prioritizing of God’s unity does mean that ‘perichoresis has much to say about about the order, or 
τάξις, that obtains between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.’95   
 Torrance unfolds his understanding of the Trinitarian order from the ‘ordinance of Baptism 
in the Name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.’96   The three persons all are the one Name 
of God.  While Torrance strongly defends that each person is of the one being of God, the order of 
the divine persons is significant.  As a result, he explains why this order is important: 
In this dominical statement, which is of primary importance in the Church’s 
formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the Father comes first: it is to him that 
the Lord Jesus Christ directs us through himself as the Son of the Father. Moreover, 
although in the order of our knowing the Son comes first, in the order of God’s triune 
Being it is the Father who comes first precisely in virtue of his being the Father of the 
Son. The relation of the Son and the Father is irreversible, for ‘the Son is from the 
Father, not the Father from the Son’. The Father comes first because he is the Father, 
although the Son is not less divine because he is the Son of the Father for there is no 
difference in Being or Nature between them. It is to be remembered, of course, that 
God the Father is not Father without the Son, for the Sonship of the Son belongs to the 
very Being of the Father and the Nature of his Fatherhood.97 
 
 91  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 174.  
 92  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 174.  
 93  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 175.  
 94  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 175.  
 95  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 175.  
 96  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 137.  Torrance does not cite Matt 28, or show that baptism is into the 
one name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but he seems to work within this basic understanding of the Great 
Commission.    
 97  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 137.   In this quote, Torrance cites Augustine, De Trinitate, 4.20.27.   
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Given what Torrance does with God’s monarchia, this passage is quite interesting.  Torrance has no 
time for a Trinitarian order of persons that speaks of the Son or Holy Spirit deriving from the 
Father.98  Torrance rightly understands that order does not mean hierarchy.  Properly understood, 
Torrance cannot completely disregard the order of the persons due to the biblical texts and the 
importance of the Father/Son relationship in his theology.  However, notice that even in this 
affirmation of Trinitarian order, which traditionally is an order of the divine persons, Torrance once 
again focuses on God’s being.  When Torrance says the sonship of the Son belongs to the being of 
the Father, what he means is that the Son is fully divine.  What this brief section on perichoresis 
shows is that because of Torrance’s conflation of person and being, perichoresis replaces a theology 
of the divine processions.  Torrance writes, ‘It is in the light of this eternal περιχώρησις of the three 
Divine Persons in God, or the coindwelling and coinhering of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
in One Another, that we are to understand the mission of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the gift 
of the Holy Spirit by the Son.’99  Rather than understanding the mission of the Holy Spirit as based 
upon the Spirit’s eternal procession, the foundation of mission, in Torrance, is perichoresis.100  While 
clearly using the concepts of processions and missions, neither one features prominently in 
Torrance’s theology of the inner-Trinitarian relations.   
 
 98  This is one way in which Torrance differs quite significantly from Barth.  Torrance aligns his 
understanding of the monarchia of God with Gregory of Nazianzen, but claims Barth’s doctrine of the divine 
persons is more in line with Basil.  See, Bruce L. McCormack, ‘The Doctrine of the Trinity after Barth:  An 
Attempt to Reconstruct Barth’s Doctrine in the Light of his Later Christology,’ in Trinitarian Theology after 
Barth, ed. Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (Cambridge, UK:  The Lutterworth Press, James Clarke & Co., 2011), 
87.  McCormack relays a private conversation with Torrance and insightfully says, ‘This, then, is Torrance’s 
point of difference with Barth – and it is a substantial one.  For what it requires is an affirmation of two things: 
1) that “Father” is not a name for the divine “essence” or ousia, but is rather the name of a relation…and 2) 
that each person of the Trinity has his being “of himself” ( a se).’  McCormack, ‘Trinity after Barth,’ 88n0.4.  
McCormack is quoting, Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 29.  Torrance’s claim that Gregory of Nazianzen 
follows his take on God’s monarchia is debatable.      
 99  Thomas F. Torrance, ed., Theological Dialogue Between Orthodox and Reformed Churches, vol. II 
(Edinburgh:  Scottish Academic Press, 1985), 224.    
 100  Joseph D. Small makes the same point, see:  Joseph D. Small, ‘Orthodox and Reformed in Dialogue:  
The Agreed Statement on the Holy Trinity,’ in The Witness of Bartholomew I: Ecumenical Patriarch, ed. William 
G. Rusch (Grand Rapids, MI:  William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 121.    
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 Torrance’s aversion to analogy lies behind his decision to replace processions with 
perichoresis.  And lying behind Torrance’s aversion to analogy is his fear of dualism or subordination 
within the Trinity.  If the Son or Spirit is less than the Father, they are ‘detached’ from God and 
therefore not God.  Torrance writes, ‘Both the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit 
are incomprehensible mysteries which are not explicable through recourse to human modes of 
thought.  Hence, as Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen insisted, we must set aside all analogies 
drawn from the visible world in speaking of God.’101  To speak of the Father generating the Son, in 
some ways, depends on the analogy of a mother giving birth – at least it seems this is how Torrance 
thinks – and, therefore, such an analogy is not useful for understanding how the Son relates to the 
Father.102  Following this revised understanding of Trinitarian order, motivated by Torrance's 
rejection of analogy, Torrance constructs one of the most innovative parts of his entire theological 
project:  God’s monarchia.  I will first discuss Torrance's understanding of God's monarchia before 
returning to his rejection of analogy. 
 Monarchia refers to the biblical teaching that the Son is begotten from the Father and that 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son.  Traditionally, the Father is the source, or fountainhead, 
of the Trinity, not because of his superiority, but because he has no procession.  At the heart of the 
Trinitarian order are the divine persons’ origins of relation.  However, notice how Torrance defines 
the monarchy of the Father:  
When considered absolutely God the eternal Father is the one Principle of Godhead, 
the μόνη Ἀρχή, Μοναρχία, or the Monarchy, but when the Father is considered in his 
inseparable oneness in Being with the Son and the Spirit, as One Being (μία οὐσία), 
then the Monarchy, as we shall see, is to be thought of as identical with the Holy 
Trinity, for it is not limited to one Person, since each divine Person is the whole God.103 
Importantly, Torrance has no place for an understanding of the Trinitarian order that would create a 
hierarchy among the persons, nor does he have any place for the Son and the Holy Spirit deriving 
 
 101  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 157.  
 102  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 158.  
 103  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 141.  
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their deity from the Father. 104   The Son is eternally Son, or else the Father would not be eternally 
Father.  As eternal Son, he is of the very being of God, just as the Father and Spirit are as well. Any 
distinction, or biblical language about the priority of the Father, or the subordination of the Son or 
Spirit, speaks only of God for us.  The Father as Ἁρχή must not mean that the Father is the cause or 
source of the Trinity.105  The Father is ‘first precisely because he is Father, but not as Deifier’.106 
Perichoresis helps express this deep reality without falling into the error of thinking of God in a 
partative way, and keeps us from falling into any notion of subordination within the onto-relations 
of the Trinity.    Furthermore, perchoresis and homoousion, argues Torrance, also show that the Holy 
Spirit does proceed from the Father through the Son (the East-West split was unnecessary according 
to Torrance) or the Trinity is divided.  And if the Trinity is divided, there is no salvation.  For Torrance, 
the monarchia of God removes all dualistic ways of understanding God, and it removes ‘any anxiety 
about the Nature of God, or any temptation to think of God behind the back of his three-fold self-
revelation—there is no such God.’107   
 However, what Torrance does next is innovative as he locates the procession of the Son and 
the Holy Spirit in God’s being.  Torrance writes:  
The name ‘Father’, then, may refer to the one Being or οὐσία of God, but it may also 
refer to the Person or ὑπόστασις of the Father. In this particular sense and use, as 
Gregory Nazianzen held, ‘Father’ is to be understood as the name for the relation or 
schesis (σχέσις) the Father bears to the Son, and is not a name for being or ousia. This 
does not mean, however, that the Son is to be thought of as proceeding from the 
Person of the Father (ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Πατρός), but from the Being of the 
Father (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός), as in the pronouncement of the Council of 
Nicaea.108 
Torrance nuances his understanding of Father that shifts the divine procession away from the divine 
persons.  It is true that the Father communicates his essence to the Son and the Holy Spirit.  
However, Torrance’s use of Father posits a procession that is not from the Father who is the being of 
 
 104  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 176.  
 105  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 180.  
 106  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 179.      
 107  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 177. 
 108  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 141.  
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God, but from the being of God who is often called Father in Scripture.  Torrance’s concern of 
dualistic modes of thinking leads him to this revised understanding of the Son’s procession – one 
that conflates, I would suggest, God’s being and persons.  The Son’s procession from the person of 
the Father is quite important theologically.  The three divine persons do not reside in God as 
Torrance gets close to saying at points.  The three divine persons are the one God.   Once again, 
lacking in Torrance is an important distinction.  In speaking of God, some things are said ‘substance-
wise’ and others are said of the divine persons.109   
 Torrance does something similar with the procession of the Holy Spirit.  In part, Torrance 
attempts to bring ecumenical consensus on the filioque clause by investigating the patristic sources 
and arguing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from ‘the one Being of God the Father.’110  What Torrance 
does is make the Spirit’s procession a function of the divine ousia instead of the divine persons just 
as he does the Son.  Locating monarchia in God’s being avoids any notion of the Trinity containing 
two principles, Torrance claims, as many in the Eastern Church feared.111  The Eastern theologians:  
defended this with reference to the teaching of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, which 
implies a distinction between procession and mission, that is, as they interpreted it, 
between the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father, and the historical 
mission of the Spirit from the Son. The pattern exhibited in the latter reflects the 
former in virtue of the fact that what the Father does he does through the Son, as Basil 
pointed out.  Does this mean that the sending of the Spirit by the Son has to do only 
with revelation and faith, and is not grounded immanently in the eternal Being of 
God? If so, would that not call in question the full homoousial relation of the Holy 
Spirit to God the Father?112  
The East, Torrance explains, often defends this understanding of procession and mission by 
appealing to the distinction between ‘the divine Being and the divine energies.’113  However, this 
tends toward apophatic theology and no real knowledge of God’s inner life.  In Torrance’s mind, this 
is a dualistic way to think.  The homoousion and perichoresis save the filioque, because the three 
 
 109  Augustine, De Trinitate, V.5.    
 110  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 186.  
 111  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 186.  This claim is debatable, because many would argue that 
locating the processions in God’s being necessarily leads to two principles within the Godhead.   
 112  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 186-187.   
 113  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 187.  
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divine persons mutually indwell one another as the One God.  Thus, ‘the Spirit is from the Father but 
from the Father in the Son.  Since the Holy Spirit like the Son is of the Being of God, and belongs to 
the Son, since he is in the Being of the Father and in the Being of the Son, he could not but proceed 
from or out of the Being of God inseparably from and through the Son.’114  Torrance’s argument is 
intriguing, but I am not persuaded, theologically or exegetically, that it is correct to formulate an 
understanding of the procession and mission of the divine persons as from the one divine Being.  
God is one, but the relations of origin, procession and generation, are ways to speak of how the 
divine persons relate to one another as the one God.  Perichoresis leads Torrance away from a true 
theology of the divine processions and to this innovative construction.  Torrance is motivated by his 
ecumenical concerns at this point, but also his soteriological emphasis on the revelation of God’s 
being.  The result is that two registers of discourse – some things are said substance wise, others are 
said relationship wise – are eclipsed and the crucial distinction Scripture maintains is elided.   
 
Relations of Origin  
 
 This elision is related to Torrance’s rejection of analogy introduced above and leaves 
Torrance’s theology with an underdeveloped theology of the divine relations.  It is true that Torrance 
develops his theology by making use of the divine perichoretic onto-relations, but, as we have seen, 
this leads to conflation in Torrance’s thought – conflation that drifts in a modalistic direction 
precisely because the foundation of the relations is God’s being and not the divine relations of 
origin.  Torrance’s theology of God’s monarchia leaves no room for real divine relations, because 
locating the persons in God’s essence does not allow us to understand the relations of opposition 
that exist between the three divine persons.  Torrance uses the language of opposition (ad alios) 
when he speaks of his understanding that the Father ‘relatively’ is the Father of the Son.115  This is 
 
 114  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 188.  
 115  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 140.  
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close to a relation of opposition, though Torrance does not work with an Augustinian or Thomistic 
understanding.116  Torrance is quite innovative in saying that Father understood ‘absolutely’ applies 
to the Trinity.117  In a traditional Thomistic understanding, ad alios or ad aliud do not refer to two 
different ways of understanding Father, but are a way to understand the divine relations.  The 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one yet ‘to the other’ they are also truly distinct.118  Aquinas’ 
understanding of the divine relations holds together Torrance’s concerns.  Emery explains, ‘Relative 
opposition consequent on origin does not just put the real distinction of the divine persons on show.  
It also exhibits the inseparability of the persons, because a relative, as such, cannot exist without its 
correlate.’119  Torrance’s revision of monarchia leaves no room for real divine relations, because he 
employs a revised understanding of God absolute (being) and God relative (persons).   
 Traditionally understood, divine relations are real but not essential.  Therefore, when the 
divine relations are compared to God’s essence, God’s essence takes priority.120  To speak of God’s 
essence, or being, is to speak of God as one not three.  Torrance’s recasting of monarchia conflates 
the persons and being because any notion of a true relation of opposition between the divine 
persons drops away.  To say it another way, Torrance's focus on the person as being leaves no place 
for any real understanding of the divine persons.  This is the case because as soon as we speak of 
God's being, the persons are no longer in view precisely because God's being is one not three.   
Friedman explains:  
This is because a relation’s particular characteristic (its ratio, in Aquinas’ terminology) 
is to refer to another, but when a divine relation is compared to the divine essence, it 
is referring not to another, but rather to itself, since when compared to the essence 
the relation is the essence, differing in a merely rational way.  This is equivalent to 
saying that the divine relations do not inhere in the divine essence and make no 
composition with it.  The divine relations, however, can also be compared to the term 
to which they refer – all relations are toward something, since that is their particular 
characteristic.  When a relation is so compared, it is, according to Aquinas, really 
 
 116  See, Aquinas, ST I, q, 28, co.   
 117  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 140.  
 118  Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 97.  
 119  Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 97.  
 120  See, Emery, Trinitarian Theology, 97-102; Russel L. Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought from 
Aquinas to Ockham (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13-14. 
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(realiter) distinct from the correlative opposite to which it is being compared.  This is 
how the real distinction between the persons comes about.121 
Replacing the divine relations with homoousial perichoretic onto-relations leaves no room for the 
persons to be truly distinct persons – there is no true ad aliud in Torrance’s theology of the divine 
persons.  Locating procession within God’s being necessarily loses the persons precisely because the 
three persons are the one God.   
 Torrance’s fear of dualism plays out in his discussion of theology of the divine persons.  
Though Torrance is clear that the one God is three persons, the focus in his theology leans heavily on 
God’s oneness.122  This, in part, is why Torrance commingles persons and being.  This seems a bit odd 
given Torrance’s dislike of the ‘static’ De Deo Uno that he believes hampers the Western church's 
articulation of the doctrine of God.  However, through this investigation of the divine persons, what 
emerges, I think, is the point that revelation and theology proper are synonymous in Torrance.  The 
God made known in Christ is the true and real God.  The God we encounter in history is Christ, who 
is wholly God, and is not divided – there is no God behind the back of Jesus Christ.  Thus, even 
perichoresis is a way to conceptualize, not so such the three divine persons, but God’s unity.  
Torrance writes:   
Perichoresis reinforces the fact that the Holy Trinity may be known only as a whole for 
it is as a whole that God makes himself known to us through himself and in himself as 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  It enables us to appreciate more fully the truth that the 
Holy Trinity is completely self-grounded in his own ultimate Reality, and that God’s 
self-revelation is a self-enclosed novum which may be known and interpreted only on 
its own ground and out of itself.123 
Notice how Torrance relates perichoresis and epistemology, and, therefore, revelation.  Torrance’s 
desire to rid theology of dualism leads Torrance to the economy.  Soteriology, the incarnate Christ, 
 
 121  Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 13-14.  
 122  This leads Gunton to claim that Torrance is really more Augustinian than he admits.  See Colin E. 
Gunton, Father, Son and Holy Spirit:  Towards a Fully Trinitarian Theology (London:  T&T Clark, 2003), xiv.  
Although Dean, rightly I think, says this claim ‘is contestable, however, in light of how Torrance’s programmatic 
distinction between the Father’s “Person” and “Being” radically redefines God’s Fatherhood.’  Benjamin Dean, 
‘Person and Being:  Conversation with T.F. Torrance about the Monarchy of God,’ International Journal of 
Systematic Theology vol. 15, no. 1 (January 2013): 62. 
 123  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 173.  
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revelation, is theology proper in that God reveals himself as he is ‘in his indivisible wholeness.’125  
Soteriology motivates Torrance’s understanding of perichoresis.  What God is in Jesus Christ and the 
Holy Spirit, he really is ‘inherently and eternally in himself.’126  Furthermore, perichoresis and 
homoousion, ‘enables us to read back the interrelations between the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit in the economy of salvation into the eternal relations immanent in the one Being of God.’127  
Yet, if the God we encounter in Christ is God as he truly is, in Christ we, somehow, encounter God in 
his ‘indivisible wholeness.’128  
 In light of this, Torrance’s discussion of Trinitarian order is intriguing.  Torrance rightly 
understands that order within the Trinity must not be understood as saying that the Son and the 
Holy Spirit are subordinate to the Father as we think of God in himself.  Jesus’ statements that the 
Father is greater (Jn 14:28) must be understood soteriologically and not ontologically.129  Torrance 
explains, ‘In other words, the subjection of Christ to the Father in his incarnate economy as the 
suffering and obedient Servant cannot be read back into the eternal hypostatic relations and 
distinctions subsisting in the Holy Trinity.’130  There is no subordination in the ontological Trinity.131  I 
agree with Torrance, yet I wonder if his reasoning at this point contradicts his entire argument, 
namely, that whatever God reveals in the incarnate Christ is in the inner life of God.  Torrance 
himself feels the tension in this theology.  For example, Torrance writes: 
It is, then, in the activity of the economic Trinity alone that we may learn something of 
the activity of the ontological Trinity, for we believe that the pattern of coactivity 
between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit in the economic Trinity is through the 
Communion of the Spirit a real reflection of the pattern of the coactivity of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit in the ontological Trinity. It is indeed more than a reflection 
of it, for it is grounded in it, is altogether inseparable from it, and actually flows from 
it. While not everything that took place in the historical economy can be read back into 
eternity, the intrinsic oneness between the coactivity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
 
 125  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 174.  
 126  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 172.  
 127  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 172.  
 128  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 174.  
 129  Recall that Owen reads John 14:28 as referring to the covenant of redemption and not merely 
Christ’s economic subordination to the Father.   
 130  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 180.  
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in the economic Trinity and their coactivity in the ontological Trinity are 
soteriologically and epistemologically absolutely essential.132  
This quote is important for understanding the conflation at work in Torrance’s theology.  Recall that 
it is true that a being acts, but that action follows being.  Even when thinking of the ontological 
Trinity, Torrance begins with ‘activity.’  There is a ‘real reflection’, which Torrance, following Barth, 
at times calls a correspondence between God’s economic self-revelation and God in se.  However, 
Torrance’s theology is so soteriologically conditioned that I am not convinced there is a ‘real 
reflection’ of God in se in Torrance’s theology.  To be fair, Torrance is not denying the ontological 
Trinity, but rather trying to establish the ontological Trinity in a Christocentric way.  However, as I 
have said before, Torrance’s theology is really more soteriological than Christological.  God’s being 
and act cannot be separated, therefore, God is truly known, not ontologically, but at the cross.   And 
while I admire Torrance’s evangelical and pastoral concerns, the logic of his thinking suggests that 
there is no real antecedent life of God.  God ad intra is God ad extra.   
Furthermore, Torrance’s soteriological metaphysic leads to his understanding of God’s 
monarchia and his commixing of God’s being with the three divine persons due to his revision of the 
Trinitarian order of persons.  The Son’s being, says Torrance, is ‘proper’ to the Father’s being, and 
the Father and the Son ‘are one in the propriety and peculiarity of nature and in the identity of the 
one Godhead.’133  Therefore, if the Son is wholly God, ‘then in a real sense he too must be the Origin 
or Principle (ἀρχή) of being along with the Father.’134  God cannot have two sources or origins 
without making the Trinity into three separate gods.  Therefore, Torrance explains how each of the 
divine persons can also be the source by appealing to perichoresis.  Torrance writes, ‘The Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit are indivisibly One, eternally coinhering in one another as the Blessed and 
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Holy Trinity, but with “one Godhead and one Principle” (μία θεότης καὶ μία ἀρχή).  That is to say, it is 
the triune God, the undivided Trinity, who is the one only ultimate Principle or ἀρχή of all things.’135   
Each person is ‘wholly all that God eternally is as God.’136  Torrance’s concern is that if we 
understand the three persons without perichoresis, then we have distinct persons who are not 
united.  However, Torrance explains this in a way that conflates the persons with God’s being.  God’s 
being and act are one.  ‘It is in this sense that we are to understand the distinction and oneness in 
the creative activity of the Father and the Son, and never of one without the other, for what the 
Father does is in the Son and what the Son does is in the Father.’137  Thus God’s unity is known in the 
Son’s incarnation as he comes to earth as the principle and origin.  While it is true that God’s 
Trinitarian acts are undivided, Torrance seems to say more.  Nor does Torrance develop anything like 
the personal acting of the divine persons found in Aquinas.  As a result, Torrance is not modalistic, 




 As we conclude this investigation of Torrance's theology of the divine persons, I return to a 
very important piece of Torrance's thought that I mentioned earlier but did not develop - Torrance's 
rejection of analogical thinking.  Torrance’s misunderstanding of the analogia entis drives his use of 
perichoresis at the expense of a robust construction of the procession of the divine persons.  Recall 
that in Torrance’s thought, homoousion cannot be separated from God’s self-revelation and that 
perichroesis serves to deepen our understanding of the homoousion.  Torrance dismisses the 
analogia entis, because he thinks that such an understanding of being is too abstract.139  Theological 
 
 135  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 80.  
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 139  I introduced Torrance’s reading of the analogia entis in chapter 5.  My goal here is to show that 
rejecting the analogia entis is one reason Torrance formulates his theology of the divine persons as he does.      
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reflection is only truly possible once Christ comes to reveal God to us.  Before Christ, God is obscure 
and the analogia entis only serves to create an abstract category of being within which God is the 
greatest such being.  It appears that the divine processions only receive sparse mention, because 
processions conceptualize the relations between the divine persons in an abstract way.   
 To understand the divine persons as Aquinas does is natural theology that thinks human 
beings ‘can find God within the givenness of the subject-object relationship, and that the similitude 
dei between the knower and the known must take place.’140  Importantly, notice that Torrance 
rejects the creature’s similitude with God according to what he understands to be the case with 
respect to Thomas.  As we have seen, this is a rejection of a way of thinking about divine and 
creaturely goodness that takes seriously the creature’s likeness to God, however measured by sin.  
Torrance’s soteriological methodology lies behind his construction – a construction that conflates 
God ad intra and God ad extra.  As a result, instead of speaking of the eternal divine processions, the 
relations of (relative) opposition that speak of the truly distinct persons in God, Torrance speaks of 
the three persons who are shown to be distinct, yet one, through their perichoretic onto-relations 
and because they are homoousios each with the other.  Rather than relations of opposition, it is the 
homoousion that teaches us that God is three persons yet one in being.   
 While Torrance does speak of processions and missions, perichoresis is the foundation of the 
divine processions due to Torrance’s fear of introducing dualistic modes of thought into his theology.  
To speak of the Father’s begetting, the Son’s generation, and the Holy Spirit’s procession requires 
the use of analogy.141  Torrance fears to say too much, because to do so risks inserting human 
analogies into God who is beyond comprehension.  Torrance is cautious, because if we know God 
only through analogy we do not really know God in his inner being.  However, this is the very 
 
 140  Torrance, Karl Barth, 155.  Torrance critiques both Aquinas and ‘Protestant realists’ for holding to 
a natural knowledge of God.  However, Torrance misunderstands Aquinas’ insistence on the need for divine 
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concern that a proper understanding of analogia entis addresses.  To speak of the processions of 
divine persons is an analogous way of speaking.  To deny this point leaves Torrance with an 
unknowable God – a God behind the back of Jesus Christ.  Torrance writes: 
What then does it mean to think of the three divine Persons specifically as ‘Father’, 
‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’? This was a question that had kept cropping up in the Church 
since the Arian controversy when attempts were made to speak of divine Fatherhood 
and Sonship on the analogy of human fatherhood and sonship. While there is certainly 
a figurative or metaphorical ingredient in the human terms ‘father’ and ‘son’ as they 
are used in divine revelation, they are to be understood in ways that point utterly 
beyond what we mean by ‘father’ and ‘son’ among ourselves and thus utterly beyond 
all sexist connotations and implications.142 
Torrance’s concern is shared by Aquinas.  However, the analogia entis, developed by Przywara who 
builds upon Thomas’ use of analogy, safeguards both God’s similarity with creatures and God’s ever-
greater dissimilarity.143  As a result, theology is done through analogy in that the analogies used 
point beyond themselves to God.  The catholic tradition holds ‘person’ to signify that which is most 
perfect in all of nature and, therefore, ‘it is fitting that this name persona is said of God.’144  Names, 
like person, are attributed to God ‘because of the eminent perfection which this name signifies.’145  
To be clear, person is not attributed to God and creatures in either an equivocal or univocal way, but 
in a way to signify God’s perfection.   
 The similarity between God and his creatures allows us to make use of analogy, however, 
the ever-greater dissimilarity between God and creatures means that even as we use the analogy of 
person, we do not understand by person the same concept as when it is said of creatures.  Any 
analogy must be understood to apply to God in a greater and deeper way.146  Torrance, however, 
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understands person more along the lines of Richard of Saint Victor than Aquinas.147  Richard defines 
a person as ‘an incommunicable existence of divine nature.’148  Aquinas does not outright reject 
Richard’s understanding of person, but is concerned that his definition only applies to God and not 
creatures as well.149  Emery explains the implications of this understanding, not only in Richard, but 
also in Torrance:  ‘If one takes Richard’s definition as the basis of one’s reflection, one will deprive 
oneself of the power of the analogy:  the word “person” no longer indicates the knot between 
human and angelic persons and divine persons, and so one’s grasp of the persons in God is very 
much loosened.’150  While Torrance does not use Richard’s language, such a person for Torrance is 
known only through disruptive grace.  There is not an analogical correspondence between persons 
divine and human.  However, to lose analogy is to loosen, or at least to lessen, a true conception of 
the divine persons.    
 Finally, Torrance’s equating of God’s monarchia with the Trinity built upon his understanding 
of perichoresis is the logical result of Torrance’s theology of revelation.  This God in himself is the 
same God revealed in the economy of grace.  Again, we find that God’s self-revelation, which is 
soteriology for Torrance, drives Torrance’s entire theology.  God is only known in his revelation.  
Therefore, quid sit Deus, is not a category Torrance finds helpful.  And, yet, the result of Torrance’s 
construction, and the rejection of what is God, leads Torrance to posit a theology that truly can 
know what God is – God in se is identical to God for us.  Speaking for more than his own Orthodox 
tradition, George Dragas explains the implications of Torrance’s ontological and economic conflation 
and how this relates to all we are discussing in this chapter.  Dragas writes, ‘From the Orthodox point 
of view, this simple tout court identification is not acceptable or adequate, because God does not 
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reveal his essence, or what He is, in his economic activity, but rather reveals Himself as the Trinity of 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, through his energies.’151  
 As we saw, Torrance does not like speaking of 'energies' and 'essences' or 'archetypal' and 
'ectypal' knowledge, because they are dualistic and abstract.  To think in such ways, for Torrance, 
introduces separation within the being of God.  However, if we understand these are distinctions, 
not separations, that God does make known to us in Scripture, then we avoid the melding of being 
and person at work in Torrance's theology.  Avoiding this conflation stops the modalistic drift at 
work in Torrance's theology of the divine persons.  In this way, the foundation remains secure.  Yet, 
the instability of Torrance’s foundation continues as we next investigate his account of Christ’s 
incarnation.
 
 151  George Dion Dragas and Matthew Baker, ‘Interview with Protopresbyter G.D. Dragas regarding 
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Chapter 7:  The Union of God and Man in Torrance 
 
 Without the incarnation, theology would not be possible.  If God has not become man, then 
humanity remains separated from God and incapable of knowing him.  In the incarnation, Torrance 
emphatically holds, the true God is definitively known.  The incarnation is God’s self-revelation 
without which knowledge of God is impossible.  This act of God’s self-communication is central to all 
of Torrance’s thought.  Torrance writes, ‘That centre is constituted by the incarnation of God’s self-
revelation in Jesus Christ the Son and Word of God and by the Holy Spirit sent by the Father through 
the Son who are of one Being and Act with God the Father.’1  In Torrance’s own way, then, he too 
has a rather developed theology of the mission of the Son.  However, Torrance’s understanding of 
the Son’s mission is that it is God’s self-communication, that is, it is revelation.  Furthermore, 
Torrance’s theology of revelation demands a soteriological starting point for his Christological 
investigation. 2  Jesus and his incarnate mission are soteriologically efficacious from beginning to 
end.  In Torrance, the incarnation is salvific as all people indiscriminately are united to Jesus simply 
because he comes as the God-man.   Jesus is more than historical, but he is not less, and if there is 
any ontological foundation of the Son’s mission, it is accessed only through history.3  Torrance 
writes, ‘The only Christ we know is Christ clothed with His Gospel and that is Christ with all His 
human life and historical acts and His self-communication to us through them.’4  This is to say, the 
Christ we encounter in history is the only Christ we know – he is never ‘naked’ – and Christ clothed 
with his Gospel is a revelation of God himself.5 
 
 1  Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 29.  Notice Torrance’s phraseology at this point.  The 
incarnation is not the coming of the Son, but is the ‘incarnation of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ.’  This 
continues Torrance’s blurring of the Trinitarian persons and it places the Son behind the back of the Father.   
 2  Molnar agrees that self-communication and self-revelation are synonymous in Torrance.  The result 
of this approach to the incarnation, and all of theology, is that Torrance begins his theology ‘with God’s 
economic Trinitarian self-communication.’  Paul D. Molnar, ‘God’s Self-Communication in Christ: A Comparison 
of Thomas F. Torrance and Karl Rahner,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 50, no. 3 (August 1997): 289. 
 3  Molnar is basically correct to say that Torrance does not historicize the incarnation, though 
Torrance is not as clear as Molnar seems to think on this point.  See, Molnar, Faith, Freedom and the Spirit, 
223-234. 
 4  Torrance, The School of Faith, lxxxiii.    
 5  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxxiii.   
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  Therefore, the preceding chapters on Torrance’s doctrine of God set the stage to now 
investigate his formulation of the Son’s incarnate mission.  As I have shown, Torrance’s theology of 
homoousion and revelation, which are synonymous with his theology proper, already introduce 
Christology.  Nonetheless, the goal of this chapter is to focus specifically on Torrance’s construction 
of Christ’s incarnation, the Son’s mission.  To this end, I will show how Torrance’s soteriological 
metaphysic is operative throughout his Christology by examining Torrance’s understanding of the 
person of Christ, the virgin birth, and the hypostatic union, as each play a prominent role in 
Torrance’s understanding of the Son of God incarnate.  This investigation will prepare us to ask in 
the next chapter how Torrance understands Christ as Mediator, because ‘Jesus Christ, to be 
Mediator in the proper sense, must be wholly and fully man as well as God.’6  Just as Torrance’s 
theology proper reveals a tendency to amalgamate person and being, a related tendency is 
Torrance’s conflation of Christ’s divine and human natures.  This is the case in Torrance’s thought, 
because the Son’s mission is formulated in relation to sinful humanity, rather than the Son’s eternal 
generation from the Father.  The foundation of salvation is a reaction to humanity’s plight rather 
than the foremost fount of God’s goodness.    Thus, Torrance’s soteriological metaphysic profoundly 
influences the way he understands the incarnate mission of the Son.      
 
The Person of Christ  
 
 To begin, the concept of person is important in Torrance’s Christology.  As we saw in chapter 
6, Torrance is careful to avoid any kind of rationalistic, or natural, understanding of person.  Recall 
Torrance’s claims that before Christian theological reflection, there was no concept of person. 7  The 
Christian concept of person arises out of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the 
ancient church.8  As the notion of person is formed through the patristic development of doctrine in 
 
 6  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 8.  
 7  Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs, CO:  Helmers & Howard, Publishers, 
1992), 48.  
 8  Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 155.  
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an onto-relational way, it is clear that God himself must define what person means theologically.9  
Torrance writes, ‘It must be remembered that the very notion of a personal subject was formed and 
injected into our thought through the patristic doctrines of Christ and of the Trinity, in marked 
contrast to the impersonal modes of thought that obtained in classical Greek philosophy.’10  It is 
‘specifically the understanding of the incarnation of the Word and Son of God in Jesus Christ in 
which the “I am” of Yahweh and the “I am” of the Lord Jesus were brought together within the 
three-fold manifestation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.’11  Christ’s advent deepens the Old 
Testament understanding that ‘the Being of God’ is ‘profoundly “personal” and, as the church 
attempts to interpret and explain God’s Trinitarian self-revelation, the ‘theological concept of the 
“person”’ develops.12   
 However, Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas turn the tradition away from a dynamic and 
relational (i.e. a theological), understanding of person, to one that is logical and philosophical.13  As a 
result, the Western catholic tradition divides the person of Christ from his works, just as God as 
Creator is divided from God as Redeemer.  Unhelpful dualistic ways of thinking are introduced into 
the Church’s understanding of the person of Jesus Christ.14  Torrance distances himself from this 
(perceived) Augustinian stream and aligns himself instead with Scotus and Richard of St. Victor who 
posit an ontological understanding of person built upon the doctrine of the Trinity.15  Such an 
 
 9  Torrance, Theological Science, 305.  Torrance’s concept of ‘onto-relations’, arises from Christological 
and Trinitarian reflection that understands both Jesus and the inner-Trinitarian relations as ‘intrinsically 
personal.’  Torrance, Mediation, 48. 
 10  Torrance, Theological Science, 305.  
 11  Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 156.  
 12  Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 156.  
 13  Torrance, Theological Science, 305-306. In Incarnation, Torrance writes, ‘In the Augustinian 
Boethian-Thomist development, persona, had come more and more to refer to an individualised substance of 
rational nature, that is, the concept of “person” as an individual with the power of reason.  That line of 
development was crowned with the Cartesian revival of the Augustinian cogito ergo sum, and the attachment 
of ego–consciousness to this individual personal substance.  But all this was bound up with the Augustinian 
conception of grace, which more and more, especially with the high Aristotelianism of the schoolmen, came to 
be construed in causal and ontological categories, so that divine grace always carried the notion of 
divinisation, and fullness of divinity.’  Torrance, Incarnation, 214. 
 14  Torrance, Mediation, 52-53.  
 15  Torrance, Theological Science, 306.   Notice, this is Torrance’s own method as well.   
227 
 
approach to the concept of person is also found in John Philoponos, who, Torrance explains, 
understands the static Greek concepts of nature, being, hypostasis, and person as they are used, not 
in philosophy, but in redemptive history.16  Although Philoponos is misunderstood by the 
‘Aristotelian Establishment’ and condemned as a monophysite heretic, for Torrance, he leads 
theology back to the theological and relational understanding of person.17  Torrance writes, ‘With 
Philoponos those Greek terms were now given a realist dynamic slant in line with his science:  God is 
living and dynamic in his very nature.’18  Philoponos does not teach a monophysite Christ, rather the 
church misunderstands his dynamic understanding of the unified person of Christ.  He does not deny 
that Christ has a divine and human nature in his one person, ‘but was insisting that as God and Man 
he was one incarnate Reality, and in no sense schizoid.’19  Christ, after all, is one unified person.20 
 For this reason, Torrance is adamant that Christ’s person and work must not be separated 
from one another.  If Christ’s person and work are separated, we are left with a pragmatic and 
anthropocentric understanding of Christ.21  The unified person of Christ is the one who acts.  In this 
 
 16  Thomas F. Torrance, Theological and Natural Science (Eugene, OR:  Wipf & Stock, 2002), 11.  
Philoponos was a Christian and a scientist who fits within Torrance’s understanding of theological science.  In 
Philoponos, Torrance finds a scientist who understands things as they are in themselves, which for Torrance 
means relationally and dynamically instead of statically. Particularly, Torrance builds upon Philoponos’ 
understanding of the creation of light.  In contrast to Aristotle’s ‘static notion of light’ Philoponos understands 
light as an ‘invisible dynamic force.’  Torrance, Theological and Natural Science, 9. 
 17  Torrance, Theological and Natural Science, 11.  
 18  Torrance, Theological and Natural Science, 11.  
 19  Torrance, Theological and Natural Science, 11.  
 20  Torrance also believes Scotus and Calvin understand person dynamically, but Locke gets theology 
off-track once again.  Torrance writes, ‘It is highly significant that the doctrine of person thus reached is not 
logically derived, as in Western thought—Roman Catholic or Protestant—by way of individualization of 
rational nature (as in the famous definition of Boethius), but is ontologically derived from the Communion of 
Being in Love in God himself. This understanding of person was picked up in the West by Richard of St. Victor 
in the twelfth century, was remarkably expounded in his De Trinitate, and had a theological tradition through 
Duns Scotus down to Calvin, but there is no need to pursue that, except to say that this understanding petered 
out in Western thought in face of the atomistic, individualistic thinking of Locke. In view of all that, it is worth 
noting that Greek patristic thought had already taken its measure of atomistic modes of understanding the 
relations between human beings as individuals who are only interconnected through their external relations, 
and it was in the course of their Christian reconstruction of ancient culture that the onto-relational concept of 
the person was produced. That was undoubtedly a great achievement, for—difficult as this onto-relational way 
of thinking has been for the Western mind—once the concept of person, both as applied to God and as applied 
to man, was introduced, it had the widest and profoundest impact, not only on the West, but upon world 
thought and culture.’  Torrance, Ground and Grammar, 173.  
 21  Thomas F. Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ (Eugene, OR:  Wipf & Stock, 2002), 149.  
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chapter, then, I first examine Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s person simply as a way to 
understand, not to suggest that Christ’s person and work are independent of one another.  Torrance 
– alongside Owen – rightly emphasises the unity of Christ’s person and work.  That being said, 
Torrance’s motivation in making this point is related, in part, to the potential conflation of being and 
person that carries over from this theology proper to his Christology.  For instance, Torrance writes, 
‘Christ’s Doing and Being are indissolubly One.’22  The constitution of Christ’s person, his divine-
humanity, then is the foundation for his work instead of a more Thomistic construction built upon 
the Trinitarian order that understands that the Father is the foundation of Christ’s work.  As I will 
discuss later, Christ’s foundation is the One from whom he comes – the Father.  Christ does what he 
does because of his filiation and eternal generation from the Father.  
 In Torrance, however, person and work are synonymous, not merely distinct and 
inseparable.  Torrance turns to the ‘I am’ statements of John’s Gospel to defend this understanding 
of Christ’s person and work, explaining that ‘the Act of Christ IS Christ; the Work of Christ IS his 
Person…His being is itself Redemption…Christ Jesus is perfectly what he does and proclaims.’23  Just 
as Torrance has no resource to say God is love, but only that God loves so too, Christ’s person, in a 
certain sense, is his work.  It is not simply that Christ is a unified person who works, but person and 
work are conflated.  Christ ‘was what he did and did what he was…His actions are not different from 
his innermost heart.’24  It seems fair to say that just as God’s being is known only through God’s acts, 
for Torrance, Christ’s person is known only through his work.25  In fact, the totality of God’s 
revelation is the work, or act, of the person of Christ.  Accordingly, Torrance writes: 
But we know God not through any act, not for example through the act of Creation, for 
there God does not communicate himself but creates a reality distinct from himself.  
God may really and actually be known in an act which is identical with his Person, that 
 
 22  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 149.  
 23  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 151.  
 24  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 149.  
 25   Notice once again how Torrance’s concern with ‘revelation’ influences his understanding.  
Torrance writes, ‘God may not be known as he ultimately is in himself but only as he reveals himself in action.  
His action means that he issues forth, that he comes, that he works.  Thus the most important element in his 
action is his presence-in-act.  His reality is his reality-in-act; apart from his acts we do not know God at all.’  
Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.   
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is, an act in which God himself is present in the Act which issues from his Being.  That 
act we found to be Jesus Christ himself, the act in which the act of God and his Person 
were identical.  There in Christ Jesus God communicates not something but himself.26 
 
To say God does not communicate himself in creation reveals that God’s goodness is not operative 
(in a Thomistic sense) in Torrance’s theological construction.  God is only known in the disruptive act 
of Christ’s incarnation.  Just as God’s being cannot be separated from God’s acts, so too Jesus.     
 In fact, ‘God’s action towards man is identical with the existence of Jesus Christ, for he was 
God incarnate…God’s act is to be thought of in terms of a Person.’27  What is more, Torrance 
equates, without distinguishing, God’s being with the person of Christ.  To think of God’s being is to 
think of Christ, or God’s being ‘as being Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to men.’28  While Torrance will 
use traditional language such as ‘the incarnation of the Son of God’, he most consistently speaks of 
the incarnation as God’s self-revelation in Christ.  This relates back to the melding of God’s divine 
nature and the divine persons investigated in the last chapter.  What is really important in the 
incarnation is that God is made known.  While this sounds biblical, and is certainly true, rightly 
understood, it reveals a conflation in Torrance’s thought instead of a distinction.  The Son of God 
incarnate is God.  To see the Son is to see the Father, because they both are the one essence of God.  
However, the Son is not the Father; he is a distinct person.  Torrance would agree with what I say 
here, but the emphasis and construction of his theology, nevertheless, commingles the being and 
person of the Son due to Torrance’s overarching concern with God’s being.   To be fair to Torrance, it 
is not so much his theology proper that carries over into his Christology, but the other way around.  
Torrance’s conflation is due, in no small part, to his earthly starting point.29  Humanity is without 
 
 26  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.      
 27  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 149.  
 28  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.  
 29  Torrance’s understanding of the development of person follows his approach to epistemology that 
moves to deeper levels as things are understood in themselves.  Torrance explains his epistemological method 
in Christian Doctrine of God, 32-72 (‘The Biblical Frame’).  In a complex section of The Ground and Grammar of 
Theology, Torrance shows what this method looks like in practice and how he moves from the economy, 
namely Jesus Christ, to the Trinity.  Torrance writes, ‘Theological understanding then pushed to the higher 
level through the Economic to the Ontological Trinity by means of the homoousion and the notion of 
perichoresis. But now this notion is refined and made to refer to the mutual interpenetration of the three 
Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—in one God. Once perichoresis is refined and changed to apply to the 
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hope without the revelation of God’s being, which is communicated in the incarnation.  Therefore, 
we only know God through the saving person of Christ.30   
 Christ’s person in action, Christ’s work, then, is primarily revelation in Torrance’s thought.31  
Christ ‘does not come to us in the flesh apart from His own Word and self-revelation…Christ cannot 
be separated from His mission of Revelation and Reconciliation.’32  Yet, Torrance’s construction at 
this point posits a somewhat instrumentalist understanding of Christ’s person – something he very 
much wants to avoid33 – due to Torrance’s consistent claim that God’s act of incarnation is identical 
with God’s eternal life. 34 This is clearly not Torrance’s goal and certainly not something he explicitly 
affirms.  Yet, the really important thing that happens in the incarnation is that God’s being is made 
known.  Torrance writes:  
Thus we cannot say that God’s Being is something other or wholly other than the act 
of self-communication in Jesus Christ.  What God is in Christ he is wholly in himself; 
and what God is in himself, he is also in his acts.  And so when we think of the Being of 
God we think of Christ; we think that is, of God’s Being, as being Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit to men.35  
 
Trinity, however, it can no longer be applied to Christology at the lower level, to express the union between 
the divine and the human natures in Christ, without serious damage to the doctrine of Christ. Whenever that 
has been done in ancient or modern times it has resulted in some form of a docetic rationalizing and 
depreciation of the humanity of Christ. On the other hand, it is in connection with the refined conception of 
perichoresis in its application to intratrinitarian relations in God that Christian theology developed its onto-
relational concept of the divine Persons—or rather, an understanding of the three Persons in the one God as 
onto-relational realities in God. And of course this gave rise to the new concept of person, unknown in human 
thought until then, and to the onto-relational notion of person at that, which is applicable to our interhuman 
relations in a created way, correlated to the uncreated way in which it applies to God.’  Torrance, Ground and 
Grammar, 173.   
 30  This assumes that Scripture cannot, or at least does not, speak of God in se.  A claim with which I 
disagree.    
 31  Of course, revelation and reconciliation cannot be separated in Torrance.    
 32  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxxiii.    
 33  Torrance believes this is a weakness of patristic theology and one reason Chalcedon needs revision 
as we will see later in the chapter.  See, Torrance, Incarnation, 206-232.  
 34  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.  These types of claims are also why Molnar’s insistence that 
Torrance avoids a historicized Christology is not as clear as he makes it out to be.  Torrance’s logic pushes in 
the direction of an eternal incarnation even though Torrance clearly does not, and or would not, hold to this 
position.  See, Molnar, Faith, Freedom and the Spirit, 225-234.  
 35  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.  
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God’s act in Christ for humanity’s salvation is ‘one with the Person of the Eternal or Son or Word 
who became flesh in Jesus Christ.’36  And more to the point, Christ ‘is in himself what he reveals of 
God the Father.’37 
 Torrance’s univocal understanding of revelation and reconciliation means that more is at 
stake than the unified person of Christ when he understands the Son’s mission ‘in relation to sinful 
man’ instead of the Son’s eternal generation from the Father.’  Starting with soteriology leads 
Torrance to make the unified person of Christ, even his eternal divine nature, somehow dependent 
upon humanity’s need for salvation.  Read back into God in se, then God must, somehow, be 
Redeemer essentially.  Yet, if Jesus is the work of reconciliation, as Torrance claims, then something 
accidental, namely redemption and reconciliation, are pulled into God ad intra.38  Such a move 
makes creation and sin necessary for God. Thus, in Torrance’s thought, without humanity’s fall into 
sin, God is not known.  Torrance would object, but I do not know how else to conceive of what he 
means with his formulation of the Son’s mission in relation to humanity’s sin.   
 Against my claim, Torrance is clear that the incarnation is a free act of God.  There is nothing 
in God that makes the incarnation necessary.  In addition, to argue that the incarnation would have 
occurred without humanity’s fall into sin is simply too speculative for Torrance – as it is for Owen.  
Yet for Torrance, this line of reasoning, when put against his understanding of the Son’s mission, 
raises the question of whether or not God would be knowable for Torrance apart from the fall.  The 
logic of Torrance’s thought suggests that God would remain unknowable, trapped in the noumenal if 
not for the incarnation.  Furthermore, the incarnation is a ‘revealing and saving act of pure grace’ 
and as such ‘reveals that there is a desperate need for saving in the world.’39  The incarnation is 
‘essentially redemptive’ and reunites God and humanity after the fall into sin.40  Torrance can give 
 
 36  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.  
 37  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.  
 38  See, Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 150.  
 39  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 76.  
 40  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 76.  
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no answer to whether or not God would have revealed himself apart from sin.  True, the Scriptures 
do not speak definitively concerning whether or not the incarnation would still happen apart from 
sin, but even this way of understanding revelation narrows God’s revelation in such a way that even 
without sin there is no knowledge of God because Christ is not incarnate.  Importantly, lying behind 
Torrance’s formulation of the incarnation is his lack of a true doctrine of creation.  If creation is 
proleptically conditioned by redemption, then it is not that the question of an unfallen incarnation is 
too speculative.  It is simply not a possibility because God is revealed because creation is a fallen 
creation.41   
 And, yet, in the opening chapters of Genesis, before the fall, the infinite God speaks, he 
reveals himself, to Adam and Eve, his finite creatures.  The Creator/creature distinction makes 
revelation necessary for finite human beings, who are not to live by bread alone, but by the living 
Word of God.42  Before the fall into sin, God makes known his plan for the world (Gen 1:26-26).  
Already, then, before Gen 3, humanity is in need of God’s self-revelation.  However, for Torrance, 
sin, not simply creation, creates a ‘breach’ between God and his creatures.  The incarnation 
overcomes this ‘breach.’43  There simply is no revelation that is not redemptive for Torrance.  Thus, 




 Christ becomes flesh by entering into humanity’s ‘adamic existence as a man made of a 
woman, made under the law.’44  Therefore, there is continuity between Christ and human beings 
 
 41  In the next chapter, I will show how this necessitates Torrance’s understanding that Christ assumes 
a fallen human nature.    
 42  Torrance’s theology leaves no room for an understanding of finite – i.e., dependent – humanity, 
but only of fallen humanity.  Torrance’s collapse of creation and redemption has profound pastoral 
implications – and not always good ones.  One example is that logically, every type of human limitation would 
be due to the fall instead of our status as the dependent creatures that we are before the fall.  Torrance has 
little recourse to distinguish between human finiteness and human sinfulness.   
 43  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 76.  
 44  Torrance, Incarnation, 94.  Torrance is clearly influenced by Barth’s long and detailed treatment of 
the virgin birth.  See, Barth, CD I/2.15.3.   
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together with Christ’s uniqueness as one who is true man and ‘true Son of God in true union with 
the Father.’45  The virgin birth reveals both Christ’s continuity and discontinuity with fallen humanity.  
And it is not biology that is so important in the virgin birth, but that in the virgin birth Jesus ‘breaks 
through the continuity of adamic existence and opens up a new continuity in a new Adam, in a new 
humanity.’46  Just as the Holy Spirit hovers over the waters when God creates the earth, so too the 
Holy Spirit comes to the virgin womb for this act of new, or re-creation.  Torrance explains, ‘Jesus 
Christ is not only mediator between God and man, but as such opens up a new way from the old 
humanity into the new.  It is in this light that we must approach the account of the virgin birth.’47 
 The virgin birth, then, is not a theory of how the Son of God becomes a man, but is ‘rather 
an indication of what happened within humanity when the Son of God became man.’48  Torrance 
holds that reducing the virgin birth to a theory jeopardizes both God’s freedom in the act of 
incarnation and the ‘miraculous creative act’ that, ultimately, is beyond explanation.49  Torrance 
writes: ‘That transcendent how is described as an act of the Spirit, as a creative act from above 
which breaks into our humanity and into our nature.  It assumes form and process within our 
humanity, and therefore its what can be spoken of, but its how recedes into the divine nature of the 
Son of God and is beyond our observation and understanding.’50  As a result, biological questions 
only give ‘biological answers, and to ask biological questions only is to presuppose from the start 
that there is nothing more here than a normal biological process.’51  To think biologically is to think 
in terms of natural theology, which Torrance wants to avoid at all costs.52  Torrance writes, ‘Thus 
 
 45  Torrance, Incarnation, 94.  
 46  Torrance, Incarnation, 94.  
 47  Torrance, Incarnation, 94.  
 48  Torrance, Incarnation, 94-95.  
 49  Torrance, Incarnation, 95.  
 50  Torrance, Incarnation, 95.  
 51  Torrance, Incarnation, 95.  
 52  Here Torrance is most likely critiquing Brunner through the influence of Barth.  While Torrance 
does not mention Brunner, Barth does in his section ‘The Miracle of Christmas’:  ‘At this point we must recall 
the extraordinary section in E. Brunner’s book, The Mediator, in which he deals with our theme. Beyond 
everything that has been said since Schleiermacher, Brunner develops the queer objection that the doctrine of 
the Virgin birth means a “biological interpretation of the miracle” (meaning the miracle of the incarnation), 
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Christ is not born as a result of human nature, but of an act of the Spirit; in other words, the 
Incarnation is an act of pure Grace and not of nature.’53  Christ has no biological father, because the 
virgin birth is the sovereign and free act of God alone.  Similarly, Mary’s role is simply a passive 
belief.  Human cooperation with grace is, for Torrance, natural theology, and has no place in his 
understanding of the virgin birth.54  Therefore, biological explanations, for Torrance, are natural 
theology and limit our understanding to what is observable and undermine God’s grace.55  The virgin 
birth, then, is the creative act by which the Son of God enters into human existence and is the sign 
that ‘God is creatively at work in a new way.’56   
 Incarnation and virgin birth cannot be separated from revelation.  As such, the virgin birth is 
‘incomprehensible’ and purely the act of God.57  Against modern critics, ‘science has nothing 
whatsoever to say on matter’ because to let science shape our understanding is to start with a 
misconception of God and what God can or cannot do.58  Furthermore, the virgin birth is not a 
theory, it is not an explanation of ‘how’ the Son of God became incarnate.59  Rather, the virgin birth 
shows what happens when the Son of God becomes human.60 
 While Torrance warns against construing the virgin birth as a theory, or in terms of biology, 
much of the Reformed tradition finds the matter of biology quite important. 61   Through the virgin 
birth, Christ escapes the original sin that passed from Adam to all his progeny by ‘natural’ or 
‘ordinary generation.’62  Christ, born of a virgin, does not descend from Adam by ordinary 
 
and is in fact an expression of “biological inquisitiveness.” The divine miracle, he contends, is supposed to be 
explained here in its How, whereas we should be content in faith with the That.’  Barth, CD I/2.    
 53  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 119.  
 54  Torrance seems to follow Barth’s critique of Roman Catholic Mariology.  Barth, and Torrance’s 
concern, is the freedom of grace, which any form of natural theology denies.  See, Barth, CD I/2.15.3.     
 55  Torrance, Incarnation, 95.   
 56  Torrance, Incarnation, 95.    
 57  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.   
 58  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.  
 59  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.  
 60  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.  
 61  Torrance, Incarnation, 88; Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116. 
 62  WLC 26; WSC 16.   
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generation.  Thus, Adam’s sin is not imputed to Christ. However, at least part of Torrance’s different 
understanding is his concern to avoid both docetic and Nestorian Christologies.63  Torrance seems to 
fear that if the virgin birth is understood biologically, then a door opens making room for a dualistic 
form of adoptionism.  It is better, says Torrance, to understand the virgin birth as pointing to ‘the 
secret of Christ’s Person, the incomprehensibility of the hypostatic union, the character of Christ’s 
Birth and Person as a fact in which God alone works and in which God may be known only through 
God.’64  Clearly, the virgin birth is not about science or theory, but about God’s disruptive, gracious 
self-revelation.  Torrance makes this point even more pointedly, writing: 
To the questions why? and whence? and how? we can only answer with the Virgin 
Birth that God begins with himself alone.  Of that the Virgin Birth is the Sign, and so 
this miracle confesses the utter hiddenness of the Vere Deus et vere homo.  The Virgin 
Birth means that neither Ebionite or Docetic Christologies are in place, but asserts that 
the Person of Jesus Christ is to be understood only spiritually, that is after the Holy 
Spirit, kata Pneuma, as well as ontologically, ex Virgine.  Just as Jesus was conceived of 
the Holy Spirit, so no man can say that Jesus is Lord but by the Holy Spirit.  That is to 
say, we cannot conceive of him as Lord but by the Holy Spirit.  It is this secret of the 
Christ, the secret of Revelation that the Virgin Birth indicates or signifies.65 
Rather than biological, the importance of the virgin birth is that it reveals that Christ’s incarnation is 
God’s ‘creative act’ and the point of the virgin birth is God’s divine initiative.66 
 
The Son’s Conception  
 
 Torrance understands the Son’s conception by the Holy Spirit in a similar way.  The Son’s 
conception is not a ‘product of the causal-historical process of nature, or of the world.’67  God’s acts 
are always free and unconditional.  The virgin birth then, is also voluntary and does not depend on 
outside causes such as a human father.68  Rather, the Son’s conception in the virgin’s womb is a 
 
 63  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.  
 64  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.  Notice again that Torrance does not work with a developed 
understanding of the divine processions.   
 65  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 116.  See, Barth, CD I/2.   
 66  Torrance, Incarnation, 92, 93.  
 67  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 118.    
 68  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 118.  
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creative act of God the Holy Spirit.69  Importantly, this creative act is not ex nihilo, ‘but rather is 
creation out of fallen Adamic humanity, ex virgine, out of the Jewess Mary.’70  This means that the 
virgin birth presupposes the first creation and is a sign that the new creation comes ‘in the midst of 
and out of the old.’71  Just as God is sovereign over Mary’s womb as he tells her of his prior choice, 
so we should also understand the ‘rebirth of men, women, and children in Jesus Christ…when he 
enters our hearts and thereby recreates us.’72  As the first creation is an act of God’s grace so too the 
new creation in the virgin’s womb is ‘an act of sheer grace…and not of nature.’73  That is to say, 
salvation is by grace alone and grace is not something manipulated and controlled by human 
creatures.  Grace always comes at the sovereign initiative of God.  God is not manipulated by 
biological – natural – processes.  Grace is always and only God’s disruptive, revelatory act that he 
alone controls.74   
 The virgin birth, Torrance continues, is not separate from ‘the whole mystery of Christ.’75  In 
the virgin birth, Christ’s divine and human natures are united in his one person.  Torrance is careful 
not to abstract the virgin birth from Christ’s person and work.  Torrance explains, ‘The incarnation is 
not only a once and for all act of assumption of our flesh, but the continuous personal union of 
divine and human nature in the one person of the incarnate Son, a personal union which he carried 
all the way through our estranged estate under bondage into the freedom and triumph of the 
resurrection.’76  In Torrance, the mystery of Christ is ‘the mystery of God’s self-revelation’.77  God is 
most fully and truly known at the cross and in his resurrection.  Importantly, Torrance explains: 
The virgin birth of Jesus Christ points to the mystery of God’s self-revelation, that God 
reveals himself within man’s fallen human life, and therefore that God’s self-revelation 
also veils itself in our humanity.  At the birth of Jesus, the mystery of Christ as true God 
 
 69  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 118  
 70  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 119.  
 71  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 119.  
 72  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 119.  
 73  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 119.  
 74  Torrance is not as clear about this concern as Barth, but his arguments, while less developed, echo 
concerns in CD I/2.  
 75  Torrance, Incarnation, 95.  
 76  Torrance, Incarnation, 96.  
 77  Torrance, Incarnation, 97.  
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and true man is inserted into our existence and is necessarily veiled, veiled because 
inserted into the flesh of sin, the sarx hamartias, as St Paul called it.  The resurrection 
of Christ points to the fact that God unveils himself, reveals himself within man’s life.  
Here the mystery of God is resurrected out of our flesh of sin, out of our death and 
corruption and is unveiled in its glory as true God and true man in perfect union.  The 
empty tomb points to the revelation of the secret of Christ and as such is the 
authentication of the virgin birth; it is the unveiling of what was veiled, the 
resurrection out of our mortality of what was inserted into it and recreated within it.  
But such a resurrection of true man and true God points back to the virgin birth of 
Jesus as a union of true God and true man.78   
Just as Christ is born from the virgin womb, he rises from the virgin tomb inaugurating the new 
creation that begins with his incarnation. 
 Torrance makes much of the Son’s conception and virgin birth because it serves his 
soteriological articulation of Christology.  Humanity is not involved in any kind of cooperative way.  
As an act of God’s grace, the virgin birth cannot be defended or explained, but only heard and 
obeyed.79  However, the virgin birth cannot be ignored.  It is quite significant in Torrance’s 
understanding of grace, which for Torrance, is synonymous with the person of Jesus Christ.  Thus 
Torrance holds: 
that when one really understands the significance of the Virgin Birth, its significance as 
an act of God’s coming grounded in himself and in an act of Grace alone which is as 
such the archetype of all other acts of Grace, and thus the very essence of our 
salvation, that one will not be able to treat the Virgin Birth lightly and set it aside, but 
rather embrace it as having a real and integral place in the Christian faith and 
dogmatics.80 
The virgin birth is vital to Torrance’s largely soteriologically determined Christology.  The virgin birth 
is not a divine validation that Christ is the Son of God.  Rather, the virgin birth is the only fitting way 
 
 78  Torrance, Incarnation, 97.  
 79  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 120.  
 80  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 120. Torrance first gave this lecture in a context where many 
were dismissing the virgin birth.  Torrance himself addresses this earlier in the lecture:  ‘It seems possible for 
people to realise the meaning of the incarnation in spite of their “weakness” here!  But that does not mean 
that the Church has a right to repudiate it or leave it out of its creed.  The Church knew well that what it was 
doing when it raised the witness to the Virgin Birth to be an article of belief, for there it has been set as a 
Watch upon the secret of Christ’s Person, which means it would not be well for any one to hurry past without 
consenting to it.  It is thus a warning that those who prefer to take their private ways are very liable to go 
astray.  But fundamentally the Virgin Birth belongs to the Confession of true faith, and those who prefer to 
pass it by should at least have courtesy enough for such a redoubtable article of Church belief to respect it 
through silence on the matter.’  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 117. 
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for the eternal divine Son to be born into this world.81  The virgin birth, for Torrance, is primarily an 
act of revelation.  ‘Thus too the Virgin birth is not to be understood as the vindication of the Divinity 
of Christ, but as the Word-Act proclaiming it.’82    Torrance brings this all together writing: 
The Virgin Birth is thus the form and fashion of the true manhood and Godhead of 
Christ.  It preserves in nuce, as it were, the truth of the fact that God and man became 
ONE in Jesus Christ in hypostatic union.  It is on the basis of this that we are truly 
assured of our being reconciled to God; for here there is created in man the possibility 
of Salvation which does not arise out of or from man; a possibility which is yet of and 
grounded in the Divine Reality.83 
Thus, Torrance understands the Son’s virgin birth in relation to sinful humanity as the form of Christ 
as true God and true human.  The union of God and man is revealed, summed up, in the revelatory 
act of the Christ’s virgin birth.  It is true that Torrance says humanity’s redemption is ‘grounded in 
the Divine Reality’, but this divine reality is the incarnate Christ whose virgin birth and hypostatic 
union are already redemptive.  Soteriology, not theology proper, governs Torrance’s formulation of 
the virgin birth.  In Torrance, the virgin birth is not founded upon the divine procession and missions.  
Rather, the virgin birth is an act of disruptive grace that it speaks not of God in se, but of God for us.   
 
The Hypostatic Union 
 
 Torrance’s soteriological foundation is intentional.  This is clear when he begins his account 
of the hypostatic union emphasising that the union of Christ’s two natures is not rightly understood 
apart from Christ’s atoning work.84  Torrance’s theology of of the hypostatic union is not first and 
foremost about the constitution of Christ’s unified person.  Rather, the hypostatic union is 
formulated in response to human sin.  That the Son of God is homoousios with the Father is 
important in Christology as well as theology proper.  If the Son is not truly God, then he is cut off 
from God, and his person and work have no saving significance.  At the same time, if the Son is not 
 
 81  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 120.  
 82  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 120.  
 83  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 121.  
 84  Torrance, Incarnation, 183-184.  
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truly human, then humanity is not truly redeemed as humanity exists in the fallen adamic condition.  
As a result, Torrance’s understanding of the hypostatic union is similar to his understanding of the 
homoousial relations of the three divine persons.  Just as the Son is homoousios with the Father, so 
too is Christ homoousios with humanity.85  Torrance writes, ‘The hypostatic union is grounded in, 
derived from and is continuously upheld by what is called the “consubstantial communion” within 
the Holy Trinity, that is the mutual indwelling or coinhering of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.’86  
Torrance is more explicit in Conflict and Agreement when he writes:  
It is in the Incarnation that we have created for the first time in the union between 
God and Man in Christ (not finally at Bethlehem, but at the Cross and resurrection 
also) a relation which we now know as unio hypostatica sive personalis, as the 
Reformed Anglican divines used to put it.  And that relation we believe to be grounded 
upon the immanent relation within the transcendent Trinity.’87 
Clearly, then, Torrance is not opposed to the idea of the immanent Trinity as the foundation for the 
Son’s incarnate mission.  The incarnation is why theology after Kant still has something to say.  As a 
result, Torrance gives priority to the soteriological foundation, the historical Christ, as he constructs 
his theology of the Son’s mission—the Son whose two natures are united in his one person. 
 In the fullness of time, God and humanity are united.88  This basic confession is at the heart 
of Torrance’s understanding of the hypostatic union.  God and man are united in the incarnation – 
an important formulation in Torrance’s thought to which I will return below.  Torrance has much to 
say about this union of God and man, and at times, he understands the hypostatic union in a broadly 
Chalcedonian way.  For instance, Torrance writes, ‘There can be no doubt that the Chalcedonian 
formulation of the Union in Christ was one of the greatest and most important in the whole field of 
theology.’89  Throughout his various works, Torrance has great respect for the ancient creeds and 
councils, even saying that ‘something quite decisive and irreversible had taken place’ in the ‘great 
 
 85  Torrance, Incarnation, 203.  
 86  Torrance, Mediation, 65.  
 87  Thomas F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement.  Volume 1:  Order and Disorder (1959; repr., Eugene, 
OR:  Wipf & Stock, 1996), 44.  
 88  Torrance, Incarnation, 105.  
 89   Conflict and Agreement in the Church 1:239.  
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work of the Nicene Fathers in formulating the apostolic and evangelical faith.’90  At times, Torrance 
clearly follows the Chalcedonian understanding that Christ’s two natures are united in his one 
person in the hypostatic union.  ‘Christ Himself is one Person in whom two natures, the divine and 
human,’ Torrance writes, ‘are united in such a way that they cannot be separated from one another, 
converted into one another, or confused with one another.  The divine and human natures remain 
distinct but united in the One Person of the Son.’91 
 And, yet, Torrance believes redemptive history is missing from the great Chalcedonian 
creed.  As much as Torrance respects Chalcedon, he claims that the formulation of Christ’s person is 
abstracted from his life and work that extends from his birth all the way to his resurrection.92  
Therefore, ‘one of the most pressing needs of theology’, is to recast the hypostatic union of Christ’s 
two natures ‘much more in terms of the mission of Christ, much more from the perspective of the 
cross and resurrection.’93  God ad extra, God’s works, somehow determine Christ’s two natures.  ‘It 
is the cross which discloses to us the secret of the Person of Christ.’94 Torrance clarifies what he 
means: 
I do not mean that we should contemplate any change in the fundamental position 
adopted at Chalcedon or even in the terminology of Leo’s Tome which conserves so 
wonderfully the whole mystery of the God-Man in the negatives inconfuse, 
immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter, and, therefore, I can only reject the way taken 
by some Orthodox theologians in recent years, in an attempt to offer a positive 
account of the hypostatic union in terms of sophiology.  What I mean is that the 
Chalcedonian Christology needs to be filled out in accordance with its own 
fundamental position, in a more dynamic way, in terms of the incorporating and 
atoning work of the Saviour, for the only account the New Testament gives us of the 
Incarnation is conditioned by the perspective of the crucifixion and resurrection.95 
 
 90  Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Introduction,’ in The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinople Creed, ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh, UK:  Handsel Press, 1981), xi.  See also, Torrance, 
Trinitarian Faith, 14. 
 91  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:109.  
 92  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:239.  
 93  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1: 239-240.  Torrance’s approval of the theology of the cross is 
found already in his 1938-1939 Auburn lectures, The Doctrine of Jesus Christ, and remains throughout his life.  
These lectures were not published until 2001 and Torrance says he is still in agreement with this early work.  
Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, ii.   
 94  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 153.  
 95  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:240.  
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Chalcedon, for Torrance, is too static.  While Torrance appreciates what Chalcedon affirms, even this 
respected formulation appears to fall into the trap of dualistic ways of thinking.  Here, Torrance gives 
us a great picture into how his theology proper, namely his understanding of Being-in-Act, is at work 
in his Christology.  No longer is it the Son’s relationship to the Father that shapes our understanding 
of the incarnation.  Rather, soteriology somehow determines the Son’s mission.  Torrance continues, 
‘When we think of Jesus Christ in Himself, in the mystery of His own Person, the Chalcedonian 
formula is quite adequate, for it expresses all that we can say, warding off on each side harmful error 
and reminding us that here we are face to face with a mystery that is more to be adored than 
expressed.’96  However, as Torrance writes of what is lacking in the Chalcedonian formulation, his 
soteriological starting point leads him to understand Chalcedon as too dualistic and captive to Greek 
metaphysics.  As a result, Chalcedon needs a soteriological recasting; Torrance thinks the 
redemptive, dynamic life of Christ is missing.  To be fair, Torrance does not want to do away with 
God in se, but God ad intra must be read in light of the Son’s incarnate mission – God ad extra.  Such 
a construction leads to a mission that is not ‘conditioned’ or anchored in the Father/Son relation of 
eternal generation, but, rather, by soteriology and redemptive history.  Mission makes the person 
instead of the person determining the mission. 
 
Hypostatic Union as Atonement  
 
 Torrance walks a fine line, affirming Chalcedon in what it teaches about the person of Christ 
in himself and its help of exposing all the various Christological heresies.97  But there is another side 
to Torrance’s thinking as well:     
But when, on the other hand, we think of His mission in relation to sinful man, of His 
Incarnation as the incorporation of Himself into our body of the flesh of sin and the 
carrying of it to its crucifixion, when we think of His entry into our estrangement in the 
contradiction of sin, and of His working out, in the midst of our humanity and 
alienation, reconciliation with God, then the Chalcedonian formulation does not say 
 
 96  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:240.  
 97  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:240.    
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enough, for reconciliation is not something added to the hypostatic union so much as 
the hypostatic union itself at work in expiation and atonement.98 
Torrance wants to hold the God in se and God for us together, but his formulation gives priority to 
redemption over the Son of God in himself.  God ad intra is only understood in light of God ad extra.  
Torrance inverts Chalcedon.   Whereas Chalcedon begins with God the Son in se, Torrance begins in 
creaturely history.  Metaphysics and soteriology should not be separated, but as the eternal divine 
Son who exists eternally outside and ‘before’ history, then creaturely history should be understood 
in terms of God ad intra and not the other way around.  Yet, this other way around is precisely how 
Torrance formulates his theology.   The result is that Torrance conflates God ad extra and God ad 
intra.  In the example above, such a conflation risks making the economic – in this case human sin – 
necessary for understanding God in se.  The Son’s historical mission is not seen as temporal 
extension of his eternal divine procession.  Here we clearly see what I have already claimed above – 
the mission of the Son is formulated ‘in relation to sinful man’ instead of in relation to the Son’s 
eternal generation from the Father.  To be clear, at the heart of the Son’s mission is his reconciling 
obedience and sacrificial death through which sinners are reconciled to God.  However, human sin is 
not the foundation of this mission even if it is the reason he is sent.  The Son’s eternal divine 
procession is the foundation for his temporal procession and mission.  At times, Torrance does speak 
of Jesus Christ as the Son of God and as the one sent from the Father, but this relation is not decisive 
in his Christology taken as a whole.  Rather, anthropology and soteriology are decisive.  What is 
really foundational for Torrance is the Son’s relation to fallen humanity instead of the Son’s eternal 
filiation.   
 This inversion of God for us and God in se motivates Torrance’s desire to recast Chalcedon.  
Throughout much of Torrance’s career, the quest for the historical Jesus consumed many 
 
 98  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:240.     
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theologians.99  In part then, Torrance’s call to rethink Chalcedon is borne out of this modern context.  
However, Torrance himself thinks the need to recast Christology begins already in the fifth century 
as ecclesiology develops in terms of the Christology of the Ecumenical Councils.100  While Nicaea 
affirms the true humanity of Christ, Christology after the Councils ‘was seriously hampered by the 
fact that full and true emphasis upon the historical Christ had not recovered after the staggering 
blows administered to it by the rationalistic notions of Logos.’101  Yet given the historical Jesus 
movement, Torrance is hopeful that a more dynamic, historical, and biblical Christology will arise.  
Torrance explains why this is the case: 
At no time in history has the Church been in a more favourable position to do that 
[construct a soteriological Christology] than to-day, if only because of the enormous 
recrudescence of the biblical emphasis upon the historical Christ, and His risen 
humanity.  Along with that has come a rediscovery of biblical eschatology which is the 
doctrine of the Ascension and Return of the risen Christ as true Man as well as true 
God, which carries with it a renewed emphasis upon time-relations because of the 
renewed emphasis upon the resurrection of the Man Jesus, and the resurrection of the 
body in Him at the last day.  It is this biblical theology even more than the classical 
Christology which will keep true our understanding of the analogical relation between 
Christ and his church.102 
Although Torrance here is critiquing a certain understanding of ecclesiology that posits the 
hypostatic union as an analogy of the Church’s relation to Christ, the underlying issue is Christology.  
Chalcedon, it seems, cannot meet the challenges of the day and leaves us with a dualistic 
understanding of the incarnate Saviour.  Torrance’s call for a renewed emphasis on eschatology 
reveals his shift away from metaphysical thinking to soteriological and historically motivated 
thinking.103 
 
 99  See, Thomas F. Torrance, "'The Historical Jesus': From the Perspective of a Theologian," in The New 
Testament Age: Essays in Honor of Bo Reicke, ed. William C. Weinrich (Macon, GA:  Mercer University Press, 
1984), 511-526.     
 100  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:232.      
 101  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:232.  
 102  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:232.  Torrance is responding here to those who want to use 
the analogy of the hypostatic union in building an ecclesiology.  Torrance is not affirming the analogia entis.     
 103  See, Torrance, Incarnation, 128; 297-344; Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:304-315; Thomas F. 
Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, vol. II:  The Ministry and The Sacraments of the Gospel (1959; repr., Eugene, 
OR:  Wipf & Stock, 1996), 154-202.   
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 Notice in the quote above that Torrance claims the New Testament itself conditions our 
understanding of the incarnation through the lens of the crucifixion and resurrection.  It is certainly 
debatable whether or not this is the case, but it serves Torrance’s understanding that all theology 
begins with Christ and that Christology and soteriology are synonymous.  This is consistent with 
Torrance’s understanding that in Christ’s ‘Person being and act are inseparably one.’104  However, 
behind this understanding is Torrance’s formulation of the mission of the Son in relation to sinful 
humanity rather than the Son’s eternal generation from the Father.  In my judgment, it is unfair to 
claim Chalcedon omits redemptive history due to its static understanding of Christ’s person and 
work.  It is better to understand Chalcedon as a council answering the specific challenge of how the 
church understands Christ’s two natures united in his one person.  In large part, Chalcedon answers 
Nestorius on the one hand, and Eutyches on the other and seeks to understand how the divine and 
human natures of Christ relate to one another as they are united in his one person.  Furthermore, 
Chalcedon builds on Nicaea which affirms the Son’s eternal pre-existence.105  True, the Chalcedonian 
Symbol begins with the Son’s eternal generation from the Father before it speaks of the Son’s 
incarnation, but the mention of the virgin birth clearly has redemptive history in view. 
 Chalcedon, then, does not deny the Son’s incarnate history, but it does raise the question of 
whether or not soteriology is the proper starting point for understanding the person and work of 
Christ.  John 3:16 tells us that out of God’s great love he sent his Son into the world, but the 
foundation for this sending is the Son’s eternal generation from the Father rather than soteriology.  
The unfolding dialogue between the Father and Son in John’s Gospel, especially John 5, roots the 
redemptive mission of the Son in his eternal, pre-existent relation to the Father.  Of course, the 
Son’s mission has salvation as its telos, but its foundation is the Son’s divine procession.  The reason 
 
 104  Torrance, Theology and Reconciliation, 135.  
 105  Philip Schaff helpfully shows the doctrinal development from Nicaea to Chalcedon:  ‘While the 
first Council of Nicaea had established the eternal, pre-existent Godhead of Christ, the Symbol of the fourth 
ecumenical Council relates to the incarnate Logos, as he walked upon earth and sits on the right hand of the 
Father. It is directed against the errors of Nestorius and Eutyches, who agreed with the Nicene Creed as 




the Son’s mission is efficacious is precisely because he is sent from the Father – from eternity and 
now ‘in the fullness of time’ (Gal 4:4).  God’s sends the Son because he is good.   
 
Christ’s Two Natures  
 
 In the incarnation, the eternal divine Son takes to himself a human nature.  Chalcedon 
teaches that Christ’s two natures cannot be divided or separated from one another in the 
incarnation.  Torrance, however, thinks this ‘must be stated more dynamically.’106  In order to 
understand Christ’s two natures more dynamically, Torrance revises a vital component of Reformed 
Christology – Christ’s humiliation.  Similar to Owen, Torrance holds that Christ’s assuming of a 
human nature is his entrance into a state of humiliation. Christ’s entire state of humiliation is one of 
active obedience.  The Son’s humiliation in which he takes on his human nature must not be 
separated from the Son’s perfect obedience to the Father.  In this way, Torrance is very much 
working with his Reformed tradition.107  Torrance’s dynamic revision is that Christ assumes a fallen 
human nature and that the obedience Christ offers is the work of his unified person.108  Torrance 
believes his revision is an improvement upon the patristic understanding of Christ’s two natures. 109  
Notice, however, that soteriology motivates this more dynamic way.  Owen also speaks of Christ’s 
humiliation and obedience, and this too is motivated, in part, by soteriological concerns – which is 
one of the reasons for the covenant of redemption.  However, in Torrance, this is taken to an 
extreme as Christ now assumes a fallen human nature, and his state of humiliation is read through 
the lens of fallen humanity and not through the Son’s relation of origin.       
 
 106  Torrance, Incarnation, 208.  
 107  Torrance does not use the term ‘active obedience’ in this context, but he clearly articulates the 
concept.  
 108  Torrance, Incarnation, 208-209.    
 109  Torrance, Incarnation, 208, 228. 
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 This is important to recognize, because when a robust understanding of the Son’s ad intra 
relationship to the Father drops out of theology, often a robust understanding of Christ’s two 
natures does as well.  What dominates Torrance’s theology of the hypostatic union, then, is that God 
and humanity are united.  For example, notice what Torrance does as he talks about this more 
dynamic way of understanding the union of Christ’s two natures – he shifts from discussing the two 
natures of Christ to the oneness of the Father and Son.  Torrance writes:  
It is precisely in the impossibility of their [the natures, but notice the shift that is about 
to occur] separation that our redemption lies, for it is redemption into unbreakable 
union and communion with the Father, and the once and for all exaltation of our 
human nature in Christ, into the life of eternal God.  It is because the incarnate Son 
and the Father are one, and cannot be divided or separated from one another, that 
our salvation is eternally secure in the hand of the Father, for no one can snatch us out 
of his hand.110 
It appears that Torrance’s concern for the Son’s homoousial relation to the Father is Torrance’s real 
concern as it overshadows the point that he (rightly) makes about the unified acts of each nature in 
Christ’s one person.  Yet, the emphasis of God united to humanity is not the concern of Chalcedon’s 
negative Christological boundary markers.111  Here, Torrance’s blending of the divine persons carries 
over into, and has implications for, his Christology.  Conflating persons in theology proper leads to 
conflating natures in Christology.  Nevertheless, Torrance constructs this more dynamic way in his 
text, Incarnation.112  Along the way, Torrance helpfully brings out many points of the Chalcedonian 
two-nature Christology.  Chalcedon helps theologians to avoid both the Antiochene extreme that 
mixed the two natures and the Alexandria extreme that tends toward Nestorianism; both must be 
avoided.113   
 
 110  Torrance, Incarnation, 208-209.  
 111  They are negative in the sense that they tell us what not to say in order to avoid one of the 
Christological heresies.    
 112  Though also see, Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 73-157.  
 113  Torrance, Incarnation, 208, 210. It is worth noting that Torrance’s understanding that Christ is not 
‘a man’ but ‘man’ is related to his desire to avoid Nestorianism.  Torrance writes, ‘Now there is a clear danger 
in speaking of the assumption of ‘a man’, for that savours of adoptionism, but on the other hand, to speak of 
the assumption of ‘man’ savours the idea that what was assumed was only human nature in general, human 
nature with all its human properties and qualities.  That was precisely the danger of Alexandrian theology, 
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 Talk of Christ’s two natures naturally leads Torrance to discuss the communication of 
properties between Christ’s divine and human natures.  Torrance focuses his discussion around the 
differences between Lutheran and Reformed Christology.  Following the Reformed tradition, 
Torrance affirms the communicatio idiomatum just as Owen does.114  The communication of 
properties affirms that each nature is distinct and acts in accordance with his own properties. 
Christ’s unified person means that what is particular to one nature can be predicated of the other 
nature, and, yet there is no mixture or absorption of the two natures.115  Furthermore, the 
communicatio idiomatum means that Christ’s distinct human nature remains after Christ’s 
resurrection and ascension.116  This point is very important for Torrance given his soteriologically 
conditioned understanding of Christology. That Christ ‘continues to exist as man…is of absolute 
importance for the saving relevance of the gospel of the risen Christ to us who remain creatures of 
flesh and blood.’117    
 However, patristic Christology misses this soteriological link between Jesus’ person and 
work.118  The Reformed tradition, however, recovers this right focus on redemptive history.119  
Torrance writes:  
While adhering loyally to the catholic christology of the ecumenical churches, the 
Reformers rejected the Roman idea of a timeless mystery and timeless repetition of 
the sacrifice in the mass.  They sought to recover the historical perspective of the last 
supper, and to reincorporate in the eucharist the double stress the once for all 
character of the incarnate work and self oblation of Christ, and upon continuous 
participation in his saving humanity.  That doctrine of the Lord’s supper, however, 
rested upon a corresponding doctrine of Christ, and the essential integration of 
incarnation and atonement.120 
 
which ever since the logos Christology came on the field, tended to throw into the background the significance 
of the historical Jesus as a single individual man.’  Torrance, Incarnation, 210. 
 114  Torrance, Incarnation, 209.  
 115  Torrance, Incarnation, 210.  
 116  Torrance, Incarnation, 209.  
 117  Torrance, Incarnation, 209.  
 118  Torrance, Incarnation, 212.  
 119  Torrance, Incarnation, 213.  
 120  Torrance, Incarnation, 214.  
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Lutheran theologians stress the union of the divine and human natures in Christ’s one person, 
whereas the Reformed ‘lay stress upon the person of the Son of God as God and man.’121  Both 
Lutheran and Reformed, though, understand Chalcedon more dynamically, moving beyond patristic 
theology that tends to understand Christ’s assumption of a human nature as a static state.122  
Whether or not this is fair, Torrance clearly reads the Reformed tradition soteriologically.  The 
Reformation understands the union of Christ’s two natures ‘from the perspective of the end result’, 
which is Christ’s ‘healing and sanctifying assumption of our adamic humanity.’123  This concern is 
shared by Reformed and Lutheran alike.  Despite their differences, Torrance explains that both 
Calvin and Luther ‘sought to reinterpret the hypostatic union.’124  Though Luther emphasizes Christ’s 
obedience, and Calvin emphasizes God’s mighty act of redemption, both formulate a more dynamic 
understanding of the Christ’s two natures.125 
 The more dynamic understanding Torrance envisions is found in the communio 
naturarum.126  The Reformation understanding of the communion of the two natures goes back to 
Irenaeus who formulates the communion in terms of union and communion in his theology of 
recapitulation.127  For Irenaeus, this ‘did not only mean the recapitulation of our fallen humanity 
from its origin in Adam and its restoration through obedience to union and communion with God, 
but the gathering up into union with God the whole life of Christ from his birth to his mature life in a 
 
 121  Torrance, Incarnation, 215.   
 122  Torrance, Incarnation, 215.  
 123  Torrance, Incarnation, 215.  Notice again that Torrance equates, and therefore conflates, Christ’s 
assumption of a human nature with the union of the two natures in his one person.    
 124  Torrance, Incarnation, 216.  
 125  Torrance, Incarnation, 216.  To be fair, Torrance does discuss the differences between the 
Lutheran and Reformed as well.  See Torrance, Incarnation, 213-228.  
 126  Torrance, Incarnation, 221.  Torrance briefly discusses how the Lutherans differ from the 
Reformed on the nature of this communion.  The Reformed maintain the distinction of the two natures united 
indirectly as the union is in the one person and not one nature united to another.  The Lutheran understanding 
is close to one in which the ‘human nature is assumed into the divine nature’ that results in ‘a mutual 
participation of the divine and human nature.’  For Torrance, the Lutheran view mixes and confuses the two 
natures.  There is a distinction without separation, but not in the way Lutheran Christology formulates the 
hypostatic union.  Torrance, Incarnation, 221-222.  Thus the Reformed think the Lutheran formulation is 
monophysite, while the Lutheran think the Reformed position is Nestorian.     
 127  Torrance, Incarnation, 221.  
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comm-union of two natures in one person.’128  That is to say, for Torrance, Irenaeus understands the 
union of the two natures dynamically and soteriologically just as the Reformers.  This union and 
communion means that the acts of each nature are truly acts of the unified person of Christ.  
Interestingly, Torrance critiques the Lutheran understanding of the communication of properties, 
clearly aligning himself with the Reformed tradition. However, Torrance’s use of the communio 
naturarum seems to agree, at least in part, with the Lutheran understanding of the ‘mutual 
participation’ of Christ’s divine and human natures in which the divine nature actively ‘penetrates 
into the human nature and the human nature passively penetrates into the divine.’129  Torrance 
gravitates toward this understanding due to the emphasis on the divine nature and divine action.  
God becomes human in Christ, but humanity does and cannot become God.130 
 The concept of the communication operationem also helps Torrance formulate his dynamic 
understanding of Christ’s two natures.  The communion of operations conceptualizes the acts of the 
divine and human natures of Christ whereby each nature works according to its peculiar properties 
in communion with the other nature, so that both divine and human works are works of the one 
person of Christ.  However, if this is all that the communion of operations means, then Christology is 
still too static and needs revision at this point as well.  Torrance says that the ‘communicatio 
operationem is concerned with more than that.’131  Torrance elaborates:  
It asserts a dynamic communion between the divine and human natures of Christ, in 
terms of his atoning and reconciling work.  It stresses the union of two natures for 
mediatorial operations in such a way that these works proceed from the one person of 
the God-man by the distinct effectiveness of both natures.  In other words, the whole 
dynamic movement of the hypostatic union has to be understood in terms of the fact 
that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, and so the hypostatic union 
is the ontological side of the dynamic action of reconciliation.  Thus we understand the 
meaning of the hypostatic union not merely in terms of the incarnation, but in terms 
of reconciliation between God and man.  And we understand the reconciliation not 
simply in terms of Christ’s work on the cross, but in terms of his incarnation, so that 
the reconciling union of God and man is understood as wrought out in the incarnate 
 
 128  Torrance, Incarnation, 221.  
 129  Torrance, Incarnation, 222.  
 130  Torrance, Incarnation, 222.  On the communion naturarum as a Lutheran, and not Reformed, 
concept, see, Muller, DLGTT:72.  
 131  Torrance, Incarnation, 226.   
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person of Christ, and in the whole course of his historical life and death and 
resurrection from the dead.132 
Here is a clear example of how Torrance revises classical concepts in service of his soteriologically 
conditioned Christology.  In Torrance’s revision, reconciliation is not the fruit of Christ’s person – as 
Aquinas says.  Again, the Son’s mission is built upon the Son’s relation to sinful humanity instead of 
his relation to the Father. 
 At times, Torrance sounds very much in line with the Reformed Orthodox.  For instance, 
Muller defines communicatio operationum as a term ‘used by the Reformed to indicate the common 
work of the two natures of Christ, each doing what is proper to it according to its own attributes.’133  
Torrance makes use of a related concept communicatio apotelesmatum, which Muller defines as 
‘the communication of mediatorial operations in and for the sake of the work of salvation.’134  
Torrance’s Reformed instincts are clear in his defining this term as ‘the co-operation of the two 
natures in the common purpose, and specific result, of redemption.’135   Yet, while the Reformed do 
develop the understanding of Christ as Mediator in both natures, Torrance’s claim that the 
Reformers radically revise Christology says too much as the fathers also use this term to speak of 
‘cooperation of the two natures’ in the hypostatic union.136  This concept is important for the 
Lutheran Christological understanding of the communicatio idiomatum, because it allows the 
Lutheran theologians to say that Christ’s two natures cooperate through a communication of 
attributes.  By contrast, the Reformed understand the cooperation as a divine gift of grace, which 
comes about because Christ is a unified person.137  Any act of either the human or divine natures is 
an act of the one person of Christ.  However, each nature acts according to its properties, for the 
Reformed tradition, of which Torrance is a part.   
 
 132  Torrance, Incarnation, 226.  
 133  Muller, DLGTT:71.  
 134  Muller, DLGTT:71.  
 135  Torrance, Incarnation, 224.  The term apotelesma (ἀπουτέλεσμα) means ‘a conclusion or 
completion of a work; accomplishment. Muller, DLGTT:35. 
 136  Muller, DLGTT:35.  
 137  Muller, DLGTT:35.  
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 One of the clearest articulations of this principle is found in the Westminster Confession of 
Faith.  WCF 8.7 reads, ‘Christ, in the work of mediation, acts according to both natures, by each 
nature doing that which is proper to itself; yet, by reason of the unity of the person, that which is 
proper to one nature is sometimes in Scripture attributed to the person denominated by the other 
nature.’138  The WCF, like Torrance, articulates an understanding of the union of Christ’s two natures 
that follow Chalcedon, but also understands Christ as mediator according to both natures.  It is 
important to see here that both Torrance and Owen (who is the primary author of the Savoy 
Declaration – a Congregational revision of the WCF) follow the Reformed tradition in their 
understanding of Christ’s mediation according to both natures.  Yet, the careful delineations of WCF 
are not dynamic enough for Torrance’s soteriological foundation.   
 Torrance’s own understanding is complex and nuanced as he seems to mostly follow the 
Reformed tradition yet modifies it at points when he finds Lutheran ideas helpful.   As Torrance 
recounts the historical development of the hypostatic union, he is formulating his theology through 
the tradition.  However, Torrance’s understanding of the communio operationem, given at the end 
of his treatment of this development in Incarnation, is where Torrance gives his complex and mature 
formulation of the hypostatic union.  Here, Torrance critiques an understanding of the communio 
operationem governed by the classical understanding of God’s immutability.  Such an understanding 
holds that the Son’s divine nature is involved in the atonement only in so far as it is the unified 
person who performs the atoning work.139  Torrance counters this, saying, ‘But if we really take the 
biblical view of God, then we must think of God the Father as sending the Son into our lost 
existence, into unutterable humiliation in order to really be one with us.’140   
 Christ’s divine nature suffers.  This is so much the case that Torrance continues, ‘But in this 
act of unspeakable humiliation, God was not simply using the humanity of Christ as his organ or 
 
 138  WCF 8.7.    
 139  Torrance, Incarnation, 227.  
 140  Torrance, Incarnation, 227.  
252 
 
instrument, while he remained transcendent to it all.  He himself actually came, the immutable God, 
humbling himself to become a creature and to suffer as a creature our judgment and death.’141  In 
spite of all the talk of natures and historical distinctions, at the end of the day, if God is not 
somehow involved in Christ’s atoning work, then it remains merely a human work.  Yet, for Torrance, 
this means that the divine nature dies and that the communicatio idiomatum is really a conflatio 
idiomatum.142  Torrance’s revision moves toward conflation, because he formulates his entire 
Christology in relation to fallen humanity instead of the Son’s eternal generation from the Father.  
 
Anhypostatic and Enhypostatic  
 
 Torrance’s revision continues as he discusses the relationship of Christ’s two natures in his 
one person.  Similar to Owen, Torrance makes use of the anhypostatic and enhypostatic 
distinction.143  Christ’s two natures are explained as anhypostatic—Christ’s flesh has no independent 
hypostasis or subsistence apart from the incarnation—and as enhypostatic—when Christ took on 
flesh, his human nature was given a real hypostasis within the hypostatic union.  Torrance says the 
Reformed tradition understands the assumption of Christ’s human nature not as an assumption into 
the divine nature, but into the ‘person of the Logos.’144  Though this understanding is found in the 
ancient church, the Reformed tradition makes a ‘real advance over the Patristic usage of these 
concepts.’145  Torrance does not develop this point, but his citation from Heppe reveals that the 
 
 141  Torrance, Incarnation, 227.  
 142  A conflation of properties.    
 143  Torrance understands this distinction arising with the development of Trinitarian dogma, and the 
concept of hypostasis, specifically the Christian understanding of person as shown in the opening section of 
this chapter.  Torrance understands the relation of Christ’s two natures in a way similar to his understanding of 
the divine persons’ onto-relations.  
 144  Torrance, Incarnation, 228.  Along Thomistic lines, Owen understands the assumption as the 
taking on of a human nature.  Strictly speaking, then, Christ’s human nature is assumed and united in the 
person.  While Torrance does not work with a Thomistic understanding, he collapses Christ’s assumption and 
the union of the two natures.   
 145  Torrance, Incarnation, 228.  
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‘improvement’ of Reformed theologians is that Christ’s human nature is not treated as a mere 
instrument of the divine.146   
 Torrance, not quoting but following Heidegger read through Heppe, explains further that 
‘the human nature assumed in the incarnation is more than human nature in general, because in the 
incarnation it is also as individual man that Jesus possesses human nature in the eternal Son.’147  This 
‘more’ unfolds as Torrance revises the anhypostatic and enhypostatic distinction.  It is hard to know 
exactly what Torrance has in mind here, but what he is attempting to do is understand Christ in 
terms of his unified person.  The enhypostasia ‘asserts that the incarnation is an act of pure grace’ in 
which God becomes human and it rules out any kind of adoptionist understanding of the person of 
Christ.148  The human nature of Christ exists only, and always, as it is assumed and united with 
Christ’s divine nature in his one person.  Furthermore, the enhypostasia denotes that Christ is a 
particular human being, the one.  Whereas, the anhypostasia refers to Christ’s ‘general humanity’ as 
he is also the many.149   
 Therefore, the enhypostasia/anhypostasia distinction helps us to see ‘the solidarity of Jesus 
Christ with all humanity in his reconciling work’ because, understood in this way, the incarnation is 
‘the union of the Word of God with mankind.’150  Torrance writes, ‘The hypostatic union did not take 
place apart from the atoning union through which sinful human nature is redeemed, healed, and 
sanctified in Jesus Christ.’151  Torrance’s point is that Jesus is both humanity and a particular human 
being – recall that in Owen, anhypostatic means that Jesus is a particular human being and not 
generic humanity.  The anhyostatic assumption reveals Christ’s humility and grace, while the 
enhypostatic ‘speaks of the fact that the person of Christ was the person of the obedient Son of the 
 
 146  See, Henirch Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics,trans. G.T. Thomson, ed. Ernst Bizer (Eugene, OR:  Wipf 
& Stock, 2017), 427.  The Reformed tradition often understands the ancient and medieval conception of 
Christ’s mediation occurring only in his human nature as making Christ’s human nature merely instrumental.    
 147  Torrance, Incarnation, 229.  
 148  Torrance, Incarnation, 229.  
 149  Torrance, Incarnation, 230.  
 150  Torrance, Incarnation, 230.  
 151  Torrance, Mediator, 70.    
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Father, who in his humanity remained in perfect holy communion with the Father from the very 
beginning, and so was sinless, and absolutely pure and spotless and holy.’152  Torrance explains the 
implications of his formulation more fully in the Christian Doctrine of God:   
In the incarnation the eternal Son assumed human nature into oneness with himself 
but in that assumption Jesus Christ is not only real man but a man. He is at once the 
One and the Many, for in Jesus the Creator become man, all human nature has been 
assumed…so that in Jesus our human being is radically personalised and indeed 
humanised, and as such is brought into intimate union with God and into the 
Communion of the Holy Trinity.153 
What emerges here is that Torrance’s real motivation for revising the anhypostasia and 
enhypostasia is his soteriological understanding of the hypostatic union.  Chalcedon does not 
account for the atoning nature of the union of Christ’s two natures.   In Torrance, the conflation of 
creation and redemption does not allow him to read creation simply as creation. While Torrance 
strongly affirms creation, unfallen creation does not inform his theology at key points, because of his 
understanding of nature and grace.  Torrance’s understanding of nature is one that is fallen and 
redeemed at every point.  Even Gen 1-3 must be read Christologically and redemptively.  As a result, 
there is no room to understand Christ assuming a human nature as there is only a fallen or 
redeemed human nature to assume. Thus, the lack of true doctrine of creation greatly influences the 
way Torrance formulates his understanding of Christ’s two natures.  There is no ‘pure’ or ‘natural’ 
human nature from which to begin.  This is one of the major reasons that Torrance develops his 
theology in the way that he does.  As I said earlier in this chapter, I would argue that this is because 
Torrance lacks a robust doctrine of creation.   
 To sum up this point, this soteriological reading of the hypostatic union leads Torrance to 
revise anhypostatic and enhypostatic.  However, at times, Torrance also employs very traditional 
understandings as well.154  Following the Chalcedonian tradition, Torrance agrees that anhypostatic 
is a way to express the notion that Christ’s human nature has no existence apart from its union with 
 
 152  Torrance, Incarnation, 232.   
 153  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 161.  
 154  This is one reason it is so hard to figure exactly what Torrance means at times.    
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Christ’s divine nature.155  Anhypostasia cannot be separated from enhypostasia, which is a way to 
say that Christ’s human nature has its existence in the person of the Son.156  Notice, however, that 
Torrance does not speak of the union of Christ’s two natures, but of the union of God and human 
nature.  Torrance writes, ‘The union between Word and Flesh, God and Man in Jesus Christ, is a 
Union of a Personal kind, due to the Fact that God in Person is acting here.’157  Torrance is not saying 
that God is a person.  However, Torrance’s concern that Jesus Christ is a true revelation of God’s 
being leads him to speak of the Son’s mission as ‘God in Person’ instead of God the Son.  This might 
seem like a slight nuance, but Torrance’s motive relates to his tendency to blur the distinction 
between the divine persons.  This modalistic drift lies behind Torrance’s blurring of Christ’s two 
natures.  Once again, theology proper influences and shapes every part of the theological project.   
 Furthermore, Torrance’s understanding of the union of Christ’s two natures is motivated by 
his concern for dualistic modes of theology that leave us with a static God.  Once more, Torrance’s 
revision of the traditional doctrine: 
This doctrine of anhypostasia and enhypostasia is a very careful way of stating that we 
cannot think of the hypostatic union statically, but must think of it on the one hand, in 
terms of the great divine act of grace in the incarnation, and on the other hand, in 
terms of the dynamic personal union carried through the whole life of Jesus Christ.  
The ancient Catholic Church never really came to put anhypostasia and enhypostasia 
together in full complementarity in that way.158 
What is missing in the Church’s understanding is that the union of God and man in Jesus Christ must 
be understood as part of God’s reconciling and atoning work.159  Understanding the hypostatic union 
in this more soteriological way, the anhypostasia is the once for all union of God and man, while the 
enhypostasia is the ‘living union continuous throughout the life of the historical Jesus’.160   
 
 155  Torrance, Incarnation, 84.   
 156  Torrance, Incarnation, 84.  
 157  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 114.  
 158  Torrance, Incarnation, 84.  Torrance does say that Cyril of Alexandria makes this connection and 
that in the early seventeenth century a Scottish theologian by the name of Robert Boyd understands 
anhypostasia and enhypostasia in this dynamic way in his In Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Ephesios 
Praelectiones, see, Torrance, Incarnation, 84.  
 159  Torrance, Incarnation, 85.  
 160  Torrance, Incarnation, 85.  
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 Torrance’s thought here is a bit confusing.  Chalcedon is important, but the fathers of the 
council did not fully avoid static, dualistic modes of thought.  And this leads to a static Christ, 
because the God-man is understood apart from actual history.  However, it is not so much that 
Chalcedon does not take the history of Christ seriously.  It is, rather, that they do not read the 
hypostatic union as soteriological from the beginning as does Torrance.  And this is the real 
difference and the reason Torrance reformulates the hypostatic union.  Torrance tellingly writes: 
Thus the doctrine of the hypostatic union has to be stated in essentially soteriological 
terms in order to give it its full truth in accord with the whole life of Christ.  This is the 
contribution of Reformed theology especially to the doctrine of Christ as expressed in 
the concept of the communicatio operationum (communication of acts of the divine 
and human natures).  It is in this way that we seek to deliver the Chalcedonian 
doctrine of Christ from the tendency involved in the Greek terms to state the doctrine 
of Christ statically and metaphysically.161  
I am not sure what to make of Torrance’s comments here, especially as he ends this section of 
Incarnation by calling for a ‘radical reconstruction’ of classical Christology.162  Yet Torrance’s 
reconstruction, I have argued, does not properly distinguish Christ’s two natures.  This leads to a 
slightly different understanding of the Reformed concept of the communicatio operationum.  
Torrance is right to stress the unity of Christ’s persons, but his revised understanding of the 
communication operationem does not maintain that Christ’s two natures act according to the 
properties of each – which is how the Reformed historically use communicatio operationem.  Rather, 
Christ’s two natures are blurred together and not in need of distinguishing.   
Conclusion 
 
 Torrance’s move away from classical Christology, in my opinion, does not ‘deliver 
Chalcedon.’  Rather, it continues to conflate being and person, and possibly even Christ’s two 
natures.  In Torrance’s doctrine of God, his focus on God’s being means that the divine processions 
and missions do not do much theological work in his theology.  This carries over into his Christology.  
 
 161  Torrance, Incarnation, 85.  
 162  Torrance, Incarnation, 85.  
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To lose a robust understanding of the Son’s eternal generation from the Father is also (at least often) 
to lose a clear two-natures Christology.  Turning to soteriology, then, Torrance’s foundation for 
Christ’s person is God ad extra.  In fact, Torrance thinks redemptive history is precisely what is 
missing from the Chalcedonian tradition.   
 Torrance’s turn away from God in se to God for us is also why the virgin birth plays such a 
prominent role in his Christology.  The virgin womb is the place of new creation.  The eschatological 
kingdom arrives as God comes to earth: 
For the Incarnation means surely that the full Divine Being or Aseity goes into action, 
that God, very God, moves toward time and into time; that the immanent personal 
relations within the Godhead are projected, as it were, between eternity and time, and 
particularly between Christ and God, in the God-man himself. There in Christ it is God 
himself in action, acting no doubt in a different way from other ways in the creation, 
for in the Incarnation there was a really new movement of God.163 
Many strands of Torrance’s thinking come together here.  His concern that God’s being is truly made 
known in Christ influences his theology proper.  This concern carries over into Torrance’s 
Christology.   Torrance writes, ‘Thus even in the assumption of flesh it is God, True God, who 
assumed flesh, and not a diminished God in any sense.’164 It is God that sinful humanity so 
desperately needs.  At face value this understanding is certainly true.  Yet, in our theology we must 
decide if it is God who is both transcendent and immanent, eternally perfect in his Triune existence 
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit who, out of his great love, comes to fallen humanity in the fullness of 
time.  Or do we begin with fallen humanity and understand God in a more historically motivated 
way?   
 Torrance’s development of the incarnation in relation to sinful humanity occurs because his 
thought neglects the divine processions.  Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the divine 
processions do not feature in Torrance’s thought precisely because of his soteriological 
understanding of Christ’s person.  Such an understanding makes it hard to say that Christ’s 
 
163  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 113.  
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incarnation is truly free and new.  Fallen creation and sinful humanity are necessary for Torrance’s 
incarnational thinking.  And all of this is motivated by Torrance’s soteriological starting point.  When 
God’s goodness is replaced with disruptive grace, God is defined by things contingent; God ad intra 
is determined by God ad extra.  Such a construction provides a foundation that is not as robust as 
the classical and medieval paradigms Torrance eschews.  
259 
 
Chapter 8: Christ as Mediator in Torrance  
 
 Torrance’s understanding of Christ as Mediator begins in eternity, in the mystery of Christ.  
Yet the eternal mystery is conditioned by the historical present.1  Mystery ‘refers to that union of 
God and man in the one person of Jesus Christ.  In him that union is thrust like an axis into the midst 
of our humanity, making everything to revolve around it and have significance only in relation to it.’2  
This axis is actualized in time but ‘recedes into eternity.’3  As a result, humanity loses this mystery in 
sin, but God’s eternal purpose remains so that ‘at last in Jesus Christ after long and patient 
preparation in God’s purpose with Israel, the mystery of God’s will became incarnate.’4 God’s will, 
the mystery revealed, is Jesus Christ himself.  The mystery of Christ, then, is God’s self-revelation by 
which he is made known to humanity.5  What is more, the mystery of Christ is God’s self-
communication, because it ‘is a mystery that recedes back into the eternal being of the Godhead.  
What God is in Jesus Christ in relation to man, he is antecedently and eternally in himself.’6  The God 
we meet in Jesus Christ is the eternal God.  Furthermore, the incarnate Christ in whom we encounter 
God is God and man in hypostatic union.  The unity of this union ‘transcends all temporal and finite 
conditions’ so much so that the hypostatic union is a ‘oneness in the eternal God himself.’7  Thus 
 
 1  Torrance’s method of theology, as we have seen throughout, is one that is soteriologically 
conditioned.   There is no knowledge of God outside of history and no revelation of God that does not 
reconcile.  Thus, Torrance writes, ‘Keirkegaard has also reminded us that in the Incarnation the Absolute Fact 
has become historical Fact, so that knowledge of it must be analogous to its historical nature.  The Truth with 
which we are concerned is identical with the historical Jesus Christ, and therefore it is Truth that can be 
communicated only historically (that is not of course to deny that it must be communicated spiritually).  The 
Truth is a historical Person, and must be communicated personally and historically.’  School of Faith, xxxiii.   
 2  Torrance, Incarnation, 165.  This definition is verbatim in Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 2:83. 
 3  Torrance, Incarnation, 165.  
 4  Torrance, Incarnation, 165.   
 5  Torrance, Incarnation, 167.  
 6  Torrance, Incarnation, 175.  While Torrance here clearly conflates God in se and God for us, in his 
theology, ‘time’ is not a linear progression of past, present, future.  On this point see,  Myk Habets, ‘“There is 
no God behind the back of Jesus Christ:” Christologically Conditioned Election,’ in Evangelical Calvinism, ed. 
Myk Habets and Bobby Grow, in Essays Resourcing the Continuing Reformation of the Church (Eugene, OR: 
Pickwick Publications, 2012), 187. 
 7  Torrance, Incarnation, 175.  Such an understanding shows the importance of the doctrine of Christ’s 
assumption of a human nature.  For instance, Calvin writes, ‘Meanwhile, the church’s definition stands firm: he 
is believed to be the Son of God because the Word begotten of the Father before all ages took human nature 
in a hypostatic union. Now the old writers defined “hypostatic union” as that which constitutes one person out 
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Torrance eternalizes the hypostatic union.8  Humanity knows this eternal mystery; it is set forth 
(prothesis) in the Son’s incarnate mission.  The Son of God comes as God’s elect one, eternally in 
God, and is made known to the world through his vicarious life of atoning obedience.    
 Therefore, in this chapter, I first discuss Torrance’s theology of election.  Christ is elected to 
come as the one who mediates the things of God to humanity and the things of humanity to God.  
This ‘bidirectional’9 mediation reveals that Jesus Christ is the elect one and the electing one, ‘the 
chosen man and the choosing God.’10  Election, therefore, is not separate from Christ’s mediation, 
but ‘it is through’ Christ’s ‘substitution that election is achieved’ because ‘election and substitution 
are one and the same act.’11  Therefore, the longer second half of the chapter considers Torrance’s 
theology of Christ’s mediation.  Central to this exploration is Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s 
vicarious humanity.  It is important to know throughout that Torrance makes a distinction between 
the Latin, or Western, theology of atonement and the Greek, or Eastern, understanding of Christ’s 
mediation.  Latin theology, says Torrance, teaches that the cross only deals with ‘actual sins’ so that 
‘infusions of grace are provided to deal with original sin.’12  Torrance has in mind the Roman Catholic 
sacrificial system, but he also opposes his own tradition’s understanding of the ‘means of grace’, 
because both are akin to natural theology.  Notably, the means of grace in Torrance’s Reformed 
tradition are Holy Scripture, prayer, and the sacraments.  It is hard to see how these ‘means’ lead to 
 
of two natures.’  Calvin, Institutes:2.14.5.  Torrance’s desire to ‘radically revise’ the old writers, i.e. the 
Chalcedonian definition, leads to an innovation that eternalizes the hypostatic union.  
 8  This calls into question Molnar’s claim that Torrance avoids a historicized Christology.  Molnar, 
Faith, Freedom and the Spirit, 225-234.  
 9  ‘Bidirectional’ is Andrew Purves’ term used to explain how Jesus ministers divine things to humanity 
and human things to God.  See, Andrew Purves, Exploring Christology and Atonement: Conversations with John 
McLeod Campbell, H.R. Mackintosh, and T.F. Torrance (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 11; Andrew 
Purves, ‘New Trends: Erskine of Linlathen, Irving, and McLeod Campbell,’ in The History of Scottish Theology, 
ed. David Ferguson and Mark W. Elliot, vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 236.  Purves discusses 
John McLeod Campbell’s influence in understanding Christ’s mediation in this way, an understanding at work 
in Torrance’s theology of mediation as we will see below.   
 10  Torrance, Incarnation, 113.  
 11  Torrance, Incarnation, 113.  
 12  Thomas F. Torrance, ‘The Atonement: The Singularity of Christ and the Finality of the Cross; The 
Atonement and the Moral Order,’ in Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell, ed. Nigel M. S. Cameron (Carlisle, 
UK: Paternoster Press), 238.   
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natural theology.13  Whereas, an Eastern theology of atonement understands Christ’s entire life as 
his vicarious humanity by which Christ perfectly obeys the Father ‘within the ontological depths of 
his oneness with us in our actual fallen existence.’14  The difference, then, is that Latin atonement 
theology is dualistic and external.  The vicarious humanity of Christ, however, does not allow such an 
understanding of his person and work.  Christ’s humanity is no mere instrument.  Torrance affirms 
that Christ has two natures, but he is more concerned to present Christ as a unified person, because 
he fears that a Latin understanding of atonement is external to Christ’s person.  An external 
atonement separates Christ’s two natures, and separates Christ’s person from Christ’s work.15 
 In response to this perceived dualism, Torrance does not build upon a Chalcedonian two-
nature Christology.  Rather, Torrance builds his theology of Christ as Mediator on what he calls 
Christ’s divine humanity.16  Torrance’s soteriological metaphysic motivates this move.  He suggests a 
proper theology of the atonement unfolds in the New Testament, not through ‘different theories’, 
but ‘is given expression by way of Christological reinterpretation of the redemptive acts of God in 
the deliverance of Israel from Egyptian bondage.’17  As a result, the Old Testament prepares us for 
Christ’s atoning life in a way that is dynamic, priestly, and ontological.18  While Torrance’s 
engagement with Scripture serves as a model for systematic theology, more than exegesis is at work 
in Torrance’s construction.  Commendable as they are, I will argue that Torrance’s redemptive 
historical concerns, rather than a theology of the divine processions, serve as the foundation of 
Christ’s person and work in his theology of mediation.  The result is that Torrance recasts the 
 
 13  Question 155 of the WLC asks, ‘What are the outward means whereby Christ communicates to us 
the benefits of his mediation?’  The answer:  The outward and ordinary means, whereby Christ communicates 
to his church the benefits of his mediation, are all his ordinances, especially the Word, sacraments, and prayer, 
all which are made effectual to the elect for their salvation.’  While Torrance does not like Westminster’s 
theology of election, it is odd that Torrance dismisses the means of grace given that it is Christ who 
communicates to his church.  Most likely, Torrance is adverse to the concept of ‘means’, because he thinks this 
implies human manipulation of grace.  However, WLC 155 and WSC 88 speak of Christ’s communication of 
grace, not human manipulation or natural theology.   
 14  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity,’ 238.  
 15  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity,’ 238.  
 16  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity,’ 241.  
 17  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity,’ 239.  
 18  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity,’ 239.  
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concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis so as to develop Christ’s divine humanity at the expense 
of his divine and human natures.  Structurally, Torrance’s divine humanity of Christ looks like a 
Chalcedonian two-nature Christology, but Torrance’s conception is nonetheless quite innovative.  By 
now it is clear that Torrance is remarkably consistent in how his theology proper informs his 
Christology.  However, that consistency results in a blurring of divine and human natures in Christ’s 
mediation similar to Torrance’s blurring of the divine persons.  The result is an unstable foundation 
of Christ’s mediation.    
 
Predestination and Election 
 
 Torrance’s understanding of election speaks of God’s eternal purpose that God has planned 
in himself and brought about in Jesus Christ.19  Torrance speaks more often of election than 
predestination, and while he uses both terms interchangeably, he understands predestination most 
properly as ‘the anchoring of all God’s ways and works in his own eternal being and will’ thereby 
referring ‘everything back to the eternal purpose of God’s love for humankind.’20   This purpose is 
both God’s ‘pre-destination and post-destination’ as it ranges from predestination to future glory as 
 
 19  Torrance, Incarnation, 169. Torrance’s theology of election is clearly influenced by Barth’s CD II/2 
even though he rarely addresses election or predestination directly, and he never engages the doctrine to the 
extent of Barth.  The main places Torrance treats election directly are: Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Predestination in 
Christ,’ The Evangelical Quarterly 13 (1941):  108-141; Conflict and Agreement 2:83-88; Thomas F. Torrance, 
Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, vol. 1 (1980; repr., Eugene, OR:  Wipf & Stock, 1998), 127-137; 
Incarnation, 168-171, 177-180, 257-258; and Scottish Theology. For a more general overview of Torrance’s 
understanding of election, see, Habets, ‘Christologically Conditioned Election,’ 173-199.  For an overview of 
election which agrees with Torrance on the implications of placing election within the doctrine of God instead 
of Christology see Katherine Sonderegger, ‘Election,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. 
Kathryn Tanner, John Webster, and Iain Torrance (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105-120.  For an 
overview of the Reformed tradition on election see Carl Trueman, ‘Election: Calvin’s Theology and Its Early 
Reception,’ in Calvin’s Theology and Its Reception: Disputes, Developments, and New Possibilities, ed. J. Todd 
Billings and I John Hesselink (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012), 97-120.  For an account 
somewhat sympathetic to Torrance, but finds the Calvin versus the Calvinist thesis wanting, and that also 
treats John Owen, see Suzanne McDonald, Re-Imaging Election: Divine Election as Representing God to Others 
& Others to God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010).  And for a general overview of election in 
Torrance’s Presbyterian tradition see,W. Andrew Hoffecker, ‘Predestination and Election,’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Presbyterianism, ed. Gary Scott Smith and P.C. Kemeny (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 397-412. 
 20  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition,’ 6.  
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in Rom 8, yet this is not to be thought of in terms of linear time, but as ‘the purpose of God in Christ 
reaching out from and into the eternal and infinite mystery of God.’21  This twofold sense is how 
Torrance understands God’s prothesis, or God’s eternal ‘setting-forth’, which is God’s 
predestination.22  Election most properly is the fulfilment of God’s eternal purpose ‘in space and 
time, patiently worked out by God in the history of Israel and brought to its consummation in Jesus 
Christ.’23  Torrance’s clarity on predestination seen here fades when he adds Christ’s incarnation to 
his understanding of God’s ‘pre’.  Torrance writes:  
The incarnation, therefore, may be regarded as the eternal decision or election of God 
in his Love not to be confined, as it were, within himself alone, but to pour himself out 
in unrestricted Love upon the world which he has made and to actualise that Love in 
Jesus Christ in such a way within the conditions of our spatio-temporal existence that 
he constitutes the one Mediator between God and man through whom we may all 
freely participate in the unconditional Love and Grace of God.24 
Election assumes Christ’s incarnation and hypostatic union, because election is ‘christologically 
conditioned.’25  Torrance writes, ‘In the fullness of time that eternal prothesis is incarnated in Jesus 
Christ, by whom all things were created, and through whom all things are restored to the purpose of 
the divine will.’26  Election is not ‘some dead predestination’ in the timeless past, but Jesus Christ 
 
 21  Torrance, Incarnation, 169.  
 22  Torrance, Incarnation, 169.    
 23  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition, 6.  
 24  Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 133.  
 25   Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  Italics are Torrance’s. Following Barth, Torrance reads the Scots 
Confession as teaching a ‘Christologically conditioned’ understanding of election.  See Karl Barth, The 
Knowledge of God and the Service of God According to the Teaching of the Reformation, trans. J.L.M. Haire and 
Ian Henderson (London, UK: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), 68-79.  Barth also cites the ‘Conf. Scotica’ in CD 
II/2:157.  Barth’s and Torrance’s appeal to John Knox and the Scots’ Confession as an early example of a 
christologically conditioned teaching of election has been challenged, even by sympathetic readers.  See David 
Ferguson, ‘Thomas F. Torrance as a Scottish Theologian,’ in T&T Clark Handbook of Thomas F. Torrance, ed. 
Paul D. Molnar and Myk Habets (London, UK:  T&T Clark Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 45-46.  Ferguson seems 
to have slightly changed his opinion of Torrance’s reading from his 1991 Aberdeen inaugural lecture:  
‘Predestination: A Scottish Perspective,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993):462-463.  See also, Donald John 
MacLean, ‘Knox Versus the Knoxians?  Predestination in John Knox and the Seventeenth-Century Federal 
Theology,’ in Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology 1560-1775, ed. Aaron Clay 
Denlinger (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 9-26. 
 26  Torrance, Incarnation, 169.  
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‘the living Word of God’ who is the ‘living act that enters time.’27  God’s eternal purpose, then, is 
nothing less than his love, or simply Jesus Christ.28  
 The goal of God’s free love and grace is God’s communion with his people.29  Sinful humanity 
can enjoy communion with God because Christ is prothesis, put forth, as a propitiation for sin.30  
Interestingly, Torrance connects this setting forth in Rom 3 with the Old Testament liturgy, 
specifically to the ‘shewbread’ through which the Old Testament priests have ‘communion in 
covenant with God’ as they sacramentally participate in the Word of life represented in the holy of 
holies.31  Torrance makes this connection to the bread of presence because, literally in Greek, the 
bread of presence is the bread of setting forth.32  The bread is set forth in order to establish 
communion with God.  Jesus, the elect one, is set forth in the New Covenant as he breaks down the 
wall, the ‘phragmos’ that inhibits relationship with God.33  This same word, ‘phragmos’, is used in 
the parable of the wedding feast in which God’s servants go out into the ‘phragmoi’ to compel those 
outside of communion to come in and enjoy fellowship with God.  This communion is what is finally 
realized in the marriage supper of the lamb.34  Clearly, God’s eternal election of Christ is decidedly 
shaped by soteriological concerns.  Torrance summarizes, and brings his ideas all together, when he 
writes: 
Not all of this, of course, is immediately related to the actual word prothesis in its New 
Testament usage, but it belongs to the context of the word in the koinonia of the 
church.  We may sum up the significance of prothesis by saying that it refers both to 
the divine election or eternal purpose in Christ who is in himself God and man, and it 
refers to the fact that the eternal purpose is set forth in the incarnation, and continues 
 
 27  Torrance, ‘Universalism or Election,’ 315.  
 28  Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 131.  Torrance writes, ‘Properly regarded, 
divine election is the free sovereign decision and utterly contingent act of God’s love in pure liberality or 
unconditional Grace whether in creation or in redemption.  As such it is neither arbitrary nor necessary, for it 
flows freely from an ultimate reason or purpose in the invariant Love of God and is entirely unconditioned by 
any necessity, whether of being or knowledge or will, in God and entirely unconstrained and unmotivated by 
anything whatsoever beyond himself.’  Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 131.Sco 
 29  Torrance, Incarnation, 169.    
 30  Torrance, Incarnation, 169.  
 31  Torrance, Incarnation, 169-170.  
 32  Torrance, Incarnation, 170.  ‘Artos tes protheseos.’ 
 33  Torrance, Incarnation, 170.  
 34  Torrance, Incarnation, 170.  
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to be set forth in the midst of the church in its koinonia through word and sacrament.  
Thus it is that we are given to have fellowship in the mystery of Christ.35 
Torrance here presents his own version of the exitus/reditus schema common to the Christian 
theological tradition, which makes humanity’s return to God the purpose of Christ’s (and 
humanity’s) election.  Importantly, election is soteriologically conditioned, which leads to an 
understanding of God in se as being determined by humanity’s need for salvation..  God’s eternal 
purpose is not based upon an eternal decree or decision that God then providentially brings about 
through both creation and providence.36  Rather, God’s eternal purpose is Christ himself.  Therefore, 
the foundation of God’s eternal election is soteriological – God ad extra.   
 
Christ’s Election  
 
 While it is impossible to uncover Torrance’s theology of election without examining his 
soteriology, my aim in the rest of this section is to explain Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s 
election in order to better understand the theological foundation for Christ’s mediation.37  To begin,  
‘Christ himself is the Elect One.’38  In line with his Reformed tradition, Torrance’s foundation of 
election is God’s eternal decree.39  However, this decree is no decretum absolutum.40  Such a 
dualistic understanding of election separates Jesus from the decree and ‘makes election precede 
grace.’41  A doctrine of election built on an absolute decree makes Christ the instrument of election, 
 
 35  Torrance, Incarnation, 171.      
 36  Torrance does not deny God’s decree but reads it in a ‘christologically conditioned’ way that is 
quite different than the way the Reformed Orthodox understand God’s decree that is worked out through 
both creation and providence.  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 37  While I personally do not endorse every point of Crisp’s conclusions, he offers a helpful and 
thoughtful account of Christ’s election that considers both the approach of Barth and Torrance, as well as the 
Reformed Orthodox.  See, Oliver D. Crisp, ‘The Election of Jesus Christ,’ Journal of Reformed Theology 2 (2008): 
131-150. 
 38  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 39  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 109. 
 40  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition,’ 7.  Barth, CD II/2:101. 
 41  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 109.  Even Calvin is guilty of placing election before grace, 
according to Torrance. 
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but not the foundation, or ground, of election.42  Torrance concludes that ‘it is just here that the 
weakness of the traditional doctrine lies.’43  The corrective to the traditional doctrine is to see that 
election is ‘grounded in the God-Man.’44  God for us is the foundation of election.  Torrance explains, 
‘If there is a paradox in the fact that election is grounded in Jesus Christ and yet in the eternal decree 
of God, it is nothing else than the central paradox of the Christian faith, the Incarnation of the Son of 
God.’45  The hypostatic union is central to Torrance’s understanding of election.  Torrance writes, ‘It 
is significant that at the heart of the mystery of election there is the hypostatic union of God and 
man, two perfect natures united and joined in one Person.’46  While this sounds like Chalcedon, 
Torrance does not use the hypostatic union to build upon a traditional two-nature Christology.  
Rather, Torrance’s appeal to Christ’s two natures sets up his understanding of Christ’s election.  The 
divine humanity of Christ is the pattern for creaturely faith and explains how we ‘relate God’s action 
to our faith.’47  Already, we are beginning to see the connection between Christ’s election and his bi-
directional vicarious humanity. 
 While Torrance’s treatment of election is not as thorough as Barth’s, Torrance’s construction 
of election is similarly motivated.48  Barth’s motivation is God’s particularity.49  Torrance’s motivation 
is the homoousion.  Saying it this way is not to suggest that Barth and Torrance differ at this point, 
but to understand God’s particularity as Torrance does.  In Jesus Christ, the only true God is 
revealed.   Although Torrance does not speak as directly as Barth does of God’s self-election, 
Torrance’s doctrine of homoousion implies a very similar understanding.50  Torrance’s ‘grounding’ of 
election in the God-Man shows that he too works with a revisionary understanding of double 
 
 42  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 109.  
 43  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 109.    
 44  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 111.    
 45  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 111.  
 46  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 47  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 48  Habets, ‘Christologically Conditioned Election,’ 176.  Torrance seems to assume Barth’s doctrine of 
election and, therefore, his account is not as detailed as Barth’s.   
 49  John Webster, Karl Barth, Outstanding Christian Thinkers, ed. Brian Davies O.P. (London, UK:  
Continuum, 2000), 89.  
 50  See Barth CD II/2:162.  
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predestination.  In Torrance, and Barth, election is not unto salvation or reprobation, but an election 
of God and humanity.  To say it as Torrance does, in Christ, God elects himself, and in Christ, God 
elects humanity.  The elected humanity is not a general humanity, but even before the incarnation, 
is the election of Jesus Christ.  As a result, Torrance’s doctrine of election and predestination equates 
grace with the person of Jesus Christ.51  Thus, Torrance writes, ‘The position of the traditional 
doctrine [of election] here really implies that there is a higher fact than Grace, and that therefore 
Christ does not fully go bail for God.’52  While Torrance’s phrase is unclear, what he means is that if 
there is something higher than Grace, than there is something higher than Christ – and therefore 
something higher than God.  Election concerns the being of God.  If there is something higher then 
‘Grace’, than Christ is detached from God.53  The absolute decree of the traditional Reformed 
understanding of election, thinks Torrance, places God behind the back of Jesus Christ.  The 
Protestant Orthodox doctrine of election is dualistic.  Torrance, writes, ‘Christ is Himself identical 
with the action of God toward men; He is the full and complete Word of God.  There is therefore no 
higher will than Grace or Christ.’54   
 However, if we say that God, or Christ, simply is grace, then we risk introducing something 
accidental to the very being of God.  This is especially true given the thorough soteriological 
understanding of theology at work in Torrance’s formulations.  Torrance affirms God’s decree of 
election but wants to read this in a Christological way to avoid any kind of abstract understanding of 
election apart from Christ.55  Torrance explains, ‘Christ is in His own Person the eternal decree of 
 
 51  Torrance also equates Jesus Christ with the atonement as we will see below.   
 52  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 109-110.  By ‘fully go bail’ Torrance means something like ‘does 
not go all out.’  Torrance’s concern with the ‘traditional’ view of predestination is that it supposedly detaches 
Christ and grace – God is not made known, but something higher than God.      
 53  Torrance’s construction seems motivated by his concern to avoid anything akin to Arianism, which 
is a dualism.    
 54  Torrance, ‘Predestination,’ 110.  
 55  While Torrance’s caution against understanding predestination as determinism is helpful, it is not 
fair to say that Calvin’s followers simply make God’s decree abstract and separate from Christ.  Owen, for 
instance, defines God’s decree of election as ‘The eternal, free, immutable purpose of God, whereby in Jesus 
Christ he chooseth for himself whom he pleaseth out of whole mankind, determining to bestow  upon them, 
for his sake, grace here, and everlasting happiness hereafter, for the praise of his glory, by the way of mercy.’  
Owen, Works 1:473. 
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God – it is a false distinction to make Him only the causa et medium and not also the full ground of 
predestination.’56  To equate Christ with the decree, however, is to conflate Christ’s person and 
work.  Here Torrance confuses the person and work of not only the incarnate Christ, but also the 
eternal Son.  God’s decree is an eternal work ad intra and is a work of the One God.57  Therefore, to 
equate the eternal person of the Son with the internal work of God is to conflate person and work, 
or, more properly, such a construction blurs the distinction between God in se and God for us.  
Torrance himself does not see this as a conflation.  Rather, if we separate Christ’s person from his 
work, or if we separate God’s works ad intra from God’s works ad extra, then Christ’s deity is called 
into question and his work is detached from his person, i.e. from God.  Such a dualistic 
understanding, Torrance argues, reduces salvation to a merely human work of a merely human 
Christ.  Torrance explains:   
What Christ is in all his life and action, in his love and compassion, he is antecedently 
and eternally in himself as the eternal Son of the Father.  The act of reconciliation and 
oneness with man, the act of forgiveness in the earthly ministry of Jesus, that is not 
merely temporal event, but eternal event.  Thus we must say that the whole course of 
Christ’s human life and work has its ground in the action of the eternal God.  Unless 
there is this eternal and essential relation between the union of God and man on 
earth, and the eternal union of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in heaven, 
we are not assured either of real, or of eternal relations with God.  Our salvation 
would have otherwise no ultimate ontological ground in reality.  What God is toward 
us in Christ, and in him toward us, in his opus ad extra, he is eternally in himself in his 
opus ad intra.58 
Torrance does not distinguish God ad intra and God ad extra precisely because he equates God in se 
with God for us.  However, this does mean not that Christ’s human nature is eternal.  The human 
nature of Jesus is ‘a creature of God’ that has existence only in Christ’s hypostatic union.59  Yet, as 
Jesus’ humanity is ‘assumed into oneness with the eternal Son’, it shares in the eternal glory of the 
eternal Son of God.60  In the incarnation, then, something new happens – the eternal Son becomes a 
 
 56  Torrance, ‘Predestination,’ 110.  
 57  God’s decrees are carried out as works ad extra.  By internal, I mean the actual decreeing of God 
that takes place within God himself.    
 58  Torrance, Incarnation, 176-177. 
 59  Torrance, Incarnation, 177.  
 60  Torrance, Incarnation, 177.  
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creature without ceasing to be God.  However, ‘The relation of the incarnate Son to the Father did 
not arise within time.’61  The foundation of Christ’s incarnation is not God’s good nature, but God’s 
‘eternal decision, an eternal prothesis which God had purposed in himself from all eternity.’62  Here, 
albeit for different reasons, Torrance’s similarity with Owen’s ‘new habitude’ in the pactum 
emerges. 
 In Torrance’s doctrine of election, God’s eternal purpose really is an eternal purpose.  
However, the foundation of that purpose and prothesis is not ontological – it is not a decision made 
on the foundation of God in se.  Rather, it is a choice understood through the lens of soteriology to 
the extent that Torrance self-consciously equates God’s work ad extra and ad intra. The equating of 
God for us and God in se leads to a basic conflation throughout Torrance’s theology.  This conflation, 
as we shall see, continues in Torrance’s theology of Christ’s mediation.  
 
Election and Covenant  
 
 Torrance moves away from a traditional Reformed doctrine of election, in part, because he 
makes election synonymous with the covenant of grace – election is to covenant.  Torrance equates 
election and covenant because Christ is election and is God’s eternal decree.  Torrance explains, 
‘God’s eternal decree is nothing other than God’s eternal Word so that in Christ we have the eternal 
decree or Word of God made flesh.  Election is identical with the life and existence and work of Jesus 
Christ, and what he does is election going into action.’63  God’s being is in Act and God’s act is in 
being.  Torrance’s understanding of election, then, is consistent with his theology proper.  However, 
it is precisely Torrance’s doctrine of God that leads to his soteriological understanding of the eternal 
decree, election, and covenant. 
 
 61  Torrance, Incarnation, 177.  
 62  Torrance, Incarnation, 177.  Notice how this sounds somewhat like Owen’s ‘new habitude’ in the 
covenant of redemption.     
 63  Torrance, Atonement, 183.    
270 
 
 At this point, it is helpful to see that the motivation of Torrance’s doctrine of election is 
similar to Owen’s use of the covenant of redemption.  At stake is more than a proper understanding 
of God’s will.  If God can only will the good, then how do we make sense of sin?  Owen’s solution is 
the covenant of redemption, God’s council, whereby the three divine persons covenant to redeem 
fallen humanity and Christ agrees to be the surety.  God’s will and God’s freedom are prominent 
concerns in both Owen and Torrance. Importantly, God’s will is one of the major reasons that both 
Torrance and Barth formulate election as they do.  Recall that earlier, Owen struggles to locate God’s 
will as he formulates the covenant of redemption.  Something similar happens in Torrance’s 
understanding of election.  Unfortunately, Torrance, unlike Barth, does not directly talk about the 
relation of election and God’s will other than to equate God’s will with Christ.64  However, the very 
thing Torrance wants to protect is called into question in his doctrine of election – God’s freedom.  It 
is hard to square how Jesus Christ is the eternal decree and is also something new in history.65  If 
Torrance simply means this is God’s plan and will, then God’s freedom could be preserved.  
However, Torrance says more.  In history, we meet the incarnate Jesus.  Therefore, God’s plan of 
redemption must be, even in eternity, Jesus Christ.  While I am not convinced of the covenant of 
redemption, Torrance’s aversion to the consilium Dei further proves that the divine processions are 
not central to his theology proper.  Torrance knows very well the traditional theology, but reads an 
appeal to the council of God as raising predestination to ‘an independent principle’ detached from 
election in Christ.66  The Reformed Orthodox understanding of predestination and election, for 
Torrance, is natural theology.67  There is no knowledge of God outside of Christ so election is 
reconstructed around the hypostatic union. 
 
 64  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 110.  See Barth, CD II/2.33.2.      
 65  Recall that Owen’s understanding that John 14:28 speaks not of the Son’s economic obedience, but 
of the covenant of redemption risks introducing subordination into God’s inner life.    
 66  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 108.  
 67  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 111.    
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 Historically, God’s eternal decree (God’s being) is distinguished from the counsel of God 
(persons), only formally, not essentially, because God is simple.  Muller helpfully explains that 
‘nevertheless, in a formal sense, the consilium is the divine decision.  The decretum is the actual 
willing or expression of that decision.’68  Thus the decree is the expression of Christ’s voluntary 
decision to redeem God’s elect.  In Owen, the concept of God’s absolute decree arises against the 
Arminians to stress, not that the Son is separated from the Father, but that humanity is not able to 
manipulate God – something Torrance agrees with – and affirms ‘the absolutely antecedent and 
unconditional character of the divine decree.’69   Another concern of Owen is the Socinians, who 
separate the decree from God’s essence.  Torrance, on the other hand, Christologically aligns the 
decree with the essence precisely because the divine processions do little work in his theology 
proper.  Torrance rightly wants to maintain God’s freedom, yet if the hypostatic union and person of 
Jesus are eternalized, even given his understanding of time and eternity, it is hard to see how the 
incarnation is not necessary rather than contingent.  God’s decree is not the expression, or willing, of 
the eternal Son’s free decision, because such a construction remains too abstract, because, like the 
decree, the divine counsel is too abstract and Torrance simply maintains that God’s love ‘knows no 
“why”.’70  God’s love ‘knows no “why”’ precisely because Torrance equates the ‘why’ with Jesus 
Christ. Torrance writes, ‘But that is not to say that Christ loves and forgives and elects us because of 
some higher reason found only in an inscrutable divine counsel.’71  Perhaps polemical concerns lead 
both theologians to overreact in their constraining of revelation.  From a Thomistic point of view, the 
‘why’ is God’s goodness.  
 I cannot help but think a robust articulation of the Son’s, in distinction from Jesus’, eternal 
yet free covenant in God’s council, which simultaneously is the decree of the one God (of which the 
Son is homoousion) better expresses Torrance’s concerns than equating and conflating election, 
 
 68  Muller, DLGTT:87.  
 69  Muller, DLGTT:87.  
 70  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 110.  
 71  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 110.  
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decree, and Christ.  Such a construction is close to the covenant of redemption, but this does not 
fully resolve the Reformed tradition’s struggle to properly predicate and locate God’s will.  Owen 
too, as we have seen, at times, conflates God ad intra and God ad extra.  The point here is that 
Torrance’s lack of discussion of the divine processions does not allow him to understand that the 
foundation of Christ’s incarnation, his mission, is his eternal procession – God ad intra.  To begin 
with soteriology is to allow the mission to condition the eternal procession, whether intentional or 
not.  The result is Torrance’s merging of God in se and God for us.  And when this occurs, Christ’s two 
natures are admixed as we will see below.  Torrance’s theology is unable to avoid conflation because 
of the ‘eternal and essential relation’ between the incarnate Christ and the Trinity.72  Thus Torrance 
internalizes the relation between God and creatures – the Creator/creature distinction is blurred – 
and, accordingly, it is no longer gratuitous and expressive of God’s will.73    
 This understanding, while indebted to Barth, radicalizes Barth’s theology of election and 
aligns more with Moltmann at this point.  Furthermore, this move is a consequence of Torrance’s 
understanding of nature and grace.  Thomas Joseph White, speaking of Barth, helpfully writes: 
This is a non-trivial matter, for if by contrast we remove the appeal to the analogy of 
creative causality from our understanding of the divine and human natures of Christ 
that are united in his person, then we must conceive of the union of God’s divine and 
human natures not in a trans-historical fashion (aided by recourse to an analogical 
doctrine of creative causality), but rather by appeal to a likeness from causal becoming 
in a pre-existent subject.74   
The result, says White, is that God is understood in a narrative fashion. ‘The incarnation becomes 
inconceivable without ascribing history to the very life of God in se, and so the very notion of the 
“immanent Trinity” is threatened.’75  And while not listing Torrance by name, White concludes, 
‘Interestingly this is precisely what we see in the post-Hegelian Barthian-inspired theologies of 
 
 72  Torrance, Incarnation, 176-177.   Recall the last block quote above.     
 73  Compare Torrance’s understanding with Aquinas ST III, q. 2, a. 7.  This move is a consequence of 
Torrance’s understanding of nature and grace.   
 74  White, The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology, Thomistic Ressourcement Series, ed. 
Matthew Levering and Thomas Joseph White (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2017), 198.  
 75  White, Incarnate Lord, 198.   
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Jürgen Moltmann, Ebehard Jüngel, and Robert Jenson, all of whom interpret Chalcedonian 
Christology while distancing themselves from a classical metaphysical understanding of creation.’76  
Torrance, in my judgement, is not as radical as these theologians, but methodologically he has 
moved a step beyond Barth in this direction.  Making Christ the decree creates more problems, it 
would seem, than it solves.   
 Torrance’s understanding of election is important to his understanding of Christ’s mediation.  
The incarnate Son comes into a world that is fallen and takes to himself sinful flesh.77  Christ’s 
election, in the fallen creation ‘becomes and operates as atoning mediation.’78  Anticipating the 
second half of the chapter, Torrance writes, ‘Thus mediation is the specific form which election 
assumes in sinful history.  That means that the union of God and man in Jesus Christ is not thought 
of as somehow ontologically complete at Bethlehem.  It begins there by entry into the enmity 
between the justice of God and our sin, but it is completed in the death, resurrection, and ascension 
of Christ.’79  Understood in terms of Christology, election focuses on humanity’s union with Christ 
that is grounded in the ‘union of the Godhead and manhood in Christ himself.’80  Election, then, is 
God’s atoning activity in Christ.81 
 
The Vicarious Humanity of Christ  
 
 Central to Torrance’s understanding of election is how the incarnation relates to the 
atonement.82  Christ’s coming as God in the flesh and his mediation are, ultimately, one unified act 
of God.  Christ’s incarnation is not simply the means and Christ’s cross the end.  Rather, Jesus Christ 
 
 76  White, Incarnate Lord, 198-199.   
 77  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 78  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 79  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14. 
 80  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 15.  
 81  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14.  
 82  See Robert T. Walker, ‘Incarnation and Atonement:  Their Relation and Inter-Relation in the 
Theology of T.F. Torrance,’ Participatio 3 (2012): 1-63.  
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is the elect human who redeems all humanity in and through his vicarious life.  The incarnation and 
atonement are one saving act because Jesus Christ does not just make atonement but is the 
atonement.83  Torrance writes, ‘We cannot therefore properly think of the Incarnation apart from 
the Atonement, or of the Atonement apart from the Incarnation.’84  Christ’s incarnation and 
mediation are not dualistically divided, because it is the unified person of Christ who fulfils his 
mediating work.  ‘It is the work of the Person and the Person who does this work.’85  Thus, 
atonement is not made simply by the work of Christ but in his incarnate person.  Torrance’s theology 
of Christ’s mediation is encapsulated in his homily commemorating Melito of Sardis:  
There is no suggestion…that atonement is something done by God outside of Christ as 
if some external relation to the Incarnation or in addition to it, but as something done 
within the ontological depths of the Incarnation, for the assumption of the flesh by 
God in Jesus Christ is itself a redemptive act and of the very essence of God’s saving 
work.  This takes place, not just in some impersonal physical way, but in an intensely 
personal and intimate way within the incarnate Lord and his coexistence with us in our 
fallen suffering condition as sinners.  Incarnation is thus intrinsically atoning, and the 
atonement is intrinsically incarnational.86 
Since this one act occurs in the person of Christ, atonement is first made between God and humanity 
in Christ’s hypostatic union as God and humanity are united in Christ’s one person.87  Humanity, as 
we will see, is included in Christ in this atoning work.  Torrance writes, ‘We must remember also that 
God has made His own (περιποιῆσαι) our humanity which He has taken up for ever into the 
Godhead.’88  Torrance does not explicitly speak of Christ needing atonement, but Christ is the 
vicarious human to whom all of humanity, in need of reconciliation with God, is united.  And as the 
vicarious human, Christ fulfils all that is necessary for salvation.89  As a result, Christ’s humanity 
 
 83  Torrance, Atonement, 94.  
 84  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 85.  
 85  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 85.  Torrance’s theology of atonement is deeply influenced by 
Barth.  Barth, similarly, says, ‘In relation neither to His person nor to His work can we under this aspect say 
everything that has to be said about Him, or everything that makes the history of the atonement this particular 
history. It is a matter of the whole Christ and the whole atonement from this one standpoint.’  Barth CD 
IV/1:171. 
 86  Torrance, ‘Dramatic Proclamation of the Gospel: Homily on the Passion of Melito of Sardis,’ in 
Greek Orthodox Theological Review 37 (1992): 155.   
 87  Torrance, Atonement, 137.  
 88  Torrance, ‘Predestination in Christ,’ 138n.62.    
 89  Torrance talks of the vicarious humanity of Christ throughout his works, but see especially 
Torrance, Mediation, passim.;  ‘The Place of the Humanity of Christ in the Sacramental Life of the Church,’ in 
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needs atoning reconciliation, not because he is a sinner, but because in the assumption, Christ takes 
on a fallen human nature – a human nature that is alienated from God.90    
 Although born of the virgin, in the incarnation Jesus does not take on an abstract or neutral 
human nature.91  Torrance writes, ‘It was not by assuming some neutral human nature but by 
assuming our actual fallen human nature, thereby taking our place under the judgement of God’s 
Holiness and Love, that he effected our salvation and transformed our human being in himself, 
bringing it into conformity with his own perfect obedience as incarnate Son of the Father.’92  An 
 
Gospel, Church, and Ministry, ed. Jock Stein (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 85-92; Scottish 
Theology, throughout, but especially 39-45 and 305-312; Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 121-123; Theology in 
Reconciliation, 224-231; Barth: Biblical and Evangelical, 234-236; Trinitarian Faith, 4, 63, 83-84, 142, 146-190, 
293-295.  Major secondary works include: James B. Torrance, ‘The Vicarious Humanity of Christ,’ in The 
Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed A.D. 381, ed. Thomas F. Torrance 
(Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1981), 127-147;  ‘Incarnation - The Vicarious Humanity of Christ,’ Abba Salama: A 
Review of the Association of Ethio-Hellenic Studies 10 (1979): 81-89; Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance, 119; Colyer, 
How To Read, 100-119; Radcliff, Humanity in Christ, passim; ‘The Vicarious Humanity of Christ and 
Sanctification,’ in Evangelical Calvinism: Volume 2: Dogmatics and Devotion, ed. Myk Habets and Bobby Grow 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2017), 199-220; Jason R. Radcliff, ‘The Vicarious Humanity of Christ as the Basis for 
Christian Spirituality,’ in Evangelical Calvinism: Volume 2: Dogmatics and Devotion, ed. Myk Habets and Bobby 
Grow (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2017), 184-198; Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical 
Theology of Thomas F. Torrance, Issues in Systematic Theology vol. 11, ed. Paul Molnar (New York, NY: Peter 
Lang Publishing, 2003), 157-177. 
 90  For a sympathetic treatment of Torrance at this point, see, Gerrit Scott Dawson, ‘Far as the Curse is 
Found:  The Significance of Christ’s Assuming a Fallen Human Nature in the Torrance Theology, in An 
Introduction to Torrance Theology:  Discovering the Incarnate Saviour, ed. Gerrit Scott Dawson (London, UK:  
T&T Clark, 2007), 55-74.  For a discussion of the differing views of Christ’s fallen humanity see E. Jerome van 
Kuiken, Christ’s Humanity in Current and Ancient Controversy: Fallen or Not? (London, UK: Bloomsbury T&T 
Clark, 2017).   It could be argued that in Torrance’s theology Christ is in need of his own atoning life and 
oblation.  However, if this is the case, from a Thomistic perspective, Christ assuming a fallen human nature and 
dying for himself is an impossibility because it is not fitting for Christ as priest to receive the effect obtained as 
priest.  ‘And, therefore, it is not fitting for Christ to receive the effect of his priesthood, but he is able to 
communicate it to others.  For the first agent in any genus is the influencer which is not a receiver in that 
genus.’  Aquinas, ST, III, q. 22, a. 4.  The logic of Torrance’s understanding breaks down when he firmly 
maintains Christ’s sinlessness and that Christ does not die for himself.   Kapic helpfully seeks to clarify 
terminology as well as point out areas of agreement and disagreement by drawing from Calvin and the 
Reformed catechisms.  See, Kelly M. Kapic, ‘The Son’s Assumption of a Human Nature:  A Call for Clarity,’ 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 3, no. 2 (July 2001):  154-166.  
 91  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 121. Interestingly, Torrance believes that the catholic church 
held largely to an understanding of Christ’s nature as fallen, but opposition to this teaching arose in the fourth 
century and as a result, from the fifth century on, especially in ‘Latin theology,’ Christ’s fallen humanity is 
replaced with ‘humanity in its perfect original state.  Interestingly, Torrance attributes the Roman Catholic 
doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to this rejection and sees the ‘so-called “Protestant Orthodoxy”,’ 
doctrine of the ‘“verbal inspiration” of the Bible’ as the Protestant version of this rejection.  Torrance, 
Mediation, 39-40.    
 92  Thomas F. Torrance, ‘The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,’ in Christ in Our 
Place: The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World:  Essays Presented to James Torrance, 
ed. Tervor A. Hart and Daniel P. Thimell (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 1989), 379.  Humanity after the fall 
is no longer good as created for Torrance.  However, humanity’s goodness is restored in Christ’s universal 
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abstract, or pure, conception of Christ’s humanity makes Christ docetic.93  Rather, Jesus takes on 
fallen human nature.  In this way, Christ goes into the far country.94  Torrance is deeply influenced by 
Barth in both this understanding of election and atonement.  Torrance asks, ‘Does not the Lord Jesus 
in his vicarious humiliation take upon himself our humanity, fallen humanity, and yet without sin?’95  
Exegetically, Torrance reads 2 Cor 5:19 in support of his claim that Christ assumes humanity’s fallen 
nature.  Flesh in the New Testament, reasons Torrance, most often means fallen flesh.  Torrance is 
clear that Christ is sinless, but in becoming sin for humanity, he takes to himself a true, and 
therefore, fallen, human nature.  As the sinless one, Jesus becomes sin so that, in him, humanity 
might become the righteousness of God.96  Torrance is adamant that Jesus himself is sinless.  Yet, the 
incarnate Son’s flesh is not ‘created out of nothing’ or absolutely new.97  Rather, Christ’s flesh is 
‘created out of fallen humanity, but without the will of fallen humanity.’98  Thus Christ enters a fallen 
state, but his will remains intact and without corruption.  Therefore, Christ is like humanity in both 
our frail finite and sinful condition.  Yet, Christ is also unlike humanity because he takes on our fallen 
nature so as to condemn sin and reconcile humanity to God.99 In this way, Christ assumes fallen 
human flesh without himself committing any sin or bearing any personal guilt.  This is such an 
important point for Torrance because he understands the patristic saying ‘the unassumed is the 
unhealed’ to mean that if Christ does not assume fallen humanity, then there is no redemption. 100  
 
incarnational redemption.  Torrance writes, ‘We are not human in virtue of some essence of humanity that we 
have in ourselves but only in virtue of what we receive from his Humanity which embodies the Life that is the 
Light of Man.  For us to be human, therefore, is to be in Christ.’  Torrance, ‘The Goodness and Dignity of Man,’ 
380-381. 
 93  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.  
 94  Barth, CD IV/1:171.   
 95  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 121.      
 96  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 121.   
 97  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.  
 98  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.  Sin in Torrance’s theology is often conceived as the human 
will departing from filial relation with God.  Christ ‘bends it’ back in his atoning life and work.  Torrance’s most 
sustained treatment of the doctrine of sin is Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2001), chapters 6-8.   
 99  Torrance, Incarnation, 205.  
 100  Torrance, Barth: Biblical and Evangelical, 202-204.  However, Torrance’s reading of this 
‘assumptus principle’ is questionable.  Leaving behind its theological warrant, historically, the saying arises to 
correct Apollinarism which denies that Christ has a true, rational mind.  The reason that Gregory insists that 
Christ assumes a human mind is not because it is fallen, but because if he does not then Christ’s person is 
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Importantly, Christ’s fallen human nature is the foundation of his vicarious humanity. Christ’s person 
is determined by soteriology.101  
 Having assumed a fallen human nature, Christ’s atoning mediation is not external to Christ’s 
person, but occurs in the ‘ontological depths’ of Christ’s person, because what is not assumed is not 
healed.102  Torrance explains: 
The Word certainly enters human flesh, was truly born of fallen humanity, the Son of 
Mary who was not blessed for any other reason than that she believed the word of the 
angel, and trusted God.  She was part of the Adamic race, of fallen humanity, and our 
Lord partook of her flesh vicariously.  Thus while we must say that Christ entered into 
fallen and corrupt humanity, we cannot say that his flesh was created out of nothing 
and absolutely de novo, it was created out of fallen humanity, but without the will of 
fallen humanity.  We must therefore think of the humanity of the Lord Jesus Christ in a 
vicarious way, as his vicarious humanity.103 
 
divided.  The mind causes the soul and body to sin, which is precisely why Apollanarius wanted to replace 
Christ’s mind with the Word.  If Christ had a soul but not a mind, he would not have a true human nature.  
Torrance and his interpreters do not make this historical point.  See, Colyer, How to Read, 104; see also 
104n.23; Thomas A. Noble, ‘Incarnation and Atonement,’ in T&T Clark Handbook of Thomas F. Torrance, ed. 
Paul D. Molnar and Myk Habets (London:  T&T Clark Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 185n.75; Peter Cass, Christ 
Condemned Sin in the Flesh:  Thomas F. Torrance's doctrine of soteriology and its ecumenical significance 
(Saarbrücken, Germany : VDM Verlag, 2009), 160-161. Torrance understands Christ’s assumption to include 
humanity’s ‘alienated mind.’  Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 165; Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of 
Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1989), 6-11; 
Mediation, 39-40; and Atonement, 437-447, where Torrance says he first learned this from H.R. Mackintosh 
but it was Barth’s teaching on this principle that ‘broke in upon’ his ‘mind’ in a quite unforgettable way.’  See 
also, Gregory Nazianzus Letter 101, in NPNF:7; John of Damascus, De Fide Orth. III.6, in NPNF:9; Aquinas ST III, 
q. 5, a. 4, co.    
 101  Torrance is again building upon ideas he finds in Athanasius.  During the great Arian controversy, 
Athanasius ‘pounced upon’ every New Testament text that speaks of Jesus’ humanity avoiding the Arian 
heresy while also uncovering the true significance of Jesus’ humanity, claims Torrance.  For the sake of all 
humanity, Christ ‘took our flesh of sin’ and even ‘our body of corruption’ subjecting himself to ‘slavery and 
divine condemnation, thus taking upon himself the curse of our sin and guilt’ as well as ‘the darkness and 
ignorance into which’ humanity has fallen. Athanasius’ point, Torrance is clear, is that Christ fully enters fallen 
existence.  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 228.  
 102  Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 250; Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 179-184.  Torrance, Barth: 
Biblical and Evangelical, 202-205.  Torrance opposes a neutral, pure human nature with his understanding of 
the assumption.  However, even Aquinas says that Christ’s human nature partook of the effects of the fall 
without saying Christ’s flesh is fallen.  See Aquinas ST III, q. 14.  Crisp helpfully explains, ‘I presume that many 
historical theologians would agree that Christ’s human nature feels the effects of the fall, and in that sense, is 
fallen.  Christ hungers, he thirsts, he tires, he feels bodily weakness, presumably he occasionally fell ill.’  Oliver 
Crisp, ‘Review of Christ’s Humanity in Current and Ancient Controversy: Fallen or Not?, by E. Jerome van 
Kuiken,’ Journal of Reformed Theology 14 (2020), 148.  Crisp argues against Christ assuming a fallen human 
nature.  See, Oliver Crisp, ‘Did Christ have a Fallen Human Nature?,’ International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 6, no. 3 (July 2004):  270-288.   
 103  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.  Here we see Torrance’s inconsistency.  Christ’s fallen 
human nature cannot include everything of which fallen human partakes or else he would be guilty of sin.  
Thus, Christ’s fallen humanity excludes fallen humanity’s will.  As noted elsewhere, sin in Torrance is often 
conceived as a bent will which Christ turns back to God.  It would seem here that Christ must not have the 
fallen human will if he is truly able to turn humanity’s fallen will back to God.   
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That Christ’s work is vicarious is commonly held within the Christian tradition as Christ is the 
substitute who stands in the place of his people.104  However, not all theologians agree on how we 
should understand Christ’s vicarious humanity.  The Reformed Orthodox tend to understand Christ’s 
vicarious humanity as his making satisfaction for sin through his obedient life which fulfils the law, 
and his taking the wrath of sin on the cross.105  Torrance understands active obedience as a life of 
sonship, not law-keeping.  While Christ does take on the judgment of sin, it is not penal in the 
traditional understanding of penal substitution.106  Any notion of law, in Torrance, is natural 
theology.107   
 By vicarious humanity, Torrance means that Christ fulfils the filiation relationship that God 
intends to share with humanity but is ruptured by sin.  Atonement is made, not simply at the cross, 
but throughout Christ’s life.  Vicariously, Christ is baptized, confesses, prays, exercises faith, struggles 
against sin and evil, dies, rises again and even repents.108  Development of these specific acts of 
Christ’s vicarious humanity are beyond the scope of this study.  However, what is important to see is 
that to understand Torrance’s conception of Christ’s vicarious humanity is to begin to understand 
Torrance’s theology of Christ’s incarnate person and his divine humanity.   
 As this understanding unfolds, Torrance’s conception of Christ’s vicarious humanity builds 
upon the tradition in novel ways.  Departing from the Protestant scholastics’ doctrine of election, 
perceived as too dualistic and external, Torrance understands Christ’s vicarious humanity as one in 
which all human beings indiscriminately participate.  Torrance clearly says: 
Since in Jesus Christ the Creator of the Word of God has become man, in such a way 
that in him Divine Nature and human nature are indivisibly united in his own Person, 
 
 104  Muller, DLGTT:392.    
 105  Muller, DLGTT:321.  
 106  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 295-306; Thomas F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, (Eugene, 
OR: Wipf and Stock, 1996), 154. 
 107  See, Torrance, Atonement, chapter 4.    
 108  Christopher Woznicki, ‘The One and the Many: The Metaphysics of Human Nature in TF Torrance’s 
Doctrine of Atonement,’ Journal of Reformed Theology 12, no. 2 (2018):  109.  
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the humanity of every man, whether he knows it or not, whether he believes it or not, 
is ontologically bound up with the humanity of Jesus and determined by it.109 
In part, Torrance’s revision of election is necessary, because all people are included in Christ’s 
atoning incarnation.  Important for understanding the constitution of Christ’s person is that in his 
assumption of fallen human flesh, all humanity is united to Christ.  Building upon his theology of the 
hypostatic union, Christ comes as humanity.  And since incarnation and atonement are ultimately 
one act, Christ atones for all people indiscriminately.  Christ’s representation is not simply external, 
or federal or limited to an elect few.110  Torrance writes, ‘Because he is the eternal Word or Logos in 
whom all humanity cohere, for him to take human nature upon himself means that all humanity is 
assumed by his incarnation; all humanity is bound up with him, he died for all humanity and all 
humanity died in him.’111  Yet, and crucially, Christ also comes as a particular man.  Christ is both 
humanity in general and a human being– the many and the one.112   
 
Anhypostatic and Enhypostatic Humanity Revisited113  
 
 To explain how Christ is both the one and the many, Torrance further builds upon his 
construction of the hypostatic union of Christ’s two natures.  Specifically,  Christ’s two natures ‘are 
not two separate natures in Christ’, but are ‘indissolubly united’ so ‘that the Word of God has really 
become one with Jesus the Man.’114  In Christ, God ‘has really assumed flesh to be one with the 
Word of God.’115  This leads Torrance, not to deny Christ’s two natures, but to build his theology 
upon Christ’s divine-humanity.  To this end, Torrance appeals to the anhypostatic/enhypostatic 
 
 109  Torrance, ‘The Goodness and Dignity of Man,’ 380.  See also Torrance, Mediation, 72.  
 110   This is quite a different construction of Christ’s limited atonement as formulated by Owen.  Not all 
people indiscriminately, but God’s elect are united to Christ by faith and, therefore, partake of his atoning life, 
death, and resurrection.   
 111  Torrance, Atonement, 182.   
 112  Torrance, Incarnation, 229; Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:243.   
 113  In chapter 7, I show how Torrance revises the tradition’s understanding of an/enhypostasis.  My 
goal here is to show how this relates to Torrance’s doctrine of Christ’s vicarious humanity.    
 114  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.  
 115  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.    
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distinction but in a way that both affirms and departs from Chalcedon.116  In using such classical 
language, on the one hand, Torrance affirms Chalcedon.  Throughout Torrance’s works, it is clear 
that the Christian tradition is important to him as he appropriates the Greek patristic fathers, his 
own Scottish tradition, and Barth to formulate his theology. In this way, Torrance is catholic.  On the 
other hand, the Hellenization thesis causes Torrance to find dualistic modes of knowing throughout 
the western tradition.  This, combined with the rise of biblical theology and the historical critical 
method, leads Torrance, as seen in the last chapter, to also say that Chalcedon needs a major 
revision due to its lack of redemptive history.117  
 In many ways, Torrance’s development of the anhypostatsis and enhypostasis is an attempt 
to hold both his catholic intuitions, yet soteriologically revised theology, together.  Thus, Torrance 
acknowledges Barth’s influence at this point, but is clear that what follows is his ‘appropriation of 
this double concept.’118  That Christ’s human nature has no existence apart from his divine nature, 
shows that the ‘authentic reality’ of Christ’s human nature and its ‘inseparable union’ with Christ’s 
divine nature is ‘“the sheer act of divine grace.”’119  As a result, the “logic of grace” on display in 
Christ’s incarnation is that ‘“all of grace” involves “all of man.”’120  Christ’s humanity is no mere 
instrument.  In fact, Torrance explains, ‘The indivisible oneness of God and man, Creator and 
creature, in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ will not allow us to contemplate any disjunction 
between what Christ does in his divine nature and what he does in his human nature – to do that 
 
 116  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity,’ 230.  
 117  While Torrance is a strong advocate of Christ’s deity, he is influenced by the quest for the 
historical Jesus.  This is not to suggest that he endorses every version or point.  However, as we have seen 
repeatedly, Torrance is greatly concerned about redemptive history. See, Torrance, ‘”The Historical Jesus”,’ 
511-526. 
 118  Torrance, Barth: Biblical and Evangelical, 125.  Walker writes that Torrance’s ‘use of the an-/en-
hypostasis is…significant and innovative.’  Robert T. Walker, ‘The Innovative Fruitfulness of an/en-hypostasis in 
Thomas F. Torrance,’ in T&T Clark Handbook of Thomas F. Torrance, ed. Paul D. Molnar and Myk Habets 
(London:  T&T Clark, 2020), 191.  See Barth, CD 1/II.15.2.3.  Barth’s understanding is much more traditional 
wherein anhypostatic is a way to say that Christ’s human nature has no independent existence apart from 
subsisting in the person of the Word and that Christ’s human nature truly has subsistence in the Son.  The 
distinction is meant to stress the union of Christ’s divine and human natures, while also maintaining the unity 
of his person.  See, Muller, DLGTT:27, 106.   
 119  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 230.  
 120  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 230.  
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would be a form of Nestorian heresy.’121  As a result, the distinction of natures virtually drops out of 
Torrance’s thought, but the distinction between divine and human takes centre stage.   
 Clearly, Torrance does not deny Christ’s two natures.  However, Torrance’s understanding of 
the unity of Christ’s person leads him away from building his Christology with a Chalcedonian 
theology of Christ’s two natures.  Instead, Torrance makes much of Christ’s divine humanity.  It is 
God that we meet in Christ’s unified person.  The Father and the Son are the same in being, and 
while distinct in person, that distinction is blurred in Torrance’s theology of Christ’s vicarious 
humanity.  Therefore, whatever it is that the Son does, the Father does as well.  Father and Son are 
one in being and in act.  The activity of Jesus Christ is the activity of God.122    
 However, it is Torrance’s Kantian-influenced understanding of Christ’s divine-human unity 
that leads Torrance to conflate the divine persons.  Torrance’s conception of Christ’s unity is one 
that goes so far as to say that ‘God the Father himself was actively and personally present in the 
crucifixion of Christ.’123  Without citation, Torrance agrees with Barth that it is, in fact, primarily the 
Father ‘who paid the cost of our salvation.’124  The doctrine of inseparable operations of the Trinity 
that affirms the unified work of God, while also affirming the distinct acts of the divine persons is not 
at work at this point in Torrance’s thought – and the consequence is problematic.125  The problem 
arises from the absence of a theology of the divine processions and missions in Torrance’s theology 
proper. This absence leads to Torrance’s underdeveloped two natures Christology.126  Precisely due 
to this absence, rather than speak of Christ’s two natures, Torrance’s Christology is content to simply 
 
 121  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 231.  
 122  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 233.  This is true in that all the acts of God are undivided.  
However, the activity of the incarnate Christ does not exhaust the ‘activity’ or work of God.   
 123  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 235.  
 124  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 235.  Elsewhere, Torrance writes, ‘We must think of God as 
directly present in Christ on the Cross, suffering along with him, and suffering not less than he.  So that we 
must look through the sacrifice of Christ to the sacrifice of God, through the passion of the Son to the passion 
of the Father.’  Torrance, ‘The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,’ 378. 
 125  Augustine’s and Aquinas’ more traditional understanding of the three divine persons’ common 
essence avoids such a conflation.  
 126  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 230.   
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speak of divine and human. When procession and missions drop out, so too (eventually) do Christ’s 
two natures and Chalcedonian and Nicene distinctions get blurry.   
 One possible objection might be that Torrance’s emphasis on Christ’s divine – humanity is 
merely another way to speak of Christ’s two natures.  I have already shown that is not quite the 
case, but Torrance goes further.  Jesus Christ, as truly God and truly man, is not a ‘third party’ in his 
mediation.127  Christ is one in being with God and one in being with humanity.128  Torrance writes, 
‘His mediation took place, therefore, both within his ontological relations with God and within his 
ontological relations with mankind.  The Lord Jesus Christ was and is God and Man in one Person, for 
in him divine and human nature were and are hypostatically and for ever united.’129  Torrance’s 
desire to understand Christ’s mediatory work in more than an external way is commendable and 
biblical.  A theology of Christ’s mediation must not deny the external, by which Torrance means, 
forensic elements of the gospel, but it must also take into account the centrality of the elect’s union 
with Christ.  What Torrance is trying to show is that Christ is not merely the instrument of salvation 
given to God’s elect forensically and detached.  Humanity is in Christ and he is in humanity.   
  While likely too speculative and philosophical for Torrance, Aquinas’ explanation that the 
Son’s human nature is united personally, and not accidentally, adds clarity to the ‘newness’ of the 
incarnation – something Torrance and Owen both want to affirm.  Since Christ’s human nature is not 
accidental, ‘it follows that according to the human nature no new personal being arises in him, but 
only a new habitude [relation] of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature in such a way 
that now that person is said to subsist, not only according to the divine nature, but also according to 
the human nature.’130  Such a construction attempts to understand both the unity of Christ’s persons 
and the newness of the incarnation.  Yet Torrance distances himself from such metaphysical 
constructions because they are simply too speculative.  If Christ is not the vicarious human in this 
 
 127  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 235.  
 128  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 235.  
 129  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 235.  
 130  Aquinas, ST III, q. 17, a. 2, co.    
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way, then he is not truly one with us.131  And, ‘were he not really one of us, he would not be our 
Reconciler or Redeemer or Mediator…he would not be our Saviour.’132  To say otherwise is to place a 
dualism, not so much between Christ’s two natures, but between God and humanity, and such a 
dualism disconnects Christ from the very people he came to save.  Ironically, it is very possible that 
in stressing the unity of Christ’s person and work, Torrance ends up losing the very unity he seeks to 
protect by introducing his own dualism within the hypostatic union itself. 
 
Christ’s Two-Directional Mediation  
 
 Even if Torrance inadvertently disrupts the unity of Christ’s incarnate person, this is clearly 
not his intent.  If, as the Latin Medieval church holds, Christ is mediator only according to his human 
nature then his humanity is a mere instrument.  This, for Torrance, is the great dualism that 
separates divinity from humanity and introduces a dualism into Christ’s person.  As we just saw, if 
Christ is not the divine human then he cannot truly save his people.  The incarnate Christ is not 
simply ‘God in man’, but ‘God as man.’133  Therefore, ‘The Son of God ministered not only the things 
of God to man but ministered the things of man to God.’134  Christ’s mediation is twofold:  God to 
humanity and humanity to God.  In this sense, Christ’s humanity is truly vicarious.  Torrance further 
explains: 
We must think of the work of Christ in terms of a mediation which fully represents 
both the divine and human side.  If sin is qualified as sin by the attitude of God against 
it, then it is the divine will that must be maintained and justified in the death of Christ.  
If sin is an act of humanity going down into the roots of human nature and existence 
bringing death, then the work of Christ from the side of the human creature must be 
stressed and a human confession before God and obedience to God must be 
fulfilled.135 
 
 131  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.    
 132  Torrance, Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 122.    
 133  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 228.  
 134  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 228.  Emphasis original.   Torrance builds this ‘bi-directional’ 
theology of mediation upon his reading of Athanasius.   
 135  Torrance, Atonement, 75. 
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Examining Torrance’s two-directional theology of Christ’s mediation helps us to further see how 
Torrance builds his understanding of Christ’s atoning person and work upon his divine humanity 
rather than his divine and human natures.   
 
Mediation from God to Humanity  
 
   First, Christ mediates God to humanity.  Torrance builds his understanding of God’s 
mediation toward humanity on the all-important principle of homoousion.136  The Father and Son are 
one in being.  So much so, that the Father is involved in the Son’s reconciling mission in a way that 
does not divide the activity of the persons.137  The Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, but 
in Torrance’s construction, just as in his theology proper, his focus is on the one being of God more 
than the three divine persons.  This greatly shapes the way he understands Christ’s mediation.  As 
Torrance unfolds his understanding of Christ’s divine to human mediation in Mediator, he writes, 
‘The supreme point which I wish to stress in this chapter is the fact that the Father/Son or 
Son/Father relationship falls within the very Being of God.’138  The Son, and his work, is not external 
to the Father.  Of course, technically, Torrance is correct.  The Father and the Son both are the being 
of God in that each of the divine persons are fully divine and the three divine persons are the one 
being of God.139  Yet, to speak this way of the divine persons is awkward and reveals why the 
traditional distinction of quid sit Deus and quails sit Deus are so helpful, and important, even as we 
move from doctrine of God to the doctrine of Christ’s mediation.  Torrance surely agrees that we 
never leave God behind when we move to other theological loci, yet without a metaphysical 
foundation upon which to build, soteriology becomes determinative.  It seems fairly clear that in 
 
 136  In many ways, the homoousion is Torrance’s central dogma that shapes all of his theology.   
 137  Torrance, Mediation, 53.  
 138  Torrance, Mediation, 54.  
 139  The idea that the relationship ‘falls within’ is less than clear and possibly problematic for the 
reason stated in this paragraph.  The three persons do not fall within the being of God, but are the being of 
God.    
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Torrance’s theology it is not just the Father/Son and Son/Father relationship that is in the being of 
God, but Jesus Christ’s relation to the Father is in the inner life of God.  While Torrance is clear that 
the incarnation is new, and Jesus’ humanity is not eternal, at the very least his theology lacks clarity 
at this point.  Torrance’s theology is self-consciously a revision of the tradition, as, whether 
intentional or not, Torrance too closely aligns God’s being with the Son’s soteriological mission.   
   This revision is rooted in theology proper.  Since Jesus Christ is the being of God, and 
because God’s being is always in act and act in being, Jesus the Mediator and his mediatorial work 
are one and the same.  Jesus ‘does not mediate a revelation or a reconciliation that is other than 
what he is, as though he were only the agent or instrument of that mediation to mankind.’140  Here, 
for Torrance, the gospel is at stake.141  If Christ as mediator is not synonymous with Christ’s 
mediation, then the Son is detached from the Father.  The homoousion is lost and there is no true 
reconciliation between God and humanity.142  The homoousion is all or nothing.  Either the Father 
and the Son are one, or they are not, even at the risk of losing the divine processions.  In Christ we 
meet God.  Therefore, Torrance reasons, Christ’s mediation is in God’s divine life. 
 In a certain sense, because Christ is God, the Father too mediates salvation.  Jesus Christ is 
God.  Finite human minds cannot totally grasp this staggering reality, but, nonetheless, in Christ God 
reveals ‘his very self, in such a way that he is identical in his divine-human relation with God’s self-
revelation, and in such a way that there is an unbroken relation in being and act between what God 
is in himself and what he is toward us in Jesus Christ.’143  The unity of God and man in Christ’s 
incarnation allows for ‘no God behind the back of Jesus Christ.’144  However, this repeated point of 
Torrance reveals the very conflation that blurs the distinction of both the divine persons and Christ’s 
two natures. Torrance’s use of homoousion is behind the conflations found in his theology.  It is not 
 
 140  Torrance, Mediation, 56. 
 141  Torrance, Mediation, 57. 
 142  Torrance, Mediation, 57-58.  
 143  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 229-230.  
 144  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 230.   
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that homoousion is wrong, or unimportant, but that Torrance’s use of homoousion does not allow 
for the nuance and distinctions that a Christology built upon a Chalcedonian understanding of Christ 
provides.  The connection to Torrance’s theology proper is clear.  The construction God’s being is 
always in act and God’s act is in being, profoundly impacts the way he understands Christ’s atoning 
person and work.  In Torrance’s thought, to speak of Christ’s work is to speak of his eternal person.  
The eternal Son is the being of God always in act.  In this way, Christ mediates God to humanity.  In 
this act, God both vindicates himself and reconciles – he forgives and restores – humanity to 
himself.145   
 
Mediation of Humanity to God  
 
 The second direction that Christ’s mediation takes is mediation from humanity to God.  
Christ’s humanity is vicarious, because he lives as the representative and substitute of each person, 
although Torrance understands representation and substitution differently than federal theology.146  
Furthermore, not only is the incarnation an act of substitution, but humanity is also united to Christ 
in his incarnation and obedient life.147  As we have seen, at the heart of Torrance’s understanding of 
Christ’s mediation is his insistence that Christ’s atoning person and work is more than external and 
instrumental.  Therefore, Christ’s incarnation creates an ontological union with humanity as it is a 
movement of God’s gracious will ‘into our actual flesh and history.’148  Christ as human represents 
humanity in himself before God in his high priestly mediation.149  In this way, Christ’s vicarious 
mediation is more than instrumental and external – humanity is in Christ.   
 
 145  Torrance, Atonement, 76.  
 146  Federal theology is sometimes equated with covenant theology though this is not accurate or fair 
to those who, like Torrance, are committed to a type of covenantal theology that is not federal in nature.  Both 
Owen and Torrance are covenantal theologians, though Owen is also a federal theologian.  This point is a 
helpful reminder that generic labels, like ‘covenant theology’, do not convey the breadth of the Reformed 
tradition.     
 147  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:244.  
 148  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 1:244.  
 149  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 151-152.  
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 A federal understanding of Christ’s mediation limits Christ’s vicarious life to God’s elect – a 
move Torrance certainly wishes to avoid.  What is more, the federal understanding of atonement 
posits an external and forensic imputation of Christ’s merits, but it is not an atonement that reaches 
into the ontological depth of humanity, for Torrance.  Such an atonement is dualistic and is precisely 
the predominant understanding of atonement in the Latin (western) Church.150  Rather, Christ’s 
‘vicarious and priestly role is carried out in his humanity and through human means, and in a human 
way.’151  Drawing once more from Athanasius, Torrance writes: 
That is to say, he [Athanasius] understood the humanity of Jesus Christ as the 
humanity of him who is not only Apostle from God but High Priest taken among men, 
and the saving work of Christ in terms of his human as well as divine agency – it is the 
human priesthood and the saving mediatorship of Jesus Christ in and through his 
human kinship with us that Athanasius found so significant.152 
Christ’s mediation from humanity toward God occurs through Christ’s priestly obedience and 
oblation.  The incarnate Christ, as a human being, lives the truly obedient human life, fully set apart 
for God.  In this way, Christ’s humanity is a ‘saving humanity’, by which humanity is ‘renewed and 
sanctified in Jesus Christ himself.’153  Christ mediates the things of humanity to God through his 
vicarious obedience.154  It is as humanity’s representative and substitute that Christ acts for us.  
Therefore, in a very real way, the Christian obeys in Christ.  Christ is the Christian’s obedience.   
 Of course, Christ’s mediation is one act of God.  Therefore, Torrance unifies both directions 
of Christ’s mediation with his understanding of propitiation.  Torrance’s understanding of 
propitiation follows C.H. Dodd’s influential thesis that propitiation is not about appeasing God’s 
 
 150  Torrance, ‘Atonement – Singularity’, 238.  Torrance reads Protestant Orthodox as turning back to 
Rome and making the same errors due to understanding Christ’s atoning work as forensic and external, i.e., 
instrumental, and not ontological grounded in Christ’s generic, or anhypostatic, humanity.  See Torrance, 
Mediation, 40. 
 151  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 152.  
 152  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 228.    
 153  Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 229.  
 154  Thomas F. Torrance, ‘The Atoning Obedience of Christ,’ Moravian Theological Seminary Bulletin 
(1959):  5.  Importantly, Christ as human obeys vicariously.  As humanity’s representative and substitute, Christ 
acts for us.  Therefore, in a very real way, the Christian obeys in Christ.  Christ is the Christian’s obedience.   
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wrath, but means to cleanse.155   Following Dodd, and Mcleod Campbell, Torrance writes, 
‘Propitiation is then to be understood as priestly mediation between God and humanity, and 
humanity and God.’156  Christ’s priestly mediation includes expiation, or the forensic act of 
atonement.157  Thus, Torrance does not deny that the gospel contains forensic elements, but his 
focus is on propitiation by which he means:  ‘personal healing and personal reconciliation’ which 
happens in humanity because it first happens in Christ.158  Propitiation is initiated and carried out by 
God in both his God – humanity and humanity – God mediation.159  It is Christ’s ‘bi-directional 
mediation that ‘leads to Torrance’s important stress on Christ’s active and passive obedience.’160  
God’s self-propitiation comes through Christ’s passive obedience seen most clearly in his sufferings 
and death on the cross, which is the culmination of Christ submitting himself to God’s law and the 
judgment of sin.161  God’s propitiation also occurs through Christ’s active obedience, which is his life-
long ‘positive fulfilment…of his sonship.’162  Christ vicariously obeys, mediating the things of 
humanity to God.163  
 
 155  Torrance, Atonement, 139-140.  Torrance cites Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, several times in 
the footnotes.  See also Donald Macleod, Christ Crucified: Understanding the Atonement (Downers Grove, IL:  
IVP Academic, 2014), Kindle loc. 2490 and 2498 of 6138.  
 156  Torrance, Atonement, 69.  
 157  Torrance, Atonement, 68.  
 158  Torrance, Atonement, 68.  
 159  Torrance, Atonement, 68.  
 160  Paul Molnar, ‘Introduction to the Cornerstones Edition,’ in Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and 
Resurrection (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998) Kindle loc. 394 of 4787.  Torrance understands Christ’s active 
obedience primarily as his life of perfect Sonship and not in terms of law keeping.  See Torrance, Theology in 
Reconstruction, 154 and Torrance, Atonement, 68-69.  Nevertheless, the Reformed tradition emphasis on 
Christ’s active obedience is related to its understanding of the sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction, namely, that 
Christ’s active obedience leaves no place for the sacrament of penance.  See, Muller, DLGTT:237-238.    
 161  Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 154.  
 162  Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 154.  
 163  Interestingly, Torrance writes, ‘This focus on the vicarious humanity of Christ is a concern that has 
been found at the heart of theological debate in Scotland ever since the Reformation.  One of the main issues 
at stake here has been the effect of the doctrine of “active obedience” in pointing up the saving significance of 
the human life of Jesus, and thus opening the way for a proper theological assessment of what has come to be 
called “the historical Jesus.”  It is rather strange, however, that his doctrine of the active obedience of Christ 
tended to be rejected by Heidelberg, Bezan, and Westminster traditions of Calvinism but was taken up by 
Albrecht Ritschl in Lutheran theology, although when its relation to the deity of Christ became loosened, as in 
a defective appreciation of the Nicene homoousion, it tended to further a liberal, moralistic approach to Christ 
and his saving significance.  Nevertheless, the doctrine of union with Christ in his vicarious human nature and 
priesthood remains central to the Reformed tradition and is surely one of its most helpful contributions to the 
ecumenical church.’  Torrance, ‘Distinctive Character,’ 9-10.  Torrance is correct that the ‘active obedience’ of 
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 The goal of this chapter is not to uncover Torrance’s theology of salvation.  Yet, it is 
impossible to uncover Torrance’s theological foundation of Christ’s mediation without 
understanding his basic soteriology. This is the case because, in Torrance, the eternal and pre-
existent Son of God is understood through history as equal to Christ’s soteriological work as his work 
is determinative of his person instead of the other way around.  Torrance writes, ‘Through the 
Incarnation of the Son the eternal relation of the Son to the Father and of the Father to the Son was 
inserted into and grounded in our humanity, while through the entire life of the Incarnate Son it was 
translated into our sphere of historical existence and actuality on earth.’164  Here, we clearly see how 
the lack of a theology of the divine missions and processions relates to the lack of a robust theology 
of Christ’s two natures.  Underlying this crucial revision to classical Trinitarian and Christological 
theology is Torrance’s soteriological metaphysic.   
 The point of departure in Torrance’s thinking is not God in se, but the historical life of Jesus – 
God for us.  In fact, God ad intra is determined by the Son’s historical mission.  Thus, we are left not 
with Christ’s two natures built upon divine procession and missions but, rather, an understanding of 
Christ as God and human who is faithful to his promises. Faithfulness, then, God for us, and not God 
in himself, is the foundation of Christ’s mediation.165  The Son’s divine procession does not pattern 
and fund his mission.  Rather, the Son’s salvific mission shapes and determines who the eternal Son 
is.  God is indeed faithful, but God is faithful because of what and who God is, not simply because he 
is observed to be faithful in the history of redemption.  We only know by what we see.  God proves 
faithful in Christ, therefore, God is faithful.  Torrance tellingly writes: 
He who was God and Man in one Person acted from the side of God in the faithfulness 
of divine Truth and Love, and acted from the side of man in the faithfulness of a life 
 
Christ is absent from the WCF, though it was the majority position and excluded to make room for those who 
did not hold to the imputation of Christ’s active obedience.  Owen’s Savoy Declaration clearly affirms Christ’s 
active obedience.  Compare chapter 8 of both the WCF and Savoy.  See Torrance, Scottish Theology, 137-139.  
See also Robert Letham, The Westminster Assembly: Reading Its Theology in Historical Context, The 
Westminster Assembly and the Reformed Fatih, ed. Carl R. Trueman (Phillipsburgh, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2009), 
113-114.  
 164  Torrance, ‘Atoning Obedience’, 78.  
 165  In Christian Doctrine of God, Torrance has a similar understanding of God’s impassibility, see, 
Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 242-244 and 250-254.  
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wholly obedient to the Father.  In that unity of the divine-human faithfulness, Jesus 
Christ was not only the complete embodiment of the faithfulness of God the Father 
toward man but the complete embodiment of the faithfulness of the Son as man 
toward the Father.  It was as such and only as such, in the entire solidarity between 
the Father and the Incarnate Son and the Incarnate Son and the Father, that Jesus 
Christ stepped forth as the divine-human Mediator.166   
Recall that Torrance thinks redemptive history is what is missing from the creeds and from 
Chalcedon.  However, rather than fill in the perceived short comings, Torrance revises the classical 
understanding of Christ as Mediator in major ways.  A turn to history and eschatology in theological 
foundations is almost always a turn away from metaphysical and ontological foundations.  God acts 
by sending his Son in order to prove faithful to his covenant promises made to his people.  However, 
the foundation of his act is not God’s act but, I would argue, God’s goodness.  God’s power and 
ability to be faithful – to do good – is grounded in the traditional doctrine of God’s omnipotence that 
works with a Thomistic understanding of God’s nature.  This is too abstract for Torrance.  Rather, 
God’s faithfulness is not static,  says Torrance, when theology takes a ‘powerful soteriological 
approach.’167 Yet, again, Torrance unintentionally, allows soteriology to determine God’s being.  In 
fact, for Torrance, through the cross, Jesus’ suffering ‘came to belong to God by nature.’168  Torrance 
rightly takes seriously that Christ is divine and the Trinity is inseparably at work in all economic 
works.  However, Torrance’s articulation of the doctrine of inseparable operations is one that, at key 




 I have argued in this chapter that Torrance revises Chalcedon with his understanding of 
Christ’s divine humanity.  The major conflation at work in Torrance’s theology of atonement is a 
conflation of Christology and soteriology as we have seen throughout this chapter (and the last).  
 
 166  Torrance, ‘Atoning Obedience’, 78. 
167  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 248.    
168  Torrance, Christian Doctrine, 248.  
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While obviously related, treating of Christ’s work and humanity’s salvation in a distinct way helps to 
avoid misunderstandings found in Torrance’s work.  One such misunderstanding is his reconstruction 
of the classic Reformed doctrine of election.  Christ does not come to redeem his elect, rather 
election is mediation.169  Torrance is right to stress the unity of Christ’s person; however, Torrance 
confuses a robust two-nature Christology with hyper Calvinism.  To hold that Christ only dies 
according to his human nature is not ‘hyper-Calvinist’ but simply to follow Chalcedon.  However, 
Torrance links this understanding of Christ’s human nature to the doctrine of limited atonement, 
because to speak of something proper only to Christ’s humanity is to divide the two natures in 
Torrance’s thought.  I highlight this example not to defend the ‘traditional view’ but to show that, 
while affirming Christ’s two natures, it is Torrance’s construction of Christ’s divine humanity that is 
the real foundation of his Christology.  Christ’s works ground Christ’s person.   
 Torrance’s theology of Christ as Mediator is greatly indebted to John McLeod Campbell, 
particularly his understanding of Christ’s vicarious humanity.170  In Campbell, Torrance finds one who 
works in the way of Athanasius and avoids the perceived dualisms so common in Western theology.  
Torrance explains Campbell’s thought:   
It was not just an external transaction (which would involve a form of Nestorian 
dualism between the divine and human natures of the Saviour), but the unitary divine-
human movement of propitiation, between God and us, and yet taking place within 
the mediatorial Person and obedient Life of Christ under law from his birth of the 
Virgin Mary to his death and resurrection.171 
Christ is elected in eternity past precisely to obey in this various way. Neither Torrance nor Campbell 
deny that Christ is one person in two natures.  However, their fear of an instrumentalist 
understanding of Christ’s human nature leads them to say there is no distinction of Christ’s human 
 
 169  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 14-15.  
 170  While acknowledging that McLeod Campbell does not directly quote Athanasius, Torrance reads 
McLeod Campbell as ‘following the great Athanasius who thought of the incarnate mediatorial and priestly 
office of Christ as one in which he ministered the things of God to man and the things of man to God, McLeod 
Campbell thought of Christ as dealing with men on the part of God, and as dealing with God on the part of 
men, not as two activities but as one seamless activity within his incarnate person.’  Torrance, Scottish 
Theology, 301. 
 171  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 298-299.  
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acts.  There is only the ‘unitary divine-human movement of propitiation.’  In this way, Torrance blurs 
the distinction of Christ’s two natures.  Nevertheless, rather than an external understanding, 
Torrance, building upon McLeod Campbell, conceptualizes Christ’s vicarious humanity in a way that 
overcomes the (perceived) instrumentalist dualism of Latin theology by grounding Christ’s atoning 
person and work in the ‘filial relations of the incarnate Son to the Father, and in the depths of 
Christ’s divine humanity.’172    
 Thus, Torrance thinks of Christ as the divine – human one more than he does as the eternal 
Son of God who takes to himself a human nature in the fullness of time.  Rather than follow 
Chalcedon, he follows McLeod Campbell.  And while I am not sure what Christ’s ‘divine humanity’ is, 
the construction follows Torrance’s merging of being and person in his theology proper.  Christ is 
God, but the Chalcedonian tradition that is built upon biblical exposition as well as theological 
reflection is more nuanced and careful than Torrance at this point.  Christ’s divine nature is of the 
same substance common to the Father and the Holy Spirit.  And, yet, the Son’s distinct person is 
truly a distinct person so that if we say God came in the flesh, we do not mean the Father, or the 
Holy Spirit take to themselves a human nature.  To suggest such ends, either in modalism, or 
tritheism.  God comes in the person of the Son because the Son of God is a divine person who 
assumes a true human nature in his incarnate mission. 
 Torrance’s understanding of Christ as substitute shows what is at stake in this revision.  
Following McLeod Campbell, Torrance has a quite developed understanding of the substitutionary 
aspect of Christ’s atoning work.  However, Torrance departs from the ‘legalist and quantitative way’ 
in which the Calvinism of his day understands substitution.173  In large part, this construction is 
motivated by Torrance’s fear that the Reformed tradition in his day tended to think of the 
atonement almost exclusively in terms of Christ’s penal substitution.174  Penal substitution as a 
 
 172  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 299.  
 173  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 302.  
 174  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 301.  
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singular ‘model of atonement’ is external and detached from Christ’s unified person.  As a unified 
person, Christ suffers as both God and man claims Torrance.  Therefore, the Father, and not only the 
Son, participates ‘in the atoning sacrifice.’175  To conceive otherwise leaves us with a Nestorian Christ 
punished in a detached way by his angry Father.176  Christ’s sufferings are more than a physical and 
external bearing of God’s wrath.  On a much deeper level, Christ’s penal substitution is ‘essentially 
spiritual and moral.’177  Further, Torrance writes, ‘His vicarious penal sufferings were certainly 
physical in his death on the Cross, but they had to do above all with what he bore for us and on our 
behalf agonisingly in the depths of his ‘divine humanity” – “the sorrows of the Man of Sorrows”.’178  
Importantly, in Torrance’s understanding of substitution, God and man both suffer on the cross.  This 
is the direct result of losing Christ’s two natures and blurring God’s being with the divine persons.  
 Finally, we have seen already that Torrance believes that Christ’s mediation, his incarnation 
and atonement, occur within the life of God.  Once again, this is motivated by Torrance’s 
soteriological metaphysic that is at work throughout his theology.  And it is this soteriological 
conditioning that leads Torrance away from Christ’s two natures to his divine humanity.  While 
structurally similar to Chalcedon’s two nature understanding of Christ’s mediation, it is important to 
note the stress on God and the human.  Recall that Torrance’s stress on God’s being leads him to 
downplay the divine persons.  It appears that something similar happens in his understanding of 
Christ’s two natures.  While Torrance is strong on Christ’s unified person, his emphasis on God’s 
being carries over into his Christology.  The result is that Christ’s mediation is not understood in 
terms of Christ’s divine nature and human nature united in his one person, but simply as God and 
 
 175  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 303.    
 176  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 303.  Here, Torrance follows McLeod Campbell:  ‘It was the profound 
kind of suffering in which God and man were one and undivided in the atoning mediation of Christ – to think of 
the sufferings of the Son without the participation of the Father in the atoning sacrifice, simply in terms of the 
judgment of the Father inflicted externally upon the Son in our stead, was a serious lapse into Nestorian 
heresy which McLeod Campbell abhorred.’  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 303. 
 177  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 304.  
 178  Torrance, Scottish Theology, 304.  Here, Torrance quotes John McLeod Campbell, Nature of the 
Atonement and Its Relation to Remissions of Sins and Eternal Life, 6th ed. (1886; repr., London, UK Macmillan 
and Co.,1895), 111-118.   
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human.  This might sound like a small difference from Calvin or Owen, but it paves the way for 
Torrance’s understanding that the atonement is in God’s inner life and that God dies on the cross.  
Christ’s eternal election and atonement, not God’s goodness, is the foundation for salvation.  
However, as we have seen throughout this study, any foundation that confuses God ad intra and 
God ad extra is unstable.  What is needed is a constructive retrieval of God’s goodness.   
 
Recap and Summary  
 
 Before turning to the conclusion, however, a brief recapitulation is in order.  As I said at the 
end of chapter 5, when I began this study, I fully expected to find Torrance’s theological approach 
more helpful than Owen’s.  Indeed, at the beginning of my doctoral work, I agreed with Torrance’s 
claim that Reformed Orthodox theology tends to be dry and scholastic precisely because of its stress 
on ‘God’s eternal and immutable decree.’ 179  Reading both Owen and Torrance in light of their 
reformed catholic tradition has caused me to reconsider things.  However, I hope that this 
reconsideration does not leave the impression that I have instead ‘sided’ with Owen.  Over the 
course of my investigation, I came to see that secondary literature of each theologian is largely 
descriptive and sympathetic rather than constructive and critical.  Therefore, I have attempted to 
read both in light of their Reformed catholic heritage in a way that is both appreciative yet critical.  I 
have also compared both to Aquinas as Owen intentionally develops Thomistic modes of thought 
and Torrance intentionally moves away from Thomas due to the perceived dualism he finds in such a 
theology.  To this end, I have learned much from both John Owen and T.F. Torrance and I am critical 
only so as to be constructive in seeking to clearly relate God and all things in relation to God in a way 
that seeks to understand God in se as the foundation of God for us at every point.   If my criticisms of 
 
 179  Torrance, School of Faith, lxxix.    
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Torrance sound ‘harsher’ it is only because he more intentionally revises and radicalizes the tradition 
in which both he and Owen work.   
 We have seen throughout that in both Owen and Torrance, a soteriological foundation leads 
to a conflation of the immanent and economic Trinity.  This is problematic because it means that 
God is defined by his works.  Owen’s unintentional conflation enters through his understanding of 
God’s justice and the covenant of redemption; this introduces, even if ever so slightly, a reading of 
God’s nature in light of soteriology instead of the other way around.180  Torrance, following Rahner, 
is not too concerned about such a conflation, because to distinguish between God in se and the God 
of the cross is to introduce a dualism into theology.  Ironically, lying behind the conflations at work in 
Torrance’s thought is his central dogma – the homoousios.  Unintentional or not, such an aligning of 
God in se and God for us is costly theologically.  The door opened by Owen is taken to its logical end 
in Torrance so much so that the distinction of Christ’s two natures, while affirmed, does not do the 
theological work Chalcedon intends.    
 To be fair, theology proper is central to both theologians’ construction of their overall 
theological project.  Although Owen and Torrance understand God in different ways, there is a 
common catholic and reformed impulse that shapes the questions and answers that each gives to 
this always difficult question – the relation of God ad intra to God ad extra.  In both, an 
understanding of the relation of the immanent and economic Trinity means taking the unfolding 
historical work of God seriously.  However, the turn to soteriology, subtly in Owen and more 
radically in Torrance, is a turn away from God in se, even if ever so slightly, the foundation of 
theology not as God in himself, but God’s redemptive acts.  Soteriology becomes the lens through 
 
 180 Rehnman makes the point that Owen’s epistemology is motivated by soteriology due to its 
‘distinctly Reformed flavour.’ Rehnman, Divine Discourse, 143.  While I agree with Rehnman’s assessment of 
Owen’s thought, to claim that a soteriologically motivated epistemology is reformed too narrowly defines the 
Reformed tradition and is historically inaccurate.  It is true that the rise of Ariminism and Socinianism leads 
many of the Reformed thinkers to down play the role of natural theology because of fallen human reason.  As 
a result, grace, understood in a disruptive sense, takes more of a central place.  We see this somewhat in 
Owen, but to conclude that all reformed theology takes this approach is not a fair or careful judgment.     
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which God’s nature is understood.  As a result, both Owen and Torrance, each in their own way, 
merge God’s nature with God’s economy.  The cost of defining God by soteriology is that something 
other than God in himself becomes the foundation for our knowledge and love of God.  In so doing, 
the order of being and knowing is not employed in a way that sufficiently safeguards against letting 
soteriology determine ontology.  The risk of this conflation is that it leads theology away from a right 
understanding of analogy by which God is known through his effects as their first and ongoing cause 
and toward a theology that posits a god made in the theologian’s own image.181  In the modern 
reformed tradition, analogy drops out, in part, due to the ‘absolute antithesis’ between God and 
creatures.182  Thus, God is not known by reasoning from his effects in creation, but only as God 
disruptively breaks into creation.  Created things, then, are mute.183   
 Misunderstanding Przywara’s account of the analogia entis, building as it does upon 
Thomas, lies behind the modern turn to this dialectical understanding of God’s self-communication.  
Aquinas clearly affirms the sharp difference between God and creatures.  Yet, rather than an 
absolute antithesis which posits a contradiction between God and creation, ‘Thomas’s 
[Creator/creature distinction] is one of non-contradiction, though not identity.’184  In the conclusion, 
I will discuss the role of causality in relation to analogical understanding.  While all human 
knowledge begins in the economy, the analogia entis reasons from created effects back to their 
foundation, which is God the Creator.  Torrance and Owen both move away from this understanding 
of analogy precisely because the similitude that exists between God and creatures is not operative in 
their theology.  ‘Causal likeness is the ground of analogical predication.’185 Causality is related to 
analogy, from a Thomistic point of view, in that ‘God’s causality is derivative…of the goodness he is.  
God, as goodness itself, is the end of all things, the cause of causes.’186  In Owen, analogy begins to 
 
 181  I will return to the importance of analogy in the conclusion.    
 182  Barth, CD III/3:102.  
 183  Christopher R.J. Holmes, ‘Revisiting the God/World Difference, Modern Theology 34, no. 2 (April 
2018), 161.  
 184   Holmes, ‘Revisiting the God/World Difference,’ 162.    
185  Rehnman, ‘Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy,’ 360.  
 186   Holmes, ‘Revisiting the God/World Difference,’ 164.  
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be understood as similarities between ‘acting subjects’, and in Torrance the antithesis is complete.  
However, a focus upon God’s goodness shows us that analogy is best understood in terms of, not 
complete antithesis, but an ever-greater dissimilarity within similarity, a likeness between God and 
his creatures.187  Understanding God’s causality analogically allows us to contemplate God’s effects, 
his creation, and reason back to God as the first cause, indeed, the end of all things.  Thus, there is 
both a similitude, and an ever-increasing difference between God and creatures.  Understanding 
analogy only in terms of difference leads both Owen and Torrance away from the ontological 
foundation of God’s goodness.  Such an understanding posits a theological foundation outside of 
God himself and gives rise to the merging of God ad intra and God ad extra found throughout their 
works.  Put simply, such a conflation is problematic, because it risks defining God by something 
contingent thus placing the theological project on unstable ground.  What is missing in both Owen 
and Torrance is a robust understanding of God’s good nature.  The conclusion of this work offers a 
retrieval of God’s goodness that, I think, helps to us to properly distinguish God in se and God for us.  
It is to this conclusion that I now turn.   
 
 














God’s Good Name: A Constructive Conclusion  
 
 
Psalm 100  
 
 In Psalm 100, the Psalmist invites all the earth to make a joyful noise to the Lord, to enter his 
gates with thanksgiving.  Theology, surely, is such a task as we seek to know that the Lord is God and 
that we are his people, living as his sheep in the pasture of God’s creation.  The Psalmist’s doxology 
is a response to God’s faithfulness in redemptive history and his steadfast love that endures forever.  
Behind all of this grand theology and humanity’s response is, of course, God himself who is good.  
Therefore, Psalm 100 is a fitting place to begin the assessment of our account of the relation 
between God in se and God’s economy as unfolded by John Owen and Thomas F. Torrance. 
 Humanity’s historical response of praise is in response to what they see – God faithfully 
loves and keeps his people.  Crucially important, though, is the foundation for this invitation to 
praise God the Creator – he is (and always has been and will be) good.  God in himself is good, and 
he is faithful to his creatures throughout all generations.  God does good in both creation and 
redemption because he is good.1  The Psalmist’s distinction between what God is, goodness, and 
what God does in Psalm 100:5 gives exegetical warrant for our understanding of God in se and God 
for us which is at the heart of this study.  As Protestant theologians, both Owen and Torrance have 
much to say of God’s free and gracious economy.  Accordingly, throughout our investigation of 
Owen and Torrance, soteriology has played a prominent role.  This impulse, found in both thinkers, 
takes seriously that God’s covenant, his plan of redemption, unfolds in real human history.  
However, redemptive history is much more than a narrative, and God is neither defined nor 
 
 1  That God is good speaks of God’s essential goodness and takes ontological priority over the good 
that God does.  Thus, the is and the do are irreversible.  If they are reversed, then God is dependent upon 
something outside of himself, or at the very least, is defined by his works instead of God in se, which is the 
foundation for his works ad extra.  God’s works express his divinity, and God’s divinity is the principle of his 
good works.  See, Christopher R.J. Holmes, The Lord is Good: Seeking the God of the Psalter (London, UK:  
Apollos, 2018), 32-33. 
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determined by soteriology.  While it is true that we know God as his finite creatures through his self-
revelation, that very revelation tells us about the eternal and self-sufficient God who has always 
existed in the plenitude of his divine life.  Before and apart from creation, the eternal Father begets 
the eternal Son, and from the Father and Son the eternal Holy Spirit proceeds.  The Son and Spirit 
are ‘begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father.’  This God is the one who makes all 
things, and ‘who for us human beings and for our salvation, came down from heaven.’2  To 
understand this move from heaven to earth, from God in himself to God’s relation to creation, is a 
perennially hard task for theologians.  In many ways, it is the question central to our entire 
investigation.  Human knowing always begins in the economy but must never take priority over the 
order of being.  Owen would agree, but at times does not succeed.  Torrance does not work with a 
primacy of being given his ontology.  Both, at times, conflate God in se and God for us.  Such an 
identification does not sufficiently safeguard against letting humanity’s need for salvation determine 
God’s being.   
 Conflation in theology proper leads to further conflation in the other theological loci as we 
trace both Owen’s and Torrance’s understanding of the relation of God in himself and God for us as 
we have seen throughout this study.  In this conclusion, I will argue that this turn to soteriology leads 
both Owen and Torrance to prioritize God’s redemptive grace in a way that downplays God’s 
goodness as communicated in both creation and redemption.  In order to show this, I will not attend 
to every conflation or question mentioned throughout the study, but I will retrace the major 
contours of theology investigated in this study.3  I will begin with God’s name, a common place to 
begin theology proper, and show that conflation already emerges in both Owen’s and Torrance’s  
treatments of God’s name ‘I Am.’4  Then, I will show how God’s goodness relates to the divine 
 
 2  Nicene-Constantinople Creed.  
 3  More specific critiques of some of the conflations arising are offered throughout the previous 
chapters.  
 4  For a very helpful overview of theology proper in the Reformed tradition, though one that is 
perhaps more consistently Thomistic than many of the Reformed Orthodox themselves, see, Rehnman, ‘The 




processions and how God’s goodness helps us articulate the processions as the foundation for the 
historical missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit.  This avoids the conflation found in both the 
pactum salutis and Torrance’s theology of election.  Lastly, I will show how goodness helps avoid 
conflation in constructing a theology of Christ’s mediation.  Therefore, this conclusion seeks to draw 
together this study with a retrieval of God’s goodness.5  
 I turn to God’s goodness because we have seen throughout this study that both Owen and 
Torrance work with a truncated view of revelation.  In my judgment, Owen overreacts in his 
polemical engagement with the Socinians.  In so doing, he turns away from natural theology to a 
more Christ-exclusive understanding of God’s revelatory acts.  Torrance, I think, also overreacts – 
due to his concern to avoid natural theology.  Theoretically, appeal to another divine attribute, such 
as truth, or justice, could attempt to bring this study to a close.  However, throughout I have argued 
that conflations of God ad intra and God ad extra arise, in part, due to this narrowing of the function 
of the doctrine of revelation.  This narrowing arises due to a slightly different understanding of God’s 
nature as compared to Aquinas (as I have demonstrated throughout).  In Owen this is unintentional 
as he follows and appropriates Thomas.  In Torrance, this occurs more intentionally as Torrance 
reads the Reformed tradition as having a distinct doctrine of God.  However, both marginalise the 
communicative nature of God’s goodness.  This is seen in that neither work with a similitude 
between God and creatures.  When the similitude between God and creatures is removed, 
knowledge of God moves ever closer to the Christ-exclusive position.  The similitude, though, works 
in tandem with God’s ever-greater dissimilarity and is both the ontological and epistemic foundation 
by which knowledge of God is communicated to creation and creatures from an analogical and 
Thomistic perspective.   
 
5  Wittman critiques Barth for too closely aligning the order of being and knowing and then turns to 
Auqinas’ theology of divine goodness as a corrective.  Tyler R. Wittman, God and Creation in the Theology of 
Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2019), 271-273.  I read Torrance 
in a similar way to Wittman’s reading of Barth.  See also, Duby, God in Himself, 135. 
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Therefore, appeal to some other attribute would not address the major concerns raised in 
this study.  An appeal to God’s communicative goodness allows us to employ the order of being and 
knowing properly and clearly.  Sufficiently safeguarding the relation between ontology and economy 
helps to avoid the conflations found in Owen and Torrance.  Also, and importantly, such a retrieval 
places God’s economic goodness upon the foundation of his nature.  God redemptively 
communicates his goodness because he is eternally and perfectly good.  Eternal election and the 
covenant of redemption risk introducing an abstract and arbitrary reason for God’s economy.  
Therefore, this retrieval of God’s goodness assists in truly confessing that God does good because 
God is good.   
 
God’s Good Name  
 
 More prominently and consistently in Torrance, but present in Owen as well, is a narrowing 
of revelation to the person of Jesus Christ.  This move, at least in part, leads to reading God in se in 
terms of soteriology.  However, the foundation for our knowledge of God is God himself, not 
anything outside of God including his redemptive acts.  To be sure, we know God through his 
created effects, but these effects, or acts, point beyond themselves to God’s immanent nature.  
God’s goodness is God’s nature, and this goodness is inherently communicative.  As Owen and 
Torrance narrow their view of revelation, free and disruptive grace trumps goodness which flows 
from God who is good.  Missing from both Owen and Torrance is an understanding of God’s 
communicative goodness.   
 While deeply influenced by Thomas, Owen’s turn to soteriology is already at work in his 
understanding of God’s name.  Following Aquinas, Owen holds that God’s being and goodness are 
the same and that God’s goodness is communicative, but Owen does not develop God’s goodness as 
the foundation for redemption.  Instead, Owen places salvation on the foundation of the covenant 
of redemption.  Owen’s soteriological concerns slightly obscure his understanding of God’s goodness 
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and its inherently communicative nature.   This is clear when Owen treats God’s good name.6  God’s 
name is ‘the principle from whence he worketh’, yet God’s name is known only as God reveals 
himself in Jesus Christ.7  Owen continues, ‘The “name” of God is all that whereby to us he is known; 
all his attributes, his whole will, – all his glory.’8  To claim that God’s name is the principle of his 
economic works is to transpose God’s name (economic) with God’s being (God in se).  The narrowing 
of God’s revelation, motivated by Owen’s concern for the priority and freedom of God’s grace, drives 
this conflation.  Torrance distances himself from the Thomistic conception of God’s name ‘I Am’ due 
to his fear of dualism.  Torrance somewhat radicalizes Rahner’s principle and does not find it helpful 
to distinguish between God as one and God as three.  In so doing, Torrance places the homoousion 
at the centre of all his theology.  The result is that Torrance commixes God’s being with God’s acts.  
As a result, Torrance cannot understand God’s name apart from soteriology.9   
 Turning to Augustine, another theologian sympathetic to the broad contours of Owen’s and 
Torrance’s Reformed tradition, helps advance our constructive retrieval of God’s goodness with a 
view to showing a more even and edifying relationship between God in se and God for us.10  
Augustine is an early thinker who wrestled with this perennially difficult question of how to relate 
God in se and God for us and, relatedly, how to articulate a robust theology of Christ’s two natures.  
Torrance, recall, appeals to Calvin to argue for his revisionary approach to Christ’s two natures.  I 
have shown that this appeal to Calvin misunderstands Calvin as Calvin himself references 
Augustine’s very important discussion in book five of De Trinitate.11   My goal here is not to lay out a 
complete theology of God’s attributes but to see how Augustine’s classical discussion helps us 
 
 6  Owen, Works 1: 368.    
 7  Owen, Works 11: 257.  Also, Owen begins to move away from natural theology due to his 
interactions with the Socinians.  Owen still affirms general revelation, but the ability for human beings to 
reason that God is is greatly reduced in Owen.  Thus in Owen, and much reformed thinking, general revelation 
and natural theology are related but not synonymous.        
 8  Owen, Works 11: 256.     
 9  Recall that Torrance introduces his own troubling dualism of the ‘I Am of God’ in the Old Testament 
and the ‘I Am of Christ.’  See chapter six (chapter 1 on TFT). 
 10    While it is anachronistic to call Augustine ‘Reformed’, the Reformed tradition is deeply 
Augustinian.    
 11  Augustine, De Trinitate, V.   
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understand the conflations that arise in both Owen and Torrance.  Therefore, Augustine helps us 
understand God in se and God for us in a way that does not commingle God with his creation.  
 Augustine connects God’s goodness with God’s name ‘I Am’ in his Ennerationes in Psalmos.12  
In his exposition on Psalm 135, Augustine begins with the Psalm’s call to praise God.  Augustine asks, 
‘What reason shall I give why you should praise him?  Because the Lord is good.’13  God’s goodness is 
the foundation for the goodness of God’s creation.  Importantly, Augustine explains that when he 
looks at God’s good creation and is pleased with what he sees, he returns again ‘to Him from Whom 
they arise, to understand that the Lord is good.’14   
 In explaining Psalm 135’s call to praise, Augustine articulates the Creator/creature 
distinction taking his departure from God’s goodness.  Everything has its being from God; created 
goodness participates in God’s goodness.  Recognizing that all things have their being from God, 
Augustine continues to compare God and creation by turning to God’s name, ‘I Am.’15  Augustine 
does so to teach that if all visible created goodness were removed, God is still good.  Augustine 
writes, ‘Every thing being taken away, by which God might be named and called, He answered that 
He is called Very Being, as though this were His name.’16  Created effects have their being from God, 
‘but compared with Him they are not, because to Be truly is to Be unchangeably, and this He Is 
alone.  For what is, is; just as the good of goods, is good.’17  God’s creation is contingent and free; its 
existence and being are from God.  God’s creation does not change God.  Rather, God who is good, is 
the foundation for his good creation. 
 Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 135 helps us to articulate God and all things in relation to 
God – God in se and God in relation to creation.  Augustine further deepens our understanding of 
 
 12   Augustine, EP 6, 135.    
 13  Augustine, EP 6, 135.3.  
 14  Augustine, EP 6, 135.4.  Augustine’s ‘turning back to God’ when encountering the effects of 
creation is very similar to Aquinas’ analogical reasoning and Calvin’s twofold knowledge of God.    
 15  Augustine, EP 6, 135.4.  
 16  Augustine, EP 6, 135.4.  
 17  Augustine, EP 6, 135.4.  
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God ad intra and ad extra when he reflects upon God’s name in his De Trinitate.18  Augustine, in his 
very important book 5, begins his contemplation of how the task of theology is even possible, or 
how humans can possibly speak of God, with the admission and confession that ‘no words of ours 
are capable of expressing’ God.19  God is not a bigger and better version of humanity.20  Therefore, if 
we understand something of human intellect or human power, we cannot simply predicate that God 
is this and more.21  Augustine writes: 
Thus we should understand God, if we can and as far as we can, to be good without 
quality, great without quantity, creative without need or necessity, presiding without 
position, holding all things together without possession, wholly everywhere without 
place, everlasting without time, without any change in himself making changeable 
things, and undergoing nothing.  Whoever thinks of God like that may not yet be able 
to discover altogether what he is, but is at least piously on his guard against thinking 
about him anything that he is not.22 
Given his understanding of God, Augustine wrestles with divine predication.  Nothing creaturely can 
describe God univocally or equivocally.  Thus Augustine begins by affirming God’s existence, that 
God is, because the human creature is incapable of speaking of God’s nature or what God is.23  
Theology proper in the Reformed tradition has its roots in Augustine (and Thomas too).   
 After these preliminary reflections, Augustine turns to Exodus 3:14 and begins to understand 
God’s being analogically.  Unlike the substance, or being, of human creatures, ‘the substance or 
being which is God is alone unchangeable, and therefore it pertains to it most truly and supremely to 
be, from which comes the name “being.”’24  Augustine distinguishes between what can be said of 
God’s substance, God in himself, and what can be said of God ad extra.25  Importantly, what can be 
said of God in se should not be understood as introducing something accidental into God – for all 
 
 18  Recall that this is the book Calvin explains as he discusses God in se and God for us that Torrance 
misreads.    
 19  Augustine, De Trinitate V.1.  
 20  Such an argument is often cited against the analogia entis, though this reveals a profound 
misunderstanding of the analogy of being.    
 21  Augustine, De Trinitate V.2.  Augustine does not have the fully developed understanding of analogy 
of Aquinas, but we can see here that he reasons in a very similar way.   
 22  Augustine, De Trinitate V.2.  
 23  Augustine, De Trinitate V.3.  
 24  Augustine, De Trinitate V.3.  
 25  Augustine, De Trinitate V. 4, 5.   
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that is in God is God, there are no accidents in God.  Nor is speaking of God ad extra to say that God 
is mutable.  Nothing is said of God accidentally, ‘because there is nothing changeable with him.’26  
Furthermore, God’s goodness is what God is essentially, and yet, creatures participate in God’s 
goodness through their very existence by way of likeness.27  The reason we can say this without 
changing God’s nature or claiming that humans become divine is because goodness is a 
transcendental – something that is not limited to any one category but is convertible with being.28  
Since a transcendental is convertible with being, it is convertible with God’s attributes.  Goodness is 
both what God is and communicable to creatures as a transcendental.29 
 Historically, theologians speak in terms of incommunicable and communicable, or absolute 
and relative, attributes of God.  Recall that Owen makes use of this absolute and relative distinction 
in his theology proper. 30   Torrance avoids it because he perceives it as dualistic, partly due to his 
misunderstanding of Calvin’s explanation of De Trinitate V – that some things are said of God 
substance wise and others are said person wise.31  Owen’s theology of God’s punitive justice leads to 
an admixture of justice as ‘essential’ and its ‘egress’ that takes a punitive form.  Owen’s 
soteriological concerns lead him to make the ‘egress’ of God’s punitive justice essential at points.  
More than intentionally revising the tradition, Owen is inconsistent. Torrance, on the other hand, 
revises God’s attributes in a more intentional and radical way due to his theology of revelation and 
his understanding of homoousios.     
 
 26  Augustine, De Trinitate V.6.  
 27  In creaturely existence, there is a concurrence of divine and human wills, but not a compatibilism 
as Sonderegger understands compatibilism.  Sonderegger, Systematic Theology 1:84, 87.  Muller points out 
that compatibilism is ‘some sort of necessitarianism’ and therefore denies God’s freedom.  Sonderegger 
admits that she posits a type of necessity.  See, Muller, ‘God as Absolute and Relative,’ 63. 
 28  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 66-67.  
 29  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 67no.41.  
 30  Owen, Works 12:93.  Here Owen does not cite Augustine but makes use of the absolute/relative 
distinction for knowledge of God.    
 31  See, for example, Torrance, ‘Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity,’ 165-167, and my discussion on 
Torrance’s misunderstanding of Calvin’s use of De Trinitate 5 in chapter 6.   
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 In the Reformed tradition, lying behind this understanding of God ad intra and God ad extra, 
is the understanding that God himself is the ontological foundation of our knowledge of God, the 
principium essendi, while the incarnate Word, the person of Christ and Scripture, not human reason, 
is the principium cognoscendi, the noetic foundation.32  Conflation arises in theological construction 
when these two principium are merged together, which happens when soteriology trumps theology 
proper.  This happens in Torrance’s realist epistemology as the object investigated, namely Jesus 
Christ, shapes and determines our knowledge.33  Torrance does not deny that there is an immanent 
life of God, but playing by Kant’s rules, God’s immanent life cannot be other than what is revealed 
economically in Christ.  Similarly, Owen’s fear of Socinianism leads him to understand God’s 
revelation more strictly in terms of the incarnate Christ as well, though he does not take this line of 
thought as far as Torrance.  Owen and Torrance both, in related but different ways, constrict 
revelation to special revelation, and therefore, knowledge of God is more and more seen exclusively 
as being revealed soteriologically. 
 The order of being and knowing is not consistently employed in either Owen or Torrance.  
Recall that Torrance redefines God’s immutability as God’s faithfulness.  Owen treats God’s relative 
attributes of grace and mercy as absolute attributes rather than pairing these relative attributes with 
absolute attributes such as God’s love and goodness.34  Traditionally, absolute and relative attributes 
are considered as pairs.  Muller explains:  ‘Not that these pairs indicate different attributes but 
 
 32  See Muller, PRRD 3:431-435.  For a recent and helpful treatment of our knowledge of God – from a 
Protestant and Reformed point of view – see, Michael Allen, ‘Knowledge of God,’ in Christian Dogmatics:  
Reformed Theology for the Church Catholic, ed. Michael Allen and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids, MI:  Baker 
Academic, 2016), 7-29.  
 33  To be fair to Torrance, all Christian theology is, in a sense, Christological.  As Michael Allen writes, 
‘It is true that all Christian theology is Christological.  However, what precisely this means is rather difficult 
especially in light of modern theologians’ use of ‘a hard version of Rahner’s Rule.’  While I agree with what 
Allen is getting at, perhaps it is better to maintain that all Christian theology is Trinitarian, not simply 
Christological.    Allen, ‘Knowledge of God,’ 19-20. 
 34  Timothy Robert Baylor, ‘A Great King Above All Gods:  Dominion and Divine Government in the 
Theology of John Owen,’ (PhD diss., University of Saint Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, 2016), 35.  I follow 
Owen’s classifications of absolute and relative at this point in order to let Owen speak, but to follow my typical 
categorization throughout this conclusion, absolute here is the same as God in se and relative is the same as 
God for us.    
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rather the same attribute considered first ad intra and second ad extra.’35  Torrance’s articulation of 
the homoousion dominates, and controls his theology to the point that Jesus is God, and what God 
reveals in Jesus is an exhaustive revelation of God (full stop).  Compared to the traditional 
understanding of the Reformed tradition, Torrance’s theology of revelation leaves no room for 
incommunicable attributes or the extra Calvinisticum.36  God in se is what is communicated in Christ.  
Jesus Christ is both the prinicipium essendi and the principium cognoscendi.  Scripture is not the 
epistemic foundation, but God himself is the noetic foundation in Torrance’s theology.  Although less 
severe, Owen’s conflations move in the same direction.  Yet to posit all knowledge of God as 
archetypal knowledge, whether intentional or not, is to transgress the Creature/creature distinction 
and risks making God dependent on something contingent.  
 Understanding God’s name as Augustine does helps us to construct a theology that rightly 
understands both God ad intra and God ad extra.  God’s good name tells us that God is ‘I Am.’   This 
is to speak of God in se.  Yet the great ‘I Am’ is also YHWH, God’s covenantal name, which is to speak 
of God ad extra, or in relation to his creation and creatures.  Once again, Augustine helpfully explains 
God’s name as both absolute and relative, paraphrasing God’s address to Moses at the Burning 
Bush, ‘That I Am that I Am, belongs to me; but that I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, 
and the God of Jacob, belongs to you. And if you are unable to see what I am to myself, understand 
what I am to you.’37   
 Working within the Augustinian tradition, Owen’s contemporary, Charnock, helps us grasp 
what is at stake: 
God is the prime and chief goodness.  Being good per se, and by his own essence, he 
must needs be the chief goodness, in whom there can be nothing but good, from 
whom there can proceed nothing but good, to whom all good whatsoever must be 
referred as the final cause of all good. As he is the chief being, so he is the chief good. 
And as we rise by steps from the existence of created things, to acknowledge one 
supreme being, which is God, so we mount by steps from the consideration of the 
 
 35  Muller, ‘God as Absolute and Relative,’ 58.  
 36  See, Michael Allen, ‘Calvin’s Christ:  A Dogmatic Matrix for Discussion of Christ’s Human Nature,’ 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 4 (October 2007):  382-397. 
 37  Augustine, EP 6, 135.6.  
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goodness of created things, to acknowledge one infinite ocean of sovereign goodness, 
whence the streams of created goodness are derived. When we behold things that 
partake of goodness from another, we must acquiesce in one that hath goodness by 
participation from no other, but originally from himself, and therefore supremely in 
himself above all other things; so that as nothing greater and more majestic can be 
imagined, so also nothing better and more excellent can be conceived than God. 
Nothing can add to him, or make him better than he is, nothing can detract from him 
to make him worse, nothing can be added to him, nothing can be severed from him. 
No created good can render him more excellent; no evil from any creature can render 
him less excellent.38 
If the God ad intra/ad extra distinction is not given the utmost and careful consideration when 
speaking of God, conflation awaits.  We have seen this in both Owen (albeit in less theologically 
costly ways) and in Torrance (in ways very costly theologically).   
 
Analogical Predication  
 
 To understand God in this way is to understand God analogically.39  The analogia entis, as 
rooted in Thomas and presented and refined in Przywara, is crucial for the rest of this chapter.  It is 
important to emphasize that the doctrine of analogy does not place God and creatures on a chain of 
being or posit a continuum between them.  To do so would be to understand God and creatures in a 
univocal way and place God and his creatures in a common genus.  A univocal understanding is one 
in which God and creatures are understood to be the same – they share both the name and ratio.40 
An equivocal understanding holds that God and creatures share only a common name, but the 
definition of that name is different for God from what it is for creatures.41  In analogical predication, 
the name and the rationes share something in common, because they both refer to one thing 
 
 38  Charnock, Works 2:286.  
 39  Charnock here clearly shows the analogical nature of his reflection on God’s goodness.   
 40  Aquinas, De Prinicipiis Naturae  6, pp. 46-47.  For a very helpful explanation of this text, from a  
modern Reformed theologian, see, Stephen J. Duby, ‘Reformed Catholicity and the Analogy of Being,’ in 
Reforming the Catholic Tradition: The Whole Word for The Whole Church, ed. Joseph Minich (Leesburg, VA: The 
Davenant Institute, 2019), 50.  Michael Allen, another Reformed theologian writes, ‘As Protestants, we need 
not fear language of an analogy of being (analogia entis).’  Allen, ‘Knowledge of God,’ 14.  Also, see the very 
helpful treatment by the Anglican theologian E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy: A Sequel to “He Who Is” 
(London, UK: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1949), 92-121. 
 41  Aquinas, De Prinicipiis Naturae 6, pp. 46-47.  
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though they are not exactly the same.42  It is important to see that analogical predication works in 
tandem with an understanding that God is the first and last cause of all things.  As the first cause of 
all things, as the perfect Creator, God’s works ad extra have a likeness to their Creator.  Similitude is 
always based on causality, though the Protestant priority of grace at times eclipses this important 
point.  Therefore, causality, analogy, and likeness work together in theological predication.  By 
analogy, we investigate the created effects within God’s economy, those works that are toward the 
outside, and reason back, not univocally or equivocally, but analogically to God.  This is what the 
Psalmist is doing in Psalm 100.  God’s historical faithfulness reveals something much deeper, 
something that the human intellect cannot know as God knows, but by analogy can know ectypally 
something of this much deeper foundation – God’s goodness.  
 
The Similitude of Goodness  
 
 Owen’s and Torrance’s soteriological reading of God’s inner life greatly informs their 
understanding of the divine processions and missions.  While Owen’s theology proper is indebted to 
Aquinas, the pactum salutis displaces the divine processions.  As a result, Owen’s foundation is built 
upon this covenant of redemption and not the communicative nature of God’s goodness.  Torrance, 
as we have seen, risks conflating God’s being with the divine persons due to his construction of the 
homoousios, which inadequately recognizes Scripture’s twofold register: some things are said with 
regard to God’s essence and others with regard to God’s persons.  As a result, wanting to root 
soteriology in God’s inner life – the instinct is correct – he too replaces the traditional foundation 
with something very similar to the covenant of redemption, Christ’s election.43  In both, the removal 
 
 42  Aquinas, De Printcipiis Naturae 6, pp. 46-47.    
 43  Comparing Owen and Barth (who Torrance follows albeit in a more radical way), Suzanne 
McDonald points out that in both Christ is ‘the primary elect of God, and the one in whose election the elect 
share…In other words, to borrow Barth’s idiom, Christ is both Electing God, as the co-author of the decree, and 
Elect Man as the one in whose election the elect participate.’  McDonald, Re-Imaging, 9no.18.  For a similar 
conclusion, see, Tay, The Priesthood of Christ, 30. 
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of goodness once more identifies soteriology with theology proper.  In large part, this conflation 
arises due to each theologian’s understanding of God’s will in relation to these alternative 
foundations – the pactum salutis and Christ’s election.   Owen risks conflating God’s being with the 
divine persons when he speaks of the will of the Father and the will of the Son in his formulation of 
the covenant of redemption.44  Torrance risks conflation given his understanding of God’s monarchia 
and, relatedly, his understanding that Jesus Christ is the will of God (following Barth).  In both 
theologians, this particular conflation arises due to their exclusive understanding of revelation as 
special or redemptive – that is, in different but related ways, Owen and Torrance both constrain 
revelation almost exclusively to Jesus Christ.  I have already argued that this narrowing of revelation 
is at work in their understanding of God’s good name.  Here, we see that conflation at the beginning 
of our theological construction carries over downstream.    While this is less true in Owen and the 
Thomistic language and concepts of natural theology are found in his works, this narrowing of 
revelation in both Owen and Torrance causes God’s similitude with respect to his creatures created 
in his likeness to drop out of their theological methodology.  When this happens, God’s self-
communicating goodness drops out as well.   
 It is first important to understand that God is good.  As perfect, God is good.  ‘God is perfect.  
Therefore, he is good.’45  However, the perfectly good God is also actus purus, because ‘to be in 
act…constitutes the nature of the good.’46  Therefore, God’s goodness is self-communicative.  God’s 
perfection means that God is complete actuality.  There is no potential in God.  Therefore, God’s 
 
 44  As we have seen, Owen knows that some will make this very objection.  He surely would defend his 
understanding by saying that though the will is common to God as one, each person that is the one essence of 
God subsists distinctly as the divine person they are, and thus has the divine will in this personal way.  Owen is 
nuanced and careful, though he treats the divine will in a way similar to the transcendentals.  I am not 
convinced that the logic of Owen’s thought does not compromise God’s simplicity.  Scripture does speak of 
‘the Father’s will’ and ‘the will of the Son’, but this is economic, not God in se.  Further, when the tradition 
uses the language of the ‘will of the Son’ or the ‘will of the Father’ it does not have quite the individualistic 
overtones as does Owen’s formulation of the pactum salutis where the Son wills and the Father wills, not so 
much as one being, but in order to make an agreement.  Owen’s formulation risks the unity of God’s will.  To 
be clear, Owen is aware of this risk, yet I do not think he sufficiently avoids it.    
 45  Aquinas, SCG 36.2.    
 46  Aquinas, SCG 36.4.    
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action is perfect and in acting God communicates his goodness.47  Furthermore, as perfect, God 
produces his like in this self-communication of goodness.48   As perfect good, God is desirable as 
things seek their own perfection, which is found in God alone.  This concise, yet technical point, 
leads us to the important principle of similitude.  Good, perfection, and similitude all work together.  
God is perfect, and that which is perfect creates its like.  There is a similitude between God and 
creatures.  Showing that such an understanding is not limited to Roman Catholicism, or to the 
medieval tradition, but carries into the Reformed tradition, Zanchi explains, ‘Truly, between God and 
created things, there is a similitude.  For the perfection of all things and their similitudes are in God, 
who is Being himself.’49  Creatures are not perfect, but they desire to be so.  Since creaturely 
goodness is a participation in God’s goodness, creaturely desire for perfection is a desire for God’s 
goodness, because goodness is distinguished from being by its desirability.50  Thus, God as summa 
bonum is most desirable.51  Therefore, God’s self-communication of goodness means that the things 
God creates and redeems have a likeness to God so that, consciously or not, all creatures have a 
natural desire for God.  Good is different from being in that it adds desirability to being.   
 In seeking for God who is truly good, or a perceived good in our sin, we seek after God, 
because humanity is created in God’s image and likeness.  Without this similitude between God and 
creatures, this desirable quality of good, which distinguishes it from being, is lost.  That is to say, 
 
 47  Aquinas, SCG 36.5.    
 48  Aquinas, SCG 36.5.  
 49  Girolamo Zanchi, De natura Dei, seu de divinis attributis, libri V (Neustadt: Wilhelm Harnish, 1598), 
I.x, q. 8 (29). ‘inter Deum vero, & res creates, similitudo est.  Perfectionibus enim omnibus, & ipso Esse, similes 
sunt omnes Deo.’  Duby shows that the early Reformers kept this understanding of similitude by quoting from 
Bartholomäus Keckermann (1571-1608).  This supports my claim that the Reformed tradition begins with a 
broadly Thomistic doctrine of God that narrows due to theological controversy and the growing fear of reason 
and natural theology.  Grace takes its place, but the understanding of grace became detached from God’s 
inherently communicative goodness.  See, Duby, ‘Reformed Analogy of Being,’ 57.  See also, Keckermann, 
Systema Logicae, in vol. 1 of Operum Omnium quae Extant (Geneva, 1614), I.2.4, pp. 673-674; 2.5, p. 679; 
Keckermann, Systema S. S. Theologiae, in vol. 2 of Operum Omnium quae Extant (Geneva, 1614, I.5, p. 80; For 
a Reformed explanation of how being does not apply to God in a general way – and therefore the analogia 
entis is not a chain of being, see, Keckermann, Scientiae Metaphysicae Brevissima Synopsis et Compendium, in 
vol. 1 of Operum Omnium, I.2, p. 2015.   
 50  Aquinas, ST I, q. 5, a. 1, co.    
 51  Aquinas, ST I, q. 6, a. 1, ad. 2.  Aquinas writes, ‘As to the second objection, it must be said that all 
things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God himself, in so far as the perfection of all things are certain 
similitudes of the divine being.’     
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God’s ever-greater dissimilarity does not discard, but works in tandem with God’s similarity to 
creatures.52  Therefore, to use Torrance’s language, we can say that God is wholly other, but he is 
also like the creatures he makes, because God is perfectly good and produces his own likeness in the 
acts of creating and redeeming.  While it could be argued that God’s sovereign communication of his 
grace means that we do not need to hold this principle of similitude, something much greater is at 
stake than simply God’s act of self-revelation.  God’s similitude with creatures follows our 
understanding of God’s nature.  If God is perfect and good, then when he creates, or redeems, ad 
extra the creatures he makes are like him in some way.53  While priority is given to the ever-greater 
dissimilarity between God and creatures, the similitude does important theological work that is 
largely absent in both Owen and Torrance.    
 We have seen that this understanding is the foundation of the analogia entis.  However, this 
understanding is also vitally important for understanding God’s will.  Aquinas explains, ‘It pertains, 
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; 
and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind 
of likeness.’54  If this is true of natural things, Aquinas continues, then ‘much more does it pertain to 
 
 52  This is not to suggest that similarity and dissimilarity are somehow the same or to downplay the 
priority of the ever-greater dissimilarity between God and creatures.  Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of 
this conclusion to develop both Owen’s and Torrance’s understanding of the imago Dei, although both 
understand the image in and through Christ.  Owen holds that humanity loses the image at the fall, though 
traces remain, and is restored in God’s elect through the process of sanctification.  Owen writes, ‘This image of 
God in Christ is represented to us in the Gospel.  Being lost from our nature, it was utterly impossible we 
should have any just comprehension of it.  There could be no steady notion of the image of God, until it was 
renewed and exemplified in the human nature of Christ.’  Owen, Works 1: 171-172.  See also, McDonald, Re-
Imaging Election, 13-15.  Torrance is a bit more complicated as he wants to affirm that the image of God 
remains after humanity’s sin, yet his proleptically conditioned understanding of creation leaves no real room 
for a human nature that remains after Adam’s sin, precisely because all of humanity is in Christ, the true image 
of God.  See, Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (1957; repr., Eugene, OR:  Wipf & Stock, 2001), 
passim.  For both Augustine and Aquinas the image of God in human creatures is to participate in God’s 
likeness.  See, Augustine, QQ. LXXXIII.; q. 74, and Aquinas, ST I, q. 93, co.  
 53  This is not to say that humans are divine or become divine in redemption when we participate in 
God’s goodness in Christ.  Right before his questions on goodness, Aquinas, in the ST, anticipates this type of 
objection.  As a result, before turning to goodness, he first asks of creatures’ likeness to God and writes that 
‘similitude attends to fitness or communication in form’ and that there are different ways in which things are 
alike.  Further, Aquinas, quoting Dionysius, explains that things can simultaneously be both like and unlike God.  
Aquinas, ST I, q., 4, a. 3, co. and ad. 1.    
 54  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 2.   
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the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible.’55 Therefore, 
God communicates his likeness in as far as he is perfect and in act.  Since God is perfect and 
transcendent, God is dissimilar from his creatures in an ever-increasing way, while at the same time 
like his creatures.  This is true both before and after humanity’s fall into sin.  Importantly, then, the 
foundation of both creation and redemption need not be found in an eternal covenant or act of self-
election.  God himself, whose very nature it is to communicate his own goodness, is the foundation 
of both creation and redemption as he freely communicates this goodness ad extra.  To be clear, the 
communication of God’s goodness in the original creation and the communication of God’s 
goodness in redemption are not synonymous.  Yet there is a corresponding and somewhat parallel 
relationship between the two.  Just as in the first creation, God freely communicates his goodness to 
the creation, so too, in redemption God freely communicates his love, his goodness, to his elect.   
 If God is good and can will only what is good, then to introduce the covenant of redemption 
or Christ’s own election changes the foundation of soteriology from God in se to God’s economy 
under the effects of sin.  God’s goodness is why God redeems.  However, and very importantly, in 
the act of redemption, God is not motivated by anything outside of himself – just as in creation.  God 
wills to redeem fallen humanity because he wills what is good, namely himself as the telos of all 
things.  Since God alone is good, ‘nothing can be the ultimate end of God but himself and his own 
goodness.’56  If this is not the case, then God is no longer God.57  God’s goodness is his essence.  
Therefore, God’s self-communication of goodness is motived only by his own essence.58 Aquinas 
explains, ‘What is more, because every agent acts in as far as it is in act, it is necessary that God, who 
is pure act, acts by his own essence.  Willing, however, is a certain operation of God.  Therefore, it is 
necessary that God has will by his own essence.  Therefore, his will is his essence.’59  Furthermore, in 
 
 55  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 2.   
 56  Charnock, Works 2:292.    
 57  Charnock, Works 2:292.  ‘God cannot will anything as his end of acting but himself, without 
undeifying himself.’    
 58  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 1, ad 3.    
 59  Aquinas, SCG 73.    
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that the goodness that God wills is desirable, ‘if the principle of the divine will is other than God’s 
own essence, it follows that some other superior to the divine will, is that which moves it.’60 God’s 
goodness, not humanity’s fallen condition, moves God to will to redeem.  Therefore, God’s goodness 
is the foundation and cause of the Son’s redemptive mission.  Goodness, then, God himself, is the 
basis of salvation.  Soteriology must be ordered to the good, God’s own goodness, and is, as such, 
derivative and exemplary of the good.  Therefore, the end in view is not simply humanity’s salvation.  
Rather, the end of redemption is that fallen creatures return to God in Christ and forever participate 
in God’s own goodness.  Unfolding this foundation of God’s goodness allows us to construct a 
theology of the Son’s mission that is built upon the foundation of the divine processions internal to 
God himself.    
 
The Freedom of God’s Goodness  
 
 Before creaturely participation in goodness, then, God must necessarily will his own 
goodness in which creatures participate.  Yet, this raises a major question.  If God’s goodness is self-
communicative, and God necessarily wills his own goodness, then, is creation, or possibly 
redemption, necessary?61  Both the covenant of redemption and Torrance’s understanding of 
election wrestle with these questions as both are attempts to maintain creation’s contingency and 
God’s freedom.62  God is not obligated by anything outside of himself to create or redeem.  Does 
introducing God’s goodness jeopardize the voluntary nature of God’s creating and redeeming work?  
 
 60  Aquinas, SCG 74.    
 61  W. Norris Clarke and Norman Kretzmann defend this understanding of God’s goodness and God’s 
relation to creation.  See: W. Norris Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person (South Bend, IN:  
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 211-227; Norman Kretzman, ‘A General Problem of Creation: Why 
Would God Create Anything at All?’ in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the God in Metaphysics and 
Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1991), 229-249.  Clarke and 
Kretzman sparked a debate among Thomist scholars which is documented in Bernhard-Thomas Blankenhorn, 
O.P., ‘The good as self-diffusive in Thomas Aquinas,’ Angelicum 79, no. 4 (2002): 803no.1.  Blankenhorn not 
only introduces the debate, but argues for the more traditional understanding that God’s act of creation is a 
free act of God’s will and is not necessitated by the self-communicative nature of goodness or anything else in 
creation.    
 62  Attempts, in my judgment, that ultimately lead to conflation of God in se and God for us.    
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Helpfully, Aquinas answers that things are necessary in two ways – absolutely and by supposition.63  
It is true that God wills some things necessarily, but this is not true of all that God wills.   God wills his 
own goodness necessarily because the divine will has a necessary habitude to the divine goodness 
because goodness is the proper object of God’s will.64  This rich theology of goodness is not lost in 
Owen’s thought as we have seen.  However, instead of the ‘necessary habitude’ that exists between 
God’s will and God’s goodness, and thus providing the foundation for the Son’s redemptive mission, 
Owen’s construction of the Father and Son voluntarily covenanting creates a new habitude within 
God in se.   
 Even if we grant that Owen does not mean this new relation is in God in himself, but is a new 
relation that arises in the incarnation (which is quite hard to conclude from the context as seen in 
chapter 2), at the very least, this new relation is not needed.  If God’s goodness communicates itself, 
then the needed relation between God’s will and the temporal missions already exists.  In Torrance’s 
thought, the elect Christ is God’s eternal decree and, therefore, God’s will and Jesus Christ are one 
and the same.  Thus, Torrance’s conflation of God in se and God for us, means that all acts of God’s 
will are redemptive – all is grace – and the category of goodness remains undeveloped.    Torrance 
does speak much of God’s love, though he does not relate it to God’s goodness.  Rather, Torrance’s 
understanding of God loving creatures more than he loves himself only further abolishes any 
distinction between God ad intra and God ad extra.  In response to both Owen and Torrance, 
retrieving a broadly Thomistic account of God’s goodness allows for theological construction that 
affirms God’s freedom in relation to creation while avoiding the conflations at work in their thought.  
 Constructing such an understanding of the Son’s mission, we begin by affirming that God 
himself is the ultimate end of the divine willing because God is the summum bonum.65  Things 
outside of God, he wills freely and contingently.  The self-communicative nature of divine goodness 
 
 63  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 3, co.  The Latin terms are ‘absolute’ and ‘ex suppositione’.     
 64  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 3, co.     
 65  Aquinas, SCG I, c. 74, adhuc.    
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does not introduce necessity into God’s being.66  God’s communication of his own goodness is 
always given freely and contingently ad extra.  God could have willed otherwise, but once he does 
will something, God’s contingent communication of goodness neither changes God nor adds to his 
essential goodness.67  God wills all things outside of himself ordered to divine goodness as their end, 
but such an ordering is free, compelled only by God’s essence, and adds nothing to God because he 
is eternally fully actualized.68  Such an end leads to a necessity of will only if the end (God’s 
goodness) cannot be attained without those things outside of God.  This is precisely why soteriology, 
as important as it is, cannot be the foundation for the Son’s mission to redeem.   
 Thomas gives the example of a journey by ship.  Such a journey is necessarily undertaken on 
a ship once the traveller is on board, but the traveller could have walked or ridden a horse.69  
Importantly, God’s willing of his own goodness is similarly understood.  Thomas writes, ‘Since the 
goodness of God is perfect, and is able to be without other things, because no perfection can be 
added to him by other things, it follows that his willing other things apart from himself, is not 
absolutely necessary.’70  Nevertheless, it can be necessary by supposition, ‘for supposing that he 
wills a thing, then he is not able to not will it, because his will is not able to change.’71  Aquinas helps 
clarify the point:  ‘Therefore, he wills both himself and other things to be, but himself as the end, 
 
 66  Charnock helpfully explains, ‘His goodness could not necessitate him to make the world, but his 
goodness could only move him to resolve to make a world; he was not bound to erect and fashion it because 
of his goodness, but he could not frame it without his goodness as the moving cause.’  Charnock, Works 2:289.  
Once God creates, he is good to his creation both in its prelapsarian and postlapsarian states.    
 67  Aquinas, ST I, q. 21, a. 3, co.  Aquinas’ understanding of freedom is not quite the same as Owen’s 
and Torrance’s understanding.  In both our interlocutors, freedom seems to convey the modern notion of a 
free choice.  Aquinas understands freedom as that which adds nothing to God, but he wills it for the sake of 
creatures.  This is not to deny that God truly could will or not will contingent things, but there seems to be a 
slight difference in how the tradition understands God’s freedom as we move from Aquinas to Owen and then 
to Torrance.  Historically, it is plausible that liberal democratic notions of freedom creep into theology proper 
given the English Civil wars and the emergence of the modern western world.  However, theologians will do 
well to think of freedom more along the lines of contingency and as a gift for the sake of others along the lines 
of Gal 5.  This application of freedom made by Saint Paul seems to be rooted in an understanding of God’s 
freedom, which is motivated by the desire of the good of others, and not by an individual’s right to hold onto 
at all costs.   
 68  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 3, co.     
 69  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 3, co.    
 70  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 3, co.    
 71  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 3, co.    
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and other things as to that end, inasmuch as it is fitting for the divine goodness that other things 
should be partakers therein.’72  God’s self-communication of goodness is the result of God’s nature.  
However, the self-communication of goodness ad extra is not compelled by anything other than God 
himself.  God is both necessarily good and freely good.73  ‘God is necessarily good in his nature, but 
free in his communications of it.’74  That God acts outside himself is not necessary, but the way in 
which God does act ad extra ‘is necessary as well as free… God indeed is necessarily good, affective, 
in regard of his nature; but freely good, effective, in regard of the effluxes of it to this or that 
particular subject he pitcheth on.’75  In order to be the summa bonum that God is, his goodness must 
be voluntarily dispersed.   
 
Goodness:  the cause and end of all things  
 
 While elements of Aquinas’ understanding of God’s goodness are clearly found in Owen, he  
focuses on the revelation of God’s goodness in redemptive history.76  Owen clearly understands 
God’s divine nature as the foundation for goodness – goodness is an essential attribute.  
Nevertheless, Owen’s focus is clearly on the manifestation of God’s goodness in creation, which 
happens primarily in Christ’s mission.  Even here, Owen begins a slight turn to soteriology and a 
narrowing of revelation to special revelation.  In so doing, Owen follows a broad trend within 
Reformed Orthodoxy that maintains God’s goodness as one of the ‘transcendental predicates of 
Being’ that ‘belongs absolutely to God.’77  At the same time, God’s goodness is ‘one of the primary 
attributes of God’s self-revelation.’78  It is this latter ‘point that receives the emphasis in the 
 
 72  Aquinas, ST I, q. 19, a. 2, co.      
 73  Charnock, Works 2:290.  
 74  Charnock, Works 2:290.  
 75  Charnock, Works 2:290.    
 76  See chapter 1 and Owen, Works 1:59-60.      
 77  Muller, PRRD 3:506.  
 78  Muller, PRRD 3:506.  
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Reformed systems.’79  This lack of emphasis, at least in Owen, leads him away from the foundation 
of God in se who communicates himself through his goodness in both creation and redemption.  
Muller’s diagnosis of the Reformed Orthodox applies to Owen:   
This point is significant inasmuch as there is some correspondence in definition 
between the Reformed and Thomas Aquinas, but there is very little in terms of the 
function and location of the doctrine of the bonitas Dei:  in this locus, certainly, the 
Reformed, unlike Aquinas, are less interested in the absolute Being of God and its 
transcendent properties than they are in the character and egress of the divine 
willing.80  
This shift in emphasis is radicalized in Torrance’s thought due to his doctrine of homoousios, so that 
God’s will is conflated with the person of Christ, and revelation of goodness is revelation of God in 
se.81  Both Owen and Torrance understand God’s will and goodness as they do because of their 
soteriologically funded theology.82  
 Both start with human salvation and read soteriology back into the divine life instead of 
reasoning from the effects found in creation back to God in himself as the cause for those effects.  
This is driven by their narrow understanding of revelation. Owen’s polemical engagement with the 
Socinians, and Torrance’s desire to resist the rise of cultural, liberal Christianity lead both to a fear of 
natural theology and the analogia entis.  Relatedly, this fear, driven by their concern for God’s 
freedom, leads them to lose – in addition to God’s similitude with creatures – another important 
piece of analogical predication, namely, causality.83  God as the summa bonum is the final cause of 
 
 79  Muller, PRRD 3:506.  
 80  Muller, PRRD 3:506.   
 81  This is the logic of Torrance’s thinking though he does not develop God’s goodness.    
 82  This is not to suggest that God’s goodness as an essential attribute drops from Reformed 
Orthodoxy altogether.  Many remain broadly Thomistic in their understanding as Muller demonstrates.  See, 
Muller, PRRD 3:506-510.  Nevertheless, beginning with the Reformed Orthodox, divine goodness, and related 
attributes, take on an ‘affective or volitional’ understanding that ‘points away from a Thomistic toward a more 
Scotistic and via moderna Augustinian accent.’     
 83  Muller’s definition of ‘causa’ along with his explanation of the use of ‘causa’ in the tradition is 
helpful and instructive:  ‘that which brings about motion or mutation. Following Aristotle, the medieval 
scholastics, the Reformers, and the Protestant scholastics held a basic fourfold schema of causality: (1) the 
causa efficiens, the efficient cause, or productive, effective cause, which is the agent productive of the motion 
or mutation in any sequence of causes and effects; (2) the causa materialis, or material cause, which is the 
substantial basis of the motion or mutation, the materia on which the causa efficiens operates; (3) the causa 
formalis, or formal cause, which is the essentia (q.v.) or quidditas (q.v.) of the thing, and which is 
determinative of what the thing caused is to be; (4) the causa finalis, or final cause, which is the ultimate 
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all good things.  However, some articulations of the analogia entis ‘reduce the ontological 
underpinnings of the divine names to ontological participation conceived solely in terms of efficient 
causality.’84  Similarly, God’s goodness seen as primarily, or only, as an efficient cause leads some 
theologians to conclude that God’s self-communicating goodness logically results in a necessary 
creation.  It is true that God is the efficient cause of all things that exist outside of God, but precisely 
because all things that God wills are ordered to the end of his own goodness, God’s efficient 
causality and final causality cannot be separated.  Barnes explains, ‘According to Aquinas, the end is 
the causa causarum, the cause of causes, precisely because it is prior in intention to the efficient 
cause and explains the causality of the efficient cause.’85  If this is not the case, then creation is 
necessary for God, because to place priority on efficient causality is to understand that the creation 
comes before the end – the end could not be reached without the means, which, as we just saw, 
introduces necessity into God’s will.  However, goodness, as the end of all things, logically precedes 
the efficient cause.   
 This logical priority of final causality that orders all things to God’s goodness is due to the 
desirability of the good, namely God.  Aquinas writes, ‘Goodness, however, because it has the 
 
purpose for which a thing is made or an act is performed.’  Muller, DLGTT:56.  It should be noted that Muller’s 
definition does not explain the priority of final causality as I do here following Aquinas.   
 84  Cody L. Barnes, ‘Ordered to the Good: Final Causality and Analogical Predication in Thomas 
Aquinas,’ Modern Theology 30, no. 4 (October 2014), 434.  While Barnes’ caution is helpful, and historically 
there was a ‘limitation or rejection of final causality among late-medieval and early modern authors’, it should 
be noted that Barnes calls for an ‘approach that expands the metaphysical underpinnings to include final 
causality and agathological participation.’  Barnes, ‘Ordered to the Good,’ 435 and 434.  This is a move away 
from the analogia entis that Barnes claims clarifies analogical predication.  However, it is not clear what true 
advance Barnes makes, as final causality, while perhaps limited by later philosophers and theologians, is at the 
heart of Aquinas’ metaphysics and his understanding of analogical predication.  Later in this same article, 
Barnes downplays his opening critique that final causality is lacking in Aquinas.  Rather, he suggests that final 
causality is neglected by Thomistic scholars in part due to an existential reading of Thomas that focuses 
primarily on the esse and actus essendi.  This reading tends to focus on efficient causality at the expense of 
final causality.  Barnes rightly contends that ‘these themes are best understood within a larger framework that 
encompasses as well the good, final causality, and agathological participation.’  Barnes, ‘Ordered to the Good,’ 
442.  Laurance Dewan makes a similar claim, see, Laurance Dewan, ‘St. Thomas and the Causality of God’s 
Goodness,’ Laval thèologique et philosophique 34, no. 3 (1978): 291-304.  Dewan cites, J. Peghaire, C.S.Sp., ‘L 
’axiome “Bonum est diffusivum sui’ dans le néo-platonisme et le thomisme”, Revue de l’ Université d’ Ottawa, 
Section spécilae, 1 (1932): 5-30.  Peghaire claims, ‘De causalité finale, il n’est pas question.’ ‘Of final causality, 
there is no question.’  Peghair, ‘L ‘axiome,’ 9. 
 85  Barnes, ‘Ordered to the Good,’ 436.  
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reason of desirability, conveys the condition of a final cause, which causality is first [among the 
causes], because an agent does not act except for a proper end, and matter is moved to its form by 
an agent, therefore, the end is called the cause of causes.’86  God wills all things with the end – his 
own goodness – already in view. 87  God alone is good essentially, as all creaturely goodness is 
derived from, and participates in, the goodness that God is.  Thus, God’s creation is ordered to God.  
However, a soteriological reading of economy into God’s being – recall that being and goodness as 
transcendental properties are convertible – introduces, however slightly, a humanity-centred, 
instead of a God-centred, understanding of soteriology.  A Thomistic understanding of goodness as 
causa finalis helps avoid this shift that introduces conflation into theology proper.   
 To sum up this section, we can say that both Owen’s and Torrance’s narrowing of revelation 
to almost exclusively God’s special revelation leads to a loss of the all-important understanding of 
God’s similitude with his creatures.  Recall that because God is perfect and good, the communication 
of his goodness creates things similar to himself.88  In the place of this similitude, in both Owen, and 
more radically in Torrance, enters God’s disruptive grace.  Owen’s truncating of revelation to almost 
exclusively special revelation – true especially after humanity’s fall – does not go as far as, but is 
related to, Torrance’s collapsing of creation and redemption.  If everything is redemption, and God is 
wholly other, there is no longer a self-communication of God’s goodness operative in the world as 
 
 86  Aquinas, ST I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.    
 87  Thomas explains, ‘It must be said that, because goodness is that which all things desire, and, 
moreover, this has the aspect of an end; it is clear that goodness implies the reason of an end. But, 
nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the reason of an efficient cause, and also the reason of a 
formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. For fire first heats before it 
causes the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness 
and the end come first, which moves to effect; secondly, the action of the effect moving to the form; thirdly, 
comes the form. Thus, in that which is caused the converse ought to be in the thing caused, so that there 
should be first, the form by means of which it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, 
whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it is able to make its like, as the Philosopher says 
(Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the reason of goodness through which its perfection is founded.’  Aquinas, 
ST I, q. 5, a. 4, co.   
 88  In discussing similitude, the foundational understanding of the analogia entis (as discussed above) 
– that, although creatures are similar to God, at the same time, there is an ever-greater dissimilarity - must not 
be lost.  If this two-sided reality is lost, then we risk losing a true distinction between the Creator and his 
creatures.   
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articulated by Aquinas and Owen’s contemporary, Charnock.  Therefore, the only way for God to 
communicate is for him to break into his creation disruptively in redemptive grace.  In need of some 
foundation, Owen and Torrance both build upon a shaky one – the pactum salutis and Christ’s 
election, which are structurally very similar.  The important point of this section is that the 
foundation of God’s goodness helps us to avoid the conflations at work in Owen’s covenant of 
redemption and Torrance’s theology of Christ’s election.  If God’s will is ordered to the good, the 
foundation for this good to communicate itself already exists in God’s acts of creation and 
redemption.  The addition of alternative foundations leaves us on less than stable ground.  As 
Charnock says, ‘The goodness of God is the efflux of his will, whereby he is beneficial to his 
creatures.’89 
 
The Goodness of the Divine Persons  
 
 God’s nature is good and, therefore, communicative in that God shares himself.  However, 
this basis for God’s economic and soteriological communication of goodness – God for us – as it 
relates to the divine processions and missions, I have not yet sufficiently rooted in its foundation in 
God in se.  God’s goodness is not dependent upon anything outside of God himself.  God as pure act 
is eternal good in se or he would not be God.90  God’s goodness is not increased when God does 
good in creation.  Holmes, explaining the relation of God’s goodness in relation to God as actus 
purus, helpfully writes, that God is good ‘signifies an unceasingly active goodness.’91  In God, there is 
no potential for his essence – his goodness – to increase.  God as pure act means that God’s internal 
 
 89  Charnock, Works 2:283.  
 90  ‘As the notion of God includes goodness, so the notion of goodness includes diffusiveness; without 
goodness he would cease to be a deity, and without diffusiveness he would cease to be good.  Charnock, 
Works 2:288.  
 91  Holmes uses the verb are instead of is because his main text is Psalm 119:68 in which the Psalmist, 
directly addressing God, prays, ‘You are good, and do good.’  Charnock’s reflections are also motivated by 
Psalm 119:68:  ’Thus God is good by nature, and his nature is not without activity, he acts conveniently to his 
own nature: Ps. cxix. 68, “Thou art good, and dost good.”’  Charnock, Works 2:288. 
323 
 
and eternal goodness is not static but active by the very nature of God.  Therefore, God’s ad intra 
operations are ‘internal communications of himself from eternity.’92  God’s ‘goodness consists in the 
action by which God delights in and enjoys himself.’93  God’s internal communication and reception 
of his own goodness, by which God enjoys himself, is the foundation for the self-communicative 
nature of divine goodness in creation.   
 Thus, we need to ask ‘how does God enjoy himself and his own goodness?’94  God’s internal 
operations, as Charnock refers to them, are the relations of origin ‘whereby the three [divine 
persons] are distinguished and constituted, the very heart, as it were, of “pure act” language.’95  The 
divine relations of origin subsist within God’s essence, which is God’s being, which is also God’s 
goodness.  To speak of God’s essence or being or goodness is to speak of the same reality – God 
himself.  As subsisting in God’s one essence, goodness is common to the divine persons.96  We must 
proceed carefully here.  At first glance, speaking of God’s goodness relatively or relationally sounds 
like a conflation of essence and persons similar to the conflations at work in both Owen and 
Torrance.  However, goodness, unlike will, is a transcendental.  A transcendental is something that 
‘denotes a characteristic found in all things throughout as well as beyond the Aristotelian 
categories.’97  Goodness, then, ‘according to that which pertains to relation, is predicated of God in 
the plural, as that which pertains to substance is predicated in the singular.’98  We can say, therefore, 
 
 92  Charnock, Works 2:288.  
 93  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 33.  
 94  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 33.  
 95  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 33.  As seen throughout, the relations of origins are the Father as 
fountain of the Trinity and the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit – the Son’s eternal generation from 
the Father and the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father and the Son.    
 96  Aquinas, ST I, q. 45, a. 6.  See also, Holmes, The Lord is Good, 33.    
 97  Joseph Owen, An Elementary Christian Metayphysics (1963; repr., Houston, TX: Centre for 
Thomistic Studies, 2013), 111.  Just as the analogia entis is not a chain of being, neither are the 
transcendentals.  The claim that being and goodness are convertible is meant to help our creaturely 
understanding of God’s simplicity, not to place God and creatures on a continuum.  Creatures have goodness 
and being only through participating in God’s likeness.  Thus we are good like God but not as God is good.  
Furthermore, the use of transcendentals have a place in Protestant theology as well as Roman Catholic.  See, 
Holmes, The Lord is Good, 66-68; Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and 
Metaphysics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 304; and Mascall, Existence and Analogy, 98-
100. 
 98  Aquinas, ST I, q. 39, a. 3, ad. 3.    
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that the Father is good, the Son is good, and the Holy Spirit is good, as long as we understand that 
this is not to say there are three different goods in God.  Rather, goodness is predicated of each of 
the persons because they subsist within one essence which is good.  Goodness, therefore, is 
predicated both of God’s essence and of the divine persons.  Each person is good, but only because 
the one divine essence is common to the three.99  
 This distinction is crucial as we consider God’s works ad extra.  The external acts of the three 
divine persons ‘express how each has the pure act of being common to them in a unique away.’100  
This ‘unique way’ is an appropriation of what is common to one of the particular divine persons 
following the pattern of Holy Scripture.101  Most strictly speaking, economic goodness is 
appropriated to the Holy Spirit, yet because all of God’s works ad extra are works of the undivided 
Trinity, the communication of God’s goodness remains the foundation by which we understand the 
theological movement from God in se to God for us.  Divine goodness is common to the divine 
processions so that when the temporal processions and missions occur within God’s redemptive 
economy, God does good.  God’s external good acts are his divine missions.  Therefore, we can say 
that the divine goodness that communicates itself ad intra in the relations of origin, God’s ‘internal 
communications of himself from eternity’ disperses itself ad extra ‘like a full vessel running over’ in 
the creation of the world.’102  If there is already a communication of God’s goodness before creation 
in God in se, then the foundation for the communication of contingent goodness is the same as 
God’s eternal goodness.  If this is the case, then at humanity’s fall, God’s goodness remains 
communicative and God’s internal communications of his own goodness are the foundation, not 
only of creation, but also of redemption.  God ad intra is always the foundation for God ad extra.  
 
 99  Emery, ‘Essentialism or Personalism,’532-536. 
 100  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 33.  
 101  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 33.  For a review of this Scriptural pattern see, Holmes, The Lord is 
Good, 33-34.  
 102  Charnock, Works 2:288.  
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  If the divine processions pattern and fund the divine missions, then there is no need for 
Owen’s pactum salutis or Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s election.  God does not have to ‘self-
determine’ or covenant within his own inner life to communicate himself to creation.103  Rather, 
God’s nature is to communicate because he is good and he does good.  The foundation of God’s 
redemptive mission by which he sends his only begotten Son because of his love for the world, is the 
goodness that God himself internally and eternally is.  To shift the foundation of the divine mission 
of God the Son to the pactum salutis or to Christ’s own election places this divine mission on the 
contingent foundation of soteriology.  Such a foundation is not enormously promising, precisely 
because salvation is a contingent and free act of God.  To lay the foundation in redemptive history 
risks positing a God who is dependent upon his creation in the case of Torrance and a God who is 
passible and reactionary for Owen.   
 
God’s Goodness and Christ the Mediator  
 
 When the Son who is eternally good and is begotten of the Father comes in the fullness of 
time (Gal 4:4), he comes to communicate this same goodness, albeit now in a redemptive way.  It is 
the goodness and love of God (John 3:16) that undergrids the Son’s mission as mediator.  A high 
view of Christ’s saving work is vital for Christian theology.  However, we must not let soteriology 
 
 103  This is not to deny that covenant is at the heart of Scripture.  However, it seems best to use 
covenant to speak of God’s ‘voluntary condescension’ that occurs as God reveals himself ad extra.  I do not 
find it helpful to use covenant as a way to describe God’s inner life.  Also, this is not to deny that Christ is 
predestined for his mission.  It is simply to argue, building upon Aquinas’s understanding, that it is God’s will by 
which Christ is predestined and sent – a will that seeks the good which is God.  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 24.  I 
develop my understanding of Christ’s predestination in the concluding section below though this is a point that 
needs to be developed much more fully by Protestant theologians working within the broadly Augustinian and 
Thomistic tradition.     
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‘eclipse the goodness of God.’104  Christ is ‘not a mediator but by the constitution of divine 
goodness.’105 Charnock ties the argument of this chapter together: 
“God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.”  The love of God to the 
world was first in intention and the order of nature, before the will of giving his Son to 
the world.  His intention of saving was before the mission of a Saviour, so that his 
affection rose not from the merit of Christ, but the merit of Christ was directed by this 
affection.  It was the effect of it, not the cause…It is true Christ gave himself, but by 
the order of divine goodness…though he was big with affection for the 
accomplishment, yet he came “not to do his own will,” but the will of divine 
goodness.106 
God’s goodness is inherently loving. In willing the good, God is loving both in creation and 
redemption.   
 A robust retrieval of God’s goodness greatly helps avoid the conflation found in both Owen 
and Torrance.  Goodness allows us to consistently understand God in se as the foundation of 
redemption without understanding God’s immanent nature through the lens of soteriology.  How 
so?  Goodness itself, because it is God’s nature, is the foundation for both creation and redemption, 
though God’s goodness does not conflate the two.  Rather, ‘Goodness is the spring of redemption’ 
and creation.107  Redemption, like creation, is free and needs no other foundation than God himself.  
If God is good, and his goodness is diffusive, then there is no need for either the pactum salutis or 
the Christ’s election.  Rather, goodness communicates itself to the world precisely because creatures 
participate in God’s likeness as they are made in God’s image.  God is perfect in such a way that 
what he creates is like him.  In creation, then, there is already a foundation for this communication 
of God’s goodness.   This foundation does not change in redemption.  What does change in 
redemption is that God’s goodness is now communicated as grace that turns fallen creatures back to 
 
 104  Charnock, Works 2:323.  Charnock’s full (and helpful quote) reads: ‘The first resolution to redeem, 
and the means appointed for redemption, could have no other inducement but divine goodness.  We cannot 
too highly value the merit of Christ; but we must not draw a value to eclipse the goodness of God.  Though we 
owe our redemption and the fruits of it to the death of Christ, yet we owe not the first resolutions of 
redemption, and the assumption of our nature, the means of redemption, to the merit of Christ.  Divine 
goodness only, without the association of any merit, not only of man, but of the Redeemer himself, begat the 
first purpose of our recovery.’    
 105  Charnock, Works 2:324.  
 106  Charnock, Works 2:323.  
 107  Charnock, Works 2:317.  
327 
 
God whom they desire.  In this sense, God’s goodness is inherently loving and ‘is rendered the sole 
cause of the redeeming death of the son.’108  Christ’s redemptive mission manifests God’s goodness 
in a way that exceeds even the original creation.109  Charnock writes: 
It must be only a miraculous goodness that induced him to expose the life of his Son to 
those difficulties in the world, and death upon the cross, for the freedom of sordid 
rebels.  His great end was to give us a demonstration of the liberality of his nature, as 
might be attractive to his creature, remove its shakings and tremblings, and encourage 
its approaches to him.  It is in this he would not only manifest his love, but assume the 
name of love.  By this name the Holy Ghost calls him in relation to this good will 
manifested in this Son: 1 John iv. 8, 9, ‘God is love.  In this is manifested the love of 
God towards us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we 
might live through him.’…he is goodness in regard of the grandeur of his affection in 
the mission of his Son; and therefore he would be known by the name of love now in 
the days of the gospel.110 
The mission of the Son is rooted firmly in the goodness that God himself is.  Here we see how God in 
se, both God’s one essence and the three divine persons, informs our understanding of God’s 
redemptive economy.   
    
The priority of goodness over love?   
 
 All this talk of God’s goodness raises an important question:  why the priority of God’s 
goodness over God’s love?  Charnock begins to answer this question with his distinction between 
mercy and love – they are not synonymous.  Following Thomas, however, Charnock understands the 
communication of God’s goodness to flow throughout creation and providence.  Importantly, this 
shows that in speaking of God’s goodness, we are not prioritizing goodness over God’s love.  God’s 
goodness is inherently loving in that God freely creates and providentially cares for his creation and 
creatures.  As a result, God’s goodness is more basic than God’s love.  The foundation of creational 
love and redemptive love, or grace, is God’s goodness.  Love is the first movement of God’s will.111  
 
 108  Charnock, Works 2:318.  
 109  Charnock, Works 2:319.  
 110  Charnock, Works 2:318.  
 111  Aquinas, ST I, q. 30, a. 1, co.    
328 
 
Therefore, God’s goodness is inherently loving because the acts of God’s will tend toward good.  God 
loves ‘just because God can and must delight in the goodness that God is.’112  God loves creatures in 
that he wills their good because everything that exists is good to some degree through participating 
in God’s own goodness.  God’s creation and creatures are good, even after the fall, and, hence, 
God’s loves them both because they participate, even in a postlapsarian state, in God’s goodness.113  
Thus, God loves creatures as the cause of their existence.114  This love remains in a general way even 
after humanity’s fall into sin because of the similitude established by God in the first creation.   God’s 
love is the cause of goodness in creatures.115 
  Yet, God’s love and goodness is shown as mercy and grace to those God redeems.  This does 
not contradict God’s general love, because God’s love is given freely to creatures and is not 
communicated to all equally.116  Therefore, the communication of goodness that remains at work 
within creation is not salvific universally for all.  All creatures participate in God’s goodness by their 
creation and existence, but not all participate in the goodness of Christ’s sonship that he 
communicates to God’s elect.117  In the fallen world, there is still a priority of grace regarding the 
salvation of God’s elect, because God’s goodness is not communicated equally to all.  Furthermore, 
the communication of redemptive goodness is free and contingent.  It is a communication that God 
initiates.   Both Augustine and Aquinas articulate goodness along such lines, and they maintain that 
God predestines those to whom he will communicate his goodness in this redemptive way.  
Goodness is the foundation of love, but it is a love that is also free and uncoerced.  If there is a 
priority of God’s goodness over love, it is only a priority in the order of knowing as creatures.  ‘The 
 
 112  Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 85.  
 113  This is not to argue for a universal understanding of salvation.  Rather, because God’s love is free, 
it is not given to all in the same way or to the same degree.    
 114  Davies, Aquinas’s Summa, 85.  
 115  Aquinas, ST I, q. 20, a. 3, co.   
 116  Aquinas, ST I, q. 20, a. 3.    
 117  Aquinas, ST III, q. 3, a. 8.    
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love of God infuses and creates goodness in things.’118  In God, goodness and love simply are God. 119  
The Father sends the Son as the mediator because of his great love for the world that longs to know 
the fullness of his own goodness.    
 Therefore, to draw this conclusion and this thesis to a close, I return to where this chapter 
began – God’s name, whereby he makes himself known as the great ‘I Am’ to Moses.  Earlier, we 
considered Ex 3:14 and how God’s name helps us to speak of God both in se and for us without 
conflating the two.  Later in the Exodus narrative, God once again reassures Moses by revealing his 
name.  This time, though, God’s name is not ‘I Am’ but ‘YHWH’, God’s covenantal name, by which 
God says that he is God for us.  In Ex 33, after leading Israel out of Egypt, Moses asks God to promise 
to be with him as he is now tasked to lead the people of Israel into the promised land of Canaan.  
God promises Moses that he will be with his people.  Then in Ex 33:17 we read, ‘And YHWH said to 
Moses, “I will do this very thing that you have asked because you have found favour in my sight, and 
I know you by name.  Then he asked, Please show me your glory.”  God said, “I will make all of my 
goodness to pass before you and I will proclaim my name, YHWH, to you and I will be gracious to 
whom I will be gracious and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy.’  Notice that the ‘I Am’ is 
also the ‘I Will’.  There is an intentional parallel here – one already developed by Augustine – that 
distinguishes God in se (I Am) and God for us (I will).120  The God who is good, makes his goodness 
known.  Foreshadowing the mission of the Son, God’s goodness now is called grace and mercy.  
Thomas Joseph White beautifully and helpfully explains Ex 33-34:  
In Exod. 33–34, the mystery of God’s covenant with Israel is being reconstituted from 
the beginning, with all of its essential elements. However, God is also making manifest 
something new in light of the sin of Israel: God is mercy, and that mercy is at the heart 
of the covenant. The framing of the revelation here is significant: “I will be gracious to 
whom I will be gracious” is an echo of “I am who I am” (3:14). In one sense this 
compounds the apophatic meaning of the divine name given in 3:14 so that, in 
essence, God is saying, “I will be who I will be and I am free to show grace and mercy 
to those who I choose.” God is not determined by human failures or successes; God 
 
 118  Aquinas, ST I, q. 20, a. 2, co.     
 119  On the understanding of creational and redemptive goodness, see, Holmes, The Lord is Good, 99-
101.  
 120  See, Augustine, De Trinitate, V.    
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remains transcendent, free…In God’s transcendent freedom, God reveals himself to be 
gracious and merciful. After all, God tells Moses that he will show him his “goodness” 
(33:19). It is precisely because God in his transcendent aseity has no dependence upon 
any creaturely being that he alone who gives existence to all things can continue to 
provide for creatures even in the face of their resistance to his grace and goodness, 
without any diminishment of his ineffable actuality of being. He who is eternally is he 
who is able to show mercy eternally. God alone can give without ever being 
diminished and without adding in the slightest way to his infinite glory.121  
However, Moses is not allowed to see the fullness of God’s goodness.  God hides Moses in the cleft 
of the rock and allows him to see only his back.  Moses then points us forward to the Mediator, the 
Son who comes in the fullness of time.  In Christ, God’s redemptive goodness is on full display.  And 
this important text, rooting us in God’s name ad intra and ad extra, helps us speak of the Son’s 
mediating mission without conflation.  Just as in Ex 3:14, understanding God in se and God for us is 
rooted in Scripture.  The one who is being itself burns without consuming the bush, but this one is 
also the Lord.  Likewise, the free and transcendent goodness of God passes by Moses as he hides in 
the rock, but here, too, this one who passes by is YHWH, God for us.   
 God is for us because of his inner divine life, which is good.  Redemption, just as creation, is 
free.  God’s perfect goodness does not increase as he sends his Son to redeem his people nor would 
it decrease if he did not.  Thankfully, however, God’s goodness is one that communicates, reveals, 
itself.  God’s climatic, redemptive, self-communication is, of course, his Son.  And while it is true that 
God the Son is predestined, the foundation for his mission is rooted in God’s own inner life that is 
convertible with his goodness.122  While Owen and Torrance do not develop the Son’s mission along 
these lines, the Augustinian tradition, running through Aquinas (and throughout this conclusion) 
does.  We have repeatedly seen that it is fitting for God to communicate his goodness as this is the 
essence of goodness.  The incarnate Christ is the highest good.123  As the greatest good, Christ 
 
 121  Thomas Joseph White, Exodus, Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible, ed. Reno (Grand 
Rapids, MI:  Brazos Press, 2016), 279-280.  
 122  Aquinas, ST III, q. 24.  Holmes writes, ‘The origin of the incarnation as an effect lies in the depths of 
God’s being.’  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 149. 
 123  Aquinas, ST III, q. 1, a. 1, co.   
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communicates his goodness in the greatest possible way, which is by uniting a human nature to 
himself in his one person.124  The Son ‘cannot cease to be the goodness he has always been.’125 
 ‘The mystery of God’s will’ (Eph 1:9), is that the good that God is, which is inherently 
communicative, is made known in and through the Son’s earthly mission.  Therefore, to put forth 
God’s communicative goodness – that is God ad intra – as the foundation for the Son’s mission is not 
to deny that the Son himself is predestined.  If this is were not so, then something external to God 
would be the cause of the Son’s mission, and God would have new ideas.126  The mystery of God’s 
will – expressed in the mission of God the Son – is free and contingent yet predestined from eternity 
in that one and simple act in which God wills all things.127  Aquinas writes, ‘Now, just as Christ is 
before all others as the natural Son of God in a unique way so in a unique way is he predestined.’128  
It is by God’s will that Christ is predestined and sent:  the divine will that always seeks the good 
which God himself is.  Understanding Christ’s predestination in this way makes clear that God is not 
reacting to human sinfulness – a reaction that shifts theology to a shaky foundation.  Rather, ‘the 
cause of divine predestination is not necessary on the part of God, nor is it due on the part of those 
predestined, but, rather, it is according to the purpose of his will.’129  And, while Christ’s 
predestination is one which unites adopted sons and daughters to God’s natural Son by grace, the 
Son’s predestination is firstly ordered ‘to the diffusion of the divine goodness through the personal 
 
 124  Aquinas, ST III, q. 1, a. 1, co.  Aquinas here quotes Augustine, De Trinitate 13.    
 125  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 150.  
 126  Aquinas, ST III, q. 24, co.   
 127  Aquinas, ST III, q. 24, co.   
 128  Aquinas, ST III, q. 24, co.       
 129  Aquinas, In Epist. Eph, cap. 1, lec. 1, no. 11. Aquinas goes on in his commentary on Ephesians 1 to 
say that predestination involves both an efficient cause, which is God’s will, and a final cause which is 
knowledge of God’s goodness.  Aquinas, In Epist. Eph, cap. 1, lect., no. 11.  Though Aquinas is here speaking of 
the elect’s predestination, this surely applies to Christ’s predestination as well.  Furthermore, Christ’s 
predestination can be understood in two ways.  Firstly, and primarily, Christ’s predestination is the one eternal 
act of God’s will.  The cause, then, of both Christ’s predestination and the elect’s is only God’s will.  Secondly, 
however, Christ is the exemplar of the elect’s predestination in that God’s elect participate by the grace of 
adoption in the Son’s natural sonship – a participated likeness.  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 24, a. 3, co and Aquinas 
ST III, q. 24, a. 4.    
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union of the two natures’ in Christ’s one person ‘from which the redemptive effects of eternal 
predestination are realized in time.’130   
 Christ’s predestination, then, serves as a type of bridge between God in se and God for us, 
but understood in terms of God’s good will, the hypostatic union ‘is the realization of the diffusive 
nature of the divine goodness.’131  Such a construction understands the foundation of Christ’s 
predestination as the goodness of the divine essence and not something in the creature.132  Christ’s 
predestination is ‘a consequence of the hypostatic union’ and speaks of the Son’s relation to the 
Father before it speaks about creation and humanity.133  Theology proper, the divine processions, 
and the hypostatic union are all theologically related. The temporal mission of the Son allows us to 
speak of the temporal effects of predestination, which are always the gift of grace, but the 
antecedent and eternal foundation of such temporal effects – God in se – remains in place.134  
Understanding Christ’s predestination as the mystery of God’s good will allows us to articulate God 
in se and God for us in a way that avoids conflating God’s inner life with his economy.  The Son is 
predestined to communicate the goodness that God is to fallen creatures.135      
 It is important to remember, at this point, that the Son’s eternal goodness is the goodness 
that is common to all three divine persons.  Furthermore, the foundation of the Son’s mission is his 
divine procession, his generation from the Father.  Just as God’s goodness is not increased by 
anything outside himself, the Son’s incarnation neither introduces change into God nor makes the 
 
 130  Roger W. Nutt, ‘Divine Goodness, Predestination, and the Hypostatic Union: St. Thomas on the 
Temporal Realization of the Father’s Eternal Plan in the Incarnate Son,’ New Blackfriars 99, no. 1079 (January 
2018), 86.  
 131  Nutt, ‘Divine Goodness,’ 92.  
 132  Nutt, ‘Divine Goodness,’ 93.  
 133  Nutt, ‘Divine Goodness,’ 93.  
 134  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 24, a. 1 and a. 2.  See also, Nutt, ‘Divine goodness,’ 93.  For Aquinas, Christ 
is predestined only according to his human nature.  This relates to his understanding of Christ’s mediation as 
occurring only in and through his human nature due to his understanding of the perfection of the divine 
nature.  See, Aquinas, ST III, q. 26.  The Reformers, for the most part, understand Christ’s mediation to occur in 
both the divine and human natures.  Thus, the relation of Christ’s predestination to the divine nature is 
something that needs much further work by other Protestant and Reformed theologians.   
 135  There is much theological work to be done by Reformed theologians in regards to Christ’s 
predestination and the communicative nature of God’s goodness.   
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Son ‘more divine than he was before.’136  Holmes writes, ‘The Son – who is wholly good in 
relationship to the Father and their Spirit, who never diminishes in goodness, who never ceases to 
be good – assists us, rather, out of his supreme goodness.’137  This supreme goodness is nothing less 
than the goodness common to all three divine persons.  Nevertheless, the Son has goodness 
differently than the Father, because the Father is a se and the Son is begotten from the Father.  The 
divine processions must guide our construction, because without the rich theology of the divine 
processions – and the order of the Trinity that is not one of hierarchy but one of ordered equality – it 
is easy to think that the Son is sent because he is ontologically subordinate to the Father.138  The Son 
is predestined for his mission.  However, if we build our understanding of this predestined mission in 
light of God’s will that always tends toward the good, then we can understand the Son’s 
predestination as one truly rooted in the divine processions.  God’s eternal decree is expressive of 
God’s will which always tends toward that which is good.  Augustine writes, ‘The most brilliant light 
of predestination and grace is the Saviour himself, the mediator himself between God and human 
beings, the man Christ Jesus.’139  Owen and Torrance do not err in understanding the Son’s missions 
as somehow willed eternally by God.  Torrance and Owen are on to something deeply reformed and 
biblical.  Yet their soteriological reading of God’s divine life leads them both to shift the foundation 
of this predestined mission away from the plentitude of God’s inner life.   
 In the section above, I relate divine goodness to the processions and missions.  That 
foundation of goodness remains as the Son comes in his temporal mission.  The relation between 
the divine processions and Christ’s two natures is on display in Jesus’ high priestly prayer in John 17.  
In Jesus’ prayer, Aquinas writes, Jesus prays ‘to show that his Father is the author from which both 
his eternal procession according to the divine nature and of everything good that he has according 
 
 136  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 149.  
 137  Holmes, The Lord is Good, 149.  
 138  Holmes explains, ‘Without an account of the processions up and running it would be too easy to 
read Mark 10:18 as denoting a kind of ontological subordination of the Son to the Father.’  Holmes, The Lord is 
Good, 159.  
 139  Augustine, De Preadestinatione Sanctiorum, XV.    
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to the human nature.’140  Christ’s subordination and obedience to the Father is one carried out in 
Christ’s human nature which participates in the divine goodness.  In his divine nature, Christ does 
not participate in divine goodness, but simply is divine goodness. And because the Son of God is 
good, as the natural Son of God, he is able to communicate God’s redemptive goodness to all those 
who are God’s adopted sons and daughters.141    
 At work in this mission is the similitude that is often lacking in both Owen and Torrance.  The 
Father sends the Son as the eternal, divine person who takes on a human nature.  The result is not a 
mixing or confusion of Christ’s divine and human natures, but a personal union of his two natures.  
Thus the incarnate Christ is both similar to and distinct from his Father.142  Christ, who is the true 
image of God (Col 1:15), as the mediator, is able to communicate both the similarity and ever-
greater dissimilarity to creatures made in God’s image.  Again, Aquinas, quoting Rom 8:29, helpfully 
explains, ‘And therefore, just as the divine goodness is communicated to all creatures through the 
act of creation according to a certain likeness, thus the likeness of natural sonship is communicated 
to human beings by the work of adoption.’143  A retrieval of God’s goodness allows us to understand 
the Son’s mission in terms of God in se and God for us.  In this way, we construct an understanding 
of the Son’s mission that is rooted in God’s inner being and life.  Such an understanding allows the 
divine missions and processions to truly do their foundational work as the processions anchor the 





 140  Aquinas, ST III, q. 21, a. 3, co.      
 141  Aquinas, ST III, q. 20, a. 1, co.   
 142  See Holmes, The Lord is Good, 153-160 for the implications of the missions of the Son and Holy 
Spirit in relation to the Creator/creature distinction.    





 The cost of losing or narrowing God’s revelation is that God’s goodness is not allowed to do 
the theological work it is capable of doing.  This is because a theology of God’s goodness co-
extensive with the analogia entis understands that in the communication of God’s goodness, God 
creates creatures that are like him even while remaining ever-greater.144  The classical understanding 
of God’s goodness as belonging to God essentially as a transcendental predicate of being and ‘one of 
the primary attributes of God’s self-manifestation’ remains formally in Owen, though his focus is 
much more on God’s economic self-revelation.145  While Torrance does not develop God’s goodness 
in his works, he would surely agree that God is good, but this goodness is known only in Christ.146  
Indeed, the foundation of Christ’s mission is the goodness that God is.  However, without a robust 
doctrine of creation, without natural theology, there is no foundation from which God can either 
communicate or perfect his goodness.147  As a result, a new foundation is needed.  This leads Owen 
 
 144  Andrew Davison makes the connection between analogy and participation clear when he writes, 
‘The world is not a continuous extension of God, and anything we say by way of a similarity of the world to 
God must be grounded in a yet-greater dissimilarity. That is why analogy features so prominently in 
participatory theology: analogy is likeness in the face of yet-greater unlikeness, or against the backdrop of yet-
greater unlikeness. The language of likeness itself, since it is not the language of identity, already implies some 
degree of “unlikeness”.’  Andrew Davison, Participation in God, 147. 
 145  Davison, Participation in God, 147.  
 146  While Torrance does not develop God’s goodness in his works, my conclusion is warranted from 
the overall logic of his theology as evidenced in a sermon on the parable of the Good Shepherd.  After quoting 
the biblical text, ‘I am the Good Shepherd’, Torrance writes, ‘When we look into the face of Jesus Christ we see 
there the very face of God…There are many people who think they can know God behind the back of Jesus 
Christ, in nature, for example.’  Torrance understands the universe as a ‘theatre’ of God’s glory.  Yet, 
Torrance’s conflation of creation and redemption enters into his thought as says ‘there is a great deal in 
nature, of course, that does not point to the glory of God.  We cannot believe that God made evil and pain and 
cruelty; and nature is full of these, especially the nature of man.  But it is important to remember that nature is 
mute.’  Thomas F. Torrance, When Christ Come and Comes Again (1957; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 1996), 87-88.  The logic of Torrance’s thought is that the fall of humanity completely destroys the 
goodness of the original creation.  Therefore, the only notion of good at work in the world is redeeming grace.  
Torrance makes a similar move, citing Calvin for support, in Conflict and Agreement in the Church 2: ‘Union 
with this Christ cannot therefore be construed in terms of metaphysical or static relationship but in terms of 
dynamic movement. As Calvin puts it in the Institutes:—“This is the wondrous exchange made by His 
boundless goodness.”’  Torrance, Conflict and Agreement 2:145.   Torrance’s conflation of creation and 
redemption radicalizes Owen’s turn toward special revelation.  Theologically, if you lose the goodness of 
creation, you consequently lose the ability to concentrate on God’s goodness.  
 147  Though writing of Barth, Susannah Ticciati’s critique of Barth’s doctrine of creation – that he 
actually does not have a doctrine of creation, only a doctrine of new creation (all grace and no nature) surely 
applies to Torrance as well.  See, Ticciati, ‘How New Is New Creation?’, 89-114.  
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to his construction of the pactum salutis, and it leads Torrance to adopt Barth’s doctrine of election, 
though in a slightly more radical key.  Owen and Torrance wrestle with their inherited Reformed 
tradition.  The early Reformers constructed robust understandings of God’s goodness.  In Owen’s 
Reformed Orthodox era, God’s goodness ad intra and ad extra are affirmed, but the focus shifts 
subtly to soteriology.  There is much less concern for God’s essential goodness, his ‘absolute Being’ 
and ‘its transcendent properties than’ in ‘the character and egress of the divine willing.’148  Such a 
focus departs from Augustine, Aquinas, Zanchi, and Charnock and it turns toward God’s economic, 
even redemptive, goodness rather than ontological goodness.   
 Throughout this study, I have argued that God’s inner life must be the foundation of all 
things outside of God at all points of theological reflection and construction.  If the foundation shifts, 
our system risks collapse.  Avoiding such conflation begins with a proper understanding of De Deo 
Uno – God’s one essence – and De De Trinitias – the three divine persons and their relations of 
origin.  We have seen that when a robust theology of divine processions is lost, in Torrance, a 
conflation of being and persons occurs that carries over into our understanding of Christ’s two 
natures.  Once we depart from Chalcedon, it is only a few small steps to conclude that Christ’s divine 
nature – God himself – dies on the cross; a most radical conflation of God in se and God for us.149  
Understanding God’s goodness helps us to avoid such conflation.  The economy of redemption – at 
every point – is funded by God’s essence.  God does good, because God is good.  
 This thesis advances our understanding of the relation of God ad intra and God ad extra by 
highlighting conflations at work in both Owen and Torrance due to their prioritizing of soteriology.  I 
have made critiques throughout this study, but there are several major points that deserve future 
 
 148  Muller, PRRD 3:506.  
 149  Recall that the conflation at work in Torrance leads him to favourably cite Moltmann in Christian 
Doctrine of God, 54, 247, 248, 252.  See also Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the 
Foundation and Criticism of Theology, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1993), especially chapter 6.  Moltman’s subtitle is quite revealing.  See also Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and 
the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993).  Recall that 
Moltmann also contributed a chapter to Torrance’s festschrift on the relation of creation and redemption, see 
Moltmann, ‘Creation and Redemption,’ 119-134. 
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constructive work and mention here.  It is true that the first generation of Reformers did not think 
the doctrine of God needed reforming.  However, as the Reformed tradition developed this priority 
of soteriology had implications for theology proper.  God’s goodness is communicative precisely 
because of quid sit Deus.  Therefore, any theology that leaves behind God’s goodness and its 
communicative characteristic posits a different understanding of God’s nature.  If God reveals 
himself only through disruptive grace, then our understanding of what God is changes.  Therefore, 
while I am largely sympathetic for retrieving classical theism, constructive retrieval must do more 
than simply ‘return to the sources.’  Retrieval theology builds upon the past, while also recognizing 
nuances and inconsistencies so that we can more clearly articulate the ‘faith once for all delivered to 
the saints’ (Jude 3).  If the call of retrieval leads us back to the sources, those very sources lead us 
forward in our present theological work.   Furthermore, this study calls for further theological 
relfection on Christ’s predestination understood as the unfolding of God’s eternal plan for 
redemption within the ‘ratio of divine goodness.’150  A theology of Christ’s mediation as the 
communication of God’s goodness deserves much careful thought going forward.151  Lastly, there is a 
great need for a Protestant and Reformed natural theology that seriously engages the concerns 
raised in this conclusion; one that surpasses a simple understanding of image-bearers built upon 
generic appeals to general revelation.  There is rightly much appeal to the image, but often it is built 
upon a theology proper that should deny the image of God in creatures outside of Christ.  
Development of these points will allow us to affirm and maintain many of the concerns found in 
 
 150  Nutt, ‘Divine goodness,’ 96.  Nutt’s suggests helpful ways forward:  ‘Thomas’ doctrine of the 
predestination of Christ provides light and clarity to his general treatment, especially concerning how the 
eternal reality of predestination unfolds in time and how the incarnation realizes the divine plan under the 
ratio of the goodness of God.  Thomas accomplishes an elusive theological task with his doctrine of the 
predestination of Christ:  namely, the articulation of the unfolding of the divine plan in time under the ratio of 
the divine goodness, while openly affirming the created means used to confer the temporal effects of the 
divine plan, without ever abandoning a gratuitous and God-centered account of predestination.’  Nutt, ‘Divine 
goodness,’ 96.  Charnock’s articulation of the covenant of redemption, which takes God’s simplicity much 
more seriously than Owen, is also worth consideration for ways forward in understanding Christ’s 
predestination.  See Charnock, Works 5:543-544. 
 151  Constructive work on Christ’s predestination is one that needs to drink deeply from the past, but 
overcomes the problems of both Owen’ and Torrance’s understandings that continue to haunt Protestant 
more broadly, and Reformed theology in particular, today. In this way, we go back in order to go forward.    
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both Owen and Torrance while avoiding the conflations at work in their theological systems.  Such a 
theological understanding is one that understands ‘for from him and through him and to him are all 
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